Facts:

The incident occurred on 30th January 1990, stemming from a dispute related to a Panchayat election. This resulted in violence, leading to the death of Ismail Khan. The trial court acquitted all seventeen accused, citing difficulties in identification due to darkness, a hostile witness, presence of injuries on both sides, and doubts regarding the presence of a key figure, the Sarpanch. The High Court, however, reversed the trial court's decision, convicting all accused of murder.

Issues:

The correctness of the trial court's decision to acquit all accused versus the High Court's decision to convict them.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the trial court's reasoning and found it to be a "possible view" rather than erroneous. It emphasized the reasonableness of the trial court's conclusions given the circumstances. Criticizing the High Court for substituting its view, the Supreme Court set aside its judgment and acquitted all accused.

The Court stressed the importance of considering all evidence and circumstances before reaching a verdict, and highlighted the principle that a trial court's decision, if based on a reasonable view, should not be overturned lightly by higher courts.

Facts:

The Collector, Lakes and Waterways Development Authority (LAWDA), Srinagar, issued a notification for the acquisition of land for the construction of a housing colony for Dal dwellers.

The appellants' land was among those acquired, and they sought reference to the Reference Court for enhanced compensation.

The Reference Court initially awarded compensation at Rs. 2,50,000/- per Kanal, which the appellants contested, seeking enhancement to Rs. 4,00,000/- per Kanal.

The High Court dismissed both the State's appeal and the appellants' cross-appeal, affirming the compensation at Rs. 2,50,000/- per Kanal.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,00,000/- per Kanal, similar to neighboring landowners in other references.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants were entitled to enhanced compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/- per Kanal, along with other statutory benefits. The court emphasized the principle of non-discrimination when lands are acquired for the same purpose and are similar in nature.

The court found that the Reference Court had erred in discriminating against the appellants by awarding them lesser compensation compared to neighboring landowners. The judgment highlighted that when lands are acquired for the same purpose and are similar, discrimination in compensation is unjustified.

The court cited precedents to support its decision, emphasizing the importance of fair compensation for acquired lands. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, the judgments of the High Court were set aside, and the appellants were awarded enhanced compensation.

Facts:

The appellants filed an application before the Single Judge alleging that the respondents violated a court order by not depositing the entire compensation money received from NHAI with the High Court.

The respondents received a refund from the Income-Tax Department, part of which was originally deducted as TDS from the NHAI payment, and utilized it without court permission.

The Single Judge issued a Rule against the respondents and restrained them from operating bank accounts without securing the TDS amount.

Issues:

Whether the respondents' utilization of the income tax refund without court permission constitutes a violation of the court order.

Whether the Single Judge's order restraining the respondents from operating bank accounts without securing the TDS amount is justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the importance of respecting court orders and ensuring compliance, particularly regarding the protection of compensation amounts in legal proceedings. It found that the respondents' appropriation of the income tax refund without court permission was indeed a violation of the court order to secure the entire compensation amount.

The Court emphasized the need to protect the compensation amount and held that the respondents should not have utilized the refund without court permission.

However, it modified the Single Judge's order to allow the respondents to operate their bank accounts after securing a specific amount determined by the court. The Court clarified that any observations made in the judgment were specific to the order and should not influence the consideration of the contempt proceedings by the Single Judge.

Facts:

Brakewel Automotive Components (India) Pvt. Ltd. (the appellant) filed a civil suit against P.R. Selvam Alagappan (the respondent) for recovery of dues arising from business transactions.

The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant due to the respondent's failure to contest effectively.

The appellant initiated execution proceedings, which were contested by the respondent through objections and an application under Section 47 of the CPC.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the respondent to the execution petition were valid under Section 47 of the CPC.

Whether the Executing Court had the authority to question the validity of the decree.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the objections raised by the respondent were not valid under Section 47 of the CPC. The Court emphasized that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree or question its validity unless there are jurisdictional errors or the decree is a nullity. The objections raised by the respondent did not demonstrate any substantial defense to the decree or establish jurisdictional infirmity. Therefore, the objections were rejected.

The Court further clarified that Section 47 of the CPC limits the scope of scrutiny to objections related to the executability of the decree, based on jurisdictional infirmity or voidness. It reiterated that a decree of a court of law is sacrosanct in nature, and execution should not be thwarted on frivolous grounds.

The judgment directed the Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings expeditiously. No costs were awarded in the matter.

Facts:

The respondent-assessee, a partnership firm engaged in the sale of ship materials, was dissolved due to the death of one partner. The issue arose regarding the valuation of closing stock for income tax assessment. The Assessing Officer initially accepted the method of valuation adopted by the assessee. However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) exercised revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, directing the valuation of closing stock at market price.

Issues:

Whether the valuation of closing stock at cost price was permissible in the case of a dissolved firm, or if it should be valued at market rate as per precedent.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court. It was ruled that when a business continues after the dissolution of a firm, it may not be necessary to follow market rates for valuing closing stock. As the business continued with the surviving partner after dissolution, the Assessing Officer's acceptance of the book value of the stock-in-trade was deemed a plausible and permissible view. Consequently, the CIT could not validly exercise powers under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act.

The Court referred to various legal precedents, including the case of A.L.A. Firm v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which discusses the valuation of closing stock upon dissolution of a firm.

The appeals were dismissed with costs, affirming the judgment of the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent Company borrowed a significant sum from a consortium of Banks, including the State Bank of Travancore. Subsequently, recovery proceedings were initiated, leading to a partial decree. The State Bank of Travancore assigned the debts due from the respondent Company to Kotak Mahindra Bank, resulting in legal disputes. The respondent Company filed a complaint alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and conspiracy against the appellants, who were officers of the State Bank of Travancore.

Issues:

Whether the complaint against the appellants, who were officers of the State Bank of Travancore, was valid and whether there was sufficient ground to prosecute them for the alleged fraudulent activities.

Held:

The Court emphasized that the decision to issue process in a criminal case requires sufficient grounds and evidence. It was found that the State Bank of Travancore had failed to inform the respondent Company about the assignment of debts to Kotak Mahindra Bank, which was a crucial omission. The complainant withdrew the complaint against other accused individuals from Kotak Mahindra Bank, but the complaint against the appellants persisted.

The Court concluded that there was no valid reason to prosecute the appellants, as they were not directly involved in the fraudulent activities, and the complaint against them lacked substance.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the complaint against the appellants was quashed.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal regarding the interpretation of the term "information" under Section 19 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981.

Issues:

The main issue pertains to the broad interpretation of the term "information" and its implications on the reassessment proceedings under tax laws.

Held:

The term "information" under Section 19 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 is interpreted broadly to encompass various factors, including data from external sources and the discovery of new facts within assessment records.

Reassessment proceedings may be initiated if the assessing officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any turnover of a dealer has escaped assessment or has been under-assessed.

The assessing officer's satisfaction regarding the existence of reasonable grounds for reassessment is crucial, and reassessment must be based on substantive information indicating potential tax evasion or under-assessment

Audit objections can trigger reassessment if they point out factual information already present in records but overlooked, or if they highlight information external to the records or arithmetical errors.

Mere audit objections or changes in opinion without substantive new information may not warrant reassessment.

In the present case, the Assessing Officer was not satisfied based on the information provided by the audit team that any turnover of the appellant-company had escaped assessment, leading to the reassessment order being deemed without jurisdiction and set aside.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the reassessment order is set aside.

Facts:

The appellants, who had cleared the State Medical Entrance Examination, were unsuccessful in the first round of counseling for admission to post-graduate medical courses in Uttar Pradesh.

They contended that the admission process, as outlined in the Information Brochure, required a minimum of three counseling rounds and a mop-up round if seats remained vacant. They alleged that the failure to conduct these rounds resulted in unallotted seats and wastage of government resources.

Issues:

Whether the failure to conduct additional counseling rounds as per the Information Brochure led to the wastage of government resources and unallotted seats.

Whether the appellants' delay in raising their grievance impacted their claim.

Held:

Admission to post-graduate medical courses for the academic session 2016-2017 in Uttar Pradesh had concluded as per the Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Dinesh Singh Chauhan, finalized on August 16, 2016.

The appellants failed to raise their grievance during the pendency of the Dinesh Singh Chauhan case, despite being aware of ongoing litigation. Their silence until after the conclusion of the admissions process precluded them from benefiting from the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'.

The law does not assist the non-vigilant, and the appellants' delayed action cannot be condoned. They cannot seek relief under the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the lower court to dismiss the writ petition.

Facts:

The appellants, claiming joint ownership of the suit premises based on a will executed by their grandmother, filed a suit and an application for eviction of tenants due to default in rent payment and unauthorized subletting. The High Court dismissed the suit and application, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellants had standing to maintain the suit and application for eviction.

Whether the tenants were in default of rent payment and had sublet the premises without the landlord's consent.

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the suit and application was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the compromise decree recognized the appellants' joint ownership, allowing them to maintain the suit and application for eviction as co-owners.

The tenants were estopped from denying the appellants' status as landlords, as they had admitted the tenancy under the appellants' predecessors and continued paying rent to them.

The tenants were in default of rent payment from October 1989 onwards, and subletting without the landlord's consent was established. The offer of rent made to someone other than the appellants was invalid.

The High Court's dismissal of the suit and application solely based on the alleged lack of standing of the appellants was erroneous. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgments and decreed in favor of the appellants, ordering the tenants to vacate the premises within three months.