Facts:

The appellants filed a civil suit seeking various declarations related to certain properties.

The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed the decision and decreed the suit in favor of the appellants.

The respondents filed a second appeal before the High Court, which admitted the appeal and framed six substantial questions of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court adhered to the procedural requirements for deciding second appeals.

Whether the High Court's decision was based on the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed jurisdictional errors in its decision-making process. Firstly, the High Court failed to answer the six substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal. Secondly, the High Court framed additional questions in its judgment, which were not raised at the time of admission or during the hearing.

These procedural irregularities caused prejudice to the parties, especially the appellants, who were deprived of an opportunity to address the court on the additional questions raised in the judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the case to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

The High Court was directed to decide the appeal in accordance with the law and without being influenced by any observations made by the Supreme Court. Given the age of the appeal, the Supreme Court instructed the High Court to expedite the decision-making process.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the sale of immovable property conducted in execution of a decree. Defendant no. 2, the wife of defendant no. 1, contested the sale, alleging that defendant no. 1 could not have sold the property to the plaintiff due to a charge she had obtained on the property in a maintenance suit. The plaintiff filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the CPC, seeking to set aside the sale, which was subsequently dismissed. The plaintiff then filed a fresh suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the plaintiff's application under Order XXI Rule 90 operates as a bar to the filing of a fresh suit challenging the sale.

Whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to the sale of the property in question.

Whether the plaintiff qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the pending suit.

Held:

The dismissal of the plaintiff's application under Order XXI Rule 90 operates as a bar to the filing of a fresh suit challenging the sale. The confirmation of the sale and the finality of previous orders preclude the plaintiff from seeking relief through a new lawsuit.

The doctrine of lis pendens applies to the case, as the suit filed by defendant no. 2 was pending at the time of the property's sale. Therefore, the sale is subject to the outcome of the pending suit.

The plaintiff does not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the pending suit. Their awareness of the litigation and failure to challenge the auction sale on legal grounds undermine their claim.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of forgery and fraudulent attempt to transfer property by executing a mortgage deed. The complainant alleged that the accused, with the aid of an imposter, created a Power of Attorney (PoA) in his name by impersonating the complainant's deceased mother, Mrs. Doris Victor. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 465 IPC, but the High Court acquitted them, finding the requirements under Section 464 IPC were not satisfied.

Issues:

Whether the ingredients under Section 463 IPC were satisfied to sustain a conviction under Section 465 IPC?

Whether the accused could be held liable for forgery under Section 464 IPC?

Whether the prosecution adequately proved the charges against the accused?

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming the acquittal of the accused. The Court emphasized that a person can only be convicted under Section 465 IPC if the ingredients under Section 463 IPC are satisfied, including those under Section 464 IPC. It was stressed that forgery requires the making of a false document, and only the person who makes it can be held liable.

The Court found deficiencies in the investigation, which contributed to the acquittal of the accused. The prosecution failed to prove the offence of forgery, and the appellant's contentions were contrary to the provisions and settled law. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved charges under Section 302 (murder) and Section 324 (voluntarily causing hurt) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The prosecution alleged that Kumar, the appellant, assaulted the deceased, Sakthivel, resulting in his death.

The incident occurred during a village festival, where a scuffle ensued between the accused and the deceased. The prosecution's case primarily relied on witness testimonies and circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

The credibility of witness testimonies, the motive behind the crime, and the quality of the investigation conducted by the authorities.

The defense argued that the prosecution's case was fabricated and highlighted inconsistencies in the evidence presented.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after analyzing the evidence and arguments presented, found significant flaws in the prosecution's case. They observed discrepancies in witness testimonies and criticized the investigative authorities for their mishandling of the case.

The Court highlighted the failure of the prosecution to explain crucial aspects, such as the injuries sustained by the accused and the motive behind the crime. As a result, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower courts, acquitting the accused of all charges.

The Court emphasized that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the benefit of the doubt should go to the accused. Therefore, the appellant was ordered to be released from custody immediately.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 3 and Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, particularly focusing on the definition of "transaction value" and its relation to the charging provisions of the Act. The Court considered the amendments brought about by the Amendment Act, 2000, which introduced changes in the levy and valuation of excisable goods. The judgment also referred to previous decisions, including the Acer India Ltd. case and the Bombay Tyre International Ltd. case.

Issues:

Whether the definition of "transaction value" in Section 4(3)(d) is subject to Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944?

Do Sections 3 and 4 of the Act operate in different fields?

Does the concept of "transaction value" depart significantly from the previous concept of "normal price"?

Held:

The Court clarified that the observation made in the Acer India Ltd. case regarding the subservience of Section 4(3)(d) to Section 3 should be understood in a limited context, where the addition of the value of a non-dutiable item was sought to be made to the value of a dutiable item for determining the transaction value of the composite item. This observation does not conflict with the decision in the Bombay Tyre International Ltd. case.

The Court held that while Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are interlinked, they operate in different fields. The measure of the levy under Section 4 is not controlled by the nature of the levy. Both sections would operate in their respective fields as long as a reasonable nexus is discernible between the measure and the nature of the levy. The decision in the Bombay Tyre International Ltd. case provides the correct exposition of the law in this regard.

The Court determined that the concept of "transaction value" under Section 4(3)(d) incorporates additions to the manufacturing cost and profit, similar to what was held permissible in the Bombay Tyre International Ltd. case. The introduction of the concept of Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT) in the amendment to Section 3 reflects a fundamental change in the charging of tax, and this change is reflected in the definition of "transaction value." There is no discernible difference between the statutory concept of "transaction value" and the judicially evolved meaning of "normal price."

Decision: The Court held that the amendments to Section 3 and the definition of "transaction value" in Section 4(3)(d) reflect a shift towards the concept of value-added taxation. Both sections operate independently within their respective fields, with a reasonable nexus between the levy and the measure of duty.

Facts:

The Jharkhand Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the `2004 Rules') were framed in exercise of powers conferred by Article 234 read with Article 309 of the Constitution of India.

Rule 21(b) of the 2004 Rules stipulated that the successful passing of an examination conducted by the Judicial Academy was the sole condition precedent for confirmation of Civil Judges (Junior Division).

The appellants, who were recruited under the 2004 Rules, were denied confirmation despite clearing the Judicial Academy examination, as they did not clear the Hindi examination conducted by the Revenue Department.

The dispute arose regarding the interpretation of the Rules in relation to the mandatory requirement of passing the Hindi examination for confirmation.

Issues:

Whether passing a Hindi examination conducted by the Revenue Department was a mandatory condition for confirmation under the Jharkhand Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules, 2004.

Held:

The Court held that the 1963 Bihar Rules, which mandated the Hindi examination, could not be read into the 2004 Rules, as the latter specifically repealed all earlier rules, including the 2001 Rules which made reference to the Bihar Rules.

The 2004 Rules clearly stated that the successful passing of the Judicial Academy examination was the sole condition precedent for confirmation.

Therefore, the Court ruled that passing the Hindi examination conducted by the Revenue Department was not mandatory under the 2004 Rules.

The Court directed the respondents to ensure that the appellants received the benefits owed to them, including coverage under the old pension scheme.

The appeal was allowed, and the parties were left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding compensation under the Railways Act, 1989, arising from a railway accident. Various legal questions concerning the quantum of compensation, the definition of "untoward incident," burden of proof regarding passengers, and the rate of interest were raised.

Issues:

The determination of the quantum of compensation concerning the date of accrual, interest, and the higher of calculated amounts.

Clarification regarding the concept of 'self-inflicted injury' under the Railways Act, particularly concerning negligence and liability.

Establishing the burden of proof when a body is found on railway premises to determine the status of the deceased as a bona fide passenger.

Determination of the rate of interest applicable to railway accident compensation claims.

Held:

Regarding the quantum of compensation, the liability accrues from the date of the accident, and the applicable amount as on that date is recoverable. Interest is payable from the date of the accident until payment at a reasonable rate, with the claimant entitled to the higher of calculated amounts.

The concept of 'self-inflicted injury' under the Railways Act requires intent to inflict harm, not mere negligence. Injuries or deaths during boarding or de-boarding a train constitute 'untoward incidents,' entitling victims to compensation.

When a body is found on railway premises, mere presence does not establish the deceased as a bona fide passenger. However, the absence of a ticket does not necessarily negate the claim of being a bona fide passenger. The burden of proof initially lies with the claimant, which can be discharged through relevant affidavits.

The rate of interest applicable to railway accident compensation claims should be reasonable and fair, similar to that in accident claim cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Interest can be awarded from the date of the accident until payment.

Decision: The Court upheld the principles outlined above, providing clarity on compensation, liability, burden of proof, and interest rates in railway accident claims under the Railways Act, 1989.

Facts:

Meenal Bhargava (appellant) and Naveen Sharma (respondent) were married and had a child, Pranav.

Disputes arose leading to Meenal leaving for India with Pranav, violating a Canadian court order granting custody to Naveen.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement mediated by the High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan, which included terms for Meenal to return to the USA with Pranav.

Both parties accused each other of breaching the settlement terms.

Naveen filed a contempt petition against Meenal for alleged non-compliance with the settlement terms.

Issues:

Whether Meenal breached the settlement agreement.

Whether the contempt proceedings were justified.

Custody of Pranav.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to adequately determine whether Meenal breached the settlement terms and focused excessively on her refusal to comply rather than addressing the underlying issues.

The Court emphasized the need to prioritize the welfare of Pranav and suggested reinstating the Habeas Corpus Petition to decide custody based on merit. The parties were urged to cooperate and consider a new beginning for the sake of their child's well-being.

Both the aforesaid appeals are allowed.

Facts:

A vacancy arose in the Bhandara-Gondiya parliamentary constituency due to the resignation of the incumbent Member of Parliament.

The petitioner approached the High Court, contending that holding a bye-election before the next general election would be impractical and costly.

The High Court dismissed the petitioner's plea, upholding the interpretation of Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of Section 151A of the Act apply to the situation at hand, where a vacancy occurred in a parliamentary constituency.

Whether holding a bye-election before the next general election is justified under the circumstances.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, apply to the case in question. The Court interpreted the statute to mandate holding a bye-election within six months of a vacancy occurring, subject to certain conditions. In this case, since the remainder of the term exceeded one year, the proviso to Section 151A did not apply, and holding a bye-election was deemed justifiable. The concerns raised about the financial burden and practicality of holding a bye-election were deemed insufficient grounds to override the statutory mandate.

Therefore, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court. There was no order regarding costs.