Facts:

The case involves the execution of a decree for permanent injunction against the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor.

Issues:

Whether a decree for permanent injunction can be executed against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor.

Held:

The court held that Section 50 CPC deals with the execution of decrees against legal representatives, including that of permanent injunction. It is to be read with Order 21 Rule 32 CPC, which provides the mode for execution of such decrees. (Para 11, 12)

The right adjudicated in the suit and the findings recorded for the grant of injunction, concerning heritable and partible property, benefit both the legal heirs of the decree-holders and bind the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. Section 50 CPC allows execution against legal representatives when a judgment-debtor dies before satisfaction of the decree. (Para 26)

The court set aside the High Court's order and directed the executing court to proceed with enforcement of the decree under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC, including requiring the legal representatives to furnish an undertaking to abide by the decree. (Para 27)

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the executing court's direction for an undertaking by legal representatives to abide by the decree was deemed proper.

Facts:

Dispute between brother (appellant) and sister (respondent No. 1) over inherited property.

The suit property located in Satara village, District Aurangabad, Maharashtra, was claimed by respondent No. 1 as her share inherited from their late father under Mohammedan Law.

Appellant contended that the property was his self-acquired through a registered sale deed and denied respondent No. 1's claim.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly dismissed the second appeal at the admission stage, stating it did not involve substantial questions of law.

Whether the case involved questions of law, particularly regarding the interpretation of documents and their implications on property ownership rights.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal without properly considering the substantial questions of law involved. The Court emphasized that when interpreting documents and examining their effects, it inherently involves questions of law. Therefore, it was obligatory for the High Court to decide such questions on merits, especially after framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration on merits. It instructed the High Court to admit the appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions of law, and decide the appeal accordingly, considering the pleadings, findings of the lower courts, and the documents presented.

Additionally, the Court encouraged an amicable settlement between the parties and granted them liberty to renew their offers before the High Court, suggesting resolving the dispute within six months for the benefit of the family involved.

The Court clarified that its decision did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy but focused solely on whether the second appeal involved substantial questions of law as defined by Section 100 of the CPC.

Facts:

Black Pearl Hotels (Pvt) Ltd. filed an appeal against M/S Planet M Retail Ltd.

Dispute arose from a conducting agreement between the parties.

The agreement included an arbitration clause.

Black Pearl Hotels sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the conducting agreement constituted a lease or a license.

Whether the determination of the nature and character of the document can be delegated to the Registrar of the Court.

Held:

The Court clarified that the determination of the nature and character of a document, especially when contested, falls within the judicial function and cannot be delegated to an officer of the Court. It further held that while an officer may examine documents for stamp duty purposes, the determination of the document's nature remains with the Judge.

The Court set aside previous orders and remanded the matter to the High Court for the learned Single Judge to determine the nature and character of the document and proceed with the case accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved a matrimonial dispute between Jitender Arora & Ors. (appellants) and Sukriti Arora & Ors. (respondents). The wife obtained an ex parte divorce from a U.K. court, while the husband obtained a divorce from an Indian court. Subsequently, the husband shifted to India along with their daughter. The wife filed a Habeas Corpus petition seeking directions for the husband to hand over the custody of the daughter to her.

Issues:

The court was to determine the custody of the daughter in the context of the matrimonial dispute between the parents.

Held:

The paramount consideration in custody disputes is the welfare of the child. The daughter in this case, being 15 years old, is deemed mature enough to understand what is in her best interest (para 10, 12).

The daughter unequivocally expressed her desire to be with her father and stated her reluctance to go to the U.K. The court cannot risk sending her to a foreign country against her wishes, which may prove to be detrimental to her well-being (para 14).

Despite giving the mother ample chances, including temporary custody, she was unable to win over the confidence of the daughter. Therefore, the welfare of the daughter lies in the continued company of her father (para 15).

The High Court's decision to grant custody to the mother was based on abstract notions without considering the specific circumstances of the case. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court is set aside (para 16).

Considering the age of the child and the circumstances of the case, the court concluded that custody should be with the father. It is noted that within three years, the child would reach the age of majority and would have the freedom to decide her own course of action (para 17).

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Custody of the child is granted to the father.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit seeking eviction of the respondent from premises initially let out for eleven months but verbally extended for a further period.

The appellant, being deserted by her husband, sought to engage her unemployed son in a business in the rented premises, asserting a genuine need for eviction.

Issues:

Whether the requirement for own occupation includes occupation by a family member, in this case, the son.

Whether the landlord's failure to examine the son who intends to do business in the premises affects the establishment of reasonable requirement.

Held:

The Court held in favor of the appellant, reinstating the trial court's decree for eviction. The court emphasized that the mere non-examination of the family member intending to engage in business on the premises does not invalidate the landlord's genuine requirement for own occupation. The need for eviction depends on genuine necessity, considering the circumstances of each case.

The court referred to Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan and others, Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, Ajit Singh v. Jit Ram, and Gulraj Singh Grewal v. Dr. Harbans Singh, highlighting that a genuine need, not mere desire, is sufficient to establish the landlord's claim for own occupation.

The court underscored that the landlord's decision to engage her son in business was legitimate, considering the family's financial circumstances. Therefore, the appellant's suit for eviction was allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, T.A. Kathiru Kunju, was engaged by the respondent, Jacob Mathai, to handle a matrimonial dispute and a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Instead of filing a complaint under the N.I. Act, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

The respondent filed a complaint with the Bar Council alleging that the appellant failed to return a cheque that was to be used as evidence in the complaint.

The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India found the appellant guilty of gross negligence and imposed disciplinary action.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted gross negligence or mere negligence in discharging his professional duties.

Whether the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Committee was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the conclusion of gross negligence was not justified. The Court emphasized the distinction between negligence and gross negligence in legal practice, citing precedents.

The failure to obtain an acknowledgment for the returned cheque did not amount to gross negligence, especially considering the explanation provided by the appellant that the cheque was handed over to the investigating agency.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee. The Court also directed the refund of the amount deposited with the Bar Council of India.

Facts:

The petitioner, Asha Ranjan, sought the transfer of the third respondent, a notorious criminal-cum-politician, from Siwan Jail, Bihar, to Tihar Jail, Delhi. The petitioner's husband, a senior reporter, was brutally murdered by a group of persons, including the third respondent. The third respondent has a history of criminal activities, being declared a history-sheeter type 'A' and facing multiple cases, including murder and attempted murder.

Issues:

Whether the court has the authority to order the transfer of an accused from one state to another.

Whether such a transfer is necessary to ensure a fair trial and protect the interests of the victims and society.

The applicability of Section 3 of the Transfer of Prisoners Act, 1950, in the context of court-ordered transfers.

Balancing the rights of the accused with the interests of victims and society in cases involving potential witness intimidation and compromised justice.

Held:

The right to fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution encompasses the interests of the accused, prosecution, victims, and society. The court must weigh these factors to ensure the Rule of Law.

In cases where there is a conflict between the rights of the accused and the interests of victims or society, the court must prioritize the collective interest in ensuring a fair trial. Fair trial cannot be compromised to accommodate the preferences of the accused.

While Section 3 of the Transfer of Prisoners Act, 1950, empowers the executive to transfer prisoners, it does not restrict the court's authority to order transfers in the interest of justice and fair trial.

The court, under Article 142 of the Constitution, has the power to issue appropriate directions to ensure a fair trial, including ordering the transfer of accused individuals.

Public interest and the need for a fair trial override equitable considerations. The court must actively intervene to prevent witness intimidation and uphold the sanctity of the justice system .

Decision: The State of Bihar is directed to transfer the third respondent from Siwan Jail to Tihar Jail in Delhi within a week. The transfer should be conducted in accordance with applicable rules, and pending trials are to be conducted via video conferencing to ensure a fair trial.

Facts:

Lal Singh Marabi, the appellant, suffered severe injuries in a motor accident, leading to the amputation of his left leg. He filed a claim seeking compensation for permanent disability.

Issues:

The assessment of compensation for the appellant's permanent disability, considering factors like loss of livelihood and medical expenses.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the lower courts erred in reducing the permanent disability factor from 90% to 60%. The Court considered the appellant's inability to pursue his livelihood as a driver or daily wage laborer due to the amputation. Based on medical certificates and the appellant's circumstances, the Court determined the permanent disability to be 90%.

The Court recalculated compensation based on the appellant's annual income and the multiplier method, awarding Rs. 5,20,200 instead of the Rs. 3,57,800 awarded by the High Court. Additionally, the Court increased the compensation for the cost of an artificial limb from Rs. 60,000 to Rs. 1,00,000.

The Court ordered the insurer to pay the enhanced compensation amount along with interest accrued, and allowed them to recover it from other responsible parties.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 19th November 2006 when the deceased, Ayodhya Prasad @ Rahasu, along with other laborers, went to cut trees on his land. The appellants confronted them, leading to a quarrel during which the deceased was attacked and subsequently died due to his injuries.

The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 302 IPC or 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court affirmed this decision.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 IPC was sustainable.

Held:

The court analyzed the evidence and applied legal principles regarding the conviction. It noted that the incident arose from a sudden fight without premeditation, falling under exception (4) of Section 300 IPC.

Therefore, the court modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. The court partly allowed the appeals, modifying the conviction and reducing the sentence to the period already served. The appellants were ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.