Facts:

The case involves allegations of irregularities in the procurement of ration, leading to an investigation. A prima facie case was found against 12 Army personnel, including the respondent. A hearing of the charge under rule 22 was convened, where the Commanding Officer found no prima facie case against the respondent. The respondent retired, but proceedings were continued against him invoking Section 123 of the Army Act. The General Court Martial was convened, and the respondent challenged the validity of the order through an Original Application (O.A.) under Sections 14 and 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal to entertain an appeal against the order convening the General Court Martial.

Interpretation of Sections 14 and 15 regarding the scope of "service matters" under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

Held:

The Tribunal held that an appeal under Section 15 was not maintainable as there was no order, decision, finding, or sentence by the Court Martial. However, Section 14 allows an application in any service matter, and "service matters" include conditions of service, which encompasses dismissal from service. The Tribunal emphasized a wide construction of Section 14, affirming its jurisdiction over service matters of Army personnel.

The words "relating to" in the definition of "service matters" in Section 3(o) should be interpreted broadly. The proceedings against the respondent, leading to a potential termination of service, were deemed related to his service. The Tribunal highlighted that an interpretation conferring jurisdiction should be preferred over one taking away jurisdiction.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant-Inspector demanded a bribe for providing electricity connection to a shed. A trap was laid, and currency notes were chemically treated. The raiding party, along with witnesses, proceeded to the DESU office. The appellant, upon receiving the bribe, was caught, and the tainted money was recovered from his pocket.

Issues:

The appellant challenged his conviction, citing major contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.

Held:

The deviations between the testimonies of PW2 and PW-3 do not negate the demand, payment of bribe, or the seizure of the bribe. Minor discrepancies in the details of handwash or pant wash are insufficient to justify acquittal. Para No.: 8, 9, 10, 11

The reason for the demand and payment of the bribe was established despite contradictions in the testimony of PW-6. The appellant's contention that the shed did not have an electricity connection was rejected. Para No.: 12

The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act is applicable as the conditions for drawing such a presumption were met. The appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation to rebut the presumption. Para No.: 13, 14

The validity of the sanction order was upheld. The sanctioning authority properly examined the material before granting sanction for prosecution. Para No.: 16, 17

Procedural lapses in the investigation, regarding the rank of the investigating officer, were considered irregularities. However, no prejudice was alleged or argued by the appellant. Para No.: 19

A mere error or irregularity in the sanction is not considered fatal unless it results in a failure of justice. Section 19(1) of the Act is procedural and does not affect the court's jurisdiction once cognizance has been taken. Para No.: 20, 21

FACTS:

Post the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections, no single party had the majority.

Efforts were made by the Governor to explore government formation, leading to President's Rule imposition.

Subsequent developments involved invitations to various parties to form the government, ultimately resulting in the swearing-in of Devendra Fadnavis as Chief Minister.

The Shiv Sena, NCP, and INC challenged the Governor's actions, claiming that the oath of office to Fadnavis was unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

The constitutional validity of the Governor's actions in inviting Fadnavis to form the government.

Whether a floor test should be conducted to determine the majority support for the Chief Minister.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the need to protect democratic values and ordered an immediate floor test to ascertain if the Chief Minister had majority support. Referring to precedents, the Court highlighted the importance of timely floor tests in such situations to prevent horse-trading and ensure a stable government.( Paragraphs 17-20)

The Court issued specific directions for the floor test, including the appointment of a Pro-tem Speaker, administering oaths to elected members, conducting the floor test without secret ballot, and live telecasting the proceedings.( Paragraph 26)

REFERRED CASES:

Anil Kumar Jha vs. Union of India, (2005) 3 SCC 150

Chandrakant Kavlekar vs. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 758

G. Parmeshwara vs. Union of India, (2018) 16 SCC 46

Jagdambika Pal vs. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 95

S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

Union of India vs. Sh. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC Online SC 442

Union of India vs. Shri Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC OnLine SC 618

Facts:

A group of individuals (Accused no. 1 to 16) armed with sticks and iron rods trespassed into a newspaper office, vandalized it, and set it on fire. Three employees lost their lives. Accused were charged under various sections, including IPC, Explosive Substances Act, and Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act. Appellant (Accused No.17), the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the time, faced charges under Sections 217 and 221.

Issues:

The appellant's alleged failure to prevent the crime, intentional disobedience of law, and allowing the accused to escape formed the crux of the case.

Held:

Bandobust Duty and Superior Officer (Para 24): Ex.-P82, the bandobust duty list, indicated that PW-30, the Additional Superintendent of Police, was the superior officer. The appellant, as Deputy Superintendent of Police, acted under PW-30's direction during the incident.

Immediate Police Action (Paras 25, 26): Evidence from PW-2 (News Editor) and PW-3 (COO) affirmed the appellant's prompt response to their calls for help. The appellant assured swift action, indicating diligence in his duties.

Disobedience and Intention (Paras 30, 31): No evidence suggested that the appellant disobeyed orders from PW-30, the officer in charge of the bandobust. Section 217 IPC requires intentional disobedience with the intention to save the accused, which was not established.

Conviction under Section 221 IPC (Para 33): For intentional omission to apprehend or aiding escape, the prosecution failed to show that the appellant intentionally avoided apprehending the accused on the spot.

Judicial View (Para 34): The trial court's plausible view that the ingredients of Sections 217 and 221 were not met should not have been substituted by the High Court. The appellant's conviction was not sustainable.

Facts:

The spouse of the appellant, a tenant, faced a suit for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997.

Issues:

Whether the spouse of a deceased original tenant is entitled to protection from eviction for non-residential premises beyond a period of five years from the date of the original tenant's death.

Held:

Discusses the interpretation of Section 2(g) and the differentiation between protection for residential and non-residential premises. Highlights the omission in the legislation regarding the spouse's entitlement under the second proviso.( Para 10)

Expresses agreement with the High Court's conclusion that legislative amendment is necessary to include the spouse in the protection granted to other heirs under the second proviso. Acknowledges the inadvertent omission and calls for attention from lawmakers.( Para 12)

Grants time to the appellant to vacate the premises until 30 June 2020 but upholds the eviction decree. Urges legislative consideration for the inclusion of the spouse in the protective provisions.( Para 13)

Facts:

The applicant, a contractor company, filed an application under Sections 11(12)(a) and 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator. The grounds cited included the alleged failure of the competent authority to appoint the sole arbitrator within the prescribed period and the necessity for an independent and impartial arbitrator.

Issues:

The maintainability of the application under Sections 11(12)(a) and 11(6) concerning the termination of the contract and the appointment of a sole arbitrator.

The validity of the appointment of the sole arbitrator and concerns about independence and impartiality.

Whether the arbitration qualifies as an International Commercial Arbitration.

Held:

The Court found the application maintainable given the facts of the case, considering it an International Commercial Arbitration. However, the delay in appointing the arbitrator was not of such magnitude to warrant the exercise of power under Section 11.

In cases where only one party has the right to appoint a sole arbitrator, the person with an interest in the outcome must not have the power to appoint. Justifiable doubts about independence and impartiality can warrant the court's appointment of an independent arbitrator.

Considering the circumstances, the application was deemed entertainable, and a retired Judge of the Supreme Court was appointed as the sole arbitrator.

Decision: The application was accepted, annulling the effect of the respondent's appointment of the arbitrator. In the exercise of power under Section 11(6) of the Act, Dr. Justice A.K. Sikri, a former Judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide all disputes arising from the agreement between the parties.

Facts:

The prosecution established harassment under Section 498-A, alleging dowry demand as the motive. The deceased was subjected to harassment to coerce her and her parents to meet an unlawful monetary demand.

Issues:

Whether the proved cruelty under Section 498-A, along with the suicide within seven years of marriage, warrants a conviction under Section 306 with the aid of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that the accused's actions directly led to the deceased's suicide.

Held:

The evidence of PW-10, the deceased's father, corroborated by PW-13, substantiates the harassment for an unlawful demand under Section 498-A.( Para 11)

Mere guilt under Section 498-A and death within seven years doesn't automatically lead to Section 306 conviction. The prosecution must establish a direct link between the accused's act and the suicide.( Para 27)

The prosecution failed to prove that the cruelty left the deceased with no choice but suicide. No evidence showed immediate cruelty prior to the suicide, and a two-month gap existed between the last visit and the suicide.( Paras 33-34)

Unlike previous cases, the charge didn't specify that the deceased was driven to suicide due to harassment. Conviction under Section 498-A is maintained, but the conviction under Section 306 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the Section 306 charge.( Paras 35-37)

Facts:

The case involves the prosecution of the Municipal Commissioner and Chief Officer of the City Municipal Council by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board for offenses under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Issues:

Whether City Municipal Councils can be considered a Department of the Government.

The liability of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers under the Water Act.

The interpretation of Sections 47, 48, and 49 of the Water Act.

Held:

The Water Act, 1974, enacted by Parliament, aims to prevent and control water pollution. It establishes Boards for these purposes and confers powers on them. (Para 7)

Section 48 of the Water Act is applicable when offenses are committed by any Department of Government. City Municipal Councils, created under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, are considered bodies corporate, distinct from government departments. (Paras 11, 15)

Municipal Councils, including City Municipal Councils, are created by State enactments and are controlled by the Government, receiving financial assistance. However, they are not considered Departments of the Government. (Para 14, 18)

The Scheme of the Water Act indicates separate representation for the Government, local authorities, and companies or corporations owned, controlled, or managed by the State Government. Municipalities, including City Municipal Councils, do not qualify as Departments of the Government. (Paras 15)

Article 243P of the Constitution defines "Municipality" as an institution of self-Government. City Municipal Councils cannot be treated as Departments of the State Government. They are entrusted with Municipal functions, including ensuring a clean environment and controlling pollution. (Paras 16, 18)

Section 47 of the Water Act pertains to offenses by companies, defining "company" broadly as "any body corporate." City Municipal Councils fall under this definition. (Paras 19, 20)

Section 47 can be applied to offenses by body corporates like City Municipal Councils. The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board's complaint under Section 49 for the prosecution of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers is deemed appropriate. (Paras 29, 31)

Facts:

The case revolves around an agreement to sell a disputed property in 1986 between the original vendor and original vendees. Subsequently, in 1987, the original vendees executed agreements to sell different portions of the property to the respondents in this case. Legal proceedings ensued, involving withdrawal of suits, impleadment applications, and amendments seeking execution of the 1986 agreement.

Issues:

Privity of contract between the appellants (original vendors) and respondent No.1 (vendees in 1987 agreement).

Assignability of contracts without the consent of the promisee.

Validity and enforceability of the 1987 agreements.

The impact of withdrawal of the suit for specific performance of the 1986 agreement.

Held:

The court observed that there was no privity of contract between the appellants and respondent No.1. To seek specific performance, respondent No.1 had to sue as 'representatives-in-interest' under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

The term 'representative-in-interest' includes the assignee of a contractual interest, but assignability requires the consent of the other party. Section 15(b) clarifies conditions for specific performance by an assignee.

Contracts may involve intertwined rights and obligations. Promisors cannot contract out their responsibility to a stranger without the promisee's consent, especially in contracts of a personal nature.

The 1986 agreement, while not expressly barring assignability, required consideration of the context and the parties' intentions regarding assignability.

The 1986 agreement was a contract combining mutual rights and obligations. The 1987 agreements were not a simple assignment but involved assuming obligations akin to a development agreement.

Respondent No.1 could seek specific performance only by proving appellants' knowledge and consent. The court emphasized that the 1987 agreements were contingent and unenforceable after the cancellation of the 1986 agreement.

Consent for assignment was not established, and the 1987 agreements were void. Respondent No.1 could not seek specific performance against the appellants.

The original vendees' rights under the 1986 agreement lapsed due to non-payment. The withdrawal of the specific performance suit indicated an abandonment of rights.

The court acknowledged collusion to frustrate the 1987 agreements and directed compensation for the loss of opportunity and inconvenience suffered by the respondents.