Facts:

The appellants were in custody in two separate cases. In the first case, they were accused under Section 21(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. In the second case, one of the appellants was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the appeal against the conviction was pending in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to bail pending trial or appeal under Article 21 of the Constitution, based on the right to speedy trial.

Whether the delays in the trial and appeal process warranted intervention from the court.

Held:

The Court referred to previous decisions regarding the grant of bail pending appeal, citing the cases of Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P. and Surinder Singh alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab.

While emphasizing the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, the Court also cited the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and others v. R.S. Nayak and another, highlighting that in case of a violation of this right, the higher court can direct the conclusion of proceedings within a fixed time.

In the interest of the administration of justice, the Court issued directions to expedite the disposal of cases and ensure timely justice delivery. These directions included timelines for the disposal of bail applications and trials, as well as measures to address delays.

Decision: The Court directed the pending trial in the first case and the appeal in the second case to be disposed of within six months. Additionally, the Court issued comprehensive directions to High Courts and subordinate courts to ensure timely disposal of cases and adherence to the fundamental right to a speedy trial.

Facts:

Krishna Veni Nagam, the appellant, filed a transfer petition seeking the transfer of a matrimonial case filed by Harish Nagam, the respondent, from Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, to Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, citing various difficulties including physical and mental torture, as well as the presence of a minor child. The appellant argued that contesting the proceedings in Jabalpur would cause hardship due to her residence in Hyderabad and the need to care for her minor daughter.

Issues:

Whether the court should transfer matrimonial cases solely based on the convenience of one party, and if not, what alternative measures could be implemented to ensure access to justice for both parties.

Held:

The court acknowledged the flood of transfer petitions and the resulting hardship faced by litigants. It invoked the principle of forum non conveniens, considering the convenience of both parties and the interest of justice. While recognizing the difficulties faced by the appellant, the court explored alternative solutions to transferring cases, such as the use of video conferencing facilities, provision of legal aid services, and communication via email and telephone.

The court issued guidelines incorporating these measures to ensure access to justice in matrimonial cases involving parties residing outside the court's jurisdiction. The specific transfer petition was allowed, and the case was transferred to Hyderabad.

The court also appreciated the assistance of the Additional Solicitor General and the Senior Advocate in the case.

Facts:

M/s. Hindustan Polymers Limited (HPL) had become a sick industrial company and owed significant debts to banks and financial institutions.

Proceedings were initiated before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA).

Petitions for amalgamation of HPL with M/s. McDowell and Company Limited, the appellant, were filed in the High Courts of Bombay and Madras.

The High Courts approved the scheme of amalgamation, and HPL was amalgamated with the appellant from April 1, 1977.

HPL had accrued interest on loans from financial institutions, which was treated as expenditure in its books.

The financial institutions waived the interest accrued prior to April 1, 1977, resulting in a question of whether the waived interest should be treated as income under Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

• Whether the waived interest should be treated as income of the appellant under Section 41(1) of the Act.

• Whether the accrued income under Section 41(1) should be accounted for while calculating accumulated losses for the purpose of availing benefits under Section 72A of the Act in the context of amalgamation.

Held:

The Court held that the waived interest should indeed be treated as income of the appellant for the purpose of adjusting accumulated losses under Section 72A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that while Section 41(1) deals with taxation of income, Section 72A provides for the carry forward and set off of accumulated losses in cases of amalgamation.

Therefore, when an amalgamated company is allowed the benefit of accumulated losses, the income accrued to the amalgamated company must be adjusted to calculate the actual accumulated losses.

The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 72A was to facilitate the merger of sick industrial units with sound ones by providing incentives and removing impediments. Thus, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the treatment of waived interest as income of the appellant for adjusting accumulated losses under Section 72A.

Facts:

The appellant, MIS. YESHWANT GRAMIN SHIKSHAN SANSTHA, operates schools and colleges and employs part-time workers with the approval of the State Government. It challenged the applicability of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Central Act) to its part-time employees, arguing that their service conditions are governed by State laws.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the Central Act apply to part-time employees of the appellant's schools and colleges, which are governed by State laws.

Whether the appellant is deemed to have defaulted in depositing Provident Fund contributions for its part-time employees.

Held:

The court interpreted Section 1 of the Central Act, which applies to various establishments, including educational institutions like schools and colleges. The Central Government had issued a notification including educational institutions under the Central Act, subject to Section 16 exemptions.

The appellant claimed exemption under Section 16(1)(b) of the Central Act, which exempts establishments under the control of the Central or State Government, whose employees are covered by government provident fund schemes.

The court found that the appellant's schools were 100% grant-in-aid and under State Government control, fulfilling the conditions of Section 16(1)(b). Therefore, the Central Act did not apply to them.

Exemption under Section 16 applies to the entire establishment, and any action taken under the Central Act against exempted establishments is unauthorized.

Initiation of recovery proceedings against the appellant, despite its exemption status, was deemed unauthorized.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involved the appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, where the appellants were convicted and sentenced under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. The prosecution's case primarily relied on circumstantial evidence, with the exception of the testimony of two chance witnesses. These witnesses claimed to have heard an altercation between the deceased and the accused before the incident occurred. However, their testimony lacked corroboration and clarity regarding their relationship with the parties involved.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of the chance witnesses, the clarity regarding the motive for the crime, and the sufficiency of evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

After careful consideration of the evidence presented, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the chance witnesses was deemed unreliable due to lack of corroboration and clarity.

Additionally, discrepancies in the prosecution's case, such as the absence of a convincing motive for the crime and ambiguity regarding the deceased's association with the accused, raised doubts about the narrative. Moreover, forensic evidence presented did not support the prosecution's case.

Therefore, the Court held that the trial court and the High Court erred in law in convicting the accused. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and both the accused were acquitted of all charges. They were to be released immediately unless required in connection with any other case.

Facts:

Signode India Limited (the appellant) was contesting its liability to pay service tax based on whether its activities constituted "cargo handling service" under the Finance Act, 1994.

The appellant contended that its activities fell under "packaging activity," which was made exigible to service tax by an amendment to the Finance Act in 2005.

Issues:

Whether the activities of the appellant constituted "cargo handling service" as per the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 1994.

Whether the amendment made by the Finance Act of 2005 impacted the liability of the appellant for service tax.

Held:

The court observed that the insertion of Section 65(76b) and Section 105(zzzf) by the Finance Act, 2005, indicated legislative intent that packaging activity is distinct from cargo handling activity.

Prior to the amendment, the appellant would not be liable to pay service tax on its activities, as they did not fall under the category of "cargo handling service."

The court made a distinction between "cargo handling service" and "packaging activity," noting that cargo refers to goods ready for transportation, whereas packaging of goods is a stage prior to becoming cargo.

The court referred to a circular issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, which clarified that services provided by cargo handling agencies undertaking packing, unpacking, loading, and unloading of goods meant to be transported are liable to tax as "cargo handling services."

The appeals were allowed, setting aside the order of the Tribunal, and any demand raised on the appellant was to be understood in the light of the judgment, granting all reliefs due.

Facts:

The case involved a husband filing for dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The wife filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights against the husband. The husband alleged nine instances of cruelty by the wife, while the wife denied these allegations and claimed that the husband had withdrawn from her company without reasonable cause.

Issues:

Whether the alleged incidents constituted cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, and whether the wife was entitled to restitution of conjugal rights.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the incidents alleged by the husband did not meet the threshold of mental cruelty as per the guidelines established in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh.

The Court emphasized that the incidents were either stale, isolated, or had been condoned by subsequent conduct. It was noted that incidents prior to 2006 were deemed condoned due to subsequent cohabitation, and isolated incidents after 2006 did not constitute cruelty.

The Court dismissed arguments that individual incidents, such as misbehavior at the husband's workplace or allegations of extramarital relations, constituted cruelty. Additionally, the Court found in favor of the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights, stating that the husband had withdrawn from her company without reasonable cause.

Facts:

The Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA opposed the telecast of the dubbed serial 'Mahabharat' in Bengali, fearing it would adversely affect the Bengali film and television industry.

They sent letters to broadcasting channels, urging them to stop the telecast of the dubbed serial, threatening non-cooperation if their demands were not met.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA violated the Competition Act, 2002, specifically Section 3(3)(b).

Whether the relevant market for analysis includes only the broadcast of TV serials or the entire film and TV industry of West Bengal.

Whether the actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA can be considered as protected under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Held

The court determined that the relevant market for analysis includes the entire film and television industry of West Bengal, not just the broadcast of TV serials. The actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA, aimed at preventing the telecast of the dubbed serial, affected the entire industry, not just broadcasting. Thus, their actions violated the Competition Act, 2002, as they hindered competition and consumer choice.

The Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA, though acting like trade unions, were considered associations of enterprises engaged in the film and television industry. Their actions, aimed at protecting the interests of their members in the industry, did not fall under the protection of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Their concerted efforts to prevent the telecast of the dubbed serial amounted to creating barriers to competition and were in violation of the Competition Act, 2002.

Decision: The court upheld the appeal, affirming that the actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA constituted a violation of the Competition Act, 2002. It emphasized the importance of competition and consumer choice, condemning any actions that hinder competition or limit consumer options.

Facts:

The Respondent, a limited company, filed a civil suit against the Appellant, the Municipal Corporation of Faridabad, seeking a permanent injunction against the recovery of house tax for certain years and a declaration that a demand notice for house tax was illegal. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal. The Appellant filed a second appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed in limine.

Issues:

Whether the suit challenging the demand for house tax is maintainable.

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the second appeal in limine, holding that it did not involve any substantial question of law.

Held:

The Court held the High Court thus, in our view, committed jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the approach of the High Court. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

The impugned order is set aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law. We, however, request the High Court to admit the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code keeping in view the pleadings and findings of the two courts below. Needless to say, the questions to be framed should be specific.