Facts:

The Appellants were owners and landholders of vacant lands in Gujarat.

The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force in August 1976.

Appellants filed returns as required under Section 6 of the Act in 1976.

Notifications were issued under Section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, declaring certain lands as excess land.

Landholders filed appeals, and the Urban Land Tribunal dismissed the appeal in 1988.

A corrigendum was allegedly issued in 1989, substituting different plot numbers.

Possession of the land was claimed to be taken over based on the corrigendum.

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 came into force in March 1999.

Landholders filed a petition challenging the dispossession in 2000.

Issues:

Whether the corrigendum effectively changed the status of the excess land.

Whether the dispossession complied with the mandatory requirements of the Act.

Effect of the Repeal Act, 1999 on the landholders' right to possession.

Held:

The State failed to establish voluntary surrender or forceful dispossession as required under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.( Paragraph 23)

The handwritten corrigendum and panchnama were not given effect to, and the Respondent-State did not come with clean hands.( Paragraph 24)

Arithmetical and clerical mistakes cannot be corrected by a corrigendum without complying with statutory requirements.( Paragraph 25)

The mentioning of incorrect plot numbers in statutory notifications cannot be corrected by issuing a hand-written corrigendum.( Paragraph 26)

The writ petition is not barred by res judicata, as the previous petition did not address the issue of dispossession and the effect of the Repeal Act.( Paragraph 27)

The appeal is allowed, and the Appellants are entitled to retain possession of the land as it is not vested in the State.( Paragraph 28)

Referred Cases:

Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1019

Shiv Chander More Vs. Lieutenant Governor, (2014) 11 SCC 744

State of Kerala Vs. P.J. Joseph, AIR 1958 SC 296

State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280

Facts:

The Appellant filed a second complaint to the District Forum after the first complaint was dismissed for default or non-prosecution. The National Commission had initially held that the second complaint would not be maintainable.

Issues:

Whether a second complaint under the Consumer Protection Act could be filed when the first complaint had been dismissed for default.

Held:

The court, referring to New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan, (2000) 3 SCC 242, observed that the relevant rules (Tamil Nadu Consumer Protection Rules) did not contain a provision similar to Order 9 Rule 9(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, prohibiting a second suit on the same cause of action after dismissal in default.

The court held that the rule of prohibition in Order 9 Rule 9(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be extended to proceedings before the District Forum or the State Commission. Since the first complaint was dismissed in default and not on merits, the court concluded that it would be permissible to file a second complaint explaining the reasons for non-pursuit of the earlier complaint.

Decision: The second complaint filed by the Appellant was deemed maintainable on the facts of this case.

Referred Cases:

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. R. Srinivasan, (2000) 3 SCC 242

Facts:

The 5th respondent worked in the appellant school for two months and 19 days in 1997-1998.

In 2010, a vacancy for the post of High School Assistant arose due to a teacher's retirement.

The 6th respondent was appointed to the position, and the 5th respondent challenged this appointment.

Issues:

Whether the 5th respondent is entitled to preferential appointment based on prior engagement in the school.

Impact of the amendment to Rule 7A(3) on the claim for preferential appointment.

Held:

Vested Right and Amendment: The court rejected the argument that the 5th respondent acquired a vested right after the amendment to Rule 7A(3). The amendment stipulated that a qualified teacher must be engaged in a vacancy lasting for one full academic year.

Principles of Interpretation: Emphasizing principles of interpretation, the court stated that a vested right must originate in a proceeding where it crystallized. Such a right can be taken away by a subsequent enactment if expressly provided.

Timing of Claim Initiation: The court noted that between 1998 and 2010, there was no opportunity for the 5th respondent to initiate a claim based on the unamended Rule 7A(3). Therefore, any claim of a vested right as of 1998 is not sustainable.

Requirement of Amended Rule 7A(3): Interpreting the amended Rule 7A(3), the court held that for preferential appointment, a qualified teacher must satisfy the requirement that the engagement lasted for one clear academic year. Since the 5th respondent did not meet this requirement, her claim is disallowed.

Conclusion: The relief granted by the High Court was set aside, and the order of the 1st respondent was also set aside. The law prevailing at the time of the 5th respondent's claim in 2010 (amended Rule 7A(3)) was upheld. The appeals stand allowed.

Referred Cases:

Abdurahiman Vs. Government of Kerala, (2009) 2 KLT 105

Commissioner of Income Tax Central-I, New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Private Limited, (2015) 1 SCC 1

Garikapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540

Maya Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 KLT 99

State of Kerala Vs. Sneha Cheriyan, (2013) 5 SCC 160

State of Maharashtra Vs. Vishnu Ramchandra, (1961) 2 SCR 26

Facts:

The appellant's husband, a sitting MLA of the U.P. State Assembly, was murdered in broad daylight. The appellant named respondent no. 5 as the assailant in the FIR, alleging a conspiracy involving respondent no. 4. The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition seeking a CBI investigation, leading to this appeal.

Issues:

Effectiveness of the ongoing investigation by state police.

Perceived involvement of state administration and police in the crime.

Allegations of a conspiracy to eliminate the appellant's husband.

Held:

The court emphasizes that if an investigation is neither effective nor purposeful nor fair, it is the solemn obligation of the courts to order further investigation. No inflexible guidelines are set, and the decision depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.(Paragraph 76)

Fair trial includes fair investigation, and if the investigation lacks fairness, the court can order further investigation to prevent a miscarriage of justice. No rigid rules are prescribed; the decision depends on the advancement of justice. (Paragraph 79)

The court acknowledges the gruesome assassination of the appellant's husband, attempts on his life prior to the incident, and representations made for additional protection. The appellant sought CBI investigation due to imputations, including police indifference and political pressure. (Paragraph 90)

Pleaded imputations include the replacement of security officers, high police officials' presence, and hasty conduct of post-mortem. The court notes the terrorizing impact on society and media coverage. (Paragraph 91)

Witnesses cited by the investigating agency have resiled from their statements, casting doubt on the efficiency of the investigation. The court stays the trial and emphasizes that the pendency of the trial is not a disarming factor for ordering a CBI investigation. (Paragraph 92)

The court discusses the choice of letting the ongoing trial drift or embarking on a de novo investigation to prevent the offense going unpunished. Exceptionally agonizing incidents warrant extra-ordinary attention for justice.(Paragraph 93)

Notwithstanding the trial's pendency, the court deems it imperative to entrust the investigation to the CBI to rule out denial of justice and instill confidence. The court emphasizes its role in the quest for truth.(Paragraph 94)

The CBI is entrusted with a de novo investigation due to exceptional features of the case. The court clarifies that this decision is made in view of the demonstrated necessity.(Paragraph 95)

The CBI is given six months to submit its report, and the trial court is instructed to conduct and conclude the trial within six months after receiving the CBI report. The interim order staying the ongoing trial is made absolute.(Paragraph 96)

Referred Cases:

Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225

Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254

Bharati Tamang Vs. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578

Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 667

Disha Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 13 SCC 337

Gudalure M.J. Cherian Vs. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 397

Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81

Inder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 6 SCC 275

Jennison Vs. Baker, (1972) 1 All ER 997

Jones Vs. National Coal Board, (1957) 2 All ER 155 CA

K. Saravanan Karuppasamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014) 10 SCC 406

K.V. Rajendran Vs. Superintendent of Police, CBCID South Zone, Chennai, (2013) 12 SCC 480

Karnel Singh Vs. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518

Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569

Kashmeri Devi Vs. Delhi Administration, (1988) Sup SCC 482

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532

Manu Sharma Vs. State NCT of Delhi, (2010) 6 SCC 1

Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira dead through L.Rs, (2012) 5 SCC 370

Mohd. Hussain alias Julfikar Ali Vs. State Government of NCT of Delhi, (2012) 9 SCC 408

National Human Rights Commission Vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 767

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578

Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association, Chandigarh through its Secretary Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 1 SCC 616

Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517

Rattiram Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 516

Ritesh Tewari Vs. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 677

Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 2 SCC 200

Samaj Parivartan Samudaya Vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 7 SCC 407

Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya, (2002) 5 SCC 521

State of Bihar Vs. JAC Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554

State of M.P. Vs. Bhooraji, (2001) 7 SCC 679

State of West Bengal Vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, (2010) 3 SCC 571

State of West Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal, (1985) 1 SCC 317

Sudipta Lenka Vs. State of Odisha, (2014) 11 SCC 527

Union of India Vs. Sushil Kumar Modi, (1998) 8 SCC 661

Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355

Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali @ Deepak, (2013) 5 SCC 762

Vineet Narain Vs. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 199

Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220

Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158

Facts:

The appellant, BUSSA OVERSEAS & PROPERTIES (P) LTD. & ANR., filed a refund claim under Section 27 of the Customs Act. The claim was dismissed by the department, citing non-compliance with formalities under the said provision. The appellant then pursued legal remedies, including a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed, and a subsequent review petition, which was also dismissed.

Issues:

The dismissal of the appellant's refund claim by the department, leading to subsequent legal challenges. The issues include the maintainability of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the order passed in the review petition.

Held:

The court held that the SLP was not maintainable. Reference was made to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The court clarified that when the prayer for review is dismissed, there is no merger, and the main order remains valid. The principle was established that if the basic judgment is not contested, and the challenge is only against the order passed in review, the court may not entertain such an SLP.

Decision: The court, in dismissing the appeal, emphasized that if the primary judgment is not challenged, and the review order is the only subject of challenge, the court may not entertain a Special Leave Petition. The decision underscores the importance of challenging the primary judgment rather than focusing solely on the order passed in review.

Referred Cases:

Abhishek Malviya Vs. Welfare Commr, (2008) 3 SCC 108

Alcatel Modi Net Works Systems Vs. Commissioner of Customs, (2000) 117 ELT 522 Tribunal

Caledonian Railway Co. Vs. Walker's Trustees, (1882) 7 App Cas 259 : 46 LT 826 HL

Collector of Central Excise Vs. India Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd., (1997) 94 ELT 495 Mad

Durga Shankar Mehta Vs. Thakur Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520

Eastern Coalfields Limited Vs. Dugal Kumar, (2008) 14 SCC 295

Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. A.P. Jaiswal, AIR 2001 SC 499

Green View Tea & Industries Vs. Collector, (2004) 4 SCC 122

Hindustan Metal Pressing Works Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2003) 153 ELT 15 SC

K. Rajamouli Vs. A.V.K.N. Swamy, (2001) 5 SCC 37

Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207

Kunhyammed Vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 129 ELT 11 SC

M.N. Haider Vs. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, (2004) 13 SCC 677

Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1997) 89 ELT 247 S.C

Mahendra Saree Emporium II Vs. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC 481

New India Industries Vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 B.C.R. 515

Quinn Vs. Leathem, (1901) AC 495

Ravi alias Ravichandran Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2007) 15 SCC 372

S.P. Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124

Sandhya Educational Society Vs. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 701

Shanker Motiram Nale Vs. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753

Shiv Charan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 370

State of Assam Vs. Ripa Sarma, (2013) 3 SCC 63

Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675

Suseel Finance & Leasing Co. Vs. M. Lata, (2004) 13 SCC 675

Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372

Union of India Vs. Jain Spinners Ltd., (1992) 61 ELT 321 SC

Union Carbide Corpn. Vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584

Vinod Kapoor Vs. State of Goa, (2012) 12 SCC 378

Facts:

The appeal involves the enforceability of an agreement to sell dated 6.1.1995 for the allotment of a plot by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

The agreement details the receipt of Rs. 2,30,000 against the alternative plot recommended for allotment to the Defendant-Respondent.

Trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity and enforceability of the agreement to sell.

Discrepancies in the total sale consideration and suit valuation.

Defendant's deposit with DDA exceeding the agreed amount.

Allotment of land being non-transferable for ten years.

Held:

The court held that the lower courts failed to consider the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and relevant legal principles. The critical issue was whether a valid and enforceable contract existed. The court, referring to Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, emphasized that specific performance is contingent on the presence of such a contract. Notably, the court highlighted discrepancies, including a higher deposit made by the Defendant with the DDA and the non-transferable nature of the allotted land.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, concluding that no decree for specific performance could be passed based on the alleged receipt-cum-agreement. The Appellant was directed to refund Rs. 4,30,000 with 6% interest per annum to the Respondents within two months.

Referred Cases:

Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1

Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew Vs. Nedumbara Kuruivila's, AIR 1987 SC 2328

Facts:

The Indian Navy required submarine batteries for three types of submarines.

Initially imported, a decision was made to indigenize the production of these batteries.

The Director General Quality Assurance (DGQA) had a detailed procedure for developing critical spares.

Existing suppliers, including M/s. Exide Industries Ltd., were developed as indigenous manufacturers.

The government explored the possibility of developing another supplier (second source) for submarine batteries.

The Respondent claimed to have developed submarine batteries and sought a development order.

Issues:

The Respondent challenged the government's decision to issue an RFP only to M/s. Exide Industries Ltd.

The High Court directed the government to issue tenders for submarine batteries, challenging the monopoly of a single source.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that for defense critical spare parts like submarine batteries, an open advertisement inviting tenders was not appropriate. The government's policy of issuing development indents, developing the source under DGQA supervision, and registration with DGQA was upheld. The High Court's direction to issue tenders for critical spare parts was set aside. The appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Appellant, a construction company, entered into a contract with the Respondent for construction work.

Nature of the work changed due to unforeseen conditions, leading to additional expenses for the Appellant.

Appellant claimed Rs. 30 lakhs under various heads, filed a civil suit in 1993, and obtained a favorable decree from the trial court.

High Court reversed the trial court's decision, emphasizing adherence to the written contract terms.

Issues:

Whether the change in the nature of work justified the Appellant's claim for additional expenses.

The applicability of Clause 11 of the contract regarding extra work.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering evidence, held that the change in work was acknowledged by the Respondent's Deputy Manager during the trial.

Parties, in the interest of justice, cannot be expected to renegotiate and reframe terms when work had a specified timeframe.

The High Court erred in emphasizing Clause 11 to reverse the trial court's findings.

Modified the interest rate from 12% to 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realization.

Facts:

The case involves the transfer of mining rights from a partnership firm to a private limited company, followed by the unauthorized transfer of the entire shareholding to another company without state permission.

Issues:

The legality of the transfer of mining rights, the application of the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil, and the violation of rules governing mining leases.

Held:

The court holds that mining rights belong to the State and are regulated under the doctrine of public trust. Transferring mining lease for private benefit without corresponding benefit to the public or the State is impermissible (Para 22).

The doctrine of lifting the corporate veil is applicable not only for tax evasion but also to safeguard public interest. The corporate entity was used to conceal the real transaction of transferring the mining lease without statutory consent (Para 23 and 26).

While each transaction may seem lawful independently, the court finds the real nature of the transaction illegal, involving the sale of mining lease without statutory consent (Para 28 and 30).

The court emphasizes that the competent authority was entitled to full disclosure of facts for an informed decision to prevent private benefit at the expense of public property (Para 35).

The transfer of mining lease for private profit without the State's consent is void. The State must regulate such transfers in the best interest of the public (Para 33).

The State is directed to frame and notify its policy for the transfer of mining leases. Until then, the court orders the maintenance of the status quo (Para 34 and 37).

Referred Cases:

Amit Products India Ltd. Vs. Chief Engineer O&M Circle, (2005) 7 SCC 393

Amritlal Nathubhai Shah Vs. Union Govt. of India, (1976) 4 SCC 108

Aron Salomon Vs. Salomon & Company Limited, (1897) AC 22

Arun Kumar Agrawal Vs. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1

Bacha F. Guzdar Vs. CI, AIR 1955 SC 74

BALCO Employees' Union Vs. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333

Balwant Raj Saluja Vs. Air India Limited, (2014) 9 SCC 407

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skiper Construction Company P Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622

Electronics Corporation of India Limited Vs. Secretary, Revenue Department, (1999) 4 SCC 458

Geomin Minerals & Marketing Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (2013) 7 SCC 571

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 765

IRC Vs. Westminister, (1936) AC 1

LIC Vs. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264

Mc. Dowell & Co. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, (1985) 3 SCC 230

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

New Horizons Ltd. Vs. UOI, (1995) 1 SCC 478

Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Ministry of Environment and Forest, (2013) 6 SCC 476

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205

State of U.P. Vs. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59

The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd., (1967) 1 SCR 934

Union of India Vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1

Victorian Granites P Ltd. Vs. P.Rama Rao, (1996) 10 SCC 665

Vodafone International Holdings B.V. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613

W.T. Ramsay Vs. IRC, (1982) AC 300

Workmen Employed in Associated Rubber Industry Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 114