Facts:

The respondent filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant to the No. 81 Deosar Constituency of Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly.

Issues:

The High Court set aside the election on various grounds including improper acceptance of nomination.

Whether the improper acceptance of the nomination materially affected the election result and whether the appellant was qualified to contest the election.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to determine whether the improper acceptance of nomination had materially affected the election result as required by Section 100(1)(d). It also found that the respondent did not plead that the appellant was not qualified to contest the election under Section 100(1)(a) based on his voter status. Therefore, the election was declared valid, and the High Court's order was set aside. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Incident occurred at a Biriyani stall leading to an altercation between the deceased and the accused.

Accused, along with associates, attacked the deceased and others with knives and sticks, resulting in the death of the deceased.

FIR lodged, investigation conducted, and charge sheet filed under relevant sections of IPC and SC/ST Act.

Trial court convicted accused primarily based on eyewitness testimony and medical evidence.

High Court upheld the conviction, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the accused shared a common object to commit the offence?

Whether the evidence proves the intention to commit murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder?

Whether the exceptions under Section 300 of IPC apply to reduce the offence?

Held:

The Court held that the accused formed an unlawful assembly and shared a common object to commit the offence. Mere presence in the assembly is sufficient for vicarious liability under Section 149 of IPC.

The injuries inflicted, the weapons used, and the manner of attack establish the intention to cause death, satisfying the requirements of Section 300 'Thirdly' of IPC.

Exception 4 of Section 300 does not apply as the incident was not sudden, unpremeditated, and not committed in the heat of passion. Accused arrived with armed men, indicating prior planning.

Based on the above findings, the appeals were dismissed, and the convictions of the accused were upheld.

Facts:The case involved two sets of suits: the appellants filed suits for eviction and damages, while the respondents filed suits for adverse possession, injunctions, and against the Municipality.

Issues:

Whether the questions formulated by the High Court satisfied the test of being 'substantial questions of law' under Section 100 of the CPC.

Whether the findings of the lower courts were binding on the High Court.

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to remand the case for a de novo trial.

Whether any party raised the ground for remand, and whether there was justification for remanding the case.

Whether the High Court's decision was based on substantial questions of law or not.

Held:

The questions formulated by the High Court did not satisfy the test of being 'substantial questions of law' under Section 100 of the CPC. The second appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law .

The findings of the lower courts were binding on the High Court, as they were concurrent in nature .

The High Court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case for a de novo trial. It also failed to formulate substantial questions of law regarding the remand .

No party raised the ground for remand, and there was no justification for remanding the case .

The High Court's decision lacked justification and failed to consider whether the questions framed were substantial questions of law.

Decision:The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, finding no error in the judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court. It held that the High Court's decision to remand the case was unjustified.

Facts:

The case involves the sentencing of the appellants in a criminal appeal. The trial court had imposed life sentences on the accused, while the High Court declined to enhance the sentence to death but instead imposed fixed term sentences.

The appellants were convicted under sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the trial court could have imposed the death sentence.

Issues:

The permissibility of imposing a fixed term sentence.

The competence of the appellate court to impose a sentence beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Determining whether the fixed term sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

Consideration of the circumstances surrounding the crime, particularly whether it constitutes an 'honour killing'.

The scope of judicial review regarding the exercise of executive powers under Article 71 and Article 161 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that the imposition of a fixed term sentence is within the judiciary's domain and is not unauthorized in law .

The court also established that the appellate court cannot impose a sentence beyond the competence of the trial court.

Regarding the concurrent or consecutive running of sentences, the court held that the High Court did not direct the sequence of serving sentences, so it is inappropriate to do so on appeal. Thus, the sentences imposed for different offences shall run concurrently.

The court considered the crime as an 'honour killing' and noted the brutality and lack of respect for human life displayed by the accused. Consequently, the imposition of fixed term sentences was deemed appropriate.

The scope of judicial review regarding executive powers was discussed, emphasizing that while amenable to review, the courts cannot exercise such powers.

Facts:

The case concerned the demand for regularization of workmen employed at Balihari Colliery under Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL).

An Industrial Tribunal initially awarded regularization without back wages, which was later modified by the High Court to give preference to the workmen whenever regular employment opportunities arose.

Issues:

Whether the modification of the Industrial Tribunal's award by the High Court adequately addressed the concerns of the workmen.

Whether the workmen, after significant passage of time and facing practical difficulties, were entitled to further relief.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the modification of the Industrial Tribunal's award by the High Court did not fully address the predicament of the workmen, who were left without practical relief. Given the prolonged duration since their engagement and nearing retirement age for many, the Court deemed it appropriate to order compensation in final settlement of all claims, dues, and outstandings payable to the remaining 14 workmen. This compensation, amounting to Rs. Two lakhs each, was to be deposited by BCCL with the Central Government Tribunal at Dhanbad. Upon verification of identity, the amount would be disbursed to the respective workmen, marking the satisfaction of the Industrial Tribunal's award. The Civil Appeal was allowed, with no costs awarded.

Facts:

An international arbitration award was passed against the appellant, making them jointly and severally liable to pay USD 6,948,100.

The award was challenged in the High Court, where a single judge held it enforceable only against one respondent, not the appellant.

A Division Bench of the High Court upheld the maintainability of an appeal despite the abolition of Letters Patent Appeal.

Issues:

Whether an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in an international arbitration matter is maintainable.

Whether the intra-court appeal would lie because of the Letters Patent.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court, holding that a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable before the Division Bench. It construed Sections 5 and 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to conclude that the appeal was permissible. The Court considered the judgment in P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and others, (2004) 11 SCC 672, and Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Limited, (2011) 8 SCC 333, among others, to establish that the Arbitration Act, 1996, is a self-contained code and that an appeal under Section 50(1)(b) is maintainable. The decision was affirmed for different reasons, dismissing the appeals without costs.

Facts:The appellants, employees of Nagarjuna Cooperative Sugars Limited, filed a petition challenging the denial of lay-off compensation. The State of Andhra Pradesh introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) that did not cover lay-off compensation. The employees, having accepted benefits under the VRS, sought lay-off compensation, leading to a legal dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, despite the employees accepting benefits under the VRS which did not cover lay-off compensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(2) of the Act, even though it was not covered by the VRS. The Court clarified that if a claim like lay-off compensation is not covered by a VRS, affected employees can approach the Labour Court for adjudication. The judgment allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and Labour Court, and remitted the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication within three months.

Facts:

The case involved the validity of a sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the concerned department for initiating disciplinary proceedings against a retired government employee under Regulation 351-A of the Civil Services Regulations, 1975.

Issues:

Whether the sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the department was valid under Regulation 351-A.

Whether delegation of power from the Governor to the Minister was necessary for such sanctions.

Held:

T.S. Thakur, CJI's Opinion: The power to direct disciplinary proceedings against a government employee, whether in-service or retired, is an executive function of the State Government. This power can be exercised by the Governor or delegated to Ministers through rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution (Para 16). The sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the concerned department was valid under Regulation 351-A as it was deemed an action taken by the Governor.

V. Gopala Gowda, J.'s Dissenting Opinion: The power under Regulation 351-A is framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, which pertains to legislative power, not executive power. Therefore, the rules framed under Article 166 cannot justify actions under Article 309 (Para 13). Without evidence of specific delegation of power by the Governor to the Minister under Regulation 351-A, the sanction granted by the Minister was invalid.

Facts:

The controversy arose from amendments made by the State of Bihar to introduce reservation in judicial services, which were challenged in a batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The amendments were not preceded by appropriate consultation with the High Court as required by Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar has the authority to provide reservation in favor of various backward classes in the judicial services.

Whether the amendments made by the State of Bihar for reservation in judicial services were preceded by appropriate consultation with the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while the State of Bihar is entitled to initiate the process of consultation for providing reservation in judicial services, such consultation must meet the requisite standards. If there is a consensus between the State and the High Court, the State would be at liberty to make appropriate rules providing for reservation. However, if there is a difference of opinion, the Government must record reasons for its inability to accept the conclusions communicated by the High Court and proceed to amend the Rules in accordance with law. Additionally, the Court directed expeditious action to fill vacancies in the judicial services. The special leave petition stands disposed of.