Facts:

The appellant, Manjeet Singh, purchased a second-hand Tata open truck insured by the respondent insurance company. The truck was stolen by passengers who were given a lift by the truck driver. The insurance company repudiated the claim on the grounds of breach of policy terms due to unauthorized passengers.

Issues:

Whether giving a lift to passengers constituted a fundamental breach of the insurance policy.

Whether ongoing arbitration proceedings between the finance company and the appellant affected the appellant's rights against the insurance company.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the act of giving a lift to passengers, although a breach of policy terms, was not a fundamental breach that would nullify the insurance policy.

Furthermore, the Court found that ongoing arbitration proceedings between the finance company and the appellant did not affect the appellant's rights against the insurance company.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the insurance company to pay 75% of the insured amount along with interest and additional compensation to the appellant. The amount was to be deposited before the District Forum, with priority given to settling the finance company's claim if not already resolved through arbitration.

Facts:

Aftaruddin, an under-raiyat, allegedly executed a sale deed transferring land to Mamataj Begam, daughter of the raiyat.

Mamataj Begam subsequently transferred the land to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of their title over the land.

Issues:

Whether Aftaruddin, being an under-raiyat, had the legal right to transfer the land.

The effect of misrepresentation in the sale deed regarding Aftaruddin's status as a raiyat.

Held:

Aftaruddin, as an under-raiyat, was prohibited from transferring his rights in the land under Section 108 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960.

The sale deed's misrepresentation of Aftaruddin as a raiyat was a subterfuge to circumvent the law, which was impermissible.

The subsequent purchasers couldn't benefit from this fraud, as the protection provided by Section 108 couldn't be negated by such tactics.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the trial court's judgment was restored, thereby dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, Asharfi, and another individual, Udai Bhan, were accused of forcibly entering the house of the victim, Phoola Devi, on the intervening night of 8/9.12.1995, and committing rape.

The appellant was convicted by the trial court for offenses including house trespass, rape, and causing hurt, along with a charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the High Court, leading to Asharfi's appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported the conviction and sentencing under the relevant sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Specifically, the Court had to determine if the offense of rape was committed with the intention of targeting the victim because of her caste identity, as required by Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Held:

The Court upheld the conviction and ten-year sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC for rape, based on the evidence provided by the prosecution, including the victim's testimony and medical evidence.

However, the Court set aside the conviction and life imprisonment sentence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, as the evidence did not establish that the appellant committed the offense specifically because the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. This section required proof of intention to target the victim based on her caste identity, which was lacking in this case.

Therefore, the appellant's appeal was partially allowed, with the conviction and sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC and other offenses upheld, while the conviction and sentence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act were set aside.

As the appellant had already served more than ten years in prison, the Court ordered his immediate release unless he was required in any other case.

Facts:

The State Government of Maharashtra introduced a subsidy scheme in the form of exemption of entertainment duty for newly set up Multiplex Theatre Complexes for three years, followed by a reduced rate of 25% for the subsequent two years.

The scheme aimed to promote the construction of Multiplex Theatre Complexes to address the declining occupancy in traditional cinema theatres.

Issues:

Whether the subsidy provided to Multiplex Theatre Complexes should be classified as a capital or revenue receipt under the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Court held that the subsidy provided to Multiplex Theatre Complexes constitutes a capital receipt. The purpose test was applied to determine the nature of the subsidy, focusing on whether it was intended to assist in setting up new units or expanding existing ones.

The Court observed that the objective of the subsidy scheme was to facilitate the construction of new cinema houses, aligning with the purpose of capital investment.

It was emphasized that the point of time at which the subsidy is paid, the source of the subsidy, and the form of subsidy are irrelevant in determining its nature.

The Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue, affirming that the subsidy provided by the State Government was indeed of a capital nature and not a revenue receipt.

Facts:The respondent was charged under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. He approached the High Court seeking the summoning of material not included in the chargesheet under Section 91 of the CrPC. The High Court allowed this application, contrary to the decision of the trial court. The appellants challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to allow the summoning of material not part of the chargesheet under Section 91 of the CrPC was contrary to established law.

Whether the defense could be considered at the stage of framing charges, potentially leading to a mini-trial.

Held:The Supreme Court held that while ordinarily, the accused cannot invoke Section 91 of the CrPC at the stage of framing charges, the court has the authority to summon material not included in the chargesheet if the interest of justice demands it. However, this does not confer an automatic right to the defense to invoke Section 91 at this stage. The court emphasized that the necessity or desirability of summoning a document should be assessed concerning the stage when the request is made and the party making the request. The court set aside the view taken by the High Court and directed the trial court to proceed with the issue of framing charges based on the observations made. The trial court was instructed to handle the matter expeditiously and in accordance with the law.

This decision is in line with the observations made in Debendra Nath Padhi and Hardeep Singh cases, where the court emphasized the court's duty to uphold justice and the rule of law, even if it means summoning material not included in the chargesheet.

Facts:

The appellant, Prabhu Dutt Tiwari, was aggrieved by the quashing of an order summoning the respondents by the High Court.

The summoning order was issued by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court-19, Deoria, based on a complaint filed by the appellant.

The complaint alleged various offenses under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the respondents.

The respondents challenged this order in a criminal writ petition before the High Court, which subsequently quashed the summoning order.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in quashing the summoning order issued by the Magistrate.

Whether there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused based on the evidence presented by the complainant at the stage of summoning.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the summoning order issued by the Magistrate. The Court emphasized that at the stage of summoning, the Magistrate's role is limited to determining whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused based on the available records and evidence presented by the complainant. In this case, the Magistrate had satisfied this requirement, and thus, the High Court's decision to quash the summoning order was incorrect.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The party-respondents were directed to appear before the trial court within one month and be released on bail upon furnishing sufficient surety/sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court. Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that its decision did not express any opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it open for the parties to pursue appropriate legal steps at the trial stage.

Facts:

The appellant (landlord) sought to recover property tax from the respondent (tenant) under Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act as arrears of rent.

The appellant claimed that the property tax exceeded the threshold for rent under the Rent Act, thereby forfeiting the tenant's protection under it.

The respondent contested, arguing that property tax cannot be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes under the Rent Act.

Issues:

Whether property tax recoverable under Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act can be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes under the Rent Act.

Held:

The Court emphasized the protective nature of the Rent Act, which aims to provide security to tenants against arbitrary eviction by landlords. It analyzed relevant provisions of both Acts and concluded that the Rent Act prevails over the NDMC Act in matters concerning eviction of tenants.

The Court rejected the landlord's argument that property tax should be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes, emphasizing that the Rent Act must prevail in landlord-tenant issues. It clarified that Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act only provides a right to recover tax as rent but does not override the protections afforded to tenants under the Rent Act. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision, and ruled that property tax recoverable from the tenant cannot be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the classification of a contract between the Corporation and the appellants for the collection of Tehbazari Fee (tolls) and parking fees. The Corporation invited bids for this purpose, and the appellants' bids were accepted, leading to the execution of contracts.

Issues:

The classification of the contract and the applicable stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the contract for the collection of tolls and parking fees fell within the definition of "Lease" under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act. Therefore, the contract was chargeable to stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act as "Lease." The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decision of the High Court to uphold the stamp duty demand by the Collector of Stamps.

Facts:

The parties in this case, Prateek Gupta (appellant-father) and Shilpy Gupta (respondent-mother), were residing in the US with their two sons. However, due to irreconcilable marital issues, they began living separately since 2014. One of their children, Aadvik, was taken to India by the appellant-father when he was barely 2.5 years old and has been residing in India since then. At the time of the hearing, the child was a little over 5 years old. The respondent-mother sought custody of the child through a writ petition filed before the High Court, which directed the appellant-father to hand over custody to her.

Issues:

The custody of the child, Aadvik, who has been residing in India with the appellant-father.

The court needs to determine whether the welfare and best interests of the child are served by granting custody to the respondent-mother, who resides in the US, or allowing him to remain with the appellant-father in India.

Held:

Delineates the court's position on the paramount importance of the child's welfare and interest in custody disputes. The court emphasizes that the invocation of principles like comity of courts should be assessed based on the specific circumstances of each case, with the welfare of the child being the overriding concern.

Underscores the limited relevance of the doctrines of "intimate contact" and "closest concern" in cases where the child is uprooted from their native country and taken to a foreign environment.

Highlight the court's consideration of the child's integration into the Indian environment, the stability of his current living arrangement, and the potential harm caused by uprooting him from his familiar surroundings.

The court concludes that the child should continue in the custody of the appellant-father, subject to any future orders from a court of competent jurisdiction. The decision is based on the child's well-being and the lack of evidence suggesting immediate restoration of custody to the respondent-mother is necessary.