Facts:

The case involves 16 accused individuals charged under multiple sections of the law for their alleged involvement in a serial bomb blast in different trains. Confessional statements of the accused were recorded, and the charges include offenses under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Explosive Substance Act, 1908, Explosives Act, 1884, Railways Act, 1989, and Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of confessional statements, the proper invocation of provisions under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, and the validity of prior approval from the District Superintendent of Police.

Held:

Prior Approval under TADA (Para 42): According to Section 20-A(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police is mandatory before recording information about offenses under TADA. The absence of such approval renders further proceedings under TADA invalid.

Validity of TADA Provisions Invocation (Para 46): The Designated Court found improper invocation of TADA provisions in certain cases, leading to the invalidity of confessions recorded in those cases. Proper invocation is crucial for the legal sanction of confessions under TADA.

Valid Invocation in Present Cases (Para 53, 54, 55): The registration of the crime under TADA in Hyderabad was deemed valid, and the invocation of TADA provisions was correct. Contemporaneous documentation supported the proper invocation of TADA provisions.

Confessions and Their Admissibility (Para 60): Section 15(1) of TADA makes confessions recorded by a Police Officer admissible. Confessions meeting statutory requirements and conditions are admissible against the maker, co-accused, abettor, or conspirator. However, caution is advised regarding reliability, especially against co-accused.

Individual Assessment of Accused (Para 71): The confessional statements of certain accused (A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-7, A-14, A-15, and A-16) were deemed admissible and established the prosecution's case against them. Their convictions were affirmed. However, for other accused (A-5, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, and A-13), their confessions were unreliable, leading to the setting aside of their convictions.

Role of Accused Individuals (Para 71.2 to 71.6): The court individually assessed the roles of accused individuals (A-5, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-13) and found insufficient evidence to support their convictions. The convictions and sentences of A-8, A-9, A-10, and A-13 were set aside.

Decision: The appeals of Accused Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 13 were allowed, and their convictions and sentences were set aside. The convictions and sentences of Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, and 16 were maintained. The case against A-5, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, and A-13 was not proven, leading to the setting aside of their convictions.

Facts:

The case originated from a government order dated July 11, 1986, providing exemption from building tax for hotels in Kerala. In response, Section 3A was added to the Kerala Buildings Tax Act, 1975. The appellant, M/S Manuelsons Hotels Private Limited, constructed a hotel based on this assurance. However, the government, on February 6, 1997, denied the promised concession, citing the omission of Section 3A.

Issues:

The validity of the government's denial of the concession promised in the government order, the legislative history of Section 3A, and the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Held:

The court held that Section 3A was enacted by the Kerala legislature, conferring the power to grant exemption from building tax from November 6, 1990, to March 1, 1993. The non-issuance of a notification under Section 3A during this period was deemed arbitrary. The doctrine of promissory estoppel applied, and the government's failure to fulfill its promise was considered unconscionable. Relief was granted for the period when Section 3A was in force, but no relief was allowed post-March 1, 1993, due to the absence of a statutory provision.

Decision: The court partially allowed the appeal, ruling that no building tax was payable by the appellants for the period when Section 3A was in force (November 6, 1990, to March 1, 1993). However, no relief was granted for the period post-March 1, 1993, when Section 3A was deleted and no statutory provision for exemption existed.

Facts:

The Court noted a lack of will on the part of the mentioned states in acknowledging and addressing the potential drought situation. Despite information available since October 2015 regarding several districts facing varying degrees of drought, no preparatory steps were taken by the states.

Issues:

The Court was the failure of the states to disclose full facts about the prevailing conditions and their apparent lack of readiness to tackle a possible disaster.

Held:

The Court held that the ostrich-like attitude of the state governments compelled it to make comments about their concern. In response, the Court directed the Union of India to constitute a National Disaster Response Force within six months from the date of the decision, with an appropriate and regular cadre strength.

Decision: The Court ordered the Union of India to take immediate action in establishing the National Disaster Response Force, emphasizing the importance of preparedness in the face of potential disasters. This decision aimed to address the negligence of the states in responding to the known drought-like conditions.

Facts:

A. Sivaprakash (Appellant) was implicated in a case under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The charges were related to the alleged misuse of official position in issuing a letter (Ex.P/16(a)) in connection with a JRY Scheme Work, leading to pecuniary advantage.

Issues:

Whether the appellant misused his official position to obtain pecuniary advantage.

Whether the prosecution established a causal connection between the release of payment and the letter issued by the appellant.

Held:

The court set aside the conviction of the appellant, emphasizing the lack of evidence establishing a causal connection between the release of payment and the letter issued by the appellant.

It was noted that there was no proof of what kind of pecuniary advantage the appellant obtained in issuing the letter.

The circular related to the JRY Scheme Work was interpreted, arguing that the appellant had no role in the Panchayat's payment to A-3.

The court highlighted that the prosecution failed to prove essential ingredients for conviction under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Reference to relevant circulars and regulations supported the argument that 50% payment release was not contingent upon the stage of execution but on the start of the work.

The nature of Ex.P/16(a) was considered, with the court pointing out that there was no causal connection between payment release and the letter.

The court relied on precedent cases, including C. Chenga Reddy vs. State of A.P. and Abdulla Mohd. Pagarkar vs. State, to emphasize that codal violations and irregularities are not sufficient to prove criminal cases.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint against Balveer Singh and another, where the police report did not include the appellants as accused persons. The complainant filed an application before the Magistrate, seeking cognizance against the appellants, which was rejected. The Magistrate limited cognizance to the son of the appellants.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 190 and 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically concerning the power of the Court of Session to take cognizance after a case has been committed to it by the Magistrate.

Held:

Section 190 Empowers Magistrate to Take Cognizance Section 190 empowers Magistrates to take cognizance of any offense, including those triable by the Court of Session. However, when the case is committed to the Court of Session by the Magistrate under Section 193, the Court of Session takes cognizance "as a Court of original jurisdiction." The order passed by the Magistrate while committing the case does not amount to taking cognizance by the Court of Session.( Para 8 to 11)

Magistrate's Active Role in Cognizance In this case, the Magistrate rejected the complainant's application after due consideration, limiting cognizance to the son of the appellants. This indicates an active role played by the Magistrate, who did not simply forward the application to the Sessions Court.( Para 21)

Judicial Review Considering the proper opportunity given to the appellants to present their case and the Sessions Court's hearing of their arguments, there is no reason mentioned to interfere with the impugned order.( Para 22)

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Sessions Court's order in this case.

Facts:

The appellant filed Title Suit No.195 of 1998 seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 25.8.1992 with the respondent.

The dispute arose over the interpretation of the term "built-up area" mentioned in the agreement.

The appellant claimed half of the built-up area on the ground floor, mezzanine floor, and the complete built-up area on the first floor of a proposed complex.

Issues:

Whether the parties had entered into an agreement knowing that 'built-up area' included common areas.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance as claimed.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a money decree.

Held:

The High Court, relying on a letter from the appellant, concluded that the built-up area includes common areas.

The Supreme Court found that subsequent letters from the respondent accepted the appellant's definition of "built-up area," excluding common areas.

It is not a case where the appellant resiled from the agreement; the respondent changed its stand and agreed to the appellant's position.

The Court, referring to Section 5 of the Indian Contract Act, held that the respondent cannot resile from the mutually agreed position.

The High Court's finding on the built-up area was set aside, and the trial court's decision was restored.

The trial court was directed to calculate the built-up area in line with the judgment and dispose of the suit expeditiously.

Facts:

The appellants, Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai and others, claimed compensation for the destruction of their agricultural land, including standing fruit-bearing trees, caused by the release of 60,000 cusecs of water from a dam constructed and maintained by the respondents (State of Gujarat and others).

Issues:

Whether the release of water from the dam amounted to negligence on the part of the respondents?

Whether the respondents demonstrated that the water in the dam was kept at a reasonable level, taking into account normal rains and unforeseen heavy rains?

Whether the release of water could be treated as an 'act of God'?

Held:

The court held that it was incumbent upon the respondents to prove proper care in maintaining the water level in the dam. The doctrine of strict liability, originating from Rylands v. Fletcher, applied, and the onus was on the respondents to show the discharge of this burden. The court found the respondents had failed to do so, establishing negligence on their part.( Paragraph 15)

The court examined whether the damage was the result of an inevitable or unavoidable accident due to heavy rains. The appellants claimed negligence on the part of the respondents in not keeping the water level sufficiently low. The court noted that the respondents did not refute this claim but instead argued that water release was in public interest. The court, relying on Rylands v. Fletcher, found negligence on the part of the respondents, contributing to the damage.( Paragraphs 26, 27, 28)

While the appellants did not provide exact proof of damages, court commissioners' report confirmed losses, including uprooted and washed away trees. The court emphasized that even without precise evidence, the appellants were entitled to reasonable compensation. The impossibility of accurately ascertaining damages was attributed to the wrong committed by the respondents.( Paragraph 29)

The appellants claimed damages of Rs. 21,50,000, but specific proof was lacking. The court acknowledged loss had occurred and, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, awarded damages of Rs. 5,00,000 as a reasonable compensation. The appeal is allowed. (Paragraph 30,31)

Facts:

Private medical colleges contested the state's authority to conduct entrance tests, claiming it violated their autonomy.

The state law for conducting entrance tests was challenged, arguing that the state lacked legislative competence on the subject.

Issues:

Whether the state's authority to conduct entrance tests for MBBS/BDS courses violated the autonomy of private medical colleges.

Whether the state had legislative competence on the subject.

Held:

The court upheld the state's authority to legislate on the issue.

Legislative entries cited: Entry 66 of List I (setting up minimum standards) and Entry 25 of List III (implementation of standards).

In cases of overlap, Entry 66 of List I prevailed.

The stand of private medical colleges was rejected, and the state law for conducting entrance tests was upheld.

Eligible candidates who couldn't appear in NEET-I and those with preparation concerns were permitted to appear in NEET-II.

The Oversight Committee appointed by the court would oversee the NEET-II examination.

Clarification that only NEET would enable admission to MBBS or BDS studies.

Facts:

M/s. Ispat Industries Limited (IIL) engaged in manufacturing HR coils, avails credit on inputs like iron ore pellets.

Sister company M/s. Ispat Metallics Industries Ltd. (IMIL) manufactures pig iron and molten metal.

Dispute arose over the transfer of iron ore pellets from IIL to IMIL, with the Commissioner treating it as a sale.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of iron ore pellets between IIL and IMIL constitutes a sale or a transfer under relevant excise rules.

Applicability of Circular dated July 1, 2002, in determining the value for duty calculation in the case of goods transferred between sister units.

Held:

The Tribunal found that the transfer of iron ore pellets was not a sale but a transfer under a joint procurement policy between sister companies.

The Tribunal relied on the circular dated July 1, 2002, stating that the value in the invoice for Cenvat Credit should be adopted for duty calculation in the case of goods transferred to sister units.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that it was a case of transfer, not sale.

The Court agreed that post-manufacturing expenses could not be added to the duty value.

The appeals by the Commissioner were dismissed.