Facts:

M/S. Fortune Infrastructure (now known as M/S. Hicon Infrastructure) launched a residential housing project named 'Hicons Onyx', later renamed 'Fortune Residency'.

Trevor D'Lima booked a flat in this project but had not received possession due to delays in construction.

The appellants transferred the project to another company due to cost escalation beyond expectations.

Trevor D'Lima filed a complaint with the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) seeking various reliefs, including possession of the flat or refund of the amount paid along with compensation for delay and inconvenience.

Issues:

Whether there was deficiency in service on the part of the appellants?

What is the appropriate quantum of compensation?

Held:

The Court affirmed the finding of deficiency in service on the part of the appellants. The court noted that the appellants failed to provide valid reasons for transferring the project to another company despite their contractual obligation to deliver the property to the respondent.

Regarding the quantum of compensation, the court noted that damages should be compensatory and awarded to place the aggrieved party in the same position as if the contract had been performed. The court fixed the market rate at Rs. 50,000 per square foot for the disputed property and adjusted the compensation accordingly.

The appellants were directed to refund the amount received from the respondent, pay compensation for delay, and cover the cost of litigation. The appellants were given six weeks to comply with the order, failing which they would be liable to pay interest.

Additionally, the court allowed the respondent to withdraw a certain amount deposited by the appellants before the NCDRC and adjusted it against the appellants' liability.

Facts:

The case involved appeals regarding the taxation of certain receipts by cooperative societies, including non-occupancy charges, transfer charges, and common amenity fund charges. The question revolved around whether these receipts were exempt from income tax under the doctrine of mutuality.

Issues:

Whether the receipts in question qualified for exemption from income tax under the doctrine of mutuality, considering their utilization for the common benefit of society members.

Held:

The doctrine of mutuality, rooted in common law principles, asserts that a person cannot make a profit from themselves. Therefore, amounts received from oneself are not regarded as income and are not taxable. However, income derived from business activities by a cooperative society is taxable under Section 2(24)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, which stands excluded from the principle of mutuality.

The court found that the receipts in question, such as transfer charges and non-occupancy charges, were utilized for the common benefit of society members, including maintenance, repairs, and amenities. This utilization aligned with the principles of mutuality, as the contributors and beneficiaries were the same.

Regarding the applicability of a government notification dated 09.08.2001, it was determined that the notification only applied to housing societies and not to premises societies, which consist of non-residential premises. Therefore, the notification did not affect the taxation of receipts by premises societies.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeals by the revenue and allowed the appeal by the cooperative society, affirming the principle of mutuality in relation to the receipts in question.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a contract awarded by ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) to a foreign company for seismic survey operations off the coast of Gujarat.

The foreign company chartered a vessel known as Geowave Commander for the survey operations.

The charterer further contracted with two appellants for assistance in survey operations, but payments were not made for their services.

Additionally, the charterer did not pay the charter hire to the owners of the Geowave Commander.

Issues:

Whether a maritime claim against the charterer, who is not the de jure owner of the ship, can be recovered through a restraint order against the ship owned by a third party.

Whether the arrest of the vessel owned by the respondent is maintainable in this case.

Held:

The Court held that a maritime claim against the charterer cannot be recovered through a restraint order against a ship owned by a third party.

The emphasis was placed on the distinction between a charter of demise and other types of charters, clarifying the rights and liabilities of the charterer.

The Court applied the principles of the International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999, to determine the maintainability of the arrest of the vessel.

It was concluded that the claim should be against the charterer personally, and not against the vessel.

The Court emphasized the importance of ownership distinction and rejected the notion of vessel detention as security for a claim against a non-owner or charterer.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, and the amount deposited by the owners of the respondent vessel, along with accrued interest, was ordered to be remitted back to them.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Kerala State Electricity Board (appellant) and Kurien E. Kalathil (respondent) regarding a contract for the construction of a dam. The appellant terminated the contract while a writ petition filed by the respondent was pending. Various petitions were filed by both parties, leading to conflicting claims over payments and interest.

Issues:

The method of appropriation of payments received by the respondent from the appellant.

Entitlement to subsequent interest on the amounts claimed by the respondent.

Validity of the reference to arbitration made by the High Court.

Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court analyzed the method of appropriation of payments made by the appellant to the respondent. It observed inconsistencies in the respondent's approach to adjusting payments towards principal and interest. The court held that payments should be strictly appropriated according to the original agreement, towards the principal first. The direction of the High Court to make further payments under Ex.P20 was set aside.

Regarding subsequent interest, the court noted that there was no direction in the decree for future interest, thus deeming it refused. The respondent's claim for subsequent interest was dismissed as not sustainable.

The court addressed the validity of the reference to arbitration made by the High Court. It emphasized the necessity of written consent from both parties for arbitration reference, which was absent in this case. Therefore, the reference to arbitration was deemed invalid.

In exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the court found the findings of the High Court to be causing loss to the appellant and therefore, it did not decline to interfere. The impugned judgment was set aside.

Regarding the quantum of payment, the court directed the appellant to pay the respondent a certain amount as per the agreement, with adjustments for excess payments made by the appellant. It also clarified that the amount claimed under certain sections would not carry subsequent interest.

Facts:

The appellant, Ummer, filed an appeal against a decision of the Family Court.

The appeal was delayed by 554 days.

Ummer cited health issues and mental disturbance as the reasons for the delay, supported by medical documents.

The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, finding insufficient cause shown by Ummer.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned considering the appellant's health issues and mental disturbance.

Held:

The cause shown by the appellant for condoning the delay was a "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The High Court should have taken a liberal view in the matter and condoned the delay.

The earlier view requiring an explanation for each day of delay had been diluted by later decisions of the Court.

The appellant's health issues and mental disturbance, supported by medical documents, constituted sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was deemed to have been filed within the limitation period.

A cost of Rs. 10,000 was imposed on the appellant to be paid to respondent No. 1.

The High Court was instructed to decide the appeal on its merits expeditiously.

Facts:

The appellants filed a writ petition challenging an order related to a land dispute, which was dismissed by the Single Judge of the High Court. Subsequently, they filed an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, which allowed them to withdraw the appeal and file a review petition. However, the review petition filed by the appellants had defects according to the Registry of the High Court, and they were directed to cure these defects. Despite the direction, the appellants did not address the defects, leading to the review application being listed before the Registrar (Judicial-1).

Issues:

The dismissal of the appellants' application by the High Court on grounds of delay and non-compliance with procedural requirements.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order and restoring the review application for hearing by the appropriate Bench.

The Court emphasized the importance of procedural laws as facilitators of justice, rather than instruments of punishment, citing the observations made in Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425. It urged for a liberal interpretation of procedural laws, particularly in cases where substantial justice is at stake.

Consequently, the Court condoned the delay in filing the application before the High Court and granted the appellants one month's time to rectify the defects in their review application, directing it to be placed before the appropriate Bench for further proceedings.

Facts:

The appellant contested in the 14th Kerala Legislative Assembly elections and was declared elected. Subsequently, the respondents filed an election petition alleging corrupt practices under Section 123(4) of the Representation of People Act, 1950. The appellant raised objections regarding the timeliness of the petition and certain defects therein.

Issues:

Whether the election petition was filed within the prescribed period of limitation.

Whether the defects in the election petition could be cured after the period of limitation.

Whether the production of documents in sealed covers violated the provisions of the Representation of People Act.

Whether the copies supplied to the appellant were sufficient.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the lower court. The Court found that the minor corrections allowed by the court were within its jurisdiction and did not violate the provisions of the Representation of People Act. Additionally, it held that the issues raised regarding the supply of copies and the production of documents in sealed covers were matters for trial and did not warrant dismissal of the petition at that stage.

Facts:

The respondents, M/s. Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd., provided various services and received payments for both the services rendered and reimbursable expenses incurred during service provision. The service tax was paid only on the amounts received for the services rendered, excluding the reimbursed expenses.

Issues:

Whether Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, which includes reimbursable expenses in the valuation of taxable services for service tax purposes, is in accordance with the provisions of sections 66 and 67 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Whether the value of free supplies of diesel and explosives could be included in the assessment of service tax for the service of 'Site Formation and Clearance Service'.

Held:

The Court held that Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, extends to reimbursable expenses, which are reimbursed by clients, in the valuation of taxable services. However, this inclusion goes beyond the mandate of Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, pertains to the value of taxable services, which are actually rendered, for the purpose of calculating service tax. The Court emphasized that service tax is levied only on the consideration paid for providing taxable services. Therefore, any amount not calculated for providing taxable services cannot be included in the valuation for service tax purposes.

The Court noted that the Legislature amended the Finance Act, 1994, in 2015 to include reimbursable expenses in the valuation of taxable services, indicating that such expenses were not originally intended to be included.

Regarding the issue of free supplies of diesel and explosives for the service of 'Site Formation and Clearance Service', the Court held that such supplies cannot be treated as part of the consideration for rendering services and should not be included in the assessment of service tax.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and disposed of the transferred writs in accordance with the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2014 and other connected matters.

Facts:

Synthetic woolen rags were imported in containers, which were destuffed in the Cochin Port Trust premises for Customs examination. However, due to inadequate storage space, the destuffed cargo was not promptly cleared by the consignees. Consequently, the goods remained idle in the port premises for an extended period, leading the port trust to impose ground rent charges on the steamer agents/owners of the containers.

Issues:

The determination of liability for ground rent charges on containers unloaded at Cochin Port but not cleared by the consignees or importers.

Specifically, whether such charges could be imposed on the vessel/steamer agents beyond the 75-day period fixed by the Tariff Authority of Major Ports.

Held:

In view of inconsistencies in previous judgments regarding liability for port charges, the matter was referred to a larger bench for resolution. The following issues needed clarification:

The interpretation of Section 2(o) of the Major Port Trust Act, considering the relevance of the title of goods and the point at which title passes to the consignee in determining liability.

Whether a consignor or steamer agent is relieved of responsibility to pay charges once the Bill of Lading is endorsed or a delivery order is issued.

The extent to which a steamer agent can be held liable for storage charges/demurrage for uncleared goods if a delivery order hasn't been issued.

Determining the principles for the port trust to recover its dues from either the steamer agent or the consignee.

Examining any statutory or contractual obligations for the port trust to de-stuff containers and return them to shipping agents.