Facts:

The appeals arose from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 6.2.2015, which dismissed writ appeals filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the judgment of a learned Single Judge.

Employees M. Mangayarkarasi and M. Jayalakshmi were accused of admitting and sanctioning bills without proper verification, leading to misappropriation in the District Treasury at Salem.

The State Government issued orders of removal from service against them, challenged before the learned Single Judge.

The Single Judge substituted the punishment of removal with stoppage of increments for two years without cumulative effect.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's application of the principle of parity was justified in the disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the gravity of misconduct by the appellants was distinct and more serious compared to other employees.

Held:

The court establish that the Supreme Court found fault with the High Court's decision for several reasons:

The gravity of misconduct by the appellants was distinct and more serious compared to other employees, as evidenced by the amount involved and the extent of lack of verification.

The Division Bench erred in applying the principle of parity without recognizing the material distinction in the misconduct alleged against the appellants.

Judicial review in disciplinary matters should only interfere with the employer's discretion if the penalty is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. In this case, the High Court substituted the penalty without proper justification.

Facts:

The respondent, Abhijit Singh Pawar, participated in the selection process for police posts in Madhya Pradesh in 2012.

He disclosed a pending criminal case against him involving charges under Sections 323, 325, 506, and 34 of the IPC.

A compromise was reached between the parties, and the charges were compounded under Section 320(2) of the CrPC.

Despite disclosure and the compromise, the respondent's candidature was rejected due to the importance of high moral conduct for police positions.

The respondent challenged the rejection in the High Court, which ruled in his favor, allowing his appointment based on merit but without back wages.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the respondent's candidature was justified despite the disclosure and subsequent compromise of the criminal case.

Whether the employer has the discretion to consider the suitability of candidates with criminal antecedents for police positions.

Held:

The Court upheld the rejection of the respondent's candidature, emphasizing the importance of maintaining integrity in the police force. It affirmed the employer's discretion to consider the suitability of candidates with criminal antecedents, even after disclosure and compromise of the case.

The decision was based on established principles outlined in relevant precedents such as Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, Avtar Singh v. Union of India, and others. These precedents affirmed the employer's right to reject candidates with criminal antecedents if it is deemed necessary to maintain the integrity and credibility of the police force.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the decisions of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were set aside. The respondent's writ petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The plaintiffs, residents of Dubai, filed a suit in the High Court of Madras as a derivative action on behalf of defendant No. 2, a Dubai-based company, regarding the ownership of shares in an Indian company held by defendant Nos. 3-7.

The plaintiffs claimed beneficial interest in the shares held by defendant No. 2, while defendant Nos. 3-7 contested this claim. The dispute primarily concerned affairs of the Dubai-based company, and the cause of action did not arise in India.

Issues:

Whether the High Court of Madras had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

Whether the dispute between the parties warranted litigation in India or Dubai.

Whether the principles governing derivative actions and beneficial interests were applicable to the case.

Held:

The High Court rightly held that the mere existence of the registered office of an Indian company does not confer jurisdiction on Indian courts when the dispute primarily involves entities from other jurisdictions.

The dispute between the parties pertained to the affairs of the Dubai-based company, and the cause of action did not arise in India. Therefore, the High Court of Madras lacked jurisdiction.

The High Court correctly observed that the relief sought against the Indian company was consequential, and the main dispute needed resolution first, which would be more appropriately handled by a court in Dubai.

The court highlighted the principles governing derivative actions, emphasizing that they must have legal sanction and are not obliged to foreign entities. In this case, defendant No. 2 was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

The definition of "Beneficial interest" under the Trust Act, 1882 was discussed, indicating that the ownership vests with the registered owner but the beneficial owner may include a person acting as a trustee, legal representative, or agent.

The court reiterated that the issue of territorial jurisdiction over a suit initiated to protect beneficial interests could only be decided if such interests were amenable to such jurisdiction. Defendant No. 2 was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

Facts:

The South Delhi Municipal Corporation (SDMC) challenged an order passed by the High Court of Delhi in favor of SMS AAMW Tollways Private Ltd under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The dispute arose from an agreement between SDMC and SMS AAMW regarding the collection of toll tax. An issue emerged concerning expenses incurred by SMS AAMW due to the dismantling of a toll plaza.

Issues:

Whether Clause 16.3 of the Agreement between SDMC and SMS AAMW constitutes an arbitration clause or merely provides for a departmental appeal.

Held:

In analyzing the clause, the Court determined that it did not constitute an arbitration clause but rather a departmental appeal. The Commissioner's role was administrative oversight, not that of an impartial adjudicator.

The Court referred to legal principles and precedents to support its interpretation. As Clause 16 did not contain a provision for reference to an arbitrator, the Court concluded that it did not constitute an arbitration clause.

Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

The Monitoring Committee appointed by the Supreme Court reported the breaking or tampering of a seal by Shri Manoj Tiwari, an elected Member of Parliament, on a property in Delhi. This action was considered a violation of the Court's orders and interference in the administration of justice.

Issues:

Whether Shri Manoj Tiwari's actions amounted to contempt of court and if the Monitoring Committee had any role in the sealing of the premises.

Held:

The court found that while the sealing of the premises was not directed by the Monitoring Committee, Shri Manoj Tiwari's involvement in breaking the seal was confirmed. His explanation of succumbing to pressure from a mob was deemed unacceptable, highlighting the importance of elected representatives upholding the rule of law.

The court decided not to take action against Shri Manoj Tiwari for his statements against the Monitoring Committee but strongly condemned the use of the court for political propaganda. The proceedings against Shri Manoj Tiwari were closed.

Facts:

The appellant, a medical officer, and the complainant, an assistant nurse, were involved in a relationship where the appellant allegedly promised to marry the complainant.

The complainant alleged that the appellant failed to fulfill his promise and subsequently married another woman.

A First Information Report (FIR) was filed against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

Issues:

Whether the allegations made by the complainant constitute offences under the relevant laws.

Whether the FIR and chargesheet against the appellant should be quashed.

Held:

We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained...

The FIR nowhere spells out any wrong committed by the appellant under Section 420 of the IPC or under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and quashing the FIR and chargesheet filed against the appellant.

Facts:

The appellant(s) challenged an order of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Matrimonial Appeal Nos. 737, 955, and 956 of 2015. Despite unsuccessful mediation attempts, the parties appeared before the Supreme Court, engaging in prolonged interactions. Eventually, a settlement was reached on monetary aspects, with minor disputes mediated by senior counsel Mr. V. Shekhar. The deed of settlement was presented and incorporated into the decree.

Issues:

The primary issue involved resolving the matrimonial dispute between Dr. Benoy Idicula Babu and Dr. Nisha Saira Benoy, including divorce by mutual consent and related matters.

Additionally, the court addressed the status of pending cases before various courts and the processing of a passport application for the minor child involved.

Held:

The court allowed the application under Section 10-A of the Divorce Act, granting divorce by mutual consent based on the settlement reached by the parties. It emphasized the conscious decision of the parties to part ways, eliminating the need for regular divorce proceedings. Furthermore, it ruled that the alimony paid by the husband to the wife should not be considered taxable income. The court directed the Passport Officer to process the mother's application for the minor child's passport, notwithstanding any pending litigation, and ordered the refund of a certain amount deposited with the Regional Passport Officer to the mother.

Various cases filed before different courts were disposed of, with pending proceedings quashed or dismissed, and all proceedings under the Indian Passport Act dropped. The court appreciated the efforts of Mr. V. Shekhar and counsels from both sides for their role in settling the dispute and acknowledged the cooperation of the parties involved. Pending applications were also disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case pertains to the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test-UG (NEET-UG), 2018 examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE). The examination consisted of 180 objective type questions, with bilingual options in English and regional languages. Mistranslations were found in the Tamil version of 49 questions, leading to ambiguity. The High Court of Madras awarded four grace marks for each mistranslated question to all 24,000 students who took the examination in Tamil, regardless of their actual performance.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to award grace marks to all Tamil medium students was justified.

Whether the bilingual system of the NEET-UG examination adequately addresses language concerns.

The validity of the methodology adopted by the High Court in awarding grace marks without considering individual performances.

Held:

The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed that the NEET-UG Examination from the academic year 2019-20 onwards will be conducted by the National Testing Agency (NTA) with improved translation methods. The court emphasized the importance of accurate translation and upheld the principle that in case of any ambiguity between a regional language and English, the English version will be considered final.

The court found the High Court's method of blind allocation of grace marks to be unjust and arbitrary, disrupting the merit-based system. It was emphasized that such decisions should be based on individual performances rather than blanket awards. The court referred to Guru Nanak Dev University v. Saumil Garg and others, (2005) 13 SCC 749, to highlight the importance of preventing arbitrariness in awarding marks and ensuring fairness in evaluations. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.

Facts:

Suits for specific performance were filed by the appellants against Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife, Manjit Kaur. Two individuals from Moradabad and Uttarakhand, claiming to be Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife, filed intervention applications (I.As.), asserting their identity as the actual defendants in the suits.

Issues:

Whether the individuals claiming to be Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife from Moradabad and Uttarakhand should be considered as necessary parties in the specific performance suits.

Whether the question of mistaken identity can be addressed in a specific performance suit.

Held:

The Court held that the individuals claiming to be Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife from Moradabad and Uttarakhand were not necessary parties in the specific performance suits.

The suits were based on the identification of Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and Manjit Kaur from Delhi as defendants. If it turns out that the defendants named in the suits are not the actual parties, the suits would fail, and the plaintiff would bear the consequences.

Therefore, the individuals in the I.As. were neither necessary nor proper parties to the suits, and their claims should be addressed separately.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the Division Bench's judgment was set aside, restoring the judgment of the single Judge.