Facts:

The dispute arises from the reorganization Scheme, which led to the re-description of the post of Telephone Operators as RTOs. The new post carried a higher pay scale and required specialized training. The reorganization introduced an element of selection criteria, including a minimum of 5 years of service. The question was whether the appellants, who were Telephone Operators seeking deployment as RTOs, were entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme.

Issues:

Whether the consequence of the reorganization Scheme amounts to a promotion rather than a mere re-description of the post.

Whether the appellants are entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme considering the eligibility criteria and specialized training for the RTO post.

Held:

The reorganization resulted in not only a re-description but also a much higher pay scale and specialized training, making it a promotion. The higher pay scale was not available to all employees who met the eligibility conditions without undergoing a selection process.

The ACP Scheme aims to address genuine stagnation and hardship faced by employees due to lack of promotional avenues. Considering the triple criteria of minimum 5 years of service, specialized training, and higher financial emoluments, the appellants are not entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the benefits of the ACP Scheme do not apply to the appellants. The High Court was right in interfering with the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal.

Facts:

The parties entered into an agreement with a clause (Clause 16B) conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Court at Delhi for any dispute related to the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff presented the suit at Gurgaon, which was not a court having jurisdiction according to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The defendant raised the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction based on the exclusionary clause in the agreement but was rejected initially.

Issues:

• Whether the suit should proceed de novo or continue from the stage where it was pending at the time of the return of the plaint.
• Whether the objection regarding exclusionary jurisdiction should be upheld.

Held:

The parties, by agreement, can confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court among multiple courts having jurisdiction over a dispute. Clause 16B of the agreement clearly indicates exclusive jurisdiction for disputes concerning the franchise agreement lies with the court at Delhi.

The High Court, in its revision order, intended the return of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC, and not continuation of the suit at Gurgaon. The suit should proceed de novo.

The law laid down in the *Modern Construction case, which allows de novo trial, is not in contradiction with **Joginder Tuli case.

Order VII Rule 10-A was introduced to avoid serving summonses on defendants when the plaint is returned after the defendant's appearance in the suit. The proceeding commences de novo under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10-A.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the appellant's failure to raise the objection initially and the completion of pleadings and evidence, led the Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution and not set aside the impugned order.

Decision: The Court held that the suit shall proceed de novo due to the existence of an exclusionary jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the parties. The objection raised by the defendant is upheld, and the impugned order of the High Court is not set aside to ensure substantial justice between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of.

FACTS:

The appellant, Gangadhar alias Gangaram, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 48 Kgs 200 gms of cannabis (ganja) and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The lower courts held the appellant to be the owner of the house from where the contraband was recovered, rejecting his defense that he had sold the house to a co-accused.

The appellant produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property in question promptly after the recovery of the contraband.

The police investigation was flawed, defective, and incomplete, leading to confusion regarding ownership and possession of the house.

ISSUES:

• Whether the appellant's claim of selling the house to the co-accused was genuine and whether the prosecution had proven his conscious possession of the house where the contraband was recovered.

HELD:

The police investigation was flawed, and the appellant's defense seemed plausible. It was questionable why the appellant, residing in his new house for 15 years, would identify his own erstwhile house as belonging to the accused and implicate himself.

The appellant promptly produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property, but the police failed to investigate its genuineness or verify the panchayat records, which could have established ownership and possession of the house accurately.

The appellant's conviction was based on his name being recorded as the owner of the house in the voters' list of 2008, ignoring the subsequent sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) executed on 12.06.2009. The prosecution did not prove that the sale agreement was a fabricated document.

The nature of the evidence did not establish the appellant's conscious possession of the house as required by the NDPS Act to attribute presumption against him regarding the recovery of the contraband. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenges the Constitutional (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Clause (6) in Articles 15 and 16, enabling reservation for economically weaker sections. The petitioners contend that this amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is contrary to the principles laid down in the Indra Sawhney case.

Issues:

• whether the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 is ultra vires the Constitution and whether it affects the basic structure of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court observed that the questions raised in this case involve substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII of Supreme Court Rules, the matter is to be heard by a Constitution Bench comprising five judges.

Decision: The Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench of five judges to determine the constitutionality of the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 and its impact on the basic structure of the Constitution.

FACTS:

The appellant, Gangadhar alias Gangaram, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 48 Kgs 200 gms of cannabis (ganja) and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The lower courts held the appellant to be the owner of the house from where the contraband was recovered, rejecting his defense that he had sold the house to a co-accused.

The appellant produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property in question promptly after the recovery of the contraband.

The police investigation was flawed, defective, and incomplete, leading to confusion regarding ownership and possession of the house.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant's claim of selling the house to the co-accused was genuine and whether the prosecution had proven his conscious possession of the house where the contraband was recovered.

HELD:

The police investigation was flawed, and the appellant's defense seemed plausible. It was questionable why the appellant, residing in his new house for 15 years, would identify his own erstwhile house as belonging to the accused and implicate himself.

The appellant promptly produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property, but the police failed to investigate its genuineness or verify the panchayat records, which could have established ownership and possession of the house accurately.

The appellant's conviction was based on his name being recorded as the owner of the house in the voters' list of 2008, ignoring the subsequent sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) executed on 12.06.2009. The prosecution did not prove that the sale agreement was a fabricated document.

The nature of the evidence did not establish the appellant's conscious possession of the house as required by the NDPS Act to attribute presumption against him regarding the recovery of the contraband. The appeal is allowed.

REFFERED CASES:

Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 9 SCC 595

Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417

Facts:

The parties entered into an agreement with a clause (Clause 16B) conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Court at Delhi for any dispute related to the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff presented the suit at Gurgaon, which was not a court having jurisdiction according to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The defendant raised the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction based on the exclusionary clause in the agreement but was rejected initially.

Issues:

Whether the suit should proceed de novo or continue from the stage where it was pending at the time of the return of the plaint.

Whether the objection regarding exclusionary jurisdiction should be upheld.

Held:

The parties, by agreement, can confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court among multiple courts having jurisdiction over a dispute. Clause 16B of the agreement clearly indicates exclusive jurisdiction for disputes concerning the franchise agreement lies with the court at Delhi.

The High Court, in its revision order, intended the return of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC, and not continuation of the suit at Gurgaon. The suit should proceed de novo.

The law laid down in the *Modern Construction case, which allows de novo trial, is not in contradiction with **Joginder Tuli case.

Order VII Rule 10-A was introduced to avoid serving summonses on defendants when the plaint is returned after the defendant's appearance in the suit. The proceeding commences de novo under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10-A.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the appellant's failure to raise the objection initially and the completion of pleadings and evidence, led the Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution and not set aside the impugned order.

Decision: The Court held that the suit shall proceed de novo due to the existence of an exclusionary jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the parties. The objection raised by the defendant is upheld, and the impugned order of the High Court is not set aside to ensure substantial justice between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The case pertains to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenges the Constitutional (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Clause (6) in Articles 15 and 16, enabling reservation for economically weaker sections. The petitioners contend that this amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is contrary to the principles laid down in the Indra Sawhney case.

Issues:

whether the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 is ultra vires the Constitution and whether it affects the basic structure of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court observed that the questions raised in this case involve substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII of Supreme Court Rules, the matter is to be heard by a Constitution Bench comprising five judges.

Decision: The Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench of five judges to determine the constitutionality of the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 and its impact on the basic structure of the Constitution.

Facts:

The court had previously issued directions in SLP(Crl) no. 2302 of 2017, instructing the Administrators of the Union Territory, State Governments, and other Central Agencies to effectively implement the use of photography and videography at crime scenes. Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports were filed by 14 States, but they failed to provide precise information about the position of CCTV cameras at each Police Station, lacking relevant details.

Issues:

• Implementation of photography and videography at crime scenes.
• Lack of disclosure of CCTV camera position in Police Stations.
• Constitution of Oversight Committees at State and District Levels.
• Allocation of funds for Oversight Committees.
• Installation of CCTV cameras in all Police Stations.
• Specification of CCTV systems.
• Establishment of Human Rights Courts in each District for redressal of complaints related to police actions.
• Updates on the constitution and workings of the Central Oversight body.
• Installation of CCTV cameras in the offices of investigative/enforcement agencies.

Held:

The court directed the concerned authorities to submit Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports within six weeks, specifying details regarding the position of CCTV cameras in each Police Station as mentioned in paragraph 8 of the order. Oversight Committees were to be constituted at both State and District Levels, with the respective State/Union Territories Finance Departments allocating funds for this purpose at the earliest. The duty and responsibility for the working, maintenance, and recording of CCTVs in Police Stations were assigned to the SHO of the concerned station. All State and Union Territories were ordered to ensure the installation of CCTV cameras in every Police Station within their jurisdiction.

Additionally, the court directed the establishment of Human Rights Courts in each District to address complaints of excessive force used at Police Stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths. The Union of India was instructed to provide an affidavit with updates on the constitution and workings of the Central Oversight body. Furthermore, the Union of India was directed to install CCTV cameras and recording equipment in the offices of investigative/enforcement agencies. The court emphasized the need for the prompt and complete implementation of the order.

Decision: The court passed the above directions and mandates, urging the Executive/Administrative/Police Authorities to implement the order in both letter and spirit as soon as possible.

Facts:

Sukh Sagar Medical College & Hospital was granted an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 to establish a medical college.

The Conditional Letter of Permission was granted for the academic year 2016-17.

However, renewal permissions were not issued by the Medical Council of India (MCI) for three successive academic sessions due to significant deficiencies.

As a result, the Essentiality Certificate was cancelled by the State Government, which the appellant challenged.

Issues:

Whether the State Government had the power to revoke or cancel the Essentiality Certificate.

Whether the appellant misrepresented the State Government and played a constructive fraud by failing to meet the minimum benchmark of standards specified by the MCI.

Held:

The Court agreed that issuing an Essentiality Certificate is a quasi-judicial function and that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to revoke or cancel the Certificate without express provisions in the IMC Act or 1999 Regulations.

However, the State Government has the authority to revoke the Certificate in exceptional cases, such as when there is fraud, loss of substratum, or other valid grounds.

In this case, the appellant failed to fulfill its commitments and misrepresented the State Government, which amounted to constructive fraud.

The Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the appellant's appeal and allowed the State to withdraw the Certificate.

The term "established" was discussed, and it was clarified that the appellant was not a well-established and running medical college, just at the threshold stage.

The duty of the State Government under Article 47 of the Constitution is to ensure good public health and create conditions for proper access to medical colleges and hospitals.