Facts:

Gulshera Khanam, the landlady, sought eviction of Aftab Ahmad, the tenant, from Shop No. 6.

The landlady claimed the eviction for the bona fide requirement of her daughter, Dr. Naheed Parveen, who was running a medical clinic in Shop No. 7.

The landlady argued that Dr. Naheed Parveen, being a co-owner of the building inherited from her father, fulfilled the criteria of having a legal right of residence, and thus fell within the definition of "family" under the Act.

The lower courts had granted eviction in favor of the landlady, but the High Court set aside the eviction order.

Issues:

Whether Dr. Naheed Parveen falls within the definition of "family" under Section 3(g) of the Act.

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Dr. Naheed Parveen, being a co-owner of the building inherited from her father, fulfilled the criteria of having a legal right of residence, and thus fell within the definition of "family" under Section 3(g) of the Act. Therefore, the landlady was entitled to seek eviction of the tenant for the bona fide requirement of her daughter (para 24).

The Court further held that the High Court had erred in reversing the findings of the lower courts without proper justification. The High Court should have confined its inquiry to whether there was any jurisdictional error committed by the lower courts, rather than re-evaluating factual aspects of the case. Therefore, the eviction order against the tenant was reinstated (para 36).

The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's decision was set aside. The eviction order against the tenant, Aftab Ahmad, in favor of Gulshera Khanam, the landlady, was restored (para 40,41).

Facts:

The contract allowed for a variation of 30% in the tendered quantity of work.

The time for completion of the contract work was extended at the request of the contractor.

During the extended contract period, the appellant-company increased the quantity of work by 30% and allotted the remaining work to a third party at a higher rate.

The company imposed a penalty on the contractor for non-execution of the remaining work.

Issues:

Interpretation of Clause 5 of the contract regarding the variation in work quantity.

The obligation of the contractor to complete the extra work within the contract period or any extended period.

The liability of the contractor for breach of contract and financial loss incurred by the company.

The authority of the company to extend the contract period.

Held:

The court held that Clause 5 of the contract empowered the company to increase or reduce the work quantity by 30% during the contract period.

The contractor was obligated to complete the extra work within the contract period or any extended period, as per the terms of the contract.

The contractor breached its contractual obligation by not completing the balance work, making them liable to compensate the company for the financial loss incurred.

The company had the authority to extend the contract period, and the contractor could have requested an extension to complete the unfinished extra work.

The stipulation in Clause 5 regarding the notice period did not prevent the company from allotting extra work during the contract period.

The contractor is liable for penalty and financial loss suffered by the company, and the company could recover the difference in contract rate and actual cost incurred to complete the work through a third party, along with interest accrued.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeal, affirming the company's right to seek compensation from the contractor for breach of contract and financial loss incurred. The contractor was granted an opportunity to make representations regarding the penalty imposed.

Facts:The appellant, R. Venkata Ramudu, challenged the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He was appointed through a selection process conducted by the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission and was allocated to the Irrigation Department.

Issues:The interpretation and application of various rules including Rule 6(2), Rule 8(c), Rule 16(a), Rule 16(h), Rule 17(a), Rule 17(b), and Rule 18(a) of the aforementioned regulations.

Held:The Court held that the power under Rule 17(a)(ii) or Rule 31 could be invoked in certain situations regarding probation extensions, and Rule 16(h) would apply in such cases requiring the fixation of the altered date of the commencement of probation. Additionally, it was observed that even if an Assistant Executive Engineer passes the Account test within the prescribed probation period of two years, they would not be considered for promotion until completing five years of service. The Tribunal and the High Court had interpreted the rules differently, but the Supreme Court disagreed with their interpretation.

Decision: Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment under appeal, ruling that the logic employed by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court regarding the promotion criteria could not be sustained. Therefore, the appellant's appeal was allowed, and the decision of the High Court was overturned.

Facts:

The case concerns the interpretation and application of various provisions of the Cantonment Act, 2006, specifically related to the eligibility of individuals living in illegally constructed buildings to be included in the voters list for elections in Cantonment areas.

Issues:

Whether persons residing in illegally constructed houses are entitled to be included in the voters list.

The interpretation of the term 'resident' and its applicability in the context of eligibility for voter registration.

The alignment of Cantonment Electoral Rules, 2007 with the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 2006 regarding voter eligibility.

Held:

The definition of 'resident' under the Cantonment Act, 2006, explicitly includes only individuals maintaining legally constructed houses, disentitling those living in illegally constructed buildings from being included in the voters list .

The term 'resident' should be narrowly construed compared to 'inhabitant', and only those residing in legally constructed houses are eligible for voter registration.

Rule 10(3) of the Cantonment Electoral Rules, 2007, aligns with Section 28 of the Act, making individuals living in houses with assigned numbers eligible to vote, thereby excluding those in illegally constructed houses.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the lower court's decision and affirming that persons living in illegally constructed houses are not entitled to be included in the voters list for elections in Cantonment areas.

Facts:

Respondent, Devjee Mishra, a Corporal in the Air Force, faced disciplinary action for overstaying leave and absence without permission.

Proceedings of District Court Martial commenced based on charge sheet served to Mishra.

Mishra pleaded guilty to the charges but later challenged the court martial order through a writ petition in the High Court.

The High Court quashed the court martial order, citing reasons such as alleged coercion in Mishra's confession and illegal confinement.

The Division Bench affirmed the High Court's decision, prompting the Union of India to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the court martial proceedings against Mishra.

Whether Mishra's confession was voluntary or coerced.

Whether Mishra's confinement during the inquiry violated his constitutional rights.

Whether Mishra is eligible for pension or gratuity despite dismissal from service.

Held:

In a detailed analysis of the High Court's reasoning, the Supreme Court found several errors and inconsistencies:

Misinterpretation of facts: The High Court wrongly concluded that there was no reference to Mishra's previous misconduct in the Court Martial Proceedings.

Failure to consider counter-affidavits: The High Court did not adequately consider the counter-affidavits filed by the appellants, contesting Mishra's claims.

Consideration of irrelevant documents: The High Court relied on documents not part of the Court Martial Proceedings, leading to erroneous conclusions about Mishra's confession being involuntary.

Misapplication of legal provisions: The High Court incorrectly interpreted Section 107 of the Air Force Act, concluding that Mishra's confinement during the inquiry violated his constitutional rights.

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and reinstated the Court Martial Proceedings against Mishra, restoring the disciplinary actions taken against him. The Court did not express any opinion on Mishra's eligibility for pension or gratuity, leaving it to the Competent Authority to decide based on the circumstances of the case.

This decision was in line with previous cases where courts upheld disciplinary actions against military personnel for misconduct.

Facts:

The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as Public Interest Litigation, seeking implementation of the Lokayukta Uttar Pradesh's recommendation/report.

The Lokayukta's report was based on a complaint against Smt. Husna Siddiqui and Sri Naseemuddin Siddiqui, recommending investigation into alleged misdeeds.

The High Court dismissed the petition, stating sufficient provisions under the Act exist for implementation and found no public interest element in the appellant's grievances.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition for implementation of Lokayukta's recommendations.

Whether the delay in investigation/enquiry benefited respondent nos. 5 and 6.

The adequacy of the ongoing investigations/enquiries by law enforcement agencies.

Held:

The Court held that MThe relief sought by the appellant was already being addressed through investigations initiated by the Competent Authority based on the Lokayukta's recommendations.

The law enforcement agencies were diligently conducting investigations/enquiries, and the Court expressed hope for timely completion, setting a deadline of six months.

The Court clarified it wasn't expressing opinions on the merits of the investigation or the defenses of the respondents.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appeal arose from the rejection of an application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

The appellants contended that the respondents, having exhausted all remedies under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, were barred from approaching the Civil Court as per Section 7L(4) of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the application under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC was justified.

Whether the respondents were entitled to file a suit in the Civil Court despite exhausting remedies under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

Held:

The Court held that while rejection of a plaint on institutional grounds is different from dismissal of a suit at the pre-trial stage on the ground of maintainability, for dismissal on a preliminary issue, the Court is entitled and obligated to consider all documents, including those provided by the defendant. The appeal was dismissed, but the appellants were permitted to raise a preliminary issue on the maintainability of the suit. The trial court was directed to address this issue before proceeding with the trial, in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The competent authority granted a license to M/s. Fascel Limited under Section 4(1) of the Telegraph Act, 1885.

The appellant, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), alleged that non-CLI calls transmitted by Tata Tele Services Limited to the BSNL network exceeded 0.5%.

The appellant contended that Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement between the parties was applicable, which had legal implications regarding such calls.

Issues:

Whether the demand raised by BSNL without considering Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement lacked legal authority?

Held:

The Court held that:

The demand raised by BSNL for the period from May 2003 to November 2003 without considering Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement lacked legal authority.

Clause 6.4.6 of the Interconnect agreement between the parties was applicable, and the demand had to be evaluated in light of its provisions.

Consequently, the order of the learned Tribunal was partially set aside, and the appeal was partly allowed.

Facts:

The Centre for Public Interest Litigation invoked the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking various reliefs regarding the conduct of business and affairs of the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI).

Allegations included irregularities such as the purchase of shares at a higher price, questionable investments, and financial dealings with entities facing legal issues.

Investigations by the Registrar of Companies (ROC) and other authorities revealed potential irregularities and violations of the Companies Act 1956.

Issues:

Whether the responses and actions of IFCI and regulatory authorities were adequate in addressing the allegations of irregularities.

Whether further independent scrutiny by competent regulatory agencies was necessary to ensure accountability and compliance with the law.

Held:

The Court held that the responses provided by IFCI and regulatory authorities were insufficient in addressing the serious allegations of irregularities. It was determined that further independent scrutiny by competent regulatory agencies was necessary to ensure accountability and compliance with the law. The Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Corporate Affairs were directed to ensure a proper scrutiny of the allegations by regulatory agencies including the Serious Fraud Investigation Office, Reserve Bank of India, and Securities and Exchange Board of India. The scrutiny should adhere to procedural fairness and include an opportunity for IFCI to respond. The directed scrutiny should commence within one month of the judgment and be completed within four months. The Union Government was tasked with determining necessary actions based on the reports received. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.