Facts:

The appellant-accused was convicted of murdering his daughter allegedly due to her marriage to a person of a lower caste. The trial court acquitted him, but the High Court convicted him under Section 304 Part I IPC, sentencing him to 10 years of imprisonment. The Supreme Court issued a show cause notice for enhancement of sentence, despite the accused's request to withdraw the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented, especially that of PW18, was reliable enough to convict the accused of murder under Section 302 IPC, and whether the appellant could withdraw his appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court decided against permitting the accused to withdraw the appeal, given the issuance of a show cause notice for enhancement of sentence. The Court must proceed with the substantive proceedings under the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and its plenary jurisdiction.

The evidence of PW18 was found to be reliable and truthful, corroborated by other circumstances and evidence. This included the recovery of a blood-stained sickle matching the blood group on the deceased's clothes, indicating the accused's responsibility for the murder.

None of the exceptions in Section 300 IPC were found to apply to the case, leading to the conclusion that the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his daughter.

Considering the circumstances, including the advanced pregnancy of the deceased, the Court ruled out the death penalty, sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment.

Accordingly, appeal filed by the accused is dismissed.

Facts:

Consignments were shipped to Bombay Port on a cash-against-documents basis. The consignees failed to lift the consignments, resulting in storage at the Port. The exporter sold the goods to the petitioner. The petitioner applied to Customs Authorities to file bills of entry and substitute bills of entry for the consignments. The Customs authority issued a detention certificate, mentioning detention for "bonafide operation of ITC formalities". The Port Trust issued demurrage charges for the storage of the goods.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was liable to pay demurrage charges for the period before acquiring title to the goods.

Whether the appellant was entitled to complete remission of demurrage charges due to delayed clearance by the Customs Department.

Held:

The Court held that the Port Trust's authority to recover dues was derived from various legal provisions, including the Contract Act, Bills of Lading Act, and Major Port Trusts Act.

The Court clarified that possession, not title, is crucial in bailment, and bailment can exist without a contractual relationship.

The petitioner, claiming through the consignor, was held liable for demurrage charges, as the Port Trust incurred expenses in connection with the bailment.

The Port Trust's decision to decline total remission of demurrage charges lacked rational consideration and sound policy. The Court set aside the decision and allowed the Port Trust to reconsider, ensuring proper reasons are recorded.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court affirmed the Port Trust's authority to recover dues, clarified liability for demurrage charges, and emphasized the need for rational decision-making regarding remission.

Facts:

Gruesome murder involving decapitation.

Accused convicted by Sessions Court based on motive, last seen theory, recovery of body, accused absconding, and false information.

High Court acquitted accused, citing incomplete chain of circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Whether motive, last seen theory, and other circumstantial evidence sufficiently establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Admissibility and credibility of evidence, including extra-judicial confessions.

Held:

Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we are of the view that it is very difficult for us to characterize the High Court judgment as perverse.

In our opinion, it seems that the motive for the crime has not been sufficiently made out.

The same goes for the last seen theory.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents is also correct in stating that though recovery may have taken place, the extra judicial confessions to PWs 6 and 7, in any case being weak evidence, cannot be relied upon in the facts and circumstances of the case.

According to us, it does seem that PW-6 is a stock witness and the fact that the confession was made at the Police Station renders it inadmissible in evidence.

This, being the case, the mere fact that the two accused may have absconded immediately and the fact that false information may have been given about the whereabouts of the deceased are not enough to complete the chain of circumstances, in a case like the present one. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Rajagopal (PW-1) was attacked and seriously injured by five accused persons armed with deadly weapons.

The attack resulted in severe injuries to Rajagopal, including fractures and the eventual amputation of both legs.

Despite several witnesses turning hostile, Rajagopal's testimony remained consistent and unshaken during cross-examination.

The medical evidence corroborated the severity of the injuries suffered by Rajagopal.

Issues:

Whether the direct evidence provided by the injured witness is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether procedural irregularities, such as delay in filing the FIR, undermine the credibility of the witness testimony.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the High Court's decision to acquit the accused was not based on a possible view of the evidence. The direct testimony of Rajagopal, supported by medical evidence, clearly implicated the accused in the attack. The Court emphasized that the delay in filing the FIR and other procedural irregularities did not undermine the credibility of Rajagopal's testimony.

The Supreme Court set aside the acquittal by the High Court and reinstated the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court. The accused were directed to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of their sentences.

Facts:

The State of Madhya Pradesh issued a demand notice to Kedia Great Galeon Ltd. for a certain amount as excess expenditure on the establishment of officers and employees under Rule 4(41) of the Madhya Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1995.

Kedia Great Galeon Ltd. challenged the demand notice by filing a writ petition without directly challenging the validity (vires) of Rule 4(41).

The Single Judge of the High Court quashed the demand notice, considering it arbitrary and unreasonable, but did not provide any specific order regarding the vires of Rule 4(41) due to the absence of a prayer challenging its validity.

The writ appeal was dismissed, with the Court holding that the vires of the Rules could not be addressed since they were not directly challenged.

Issues:

Whether the vires of Rule 4(41) of the Madhya Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1995, could be considered in the appeal when not directly challenged by the writ petitioner.

Whether the demand notice issued by the State was arbitrary and unreasonable.

Held:

The Bench observed that under the Rules of the High Court, the Bench hearing the writ petition was not competent to pass an order declaring Rules ultra vires. The Court noted that if the writ petitioner intended to challenge the vires of the Rules, they should have filed the writ petition before the appropriate Bench with jurisdiction over such constitutional issues (Para 40).

It was clarified that something which the writ petitioner did not intend or pray for could not be considered in the appeal (Para 40).

The Court held that there was no sufficient foundation laid in the writ petition to determine whether the demand was arbitrary and unreasonable. The details of the demand were not adequately explained, particularly regarding expenditure versus revenue (Para 52).

However, considering the overall circumstances, the Court granted liberty to the respondent to represent against the demand notice before the State Government, which should consider relevant facts and factors (Para 54).

Decision: The appeal was disposed of with the decision that the vires of Rule 4(41) could not be addressed since they were not directly challenged, and the respondent was granted liberty to represent against the demand notice before the State Government.

Facts:

Ravada Sasikala, the appellant, was subjected to an acid attack by the accused after her family refused his proposal for marriage.

The accused was convicted under Sections 326 and 448 of the IPC, but the High Court reduced the sentence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's reduction of the sentence was justified considering the gravity of the offense, the impact on the victim, and the societal interest.

Held:

The Court reinstated the trial court's sentence and emphasized the importance of proportionate punishment and victim compensation. Justice Misra stated: "When there is medical evidence that there was an acid attack on the young girl and the circumstances having brought home by cogent evidence and the conviction is given the stamp of approval, there was no justification to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.

The Court further directed the accused to pay a compensation of Rs. 50,000 and the State to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the victim, with additional imprisonment in case of non-compliance. This decision was based on the principle that justice must be served not only to the accused but also to the victim and society at large.

Facts:

The incident occurred on January 19, 1991, involving an attack on Askari resulting in his death, and injuries to Mohd. Asad and Md. Vasir.

The appellants were convicted by the trial court based on evidence provided by eyewitnesses and post-mortem reports of the deceased.

The High Court upheld the conviction, finding the witnesses reliable despite some personal enmity and contradictions in their statements.

Issues:

Whether the conviction based on eyewitness testimony and other evidence is valid.

Whether there are sufficient grounds to interfere with the decision of the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellants based on the evidence presented, including eyewitness testimony and post-mortem reports. The witnesses were found to be reliable, and the prosecution's case was deemed acceptable.

The Court rejected the submissions made by the appellants' counsel, emphasizing the principles established in previous judgments. Consequently, the appeals lacked merit and were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent-company was accused of fraudulently obtaining higher credit limits from the bank based on forged and false stock statements.

During the proceedings, a compromise was reached between the bank and the respondent-company under a One Time Settlement scheme.

The trial court dismissed an application for compounding of offenses, citing certain sections of IPC as non-compoundable offenses.

The respondents approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and the proceedings, which was granted based on the settlement.

Issues:

Whether the FIR and the consequential proceedings alleging non-compoundable offenses could be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC on the basis of a settlement.

The applicability of Section 320(9) of CrPC in such cases.

Held:

The Supreme Court, upholding the decision of the High Court to quash the proceedings, emphasized the doctrine of judicial restraint and the separation of powers among the organs of the state. It noted that encroaching into the domain of the legislature or the executive would violate the rule of law, which is a basic structure of the Constitution of India.

Furthermore, the Court referred to various precedents and observed that depending on the facts of the case, the continuation of criminal proceedings after a compromise between the parties might amount to abuse of the court's process and be futile.

In conclusion, while keeping the point of law open, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the principle of judicial restraint.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding property transferred to Respondent No.2, Prachaarini Sabha, through a registered deed in 1940, with specified conditions and purposes.

Appellants sought permission under Section 92 of the CPC to file a suit against the respondents, alleging that the Sabha was acting as a trust.

Issues:

Whether leave of the court is a prerequisite for the institution of a suit against a public trust under Section 92 of the CPC.

Held:

The Court held that the purpose of the transfer indicated the nature of Prachaarini Sabha as a trust.

A suit under Section 92 presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character.

Granting leave under Section 92 does not entail deciding the rights of the parties or adjudicating upon the merits of the case, but only considering whether there is a prima facie case for granting leave.

The requirement of giving notice to proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 is a rule of caution but not mandatory.

The examination of the plaint annexed with the application under Section 92 is crucial to determine the maintainability of the suit.