Facts:

The marriage between the appellant and respondent occurred in 1994, with two children born in 1995 and 2003. Since 2008, the parties had been living separately, and disputes led to civil and criminal proceedings. Eventually, a settlement was reached in April 2017, seeking divorce by mutual consent, with the appellant agreeing to provide permanent alimony to the respondent. A petition was filed before the Family Court seeking waiver of the statutory six-month waiting period for the second motion, citing long separation and no possibility of reconciliation.

Issues:

Whether the six-month waiting period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, could be waived by the court in exceptional circumstances.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after examining various precedents, held that the waiting period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory. The Court outlined factors to consider before granting waiver, including the length of separation, efforts at mediation, settlement of issues between parties, and the likelihood of reconciliation. The Court emphasized the need to consider the interests of justice and the objective of providing a chance for reconciliation while avoiding prolonging the parties' agony.

The Court's decision was based on several paragraphs of the judgment, including Paragraphs 18 to 23, which specifically address the interpretation of Section 13B(2) and the factors guiding the court's discretion in granting waiver.

Additionally, the Court mentioned the possibility of conducting proceedings via video conferencing and allowing representation through close relations in cases where personal appearance is not possible.

The parties were granted the liberty to move the concerned court for fresh consideration in light of the Supreme Court's order, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. (APCPL) and Era Infra Engineering Ltd. (EIEL) regarding a contract for constructing a permanent township for a thermal power project. APCPL appointed its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as the sole arbitrator. EIEL later challenged the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, alleging potential bias due to the arbitrator's employment with APCPL.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of an employee of a party as an arbitrator raises justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality?

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the appointment of the arbitrator?

Whether the arbitration should proceed in accordance with the law despite the challenge to the arbitrator's appointment?

Held:

The mere fact that the arbitrator is an employee of one of the parties does not ipso facto raise a presumption of bias or lack of impartiality. (Para 1.1)

In this case, there was no evidence to suggest that the appointed arbitrator, being the CEO of APCPL, lacked independence or impartiality. (Para 1.2)

The principles governing appointments under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, both before and after the 2015 Amendment, were outlined. (Para 1.3)

The procedure for challenging an arbitrator under Section 12 of the Act mandates disclosure of circumstances likely to affect independence or impartiality. EIEL failed to raise objections within the prescribed time and procedure. (Para 1.4)

The High Court erred in interfering with the arbitration process without sufficient cause. The arbitration should proceed in accordance with the law. (Para 1.4)

Decision: The appointment of the arbitrator by APCPL was upheld, and the arbitration was directed to proceed in accordance with the law. (Para 1.4)

Facts:

The case involves a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 728 of 2015 filed seeking a ban on the use of fireworks in the NCR.

An interim order was passed on November 11, 2016, suspending all licenses permitting the sale of fireworks within the NCR.

Manufacturers and suppliers of fireworks sought a modification of the interim order.

Issues:

The main issue was to balance public health concerns with the interests of those holding valid licenses to sell fireworks.

Another issue was to determine the extent of the contribution of fireworks to air pollution in the NCR.

Held:

The residents of the NCT of Delhi and the entire NCR are entitled to breathe unpolluted air, and the right to clean air is a recognized constitutional right. While health concerns must take precedence, a balanced approach is necessary to address both public health and the interests of those holding valid licenses. (Para 65-68)

A complete ban on the sale of fireworks may not be fully warranted, but there is a need for regulation to gradually reduce air pollution caused by fireworks. The court recognized the need to regulate the availability and sale of fireworks in Delhi and the NCR. (Para 69-70)

The health of the people in Delhi and the NCR must take precedence over any commercial or other interests, necessitating a graded regulation that would eventually result in a prohibition. (Para 71)

Decision: The court issued several directives to regulate the sale and use of fireworks, enforce safety standards, reduce the number of temporary licenses granted, and encourage community participation in display fireworks.

With the above directions, I.A. No. 52448 of 2017 is disposed of.

Facts:

Complaint filed against the respondent for evasion of excise duty.

Omission of Rule 56A during the pendency of proceedings.

Application for discharge filed by the respondent based on the omission of Rule 56A.

High Court quashed the charge citing the omission of Rule 56A as a reason.

Issues:

Whether the omission of Rule 56A affects the charge of evasion of duty.

Whether the prosecution can continue despite the omission of the procedural rule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the omission of a procedural rule (Rule 56A) did not affect the charge of evasion of duty against the respondent. The Court emphasized that the prosecution should not be deprived of the opportunity to prove evasion, which is an offense in itself. Therefore, the High Court's decision to quash the charge based solely on the omission of Rule 56A was not justified. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the trial court's order.

Facts:

The petitioner, Madha Medical College and Research Institute, challenged the Union government's order debarring it from admitting students for the MBBS course during the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The college had faced deficiencies in faculty, residents, infrastructure, and other facilities as noted in assessment reports by the Medical Council of India (MCI). Despite efforts to rectify these deficiencies, subsequent inspections still found significant shortcomings.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be granted recognition under Section 11 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and whether it should be allowed to participate in the counseling process for MBBS admissions for the upcoming academic year.

Held:

The court ruled that there was no prohibition on conducting multiple inspections if deemed necessary by the MCI to ensure compliance with regulations. It affirmed the MCI's authority to conduct inspections and make recommendations based on its findings. (Para. 17)

Emphasizing the importance of maintaining standards in medical education and protecting public interest, the court upheld the MCI's authority to conduct inspections and make recommendations based on its findings. (Para. 19)

While allowing the petitioner an opportunity to rectify deficiencies for consideration in the subsequent academic year, the court granted the college an opportunity to rectify deficiencies for consideration in the academic year 2018-19. It directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within two months and notify the college of any remaining deficiencies. The petitioner would have an opportunity to address these issues before the MCI made recommendations to the Union government. (Para. 21)

The court ordered that the bank guarantee of Rs. 2 crores provided by the petitioner would remain active during this period and should not be encashed. The court also directed the Union government to consider the MCI's recommendations in accordance with the law and provide the petitioner with a fair hearing before making a final decision. (Para. 22)

The court clarified that it found no grounds to interfere with the Union government's previous decisions regarding the petitioner. (Para. 23)

Facts:The petitioner, Major S.D. Singh Medical College and Hospital, challenged an order by the Union government prohibiting it from admitting students for the MBBS course during the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The government authorized the Medical Council of India (MCI) to encash a bank guarantee of Rs. 2 crores. The case stemmed from deficiencies observed during various inspections, leading to permission denials for admitting new students.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's explanations and submissions regarding deficiencies were adequately considered.

Whether the court can interfere with factual determinations made by expert statutory bodies like the MCI.

The appropriate course of action concerning the petitioner's situation for the academic year 2018-19.

Whether relief could be granted for the academic year 2017-18.

Held:

The court held that the petitioner's explanations and submissions regarding deficiencies raise factual issues best verified by the MCI as an expert statutory body. The court cannot re-evaluate factual situations regarding faculty availability and infrastructure adequacy.( Para 10)

The court directed the MCI to reevaluate the college's situation for the academic year 2018-19. A fresh inspection was mandated within two months, allowing the college an opportunity to rectify deficiencies. The bank guarantee would remain active during this period, and the Union government was directed to consider MCI's recommendations and issue a final decision after providing a hearing to the petitioner.( Para 11)

Relief for the academic year 2017-18 was declined, considering broader interests in medical education and a related judgment delivered the same day.( Para 12)

Facts:

The petitioner, a trust operating a medical college, filed a writ petition challenging the government's order debarring them from admitting students and seeking to encash a bank guarantee. The government's decision was based on deficiencies found during a surprise inspection conducted by the MCI.

Issues:

Whether the surprise inspection conducted by the MCI was permissible.

Whether the government's decision to debar the petitioner and encash the bank guarantee was justified.

Whether the court should intervene in the matter through judicial review.

Held:

The surprise inspection conducted by the MCI was found to be permissible, in accordance with Clause 8(3)(l)(d) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999. (Para 24-25)

The court clarified that the absence of a requirement to record reasons for each inspection does not render surprise inspections invalid. Previous judgments must be understood in their specific contexts and factual circumstances. (Para 27-33)

After scrutinizing the explanation provided by the petitioner's principal regarding deficiencies highlighted during the inspection, the court found that the government's decision to debar the petitioner was justified. (Para 34-38)

The court emphasized the distinction between judicial review and the power of appeal, stating that judicial review does not involve re-appreciation of evidence but focuses on ensuring fundamental rights and the proper exercise of governmental powers. (Para 43-51)

While the initial order lacked reasoning, the subsequent order provided substantial reasons. The court found the latter order to be valid. (Para 52-53)

The petitioner was not entitled to a Letter of Permission (LOP) for the academic session 2017-2018, and no petitions for LOP for that session would be entertained. Students already studying based on LOP for the academic year 2016-2017 would be allowed to continue until course completion. Applications submitted for 2017-2018 would be treated as applications for 2018-2019. The petitioner would keep the bank guarantee deposited with the MCI alive, and the MCI would not encash it. The MCI would conduct a fresh inspection within two months, allowing the petitioner an opportunity to rectify deficiencies. The Central Government would make a final decision after considering the MCI's recommendation and providing a hearing to the petitioners. (Para 54)

Facts:

The plaintiff, Bharat Bhushan Bharti, claimed ownership as "Mahant" and "Manager" of a temple named Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj in Uttarakhand.

The plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership over the temple land and permanent injunction against interference by the State and its authorities.

The trial court partially decreed the suit, declaring the plaintiff as the owner of a portion of the land by adverse possession, granting easementary rights over a well, and issuing a permanent injunction.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff's suit lacked necessary material pleadings and particulars to claim ownership over the temple land and permanent injunction.

Whether the lower courts erred in granting ownership rights based on adverse possession without proper pleadings or evidence.

Whether the High Court failed to address relevant legal issues and dismissed the appeal without proper consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing both parties and examining the record, found several jurisdictional and legal errors in the lower courts' decisions.

The plaintiff's suit lacked necessary material pleadings and particulars to claim ownership over the temple land and permanent injunction. (Para 20-27)

The lower courts erred in granting ownership rights based on adverse possession without proper pleadings or evidence. (Para 30-31)

The High Court failed to address relevant legal issues and dismissed the appeal without proper consideration. (Para 32-33)

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the lower courts, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs payable to the appellant. (Para 38)

Facts:

The case involved officers seeking induction into the Indian Police Service (IPS) after initially serving in the DANIPS (Delhi, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Daman and Diu, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli Police Service).

The officers sought regularization of their service in certain grades within DANIPS, which was eventually granted by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) directed the state to convene the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) for their promotion within DANIPS and subsequent induction into IPS.

The Ministry of Home Affairs issued orders for their induction into IPS.

Issues:

Whether seniority in IPS should depend on grade pay, as suggested by the Sixth Pay Commission Report.

Whether the direction issued by the High Court to amend relevant regulations and rules regarding seniority based on grade pay was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that seniority in IPS should be based on the date of induction into IPS, not on the length of service in any other service prior to induction. The Court rejected the notion of using grade pay as the sole determinant for seniority across different services. The direction issued by the High Court to amend relevant regulations and rules regarding seniority based on grade pay was set aside.

This conclusion was based on the reasoning that the grade pay should operate only within the same service and cannot be used to determine seniority across different services. The Court emphasized the principle that seniority in IPS is to be determined by the date of induction into IPS, not by the length of service in another service. The Court also reiterated that it cannot direct legislation, citing the principle established in the case of Manoj Narula vs. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1.