Facts:

The case involves the sale of imported pig hair bristles and the applicability of Exemption Notification No. 34/98-Cus. dated 13.06.1998.

Issues:

Whether the importer is entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification despite the sale of pig hair bristles without payment of sales tax.

Held:

On a reading of Sections 3 and 7 of the Act, it becomes clear, therefore, that so far as the imported item, viz., pig bristles is concerned, no sales tax, in fact, is charged on the same. This being the case, it is obvious that the proviso to the Notification dated 13.06.1998 gets attracted and since no tax is chargeable on the sale of such goods, the said Exemption Notification will therefore, not apply.

We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of CESTAT and restore that of the Commissioner. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The subject land, acknowledged as evacuee property, was initially acquired under Section 12 of the DPCR Act and later transferred to the compensation pool. However, a subsequent attempt was made to acquire the same land under the LA Act. The appellant argued that the land ceased to be evacuee property after its acquisition under the DPCR Act. Conversely, the respondents contended that the land retained its evacuee property status even after inclusion in the compensation pool.

Issues:

Whether the land, after acquisition under the DPCR Act, ceased to be evacuee property, thus making it subject to acquisition under the LA Act.

If the land vested in the Central Government after acquisition under the DPCR Act, could it still be acquired under the LA Act?

Held:

The court analyzed the provisions of the DPCR Act and the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and concluded that the land ceased to be evacuee property after its acquisition under Section 12 of the DPCR Act. Therefore, the exemption clause in the LA Act notification exempting evacuee property from acquisition did not apply to the subject land.

Additionally, the court held that the delivery of provisional possession created an encumbrance on the property, which could be subject to acquisition under the LA Act, even if the ownership vested in the Central Government. Consequently, the court set aside the order of the High Court and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

The case revolved around the alleged murder of the deceased, Manoj, who was last seen alive in the company of the appellants. The prosecution contended that the appellants murdered Manoj for the money he was carrying. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and the "last seen theory."

Issues:

Whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence and the "last seen theory."

Held:

The court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. Several doubts and inconsistencies emerged during the examination of witnesses and the circumstances surrounding the case. Despite relying on the "last seen theory," the time gap between the alleged last sighting and the recovery of the body was significant, casting doubt on the prosecution's case. Additionally, no corroborative evidence supported the theory.

As a result, the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. This decision underscores the importance of thorough investigation and conclusive evidence in criminal proceedings.

Facts:

Ravindra Kumar Shrivastava, the appellant, was initially employed as a daily wager in the Forest Department before 1990. His service was regularized as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC).

In 1992, he was made in charge of Office Steno, and in 2002, he was absorbed as a Steno-typist. Subsequently, in 2003, he was promoted to the position of Stenographer.

However, his promotion to Stenographer was canceled on the grounds that he did not meet the eligibility criterion of having worked continuously as a Steno-typist for five years before promotion.

Issues:

Whether the appellant fulfilled the eligibility criteria for promotion to the position of Stenographer.

Whether the cancellation of the appellant's promotion was justified.

Held:

The State Government's letter dated 23.02.1989 prescribed the criterion for promotion to the post of Stenographer, requiring five years of experience as a Steno-typist and passing the shorthand and typing exam. The appellant passed the exam only in 2000, and he was absorbed as a Steno-typist in 2002. Therefore, he became eligible for promotion to the position of Stenographer only in 2007.

Although the Divisional Forest Officer recommended seniority for the appellant as a Steno-typist from 1998, there was no official acceptance of this recommendation. Thus, he could not claim seniority from that year.

The High Court rightly held that the appellant did not satisfy the eligibility criteria of having continuously worked for a period of five years as Steno-typist before being promoted as Stenographer. The impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference exercising jurisdiction Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.

Facts: The case involved a dispute regarding the restoration of land to persons belonging to scheduled tribes under the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974.

Issues: The main issue revolved around the validity of the revisional proceedings initiated under the Act and the interpretation of the statutory provisions concerning the restoration of land to scheduled tribes.

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for fresh consideration. It emphasized the importance of impleading all necessary parties, including the State of Maharashtra and the relevant authorities, for a proper defense and effective assistance in cases concerning welfare legislations for scheduled tribes. The Court clarified the scope of revisional powers under the Act and directed the High Court to reconsider the writ petition, ensuring the inclusion of all necessary parties. It urged expedited disposal of the case within six months.

Facts:

The election schedule for General Election 2012 of Councilors under the Act was published on February 2, 2012.

Smita Subhash Sawant (the Appellant) and Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin (Respondent No. 1) contested the election from Ward No. 76 for Municipal Corporator.

The election was held on February 16, 2012, and the results were declared on February 17, 2012.

Respondent No. 1 filed Election Petition No. 129 of 2012 on February 28, 2012, challenging the election of the Appellant.

The main contention was whether the petition was filed within the limitation period prescribed by Section 33(1) of the Act.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 33(1) regarding the starting point of the limitation period for filing an election petition.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the list prescribed under Section 28(k) of the Act was available for sale or inspection on February 17, 2012.

Therefore, the limitation period for filing the election petition began on February 17, 2012, and ended on February 27, 2012.

Since the election petition was filed on February 28, 2012, it was beyond the limitation period and thus barred by limitation.

The Court emphasized that Section 33(1) is controlled by Section 28(k) only and does not include Section 10 or 32 for deciding the limitation issue.

It highlighted the importance of interpreting the statute's language plainly and unambiguously, without adding or subtracting any words.

The appeal was allowed, and the election petition filed by Respondent No. 1 was dismissed as barred by limitation, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1968. It concerns a show cause notice issued to an agent by the SubDivisional Controller, Food and Supplies (SCFS), regarding discrepancies in the distribution of superior kerosene oil.

Issues:

The competent authority to initiate disciplinary action as per.

The jurisdiction to cancel or suspend licenses of agents and dealers.

The time limit for passing orders under.

Held:

The power to grant licenses to agents and dealers is different under Paragraphs 5 and 6 respectively. The Director alone has the authority to grant a license to an agent, while the license of a dealer can be granted by either the Director or the District Magistrate.

The jurisdiction to cancel or suspend licenses is vested in the Director and the District Magistrate, as per a composite paragraph. However, a harmonious reading of the provisions indicates that the authority who grants the license should have the authority to cancel or suspend it.

A purposive interpretation of the Control Order is necessary to uphold legislative intent and avoid absurd results. It would be incongruous to allow a District Magistrate to cancel or suspend a license granted by the Director.

The term "District Magistrate having jurisdiction" in Paragraph 6 refers to the same authority who has the power to grant licenses to dealers. Thus, the Director alone has the authority to issue show cause notices and pass orders under Paragraph 9.

Orders under Paragraph 9 must be passed within 30 days from the date of serving the show cause notice or suspension of the license. The order comes into effect upon communication to the agent or dealer.

Interpreting the words "date of the order" in Paragraph 10 purposively, it is concluded that the order's effectiveness is determined by its communication to the concerned party. Nullifying orders based on communication delays would frustrate the purpose of the Control Order.

Decision: The order issued by SCFS remains valid, and the respondent is granted liberty to prefer an appeal within the prescribed period to the State Government.

Facts:

The Assessee, a Public Charitable Trust, filed its return for the Assessment Year 1994-95 declaring 'nil' taxable income, claiming deductions under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act.

The Assessing Officer allowed the deduction for actual expenditure made by the Trust but denied the deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes as it exceeded 25% of the total income.

The Assessee appealed against the denial of deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes.

Issues:

Whether the Assessee is entitled to deductions for actual expenditure and for setting apart a portion of income for charitable purposes under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act?

What is the interpretation of the provisions of Section 11 regarding the deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes?

Held:

The Court outlined the three stages for claiming deduction from income under Section 11, namely actual expenditure, setting apart 25% of total income, and investment in Government securities for the remaining amount.

The Court held that the Assessee's option exercised in the return itself for setting apart an amount exceeding 25% of the total income was erroneous. The deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes should be limited to 25% of the total income.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the lower courts, and directed the Assessing Officer to recompute the taxable income in accordance with the judgment, limiting the deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes to 25% of the total income.

Facts:

The appellant, Lloyd Electric and Engineering Limited, disputed the liability to pay Central Sales Tax (CST) at a rate of 2 percent or 1 percent for the period from April 1, 2009, to June 17, 2009, based on the Industrial Policy of the State of Himachal Pradesh.

The Industrial Policy provided for a concessional rate of CST at 1 percent for eligible industrial units until March 31, 2009. The government decided to extend this concession until March 31, 2013, or until CST was phased out.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is liable to pay CST at 2 percent or 1 percent for the period from April 1, 2009, to June 17, 2009, based on the State's Industrial Policy.

Interpretation of notifications issued by the Excise and Taxation Department regarding the applicability of the concessional CST rate.

Held:

Defines the decision of the Court: "The State Government cannot speak in two voices. Once the Cabinet takes a policy decision to extend its 2004 Industrial Policy in the matter of CST concession to the eligible units beyond 31.03.2009, upto 31.03.2013, and the Notification dated 29.05.2009, accordingly, having been issued by the Department concerned, viz., Department of Industries, thereafter, the Excise and Taxation Department cannot take a different stand.

Concludes the decision: "Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside. It is declared that the Appellant shall be entitled to the concessional rate of CST @ 1 per cent with effect from 01.04.2009 till 31.03.2013 until it is duly varied by the State Government.