Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of land by the Rajasthan Housing Board from Khatedars, who belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Housing Society claimed to have entered into agreements for sale with the Khatedars for the land in question.

Issues:

The validity of the agreements for sale, the entitlement to compensation, the applicability of statutory provisions, and the legality of the land acquisition process.

Held:

The agreements for sale between the Khatedars and the Housing Society were declared void ab initio under Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, as such transactions involving Scheduled Caste members with non-Scheduled Caste entities are prohibited.

The Housing Society's claim for compensation was rejected, and it was determined that only the Khatedars were entitled to compensation for the acquired land.

The reference for compensation filed by the Housing Society was not barred by limitation, as it had filed objections during the acquisition process and actively participated in related proceedings.

The circular dated 27-10-2005 did not confer any right on the Housing Society or the Khatedars to claim developed land, as it was not applicable in this case.

Compensation should be disbursed directly to the Khatedars or their legal representatives to ensure they are not deprived of their rightful compensation.

Facts:

Respondent No. 4 lodged a First Information Report (FIR) alleging fraudulent execution of sale deeds in 1994 concerning land owned by her.

Appellants, close relatives of the complainant, were named as accused but their specific roles were not mentioned.

The land in question was joint family property.

Issues:

Whether the FIR lodged after a long period of 19 years constitutes an abuse of legal process.

Whether there was any prior civil court action seeking cancellation of the sale deeds.

Whether the absence of specific roles assigned to the appellants in the execution of the sale deeds justifies the quashing of the FIR.

Held:

In view of the above facts read together, we have no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion that in the present case the First Information Report in question is nothing but abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant, and the First Information Report is liable to be quashed. As such, we hold that the High Court has erred in law in not allowing the writ petition in the above facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The First Information Report, lodged against the present Appellants, stands quashed.

Facts:

The case pertains to the liability of excise duty on 'Transmission Assembly,' an intermediate product in the manufacture of tractors.

Issues:

Whether 'Transmission Assembly' is liable to excise duty.

Whether the extended period of limitation is applicable to the Revenue.

Whether there was suppression or intent to evade duty by the appellants.

Held:

The Transmission Assemblies of tractors are commercially known products, irrespective of whether they have been sold.

To levy excise duty, two conditions must be met: there must be "manufacture," and the resulting product must be "goods" known to the market as such.

The term "goods" encompasses substances known to the market as materials, commodities, and articles capable of being sold.

The extended period of limitation is not available to the Revenue due to lack of suppression or intent to evade duty by the appellants.

Decision: The Court ruled in favor of the appellants, stating that Transmission Assemblies are liable to excise duty as they are commercially known products. However, due to the absence of suppression or intent to evade duty, the extended period of limitation is not applicable to the Revenue.

Facts:

Aryan Electronics imported a consignment of electronic goods described as "parts of VCD - LENCE WITH MECHANISM."

The declared value of the goods was US $0.72 per piece.

Customs authorities doubted the accuracy of the declared value, suspecting the goods were branded and undervalued.

Further investigation revealed the goods were sub-assemblies for VCDs, marked "Made in China" and bearing the brand name "Samsung."

The Commissioner of Customs determined a new value for the goods at Rs. 73.94 per piece, allowing clearance upon payment of differential duty and redemption fine.

Issues:

Whether the Commissioner's valuation of the imported goods based on similar goods was justified.

Whether the redemption fine and penalty imposed were excessive.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the Commissioner based the valuation on similar goods, not identical goods, as there was no evidence of identical goods available (Para. 8).

The instances provided by both the Department and Aryan Electronics were accepted without objection, and the imports used for comparison were from the same period, satisfying the requirements of the Customs Act (Para. 10).

Discrepancies in the Tribunal's reasoning regarding import prices were noted, and the Commissioner's decision to revise the valuation was upheld (Para. 11).

However, the redemption fine and penalty imposed were deemed excessive. The redemption fine was reduced to Rs. 6 lakhs, equivalent to the differential duty, and the penalty was eliminated altogether (Para. 14).

Facts:

The case involved the expulsion of certain members from a cooperative housing society for non-payment of dues. The High Court affirmed the expulsion but also issued directions for construction and allotment of additional flats/apartments to the expelled members based on concessions made by the society's counsel.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of the Court: Whether the court's jurisdiction extends to issuing incidental directions in petitions filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Authority of Lawyer: Whether a lawyer has the authority to make concessions on behalf of a client without explicit instructions.

Legal Standards: Whether the conduct of the lawyer adhered to the Bar Council of India Rules and professional standards.

Concessions and Admissions: Whether admissions made by lawyers are binding on their clients, and the significance of obtaining explicit authorization.

Held:

The Court emphasized that petitions filed under Article 226 primarily pertain to challenging orders, while Article 227 deals with supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and tribunals. Any incidental directions issued should relate to the subject matter of the petition. The Court underscored the principle that lawyers are agents of their clients and must act according to their instructions. They should not make concessions or statements before the court without explicit authorization from the client. The Court set aside the directions issued by the High Court, emphasizing that the High Court should have confined itself to the subject matter and issues raised in the writ petition. Additionally, the Court underscored the importance of lawyers obtaining necessary instructions from their clients before making concessions or statements before the court. While allowing these appeals.

Facts:

Pradip Nanjee Gala, the appellant, was a partner in an Assessee-Firm with outstanding sales tax dues for certain assessment years.

Gala claimed to have entered into a settlement with the State Minister for Finance regarding his individual share of the tax liability.

Issues:

Whether a settlement between an individual partner and the State Government can discharge the partner from the obligation to pay the sales tax dues of the Assessee-Firm.

Whether such settlement is permissible under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed relevant sections of the Act, particularly Sections 14, 18, and 45, along with pertinent rules.

It found that the Act did not provide for settlements between individual partners and tax authorities to determine their liability.

The Court emphasized the joint and several liability of partners under Section 18 of the Act.

It noted that the Act only allows for remission of tax payable by the dealer (the firm) under Section 45, with no provision for settlements with individual partners.

The Court reiterated the principle that tax laws should be strictly interpreted based on what is clearly stated in the statute.

Based on its analysis, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, confirming Gala's liability for the firm's sales tax dues.

The appeal was dismissed, and Gala was ordered to pay costs.

Facts:

The appellant company took over the factory of the third respondent company along with its workmen under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Subsequently, the appellant company introduced a voluntary retirement scheme (VRS), which all workmen availed.

The respondent-Union demanded the reinstatement of the workmen in the factory, alleging coercion and forced termination.

The Labour Commissioner initially declined to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal, stating no industrial dispute existed.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of undertaking complied with Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Whether the voluntary retirement scheme was voluntary or forced.

Whether the Labour Commissioner's refusal to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal was justified.

Whether the dispute was barred under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.

Held:

The Industrial Tribunal must adjudicate the validity of the transfer of undertaking under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Allegations of coercion and forced termination necessitate thorough examination by the Industrial Tribunal.

The Labour Commissioner's refusal to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal was unjustified, as disputed questions of fact require adjudication.

Estoppel does not prevent the adjudication of void or voidable contracts; disputed questions of fact must be determined by the Industrial Tribunal based on evidence.

The subject matter of the dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 are distinct and arise from different causes of action. The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves challenges to the appointment of Khub Ram as Chief Inspector in Haryana Roadways, along with subsequent litigation regarding the appointment of Dalbir Singh and Mahavir Prasad. The challenges primarily revolve around the qualifications and selection process.

Issues:

The validity of Khub Ram's appointment due to lack of requisite experience, the propriety of appointing Dalbir Singh retrospectively, and Mahavir Prasad's claim for appointment based on his position in the select list.

Held:

The court dismissed Khub Ram's appeal due to fraudulent conduct in obtaining the position and lack of essential qualifications. The retrospective appointment of Dalbir Singh was set aside as he was not among the selected candidates initially.

While Mahavir Prasad's appeal was partially allowed, no further relief was granted to him due to res judicata and the passage of time. Compensation was directed to be paid to Mahavir Prasad by the State of Haryana for the irregularities in the appointment process.

Facts:

The appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the respondent, alleging failure to repay a loan and issuance of a dishonored cheque.

The trial court convicted the respondent, which was later overturned by the High Court.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the burden of proof shifts to the accused once the issuance of the cheque and its dishonor are established by the complainant.

Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act favors the complainant in such cases.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the burden of proof shifts to the accused once the issuance of the cheque and its dishonor are established by the complainant.

The Court reiterated the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which favors the holder of the cheque.

The respondent's defense claiming that the cheque was issued in 1999 as security against a loan was deemed unsupported by evidence.

The fact that the cheque was dishonored due to stop payment indicated the respondent's knowledge of its presentation.

The High Court erred in placing the burden of proof on the complainant and thereby acquitted the respondent incorrectly.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the conviction of the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.