Facts:

Appellant Khuman Singh convicted under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

Deceased Veer Singh, belonging to "Khangar" Scheduled Caste, objected to the appellant grazing buffaloes in his field, leading to a verbal altercation.

Appellant attacked the deceased with an axe during the altercation, causing his death.

Appellant sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court, affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

Consideration of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC regarding sudden fight without premeditation.

Held:

The court found no evidence to establish that the offense was committed solely on the grounds of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste.

Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act set aside; appellant acquitted of this charge.

Conviction under Section 302 IPC modified to Section 304 Part II IPC, considering the incident as a sudden fight without premeditation.

Appellant, having served more than twelve years in jail, sentenced to the period already undergone.

The appeal was partly allowed, and the appellant ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Facts:

Arbitration proceedings initiated based on an agreement dated 28th April 2000.

Dispute arose regarding the time limit for the conclusion of arbitral proceedings.

Appellants argued that the arbitrator's mandate terminated as per the agreement's time limit.

High Court held that the appellants waived their right to an extension of time.

Issues:

Whether the time limit specified in the arbitration agreement is binding.

Whether the appellants waived their right to enforce the time schedule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the time limit agreed upon in the arbitration agreement is binding. The court emphasized the importance of parties adhering to agreed-upon time limits in arbitration proceedings. As per Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the terms of the agreement, after the expiry of four months, the arbitrator became unable to perform the functions, and the mandate stood terminated. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The respondents were given the liberty to address their grievances through appropriate legal avenues.

Facts:

Incident occurred on 17th March 1997 at 7:00 a.m.

Deceased attacked at a tea stall; accused included Abdul Hai (accused No. 1), who was later murdered.

Witnesses presented inconsistent testimonies.

Trial court acquitted accused No. 9 and convicted accused Nos. 5 & 6.

Issues:

Inconsistencies in witness testimonies.

Reversal of trial court's decision.

Adequacy of legal principles under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of putting incriminating material to the accused, recognizing the principles of audi alteram partem. It referred to judgments, including Asraf Ali vs. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328, stressing the necessity of specific, distinct, and separate questioning under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.( Para 22)

The court observed that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, lack of gun-related evidence, and reliance on related witnesses raised doubts about the case. It highlighted the perfunctory nature of the Section 313 statement and the improvements between the FIR and witness testimonies.( Para 24)

The court acquitted accused No. 9, stating he is entitled to a clean acquittal. Accused Nos. 2 & 3 were also acquitted due to the benefit of doubt. The appeals were allowed, and parties were left to bear their own costs.( Para 35)

Facts:

The State of Karnataka acquired 78 acres 16 guntas of land, including survey no.30 measuring 5 acres 33 guntas, for public purposes.

The appellant cooperative society was granted possession of a portion of the acquired land, including survey no.30.

Respondent no.3 claimed ownership of survey no.30 and sought de-notification of the remaining 3 acres 5 guntas (disputed property).

The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the withdrawal notification issued by the State Government.

Issues:

The validity of the de-notification order, the misuse of de-notification powers affecting planned development, and the balance between private interests and public good in layout formation.

Held:

The interprets Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, emphasizing the government's power to withdraw from acquisition proceedings when possession has not occurred. The purpose of this section is clarified, highlighting the prevention of forced acquisition when it ceases to be beneficial for the intended purpose. (Para 27)

, the court expresses concern over the misuse of de-notification powers by the State Government, particularly affecting planned development in cities like Bangalore.( Para 33)

Outlines the historical context, with the State Government initiating acquisition proceedings in 1982 and executing an agreement in 1984 to acquire 78 acres 16 guntas, including survey no.30.( Para 34

Highlights the approved layout plan issued by the government, indicating meticulous planning for the development of the layout, including civic amenities, open spaces, and roads.( Para 35 )

The court notes that the disputed property is within the layout and earmarked as a civic amenity. De-notification could jeopardize the planned development of the layout, causing public inconvenience.( Para 36)

Emphasizes that the government should refrain from de-notifying land acquired for layout formation, and the courts should be strict in considering landowners' pleas for de-notification, prioritizing public good over private interests.( Para 38 )

Criticizes the arbitrary nature of the de-notification order, considering the appellant's objections and the adverse impact on the layout's planned development.( Para 45 )

The court directs the appellant to reserve the disputed property for civic amenities and a playground, prohibiting any allotment or sale. Competent authorities are instructed to develop the remaining portion for the benefit of the general public.( Para 55)

Facts:

Brig. Devinder Singh, the respondent, was promoted to Brigadier in May 1998 and assumed command during Operation Rakshak in 1999.

The respondent claimed to have forecasted the pattern of Kargil intrusion, dismissed by senior officers.

The Tribunal ordered correction of facts in certain reports and expunging an Annual Confidential Report (ACR) written by Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal.

Issues:

Whether the respondent can seek recording of the After-Action Report in the manner sought by him.

The Tribunal's direction to correct facts in the reports.

Held:

The After-Action Report is a compilation of reports for future strategic studies, with no adverse consequences for officers.

The respondent had been conferred the Vishisht Seva Medal.

Reports have no civil consequences and are not subject to judicial review.

The order to expunge the ACR is not challenged.

The Supreme Court is not the authority to appreciate historical facts.

The Tribunal's direction to correct the After-Action Report is set aside, and the appeals are allowed.

Facts:

On October 16, 2013, an incident occurred at a hotel resulting in the victim falling from the terrace of the 6th floor to the 4th floor, causing injuries.

The accused faced charges, including criminal negligence and violation of license conditions by the hotel management.

Issues:

The key legal issues involved determining the vicarious liability of directors, specifically accused no.2 (Managing Director).

Allegations of negligence with criminal intent and the applicability of various sections and acts were central to the case.

Held:

Clarified that accused no.2, the Managing Director, could not be directly implicated in the allegations of negligence with criminal intent.

The Court emphasized the necessity of sufficient material to establish an individual's active role and criminal intent in cases of vicarious liability.

The General Manager (accused no.4), being out of the country during the incident, stood on different grounds, and allegations against him required examination during a trial.

Section 4 of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003, was analyzed, highlighting the obligation for hotels to provide a separate smoking area. Absence of allegations regarding the absence of any smoking area justified quashing charges under this section.

Decision: The Court quashed the chargesheet against accused no.2 and the summoning order. For accused no.4, the chargesheet was quashed, but only in relation to proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the 2003 Act.

Facts:

Respondent company processed cotton and non-cotton seeds in its unit.

Processed seeds stored in a godown for transportation.

Appellant alleged the respondent lacked a valid license for storage and committed a violation.

Seed inspector sealed the godowns; respondent filed a writ petition.

Issues:

Validity of the sealing of godowns by the seed inspector.

Requirement of a separate license for labeling and packaging activities.

Compliance with Seeds Acts, Rules, and related regulations.

Held:

The respondent lacked a license for storage or sale of seeds, making the labeling and packaging activities illegal (Para 24).

Packaging and labeling operations require a separate license under Seeds Rules, 1968 (Para 25).

Powers of the Seed Inspector include entering premises, drawing samples, seizing stock, and issuing stop-sale orders (Para 32).

Section 14(1)(e) of the Seeds Act grants the Seed Inspector the power to exercise other necessary powers, including sealing (Para 33).

Sealing can be justified if the Seed Inspector has reasons to believe an offense is being committed and if it is necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act (Para 35).

The actions of the Seed Inspector and authorities in sealing the godown were not arbitrary, considering the non-compliance of the respondent and lack of information (Para 36).

Facts:

Marriage of deceased Sahitya with L. Manjunatha on March 10, 2006.

FIR lodged on August 25, 2009, alleging that Sahitya was killed by the appellants along with others.

Initial allegations of dowry demand and harassment against appellants.

Lack of evidence supporting dowry demand or harassment.

No proven conspiracy involving appellants.

Charges framed against appellants included offenses under Sections 120-B, 302, 498-A read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issues:

Absence of dowry demand or harassment allegations against the appellants.

Lack of evidence supporting the conspiracy charge.

Omission to frame an alternative charge under Section 302 IPC.

Compliance with procedural laws and principles of natural justice.

Held:

Chain of Circumstances and Lack of Conspiracy (Para 15-16): The Court held that the chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that the appellants were solely responsible for the crime was not completed. The conviction was based on probabilities rather than conclusive evidence. The charge of conspiracy against the appellants was not proved.

Omission to Frame Alternative Charge (Para 18-19): Emphasizing the importance of framing charges, the Court considered the omission to frame an alternative charge under Section 302 IPC. It reiterated that the accused must be aware of the exact nature of the charge against them to ensure a fair trial. The absence of framing a charge, coupled with the failure to prove the alleged conspiracy, led to prejudice and failure of justice.

Principles Relating to Framing of Charges (Para 20): The judgment cited principles related to Sections 212, 215, and 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, emphasizing the importance of framing charges to enable the accused to understand the nature of the accusations against them.

Acquittal of the Appellants (Para 21): Based on the above considerations, the Court allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellants of the charges, and directed their release if not required in any other case.

Facts:

The respondent was initially appointed as a Road Gang Mazdoor.

Subsequently appointed as a Revenue Assistant based on a High Court order, as she possessed a Diploma in Civil Engineering.

The respondent sought appointment as a Town Planning Inspector based on her qualifications.

The appellant challenged the High Court's order directing the respondent's appointment as a Town Planning Inspector.

Issues:

Whether possession of educational qualifications alone is sufficient for appointment to a public post?

Whether appointments must be made in accordance with applicable recruitment rules?

Whether the respondent was eligible for appointment as a Town Planning Inspector?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that possession of the required educational qualifications is not the sole criterion for appointment to a public post. Appointments must be made in accordance with applicable recruitment rules, either under the law enacted pursuant to Article 309 of the Constitution of India or rules made under the proviso to Article 309. In the absence of recruitment rules, appointments should follow executive instructions prescribing eligibility conditions.

The respondent's appointment as a Revenue Assistant, based solely on possessing a Diploma in Civil Engineering, was deemed illegal. The Court emphasized that appointments should be made through proper procedures, including advertising posts and providing opportunities for eligible candidates to apply.

The High Court's order directing the consideration of the respondent's appointment as a Town Planning Inspector was set aside. The Court clarified that the respondent was not in the feeder cadre for such a post, and the appointment would be against the applicable rules. The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 20,000 on the respondent for initiating frivolous proceedings.