Facts:

The delinquent employee was under probation.

A complaint challenging his appointment was lodged, alleging he lacked the requisite qualifications.

An ex parte vigilance enquiry was conducted behind the back of the employee.

Stigmatic remarks were made during the enquiry process.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the employee's service during probation was simpliciter or punitive.

Whether the conduct of an ex parte enquiry and the presence of stigmatic remarks violated the principles of natural justice.

Held:

The Court ruled that if misconduct or misdemeanour forms the basis for the final decision to terminate the probationer's service, even if done through a non-stigmatic order, it can be considered punitive rather than a simple termination.

Conducting an ex parte enquiry behind the back of the employee and making stigmatic remarks constitute a clear violation of principles of natural justice.

The termination in this case was not simpliciter but punitive, as it was based on misconduct allegations and violated principles of natural justice.

The appellant is directed to be reinstated in service within six weeks, with entitlement to 50% of his salary to be paid within that period.

Decision: The Court allows the appeal and directs the reinstatement of the appellant in service with 50% salary payment within six weeks.

Facts:

The dispute arose between Sumer Builders Pvt. Ltd., the appellant-developer, and Narendra Goran, the respondent, regarding possession of land situated in Indore. The respondent had handed over possession of the land to the appellant to start construction work. However, a dispute ensued between the parties.

Issues:

The core issue revolved around the possession of the land.

The appellant claimed exclusive possession based on a development agreement, while the respondent asserted that they had taken over possession.

Held:

The Court, comprising Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant, observed that Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, excludes Sections 16, 17, and 20 from application to the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction. Therefore, as far as the Bombay High Court is concerned, Clause 12 of the Letters Patent would govern the controversy.

The dispute was primarily about possession of the land, as evidenced by correspondences and the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Any order passed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act would directly impact the land, indicating that it falls within the category of a "suit for land" under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the revocation of the earlier granted leave. It upheld the determination that the dispute was indeed embedded in the possession of the land and fell within the category of a "suit for land" under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Facts:

The landlords purchased a property in Barshi town, occupied by the tenant.

Tenant contested eviction, claiming no rent was payable until "standard rent" was determined.

Tenant argued against eviction on grounds of non-payment of rent, asserting he had made a payment to the landlords' uncle.

Landlords claimed they needed the property for their betel-nuts and betel-leaves business.

Tenant argued against landlords' bona fide need, stating they were joint with their father and uncle in residence and business.

Issues:

Whether rent was payable by the tenant pending determination of "standard rent".

Whether the landlords had a bona fide need for the property for their own business.

Held:

Rent was payable by the tenant despite the pending determination of "standard rent". The court found the tenant's argument regarding a payment made to the landlords' uncle insufficient to absolve him from defaulting on rent.

The landlords had a bona fide need for the property for their own business purposes. The court determined that the landlords had purchased the property specifically for their betel-nuts and betel-leaves business and had no evidence suggesting alternative business engagements at the time of filing the suit.

The court examined comparative hardship between the parties and found that the landlords had alternative sources of income, while the tenant's livelihood was primarily dependent on the property in question. Based on these findings, the court set aside previous orders and allowed the landlords' appeal, directing the tenant to vacate the premises by a specified date.

Facts:

The appellant, N. Sunkanna, was accused of offenses under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, a Deputy Tahsildar, collected illegal payments from fair price shop dealers in Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh.

The complainant initially supported the prosecution's case but later disowned his complaint during the trial.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the appellant's demand for illegal gratification.

Whether the legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act could be applied in the absence of proof of demand.

Held:

The court held that the prosecution failed to provide evidence of the appellant's demand for illegal gratification. Mere possession and recovery of currency notes from the accused were not sufficient to prove the offense under Section 7 without proof of demand.

The legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act, allowing presumption of acceptance of illegal gratification, is based on proof of demand. Since there was no proof of demand, the presumption could not be applied. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the appellant's conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, and acquitted him of the charges.

Facts:

The Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) conducted the 53rd to 55th Combined (Mains) Competitive Examinations, 2011. The appellants challenged the results, alleging that the BPSC had moderated marks instead of scaling them down, contrary to directives from the High Court in a previous order. They argued that this moderation method was inappropriate because the examinations included optional papers in different subjects.

Issues:

Whether the BPSC's methodology for evaluating the examination answer-scripts was appropriate.

Whether the High Court's directives and the precedent case of Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and Another, governed the evaluation process.

Held:

The Court held that the BPSC's methodology for evaluating the answer-scripts was within its discretion and did not warrant judicial intervention. It emphasized that the choice between moderation and scaling should depend on various factors and be left to expert bodies like public service commissions.

The Court dismissed the appeals, stating that the BPSC had acted diligently and without malice. It also noted that there was no gross or palpable unreasonableness in the BPSC's decision. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioner, a police officer, filed a writ petition seeking the transfer of investigation to either the CBI or an SIT outside the control of the Chief Minister of Gujarat. Allegations included involvement of the then Chief Minister of Gujarat in the 2002 riots, and claims of retaliation through a criminal case against the petitioner. The petitioner remained silent for nine years regarding a critical meeting on February 27, 2002, and failed to disclose relevant emails. The petitioner's conduct raised questions, especially regarding the withholding of crucial information.

Issues:

The petitioner's conduct, allegations of leaking sensitive information by the SIT, and the scope of inquiry concerning specific allegations against the petitioner.

The court also addresses the issue of criminal contempt in relation to the petitioner's actions.

Held:

The petitioner's failure to disclose information about the critical meeting and relevant emails demonstrates a lack of clean hands. The petitioner's explanation for the omission is not credible.

The petitioner's failure to disclose relevant emails at the appropriate time indicates questionable conduct. The explanation offered for the delay in disclosure is not satisfactory.

The scope of inquiry is limited to specific allegations, and the issues raised by the petitioner do not warrant the involvement of an SIT. Investigation into affidavit preparation and email hacking is not justified.

The SIT's investigation concluded that the petitioner was not present at the critical meeting on February 27, 2002. There is no basis for constituting a new SIT to revisit this aspect.

Allegations of leaking sensitive information by the SIT are baseless. The petitioner's attempt to mislead the court and suppress relevant information is condemned.

The scope of the case does not warrant an SIT investigation. The chargesheet has been filed, and the investigation has been thorough. The petitioner's attempts to widen the scope of the case are unfounded.

The court reiterates that the accused does not have the right to choose the investigating machinery. The allegations raised by the petitioner do not justify the involvement of the SIT or the CBI.

The petitioner's conduct does not merit special treatment, and investigation must proceed according to the law. No monitoring of the case is deemed necessary.

The petitioner's submission regarding the transfer of investigation after the chargesheet is filed is untenable. The court emphasizes the need for adherence to legal procedures.

Consulting knowledgeable individuals before filing court documents does not constitute criminal conspiracy. The petitioner's allegations of criminal contempt are not substantiated.

The petitioner's actions do not amount to criminal contempt or interference with the administration of justice. Sharing information with an advocate-politician does not constitute contempt. The petitioner's conduct regarding the sharing of information does not constitute criminal contempt. The court emphasizes the need for evidence of intent to aid the accused.

The exchange of emails between the parties does not interfere with the administration of justice or constitute contempt.

The applications for criminal contempt are barred by limitation and lack merit.

As a chargesheet has been filed, the trial court is directed to proceed accordingly. The investigation into email hacking should be expedited.

Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of land by the State of Haryana for Haryana Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HSIIDC). The Manesar Industries Welfare Association, an association of beneficiaries of the land acquisition, contested the compensation enhancement based on a sale deed allegedly involving inflated prices by two companies.

Issues:

The maintainability of the curative petition filed by the Manesar Industries Welfare Association.

Held:

The Court found the curative petition to be misconceived and vexatious. It upheld the objections raised by the Registry regarding the non-maintainability of the petition. Additionally, costs of Rs. One lac were imposed on the Applicant, payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority. These costs were suspended but would become immediately payable if further litigation on the same subject matter was initiated by the Applicant or any of its members.

Facts:

Notifications issued in 1992 and 1993 by the State Government for land acquisition.

Award determining compensation made in 1995, but compensation not paid to the Appellant.

Compensation deposited in the Government Treasury, not in the Reference Court.

Appellant challenged acquisition in High Court, which was dismissed.

Appeal made to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 lapses under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Compliance with provisions regarding compensation payment or deposit.

Held:

The Court concluded that acquisition proceedings concerning the Appellant's land lapsed with the enactment of the Act. The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and it was held that the acquisition proceedings initiated through the notifications in 1992 and 1993, followed by the award in 1995, lapsed only concerning the Appellant.

The Court referred to previous judgments, including Pune Municipal Corporation case, where it was held that the mere deposit of compensation in the Treasury does not suffice.

Facts:

The case involves an employee who resigned after completing 23 years and 7 months of service with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) at the age of 50. Subsequently, the LIC notified the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995, with retrospective effect. The employee sought pension benefits as per these rules, which was denied by the employer and lower courts.

Issues:

Whether the employee is entitled to pension benefits despite resigning from service.

The interpretation of resignation versus retirement under the relevant rules and regulations.

The application of beneficial legislation in favor of employees' entitlement to pension benefits.

Held:

The court held that the employee should not be deprived of pension benefits merely because he resigned instead of retiring.

It was established that resignation and retirement have distinct connotations, with retirement requiring completion of qualifying service and adherence to extant rules and regulations.

Despite the absence of a provision for voluntary retirement at the relevant time, the employee's resignation could be construed as voluntary retirement under Rule 31 of the Pension Rules, 1995.

The court emphasized the need to interpret the rules in a manner that extends benefits to employees, in line with the objectives of beneficial legislation (Para 6).

Delay in claiming pension benefits would not thwart the claim, as long as it does not adversely affect settled third-party rights. However, relief regarding arrears of pension would be restricted to three years prior to the filing of the case.

The employee is entitled to pension benefits, subject to refunding the entire amount of the corporation's contribution to the Provident Fund along with accrued interest, as per the Pension Rules of 1995.