Facts:

Pratap Singh Yadav, the appellant, surrendered a residential plot allotted by Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) and accepted a refund. Later, he filed a consumer complaint seeking restoration of the plot or an alternative one, along with compensation. The District Forum initially ruled in favor of the appellant, but the State Commission overturned this decision.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to restoration of the plot and compensation, and if the complaint was time-barred.

Held:

The Supreme Court directed disciplinary action against HUDA officials responsible for irregularities in the allotment process. The appellant was allowed to retain the plot, subject to depositing the prevailing price per square meter within six months. Failure to comply would result in dismissal of the appeal, affirming the previous decisions, and HUDA would be allowed to dispossess the appellant and resume possession of the plot.

Facts:

The respondent filed two complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the appellant.

Both complaints stemmed from loans advanced by the respondent to the appellant on two different occasions, with subsequent dishonored cheques issued by the appellant.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant and awarded sentences, which were upheld by the District and Sessions Judge and subsequently by the High Court with a reduction in default sentence.

Issues:

Whether the sentences in the two complaint cases should run concurrently due to the identical nature of the transactions.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the nature of the transactions and the provisions of Section 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of concurrent running of the substantive sentences due to the overwhelming identicalness in the features of both cases.

The Court clarified that the appellant would still have to serve the default sentences if the fine imposed as compensation had not been paid.

The appeals were allowed to the extent that the substantive sentences of 10 months simple imprisonment awarded to the appellant in both complaint cases would run concurrently.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the election of a returned candidate in a Legislative Assembly election where only two candidates contested. The losing candidate filed an election petition alleging false declaration of educational qualification and improper acceptance of nomination.

Issues:

Whether the information provided by the returned candidate regarding his educational qualification constituted a false declaration.

The significance of improper acceptance of nomination, particularly in cases involving only two candidates.

Whether the losing candidate should be declared elected after the election of the returned candidate was declared void.

Held:

The Court found that the returned candidate's declaration regarding his educational qualification amounted to a false declaration, emphasizing the duty of candidates to provide correct information, especially regarding educational qualifications.

The Court differentiated the impact of improper acceptance of nomination based on whether the candidate involved was the returned candidate or another contestant. In cases where there are only two candidates and the returned candidate's nomination is improperly accepted, there's no need to prove that the election was materially affected; it would be void without further inquiry, and the remaining candidate would be declared elected.

The High Court's decision to refuse to declare the losing candidate elected after he switched parties post-election was upheld. The High Court's discretion in this matter was deemed appropriate, considering the anomalous situation that would arise from such a declaration.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, and the High Court's decision was upheld.

Facts:

Sailors were appointed in the Indian Navy before July 3, 1976, with appointment letters stating a term of 10 years of active service and 10 years on fleet service thereafter, if required.

Fleet Reserve Service was discontinued due to a government policy dated July 3, 1976.

Applicants sought the grant of Reservist Pension and Special Pension, which were initially rejected by the tribunal.

Tribunal accepted the claim of appellants for the grant of Reservist Pension in another application.

Issues:

Whether sailors were entitled to Reservist Pension or Special Pension under the Navy (Pension) Regulations, 1964.

The effect of the government policy discontinuing Fleet Reserve Service on the eligibility of sailors for pension benefits.

Held:

The condition in the appointment letter does not automatically entitle sailors to continue in Fleet Reserve Service after completing the initial active service period.

Completion of active service does not imply automatic transfer to Fleet Reserve Service; an express order from the competent authority is necessary for such transfer.

Regulation 269 states that a sailor's service would continue "so long required" or "if required" for a further 10 years in the Indian Fleet Reserve.

Sailors must fulfill the prescribed Naval and Reserve qualifying service of 10 years each to qualify for Reservist Pension under Regulation 92.

Regulation 95 provides for Special Pension to sailors discharged due to government policy or reorganization.

The court directs the competent authority to consider cases of sailors whose active service period expired on or after July 3, 1976, for Special Pension under Regulation 95.

The appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

The petition initially labeled as a contempt petition was treated as a limited review petition concerning the calculation and payment of interest by LIC to the petitioners.

The main contention was to determine from which date the interest should be calculated and paid by LIC, as per the final order dated 10th December 2015.

Issues:

The determine the starting date from which LIC would be liable to pay interest to the petitioners.

The modification of the final order dated 10th December 2015 to specify the date for interest calculation and payment.

Held:

The Court held that LIC would be liable to pay interest at the prevailing bank rate (without penal interest) from 30 days after the date of death or date of maturity relating to the life insurance policy concerned, or from 4th April 2008, whichever is later. The Court modified the final order dated 10th December 2015 accordingly. Despite arguments for a reduction in the rate of interest, the Court maintained the prevailing bank rate without penal interest, considering the delay caused by interim orders. The matter was disposed of with the directive for LIC to discharge its liabilities promptly and without unnecessary delay as per the modified order (Para 13).

This decision aligns with the Court's earlier observations regarding the interpretation of relevant regulations and the equities between the parties, ensuring fairness in the payment of interest by LIC to the petitioners.

Facts:

The case involves the assessment of sales turnover of home appliances by KAIL Ltd. for the year 1999-2000 under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (KGST Act). The dispute arises from whether KAIL Ltd. is the brand name holder of "Sansui" products it sold and whether its sales qualify as the first sale under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.

Issues:

Whether KAIL Ltd. is the brand name holder of "Sansui" products sold by it and whether its sales are liable to tax under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act.

Held:

The court analyzed evidence, including correspondence, newspaper reports, and affidavits, which indicated KAIL Ltd.'s association with the "Sansui" brand. It was established that KAIL Ltd. was a subsidiary or group company of Videocon International Ltd., which held the brand name rights for "Sansui" in India.

The court concluded that when products are marketed under a brand name, the marketing company can be assumed to be the holder of the brand name or authorized to use it.

While sales between holding and subsidiary companies may not be intended to be covered under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act, if the sale is at a realistic price and usual margins are charged, it should not be ignored. However, evidence showed unusually high margins charged by KAIL Ltd.

The court affirmed that the tax assessment under Section 5(2) was rightly levied on KAIL Ltd. as it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that KAIL Ltd. was the brand name holder of "Sansui" products.

The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

Navjot Singh Sidhu, the appellant, contested the 2009 election for the 02-Amritsar Parliamentary Constituency.

The election was challenged in E.P. No.3 of 2009 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.

Sidhu filed an application for the dismissal of the election petition, claiming deficiencies in pleadings.

The High Court partially granted relief to Sidhu but ordered a regular trial for certain allegations, including exceeding the expenditure limit and alleged assistance received from a government official.

Sidhu appealed against this decision.

Issues:

Whether the election petition adequately pleaded the allegations of corrupt practices.

Whether the allegations regarding election expenses and assistance from a government official warranted a regular trial.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the election petition sufficiently pleaded the allegations of corrupt practices regarding election expenses.

The Court ruled that the details provided in the petition regarding the expenses incurred by the candidate were adequate, and thus, the trial on this issue should continue.

Regarding the assistance received from a government official, the Court determined that if the official was rendering service under the State Government when providing assistance, it constituted a corrupt practice. Therefore, this issue should proceed to trial.

The Court found that the third allegation concerning actions taken by the Returning Officer had become academic due to the passage of time.

Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, and the trial of the election petition on the surviving issues was ordered to recommence.

Facts:

The case involves the cancellation of a plot allotment by a Housing Co-operative Society to one of its members (the original allottee), subsequent cancellation of membership, and the transfer of the plot to another party.

A compromise deed was entered into between the Society, the subsequent plot owner, and the original allottee's son (the appellant), resulting in compensation for the appellant.

The appellant challenged the cancellation of the allotment, subsequent transfer of the plot, and the registration of related documents.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of the allotment and membership by the Housing Co-operative Society was lawful.

The validity of registration of documents related to the cancellation and subsequent transfer of the plot.

The applicability of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this matter.

Held:

The Co-operative Society was within its rights to unilaterally cancel the allotment and membership of the original allottee due to alleged violations of bye-laws.

The Registrar's role is limited to registration, and there is no provision empowering them to cancel registrations post facto.

Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and should not be used for private or contractual disputes.

The appellant should pursue statutory remedies available under the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, for resolution of the dispute.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition and directing the appellant to pursue statutory remedies. The court clarified the limited role of Registrars in post-registration matters and emphasized the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' to temporary employees (referred to as daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on a casual basis, contractual employees, etc.). These temporary employees were engaged in duties and responsibilities similar to those of regular employees holding the same or corresponding posts within the State of Punjab. The qualifications possessed by these temporary employees were also suitable for appointment on a regular basis.

Issues:

Whether the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is applicable to temporary employees who perform duties equivalent to those of regular employees, holding the same post.

Held:

The Court held that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' applies to all temporary employees engaged in duties similar to those of regular employees. Temporary employees must be paid wages at the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged government employees in the same post.

The Court outlined the parameters for applying the principle, including the burden of proof on the claimant to demonstrate parity in duties and responsibilities, irrespective of departmental distinctions, and the necessity for similar qualifications for recruitment.

The Court clarified the misinterpretation of previous judgments by the High Court and affirmed the applicability of the 'equal pay for equal work' principle to temporary employees, emphasizing that it should not be confused with issues of regularization.

The differential treatment of temporary employees based on their length of service was set aside by the Court, affirming the entitlement of temporary employees to wages at the minimum of the pay-scale for their category but not to allowances attached to regular posts.