Facts:

The respondent, M/S Roofit Industries Ltd., was accused of evading central excise duty by not properly computing the assessable value of finished goods.

The dispute arose over the deduction of freight, insurance, and unloading charges from the price of excisable goods, claiming that the place of removal of finished goods was different from the factory gate.

Issues:

• Whether the deduction of freight, insurance, and unloading charges from the price of excisable goods is permissible for valuation for excise duty purposes.

• Determining the time and place of sale for excisable goods.

Held:

The duty of excise is charged based on the value of goods, deemed to be the normal price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade at the time and place of removal.

The place of removal is crucial for valuation, and if goods are cleared at the factory gate, excise duty is charged based on the valuation at the factory gate, excluding post-removal expenses such as freight and insurance charges.

The ownership of goods transfers either at the factory gate or at the buyer's premises upon delivery, depending on the terms of the sale agreement and the Sale of Goods Act. In this case, it was determined that the sale of goods did not take place at the factory gate but at the buyer's premises upon delivery.

The Central Excise and Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) did not consider all relevant aspects and merely relied on precedent. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside CESTAT's decision and restored the order passed by the adjudicating authority, upholding the demand for excise duty based on the valuation at the buyer's premises upon delivery.

Facts:

The State Government acquired land for the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD) for the development of the Balaji temple town.

Landowners, who had small shops and hutments on their land, contested the compensation rate set by the High Court, which reduced it to Rs. 30 per square feet from the Reference Court's range of Rs. 80 to Rs. 100 per square feet.

The landowners argued that the Reference Court's determination was fair and that the High Court's reduction lacked basis due to the absence of evidence of land sales in the area, which was affected by statutory bans.

Issues:

Whether the Reference Court's compensation rate was justified.

Whether the High Court erred in reducing the compensation rate without sufficient basis.

Whether the statutory bans on land sales affected the evidence presented in the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and found that the Reference Court's approach of considering adjacent land rates and applying an annual escalation rate was valid.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, which didn't sufficiently consider the area's potential due to its pilgrimage status.

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, restoring the Reference Court's compensation rate of Rs. 80 to Rs. 100 per square feet. However, it modified the decision to have a uniform rate of Rs. 90 per square feet for all landowners.

The Court suggested that TTD may consider providing alternative land or shops to the affected landowners for their livelihood, though this wasn't made a formal order.

The impugned judgment/order of the High Court was set aside, and the awards passed by the Reference Court were restored with modification.

Facts:

The Cochin Port Trust, a statutory authority constituted for rendering port services under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, was engaged in activities such as selling scrap items, tender forms, firewood, waste paper, and disposal of unserviceable equipment. Assessments were made for sales tax on these activities, considering the Cochin Port Trust as a dealer under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

Issues:

Whether the Cochin Port Trust qualifies as a "dealer" under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, making it liable to pay sales tax.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the activities of the Cochin Port Trust fell within the purview of the definition of "dealer" under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The court differentiated between the definitions of "dealer" under the TN Act and the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, noting that the latter had a wider definition that included persons involved in transactions irrespective of whether they were in the course of business.

The court also considered an amendment to the TN Act that specifically brought port trusts within the definition of "dealer," rendering the previous decision regarding the Madras Port Trust irrelevant in this context.

Additionally, the court rejected the argument that incidental or ancillary transactions should not be considered as business activities, emphasizing the expansive definition of "dealer" under the Kerala Act. Thus, the Cochin Port Trust was held to be assessable to tax under the Act. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Santosh Pawar, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of his wife, Saraswatibai, by setting her on fire. The prosecution presented evidence including a dying declaration from the deceased, eyewitness testimony, and medical reports to establish the guilt of the accused. The appellant's defense argued that the act was accidental and that he attempted to extinguish the fire to save his wife.

Issues:

Whether the act of pouring kerosene and setting the victim on fire constitutes murder under Section 300 of the IPC.

Whether there was premeditation or intention on the part of the accused to cause the death of the deceased.

Whether the appellant's attempt to extinguish the fire mitigates the offense.

Held:

The court held that the act of pouring kerosene and setting the victim on fire constituted murder under Section 300 of the IPC. It ruled that even if there was no premeditation, the accused's actions amounted to causing injuries so imminently dangerous that they would likely result in death. The court distinguished the present case from a previous case cited by the defense, emphasizing the appellant's full awareness of his actions and the societal impact of crimes against women. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC was affirmed.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between landlords and a tenant regarding eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and personal necessity, governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The tenant contested the suit and filed applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act.

Issues:

Whether the tenant's deposit of rent with the Rent Controller instead of the Civil Judge constituted a default under Section 7(1) of the Act,

Whether the High Court's decision to uphold the orders of the trial court was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the 1997 Act, particularly Section 7, and noted that while strict compliance is necessary, the tenant's deposit with the Rent Controller might have been a bona fide mistake. Considering the earlier observation by the Court to allow the tenant to establish the bonafide nature of the deposit, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no merit in the appeal.

Facts:

Makhan Singh was convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), for the possession of a commercial quantity of poppy husk.

The prosecution's case relied on the recovery of poppy husk from a vehicle allegedly driven by Makhan Singh. However, independent witnesses did not support the prosecution's version.

Witness testimonies revealed discrepancies, with independent witnesses stating that Makhan Singh was not arrested in their presence, and they signed blank papers at the police station. Defense witnesses corroborated this version.

The conviction was primarily based on the testimonies of official witnesses involved in the recovery, but the court found their testimonies lacking credibility, especially considering the doubts raised by independent witnesses.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution adequately proved the guilt of Makhan Singh beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether there was compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act regarding the search and seizure.

Held:

The court held that the burden of proof lies heavily on the prosecution in NDPS cases due to the severity of punishment. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish Makhan Singh's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not required since the recovery was made from the vehicle and not from the person of Makhan Singh.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside Makhan Singh's conviction and ordering his release. The fine imposed was also ordered to be refunded.

Facts:

Ramgarh Farms and Industries Ltd. claimed tenure holder status over certain lands in Nagina Tehsil. Ceiling proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, were initiated, resulting in the declaration of some land as surplus. Subsequent legal proceedings ensued, including challenges to forest declarations under the Indian Forest Act.

Issues:

Whether Ramgarh Farms qualifies as a tenure holder.

Validity of ceiling proceedings and forest declarations.

Interpretation of relevant laws and notifications.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Ramgarh Farms cannot be considered a tenure holder due to the nature of its land acquisition through a lease. Thus, it is entitled to retain only up to the ceiling limit of 18 acres, as per the amended Act.

The Court dismissed Ramgarh Farms' appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. It directed the prescribed authority to allow Ramgarh Farms to retain land up to the ceiling limit of 18 acres and not more.

Facts:

The incident occurred merely two years after the marriage between the deceased and the appellant-husband. Allegations pointed towards the wife's death by hanging under suspicious circumstances, with a backdrop of consistent demands for dowry and maltreatment against her.

Issues:

The culpability of the appellant-husband regarding charges of dowry harassment and abetment to the wife's suicide.

Held:

The material witnesses provided coherent and consistent testimony, establishing the deceased's continuous harassment, assaults, and intimidation, commencing shortly after the marriage. The demand for dowry predated the marriage and escalated over time, eventually leading to the wife's tragic demise.

The prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with the evidence forming an inseverable link between the events before the marriage and the wife's unnatural death. Despite minor inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony, the substance of their accounts remained intact, establishing the essential elements of the offenses charged.

The Court concurred with the legislative objectives of the Dowry Prohibition Act and relevant provisions of the IPC and Evidence Act, emphasizing the seriousness of dowry-related offenses and the necessity for effective legal intervention.

Decision: The Court upheld the conviction and sentence pronounced by the High Court, affirming the prosecution's ability to establish the appellant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. The appeal fails and is dismissed.

Facts:

Guramma, the wife of the first defendant, owned a property.

After Guramma's death, the plaintiff, who was her son, claimed ownership of the property, alleging that the first defendant had consented to transfer the property to his name in revenue records.

The defendants contested this claim, arguing that the property was purchased by Guramma with funds provided by the first defendant, and that both the plaintiff and the first defendant were entitled to a share of the property.

Issues:

Whether the mutation entries in the revenue records conveyed or extinguished any title to the property.

Whether the first defendant had relinquished his right to half of the property.

Whether the High Court's decision was erroneous.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the mutation entries in the revenue records did not convey or extinguish any title to the property and that the first defendant had not relinquished his right to half of the property at any point.

The Court held that the High Court had erred in concluding that the first defendant had acquiesced to the transfer of the entire property to the plaintiff's name based on the mutation entries.

The argument that, due to the first defendant's age and the existence of other properties owned by him, interference with the High Court's judgment was not warranted was rejected by the Supreme Court.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the judgment of the lower appellate court, allowing the appeals of the defendants.