FACTS:

The appeals involved BSNL appealing against judgments that dismissed its original suits on the grounds of being time-barred. BSNL contended that as a central government company, it should benefit from an extended limitation period for filing suits.

ISSUES:

Whether BSNL, as a central government company, is entitled to a longer limitation period for filing suits.

Whether the tribunal's finding on the limitation period regarding demand notices issued to a respondent was correct.

HELD:

The Court rejected BSNL's argument that it should benefit from a longer limitation period as a central government company. It emphasized that BSNL, despite being controlled by the central government, is a separate legal entity and cannot avail itself of the extended limitation period applicable to the central government. Additionally, since BSNL had not filed the suit on behalf of the central government, the longer limitation period did not apply. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The court also upheld the tribunal's finding regarding the limitation period for demand notices issued to a respondent. It stated that the tribunal's decision was based on relevant clauses of the interconnect agreement between the parties and was not erroneous. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

Master Satyam Gandhi, the appellant, sought admission to Class XI in St. Jones School, Chandigarh, after passing Class X.

He expressed a preference for the medical stream but was denied admission due to his pre-board exam results.

The school offered him admission to the commerce stream, which he refused.

Master Gandhi filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking admission to Class XI, which was dismissed.

He appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was unfairly denied admission to Class XI in the school.

Whether the refusal of admission to the appellant was justified based on his pre-board results and aptitude test.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court to dismiss the appellant's writ petition. The Court found that the school had offered admission to the appellant in the commerce stream, which he declined. It was established that the appellant had applied for admission to the medical stream, but due to his marks in the pre-board results and aptitude test, he was found ineligible for that stream. The Court noted that the appellant had the option to accept admission to the commerce stream but chose not to. Therefore, there was no basis for the Court to interfere with the High Court's decision.

Facts:

Soni Kumari and Deepak Kumar filed a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Family Court allowed the first motion for divorce but rejected the prayer for waiving the statutory period of six months prescribed under Section 13-B(2) of the Act for filing the second motion.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to waive the cooling-off period in the case of divorce by mutual consent.

Held:

In this case, the Supreme Court invoked its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to waive the cooling-off period of six months and grant a decree of mutual divorce to the parties. The Court found it to be a fit case for exercising this power to do complete justice between the parties. The Court referred to previous decisions where it had waived the cooling-off period in similar situations to provide relief and complete justice.

The Court emphasized the importance of considering the settlement between the parties and ensuring that there is no collusion or coercion involved. It held that in cases of irreconcilable situations, it is within the Court's authority to waive the statutory period to grant relief to the parties.

This decision aligns with previous cases where the Supreme Court has exercised its powers under Article 142 to grant relief in divorce proceedings, ensuring fairness and justice to the parties involved.

Facts:The case involves criminal appeals stemming from an incident in which Lalit Suneja was shot dead by two unknown persons. The prosecution alleged that Nitin Shah and others conspired to eliminate Lalit Suneja due to a business dispute. The primary evidence relied upon by the prosecution was a complaint allegedly filed by the deceased, Lalit Suneja.

Issues:

Authenticity of the complaint filed by Lalit Suneja.

Existence of a conspiracy to eliminate Lalit Suneja.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

In light of the discrepancies and lack of evidence presented by the prosecution, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the judgment of the High Court. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity of the complaint and establish the essential elements of the conspiracy. The absence of corroborative evidence and the doubts regarding key aspects of the case led to the dismissal of the appeals.

Facts:

The appellant, a Zilla Parishad member, was disqualified by the District Collector-cum-Presiding Officer due to alleged violation of party whips in an election. The appellant challenged the disqualification through various legal channels, leading to conflicting interim orders by different courts. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court for final adjudication.

Issues:

Whether the interim orders issued by the High Court were legally sustainable.

Whether the appellant's disqualification from the post of Chairperson was valid.

Whether the Division Bench's directions to remove the appellant from office were justified.

Held:

The Court held that the interim orders issued by the Division Bench of the High Court were legally unsustainable. The court emphasized that the District Court was empowered to pass appropriate interim orders regarding the appellant's disqualification until the election petitions were disposed of. The court found that the appellant's assumption of office as Chairperson, pursuant to the order of the Single Judge, was valid. The Division Bench's direction to remove the appellant from office and appoint the Vice-Chairperson in his place was deemed untenable and perverse. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and directed that the election petitions be decided within three months. All pending appeals and petitions before the High Court were disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved accused individuals who allegedly availed loans from multiple banks by submitting forged documents. FIRs were filed against them, leading to criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether settlements between the accused and banks justify the quashing of criminal proceedings, the validity of the accused's claim of ignorance regarding transactions, and the applicability of inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings.

Held:

The Court rejected the accused's claim of ignorance and emphasized that lack of awareness, knowledge, or intent is not a valid defense in economic offenses. The offense remains gender-neutral, and the gender of the accused cannot influence the application of criminal law.

The Court underscored the seriousness of financial crimes, noting their societal impacts and the grave consequences for institutions and society at large. It emphasized the importance of ensuring a speedy trial for such offenses and rejected the principle of quashing proceedings merely to reduce the load on the justice system.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the trial magistrate to proceed with the case in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of cruelty and harassment against the appellants, who are the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased. The deceased faced significant mistreatment from her husband and in-laws, leading to her death by consuming poison. The prosecution contended that the accused subjected the deceased to cruelty due to dowry demands and other issues, ultimately leading to her suicide. The trial court and the High Court convicted the appellants under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC based on the evidence presented.

Issues:

Whether the courts below correctly convicted and sentenced the accused for the offenses under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC?

What is the appropriate order to be passed based on the evidence and legal arguments presented?

Held:

The court upheld the conviction under Section 498A for cruelty, as ample evidence was presented to establish the harassment faced by the deceased. However, the court found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused abetted the deceased in committing suicide, as per Section 306 of the IPC. Therefore, the conviction and sentence under Section 306 were set aside. The court modified the sentence for the offense under Section 498A, considering the age and circumstances of the accused, directing that the period already spent in custody would suffice as punishment.

Facts:

The case involved a reassessment notice issued under section 21(2) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, dated March 13, 2002, seeking reassessment for the assessment year 1990-91, which had been completed on March 25, 1995.

Issues:

Whether the reassessment notice issued beyond the limitation period is valid under the amended proviso of section 21(2) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948?

Interpretation of the amended proviso and its implications for the assessment and reassessment under the Act.

Held:

The period of limitation for reassessment under section 21(1) and the first proviso is to be counted from the end of the relevant assessment year, i.e., March 31, 1991.

The amendment to the proviso on April 30, 2001, substituted the previous provision with "six years from the end of such year or March 31, 2002, whichever is later." Assessments or reassessments cannot be made after the expiry of six years, and the assessment cannot be made solely by March 31, 2002, irrespective of the assessment year.

The law in force in the assessment year is to be applied unless there is an amendment with retrospective operation. The amendment aimed to balance the interests of both the assessee and the revenue.

Decision: The initiation of reassessment was not valid as it was barred by limitation. Therefore, the appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to Criminal Appeal Nos. 1187-1188 of 2015. The appellant, AG, sought recall of prosecution witnesses in a matter concerning the commission of rape.

Issues:

Whether recall of prosecution witnesses was justified at the stage when the statement of the accused had been recorded.

Whether the previous defense counsel's alleged incompetence warranted the recall of witnesses.

Whether the interest of society and expeditious trial in sensitive cases like rape should outweigh the convenience of recalling witnesses.

Held:

Emphasizes that while the advancement of justice is paramount, recall cannot be permitted merely for convenience. It underscores the presumption of competence for appointed counsel and warns against the potential consequences of allowing retrials on every change of counsel (Para 15, 16).

Highlights the urgency of fast-tracking trials in sensitive cases and questions the necessity of recalling witnesses based on counsel's alleged incompetence. It rejects the notion that the accused's suffering in custody justifies recall (Para 22, 26, 27).

Stresses the importance of a fair trial while considering the hardship on witnesses and the risk of undue delay. It criticizes the lack of specific reasons for recalling witnesses and asserts that recall should not be arbitrary (Para 27).

Disapproves of the High Court's decision to allow recall without sufficient justification, noting inconsistencies between the trial court's reasoning and the High Court's conclusion (Para 28).

Outlines reasons for disapproving the High Court's view, including the presumption of competent counsel, the urgency of expeditious trials, and the lack of prejudice to the accused if witnesses are not recalled (Para 29).

Sets aside the High Court's order and dismisses the application for recall of witnesses (Para 30).