Facts:

Satyendra Kumar Mehra (also spelled as Satendera Kumar Mehra) appealed against his conviction under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) related to fraud. The trial court convicted Mehra and imposed a sentence with a fine. He filed an appeal before the High Court and sought the suspension of his sentence.

Issues:

Whether Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 automatically stays the payment of fine as part of the sentence pending appeal.

Held:

The court clarified that Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not stay the sentence of fine during the pendency of the appeal. The purpose of Section 357(2) is to defer or withhold the utilization of compensation awarded until the appeal process is completed. It does not relate to the suspension of sentence or stay of fine.

The court further explained that Section 357(2) is applicable only when the court orders payment of compensation utilizing the fine as part of the sentence or directs compensation under specific circumstances mentioned in Section 357(1) or (3). Since there was no such direction from the trial court in the present case, Section 357(2) was not applicable.

Therefore, the High Court was justified in directing the appellant to deposit the fine amount pending appeal. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

Netram Sahu (the appellant) worked as a daily wager for 22 years and 1 month, then his services were regularized as a Pump Operator by the State of Chhattisgarh. The appellant retired on 30.07.2011 but was not paid gratuity. He filed for gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The Controlling Authority allowed the application, but the High Court later set aside this decision, leading to the appellant's appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, having served 22 years as a daily wager and 3 years as a regular employee, was entitled to gratuity as per the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that he is entitled to gratuity. The Court emphasized that the appellant actually served for 25 years, with 22 years under the State. The regularization of his services by the State made him eligible for gratuity regardless of his earlier status as a daily wager.

The Court criticized the State's opposition to the appellant's legitimate claim and ordered the State to pay the gratuity along with a cost of Rs. 25,000 to the appellant within three months.

Facts:

Gorusu Nagaraju was convicted for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and Section 235(2) of the CrPC for the murder and disappearance of evidence related to the murder of Desineedi Venkateswararao @ Venkatesh. The prosecution proved seven circumstances connecting the appellant to the crime, including being last seen with the deceased, purchasing liquor together, recovery of the body with injuries, presence of appellant's fingerprints at the scene, recovery of seized articles at appellant's instance, appellant holding grudge against the deceased, and failure of appellant to explain the circumstances.

Issues:

Whether there were grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of conviction by the lower courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court noted that the findings of conviction by the Sessions Judge and the High Court were concurrent and based on the appreciation of evidence, which usually binds the Supreme Court unless there are indications of perversity, arbitrariness, absurdity, or illegality.

The Court reviewed the evidence and found that the prosecution proved the seven circumstances linking the appellant to the crime. Despite some witnesses turning hostile, the evidence of witnesses who maintained a consistent version of the circumstances was rightly relied upon. The Court emphasized that minor contradictions or inconsistencies in evidence do not affect the material evidence.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's conviction was upheld.

Facts:

The respondent, a retired Train Examiner from the Indian Railways, faced difficulties in obtaining his rightful pension for over 27 years.

Various office memoranda and policy resolutions by the Government of India regarding pension calculations led to confusion and disputes.

The Central Administrative Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the respondent, but the Madras High Court overturned this decision.

Issues:

Whether subsequent office memoranda override or complement earlier ones regarding pension entitlements.

Whether the respondent's post was re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in the case of K.S. Krishnaswamy vs. Union of India, emphasizing that subsequent office memoranda clarified and complemented earlier ones, rather than overriding them.

The Court found no evidence to support the claim of the respondent's post being re-designated as Junior Engineer Grade-II.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the Madras High Court and allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India.

Any payments made to the respondent were to be retained, and a copy of the order was to be sent to the Department of Personnel and Training of the Government of India.

Facts:

The State of Bihar appealed against the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, contending that the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, excluded the application of the Central Act. The arbitration agreement between the parties specified the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, excludes the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Whether Section 4(3)(b) of the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that since the arbitration agreement between the parties specified the applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, would not apply. Therefore, there was no ground to interfere with the appointment of the arbitrator under the Central Act.

The Court declared Section 4(3)(b) of the Bihar Public Works Contracts Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, unconstitutional as it allowed the termination of the Chairman and other members of the Arbitration Tribunal at the pleasure of the Government, which was inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The case arose from a dispute in the execution of a works contract, referred to an arbitrator by the High Court. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The respondent sought to amend its objections after three years, initially rejected by the trial court but later allowed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether objections to jurisdiction can be raised under Section 34 of the Act, even if not raised under Section 16, and the permissibility of amendments to objections beyond the period of limitation.

Held:

The Court held that objections to jurisdiction could be raised under Section 34 of the Act, even if not raised under Section 16. The court disagreed with certain observations made in M/s MSP Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd., particularly regarding the interpretation of the phrase "public policy of India" and the jurisdiction of the tribunal. As the amendment application was not pressed, the appeal was rendered infructuous, and the impugned order was set aside. The matter was directed to be taken up by the trial court for consideration of objections under Section 34 of the Act.

The court left it open for the respondents to argue that their objection regarding the exclusion of the Act by the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 could be raised even without formal pleading, as it was a legal plea. The appellant was also allowed to argue to the contrary.

Facts:

The incident occurred on March 25, 1993, involving the shooting of the deceased by the respondents.

The prosecution's case relied primarily on the testimonies of three witnesses: Naresh Pal (PW1), Dharmendra (PW2), and Prakashee (PW3), the complainant, an eyewitness, and the deceased's wife, respectively.

The High Court acquitted the respondents, finding the prosecution witnesses not credible, leading to the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Issues:

The credibility of prosecution witnesses.

Whether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court concurred with the High Court's assessment that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Various inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were noted, including contradictions, lack of plausible explanations for their presence at the scene, and suspicious conduct. The failure to present crucial witnesses further weakened the prosecution's case.

Therefore, the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh was dismissed, affirming the acquittal of the respondents.

Facts:

The appellant participated in an auction held on 14th February 2013.

He deposited earnest money and part of the auction amount.

Eventually, he deposited the remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation of sale.

The auction was challenged, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the 15-day period for depositing the remaining 75% started from the date of communication of confirmation of sale or from the date of the auction.

Held:

The court analyzed Rule 9 of the 2002 Rules and concluded that the 15-day period for depositing the remaining amount starts from the date of confirmation, not from the date of the auction. Various provisions of Rule 9 indicated that the deposit of the remaining amount is to be made after confirmation of sale by the secured creditor. Therefore, the auction purchaser had complied with the provisions of Rule 9 by depositing the remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation of sale.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders, and directed the delivery of possession in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the election of respondent no.1 by filing an election petition before the High Court, alleging various violations of instructions issued by the Election Commission and provisions of the Representation of People Act. Respondent no.1 filed two applications seeking to strike out certain paragraphs of the election petition and to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court allowed both applications.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's approach in considering the applications was correct.

Whether the election petition disclosed a cause of action.

Whether the paragraphs sought to be struck out contained material facts.

Whether the High Court erred in its analysis of the contents of certain paragraphs of the election petition.

Whether the applications filed by respondent no.1 should be rejected and the Election Petition restored for further proceedings.

Held:

The High Court's approach in considering the applications was erroneous as it ventured into analyzing the matter on its merits, which was prohibited at that stage.

The election petition should be read as a whole, and it cannot be dissected sentence-wise or paragraph-wise to rule out the disclosure of a cause of action.

The High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action. The pleadings should contain all necessary details and particulars as required by law.

The averments made in the paragraphs of the election petition were not frivolous and vexatious, and the High Court erred in analyzing their tenability on merits.

The High Court's analysis of the contents of certain paragraphs of the election petition was incorrect. Those paragraphs disclosed material facts necessary for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election void.

Both applications filed by respondent no.1 were to be rejected, and the Election Petition was to be restored to the file of the High Court for further proceedings. Similarly, the applications filed by the appellant were to be restored for decision by the High Court.