Facts:

The appellant, MIS. YESHWANT GRAMIN SHIKSHAN SANSTHA, operates schools and colleges and employs part-time workers with the approval of the State Government. It challenged the applicability of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Central Act) to its part-time employees, arguing that their service conditions are governed by State laws.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the Central Act apply to part-time employees of the appellant's schools and colleges, which are governed by State laws.

Whether the appellant is deemed to have defaulted in depositing Provident Fund contributions for its part-time employees.

Held:

The court interpreted Section 1 of the Central Act, which applies to various establishments, including educational institutions like schools and colleges. The Central Government had issued a notification including educational institutions under the Central Act, subject to Section 16 exemptions.

The appellant claimed exemption under Section 16(1)(b) of the Central Act, which exempts establishments under the control of the Central or State Government, whose employees are covered by government provident fund schemes.

The court found that the appellant's schools were 100% grant-in-aid and under State Government control, fulfilling the conditions of Section 16(1)(b). Therefore, the Central Act did not apply to them.

Exemption under Section 16 applies to the entire establishment, and any action taken under the Central Act against exempted establishments is unauthorized.

Initiation of recovery proceedings against the appellant, despite its exemption status, was deemed unauthorized.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involved the appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, where the appellants were convicted and sentenced under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. The prosecution's case primarily relied on circumstantial evidence, with the exception of the testimony of two chance witnesses. These witnesses claimed to have heard an altercation between the deceased and the accused before the incident occurred. However, their testimony lacked corroboration and clarity regarding their relationship with the parties involved.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of the chance witnesses, the clarity regarding the motive for the crime, and the sufficiency of evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

After careful consideration of the evidence presented, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the chance witnesses was deemed unreliable due to lack of corroboration and clarity.

Additionally, discrepancies in the prosecution's case, such as the absence of a convincing motive for the crime and ambiguity regarding the deceased's association with the accused, raised doubts about the narrative. Moreover, forensic evidence presented did not support the prosecution's case.

Therefore, the Court held that the trial court and the High Court erred in law in convicting the accused. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and both the accused were acquitted of all charges. They were to be released immediately unless required in connection with any other case.

Facts:

Signode India Limited (the appellant) was contesting its liability to pay service tax based on whether its activities constituted "cargo handling service" under the Finance Act, 1994.

The appellant contended that its activities fell under "packaging activity," which was made exigible to service tax by an amendment to the Finance Act in 2005.

Issues:

Whether the activities of the appellant constituted "cargo handling service" as per the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 1994.

Whether the amendment made by the Finance Act of 2005 impacted the liability of the appellant for service tax.

Held:

The court observed that the insertion of Section 65(76b) and Section 105(zzzf) by the Finance Act, 2005, indicated legislative intent that packaging activity is distinct from cargo handling activity.

Prior to the amendment, the appellant would not be liable to pay service tax on its activities, as they did not fall under the category of "cargo handling service."

The court made a distinction between "cargo handling service" and "packaging activity," noting that cargo refers to goods ready for transportation, whereas packaging of goods is a stage prior to becoming cargo.

The court referred to a circular issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, which clarified that services provided by cargo handling agencies undertaking packing, unpacking, loading, and unloading of goods meant to be transported are liable to tax as "cargo handling services."

The appeals were allowed, setting aside the order of the Tribunal, and any demand raised on the appellant was to be understood in the light of the judgment, granting all reliefs due.

Facts:

The case involved a husband filing for dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The wife filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights against the husband. The husband alleged nine instances of cruelty by the wife, while the wife denied these allegations and claimed that the husband had withdrawn from her company without reasonable cause.

Issues:

Whether the alleged incidents constituted cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, and whether the wife was entitled to restitution of conjugal rights.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the incidents alleged by the husband did not meet the threshold of mental cruelty as per the guidelines established in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh.

The Court emphasized that the incidents were either stale, isolated, or had been condoned by subsequent conduct. It was noted that incidents prior to 2006 were deemed condoned due to subsequent cohabitation, and isolated incidents after 2006 did not constitute cruelty.

The Court dismissed arguments that individual incidents, such as misbehavior at the husband's workplace or allegations of extramarital relations, constituted cruelty. Additionally, the Court found in favor of the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights, stating that the husband had withdrawn from her company without reasonable cause.

Facts:

The Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA opposed the telecast of the dubbed serial 'Mahabharat' in Bengali, fearing it would adversely affect the Bengali film and television industry.

They sent letters to broadcasting channels, urging them to stop the telecast of the dubbed serial, threatening non-cooperation if their demands were not met.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA violated the Competition Act, 2002, specifically Section 3(3)(b).

Whether the relevant market for analysis includes only the broadcast of TV serials or the entire film and TV industry of West Bengal.

Whether the actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA can be considered as protected under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Held

The court determined that the relevant market for analysis includes the entire film and television industry of West Bengal, not just the broadcast of TV serials. The actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA, aimed at preventing the telecast of the dubbed serial, affected the entire industry, not just broadcasting. Thus, their actions violated the Competition Act, 2002, as they hindered competition and consumer choice.

The Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA, though acting like trade unions, were considered associations of enterprises engaged in the film and television industry. Their actions, aimed at protecting the interests of their members in the industry, did not fall under the protection of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Their concerted efforts to prevent the telecast of the dubbed serial amounted to creating barriers to competition and were in violation of the Competition Act, 2002.

Decision: The court upheld the appeal, affirming that the actions of the Co-ordination Committee and EIMPA constituted a violation of the Competition Act, 2002. It emphasized the importance of competition and consumer choice, condemning any actions that hinder competition or limit consumer options.

Facts:

The Respondent, a limited company, filed a civil suit against the Appellant, the Municipal Corporation of Faridabad, seeking a permanent injunction against the recovery of house tax for certain years and a declaration that a demand notice for house tax was illegal. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal. The Appellant filed a second appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed in limine.

Issues:

Whether the suit challenging the demand for house tax is maintainable.

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the second appeal in limine, holding that it did not involve any substantial question of law.

Held:

The Court held the High Court thus, in our view, committed jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the approach of the High Court. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

The impugned order is set aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law. We, however, request the High Court to admit the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code keeping in view the pleadings and findings of the two courts below. Needless to say, the questions to be framed should be specific.

Facts:The incident occurred on 01-01-2005, where Lalit Mohan Rai was shot and killed in front of Hotel Shalimar, which he co-owned. The FIR was filed by Himanshu Mohan Rai, the brother of the deceased. The prosecution's case relied heavily on eyewitness testimony, particularly that of Himanshu Mohan Rai (P.W. 1) and Chandra Shekhar Rai (P.W. 2), who both identified Imran Afreen as the assailant.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution witnesses, inconsistencies in the FIR, discrepancies in the investigation, and the inconclusive ballistic report.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 to be credible and reliable, corroborating each other's accounts of the incident. The Court also addressed the issue of the ballistic report, stating that the absence of a conclusive link between the recovered weapon and the shots fired did not undermine the eyewitness testimony.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the facts and circumstances of the case warranted interference with the acquittal of Imran Afreen. Consequently, it allowed the appeals filed by Himanshu Mohan Rai and the State of Uttar Pradesh, setting aside the High Court's judgment and convicting Imran Afreen under Section 302 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment.

The Court directed Imran Afreen to surrender within two weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

Mohan Kumar (appellant) filed a civil suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh and others regarding the ownership of a piece of land.

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, holding him as the owner of the disputed land.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and the suit entirely, disagreeing with the Trial Court's findings on ownership.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal without giving him an opportunity to prove his title with proper evidence.

Whether the Trial Court's decree in favor of the appellant was legally sustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant should have been given an opportunity to prove his title by adducing proper evidence, rather than outrightly dismissing the suit. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders, and remanded the case back to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Court emphasized the duty of the court to assist parties in arriving at a settlement, particularly in cases involving the government or public officers. The Trial Court was directed to make every endeavor to assist the parties in settling the dispute before proceeding to decide the suit on merits.

The parties were instructed to appear before the Trial Court on a specified date, with the Court directed to conclude the proceedings preferably within six months from that date.

Facts:

The deceased, an employee of Gujarat Electricity Board, died in a road accident involving a vehicle insured by National Insurance Co. Ltd.

The wife of the deceased was subsequently given employment by the employer on compassionate grounds, receiving a regular salary.

The appellant, National Insurance Co. Ltd., contested the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, arguing that the amount received by the claimants from compassionate appointments should be deducted from the compensation amount.

Issues:

Whether the income received by the claimants from compassionate appointments should be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Held:

The Court rejected the argument put forth by the appellant and held that the income from compassionate employment should not be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Act. The Court reasoned that the compensation is meant to address the loss of income suffered due to the accident, and compassionate appointments offered by a separate entity do not offset this loss in the same way as financial schemes directly compensating for the loss of income.

The Court cited previous judgments to support its stance, highlighting the distinction between financial assistance directly compensating for the loss of income and compassionate appointments providing ongoing employment opportunities.

Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the respondents, affirming the judgments of the lower courts and dismissing the appeals brought by National Insurance Co. Ltd.