Facts:

Mr. Dewan, the testator, executed a Will in 1984, bequeathing his property.

The Will granted a life interest in the suit house to his wife, Mrs. Pritam, while giving absolute ownership of the ground and first floors to his son and daughter respectively.

Disputes arose after Mr. Dewan's demise regarding the nature of Mrs. Pritam's interest in the suit house.

The matter was brought before the courts by Mrs. Pritam's son and daughter against her daughter.

Issues:

Whether Mrs. Pritam's interest in the suit house was absolute or limited.

Whether the case falls under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Held:

The Court held that Mrs. Pritam's interest in the suit house was a "life interest," as per the terms of the Will, and fell under Section 14(2) of the Act.

The testator's intention, as reflected in the Will, was to grant only a life interest to his wife, while conferring absolute ownership on his son and daughter.

Mrs. Pritam's interest remained restricted till her death, as per Section 14(2) of the Act, despite the absence of any explicit restrictions in the Will.

The Court found similarities with previous cases, such as Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike, where similar restrictions resulted in a "life interest" falling under Section 14(2) of the Act.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the lower court's decision that Mrs. Pritam's interest in the suit house was limited to a life interest under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Facts:

The appeal arises from a Writ Petition filed by the Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Associations of India in the Delhi High Court, challenging the applicability of certain Acts and Rules to services rendered in hotels and restaurants, particularly concerning the pricing of mineral water.

Issues:

Whether composite contracts for services and food and drinks in hotels/restaurants are subject to the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, and the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, especially regarding charging prices exceeding the MRP for mineral water.

Held:

The court held that the definition of "sale" under the relevant Acts does not differentiate between the sale of goods and the provision of services in composite contracts. Despite a constitutional amendment deeming supply of goods as part of any service to be a sale, subsequent enactments retained the same definition of "sale." The objective of these enactments is to standardize weights and measures for defined goods, ensuring transparency and consumer protection, rather than regulating services.

The court affirmed that neither the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, nor the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, apply to regulate the sale of mineral water in hotels and restaurants. This interpretation is in line with previous judgments emphasizing the indivisibility of service and sale in such establishments.

Facts:

The Section 4(1) Notification for land acquisition was issued on 17.01.1974.

Compensation was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer on 04.06.1977.

The appellants did not pursue the matter further under Section 18 of the Act for reference.

Other claimants pursued the matter, leading to an enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court.

The appellants filed an application under Section 28A seeking similar enhancement.

While the Section 28A application was pending, the award under LAR Nos. 123 and 129 of 1983 was challenged in appeals.

The High Court disposed of these appeals on 23.03.2009, granting compensation at a higher rate.

However, during the pendency of the appeal, the Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on the Section 28A application on 25.10.2000, awarding compensation at the previous rate.

The appellants filed fresh applications under Section 28A on 27.05.2009 based on the judgment of the High Court dated 23.03.2009.

Issues:

Whether successive applications under Section 28A are permissible.

What is the proper course of action for the Land Acquisition Collector when the award is pending in appeal.

Held:

In the peculiar facts of the case, the Court held that while only a single application is maintainable under Section 28A, the Collector should have kept the application pending until the appeals were decided. Therefore, the Court directed the Collector to reconsider the original Section 28A application dated 31.12.1992 in light of the High Court's judgment dated 23.03.2009. The Court set aside the previous award dated 25.10.2000. The Court also directed the Collector to pass orders within three months from the presentation of the judgment copy and disbursed the consequential benefits to the appellants within one month. There shall be no order as to costs. (Para. 17-19)

Facts:

Balwant Singh Thakur filed a complaint against Kaushal Kishore Awasthi alleging professional misconduct.

Thakur accused Awasthi of objecting to the registration of a sale deed concerning a property dispute, claiming it constituted professional misconduct.

The objection stemmed from Thakur's alleged failure to repay a debt owed to Awasthi, rather than Awasthi's role as an advocate in any legal proceeding.

Issues:

Whether Awasthi's objection to the sale deed amounted to professional misconduct as per the provisions of the Advocates Act and Rules framed thereunder.

Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Awasthi by the State Bar Council was proper and within jurisdiction.

Held:

The Court held that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Awasthi was improper and without jurisdiction. The objection raised by Awasthi did not constitute professional misconduct as it was unrelated to his role as an advocate in any ongoing legal proceedings. The property in question was not being sold in execution of any decree related to a previous lawsuit where Awasthi had represented Thakur. The objection was based on a personal financial matter between Awasthi and Thakur, not on any professional grounds. Therefore, the Court allowed Awasthi's appeal and set aside the orders passed by the Bar Council of India. (Para. 7-8)

Facts:

A child named Pradyumn Thakur was found dead with a neck injury at Ryan International School.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) took over the investigation.

The management executives of the school, including Mr. Ryan Pinto, Dr. Augustine Francis Pinto, and Mrs. Grace Pinto, approached the High Court for anticipatory/interim bail.

The High Court granted interim bail to the private respondents until the presentation of the challan by the CBI.

Issues:

Whether the private respondents concealed material facts or suppressed information.

Whether there was evidence directly implicating the private respondents in the crime.

Whether the grant of interim bail was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence implicating the private respondents in the crime. The Court noted that the investigation was ongoing, and the CBI was yet to conclude on their involvement. Therefore, the grant of interim bail was justified. The Court also observed that the private respondents had not concealed material facts or suppressed information, considering the timing of their approach to the High Court and the widespread media coverage of the incident.

The Court further emphasized that the CBI had not called the private respondents for interrogation, and there was no evidence of their complicity in the crime. As a result, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to grant interim bail to the private respondents.

Facts:

Trilok Singh Chauhan (Appellant) owned Shop No. 46 Adarsh Gram Chauhan Market, Yatra Bus Station, Rishikesh.

Ram Lal (Respondent) operated a cloth business as a tenant in the shop.

Appellant issued a notice to respondent on 07.09.2001, alleging non-payment of rent since December 2000 and demanding payment within one month, failing which the tenancy would be terminated.

Appellant filed a case seeking recovery of rent, compensation, and eviction of respondent.

During the trial, issues were framed, including the determination of the rate of rent.

Trial Court found in favor of the appellant, holding the rate of rent at Rs. 1500/- per month, and issued a decree of eviction against the respondent.

High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, set aside the Trial Court's decision, holding the rate of rent to be Rs. 250/- per month.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Trial Court's findings on the rate of rent.

Whether the Trial Court failed to consider additional issues framed during the trial.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to set aside the Trial Court's findings on the rate of rent was unsustainable. The Trial Court's decision was based on evidence, including a reference to the Evaluation List and an adverse inference drawn against the respondent. The High Court failed to adequately address these factors. Moreover, the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887, is limited and can only be exercised in specific circumstances. Since none of these circumstances were present in this case, the High Court erred in interfering with the Trial Court's decision. Additionally, the argument regarding the Trial Court's failure to consider additional issues was rejected, as the notice clearly indicated termination of tenancy and there was no question of waiver. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Trial Court's decree.

Facts:

The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board conducted an examination for recruitment of Trained Graduate Teachers in January 2009.

Multiple challenges were made to the examination process, leading to litigation in the Allahabad High Court.

Conflicting judgments were passed by different Single Judges of the High Court regarding the correctness of certain questions and answers.

Re-evaluation of answer sheets was directed by a Single Judge, which was upheld by a Division Bench, and disputed questions were referred to an Expert Committee.

The case eventually reached the Supreme Court due to the prolonged legal proceedings and lack of finality in the examination results.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's interference in re-evaluating answer sheets was justified.

What should be the appropriate course of action considering the multiple evaluations and legal complexities of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court expressed concern over the prolonged litigation and lack of finality in the examination process, emphasizing the importance of judicial discipline.

The Court reiterated established principles regarding re-evaluation of answer sheets, emphasizing it should be allowed only in exceptional cases where a material error is clearly demonstrated.

The burden of proof lies heavily on the candidate to show that a key answer is incorrect without any inferential reasoning.

A middle path was chosen by the Court, directing the declaration of results based on the third evaluation of answer sheets.

Candidates already working as Trained Graduate Teachers, if found unsuccessful in the third declaration, would be allowed to continue in their positions.

Newly selected candidates would be appointed as Trained Graduate Teachers through supernumerary posts, without entitlement to consequential benefits.

The Court concluded by issuing directions to implement its decision and expressed disappointment with the handling of the case by the lower courts, stressing the importance of judicial discipline.

Facts:

The case involved a partition suit concerning properties inherited after partition. The appellant sought to amend the plaint to include a claim for a share in the sale proceeds of a property sold by the respondent.

The trial court rejected the amendment application, citing the limitation period for the claim.

The appellant challenged this decision in the High Court, which upheld the rejection of the amendment application.

Issues:

Whether the amendment application should be allowed considering the commencement of the trial and the limitation period for the claim.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that since evidence was led by both parties after the filing of the amendment application, no prejudice would be caused to the defendant by allowing the amendment. The Court emphasized the purpose of amendments to determine the real questions in controversy and to prevent delay in proceedings.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the trial court. It directed the trial court to allow the amendment application and to consider framing additional issues, if necessary. The parties were given an opportunity to lead additional evidence, and the suit was to be decided finally within a specified timeframe.

Facts:

The appellant, Asharfi, and another individual, Udai Bhan, were accused of forcibly entering the house of the victim, Phoola Devi, on the intervening night of 8/9.12.1995, and committing rape.

The appellant was convicted by the trial court for offenses including house trespass, rape, and causing hurt, along with a charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the High Court, leading to Asharfi's appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported the conviction and sentencing under the relevant sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Specifically, the Court had to determine if the offense of rape was committed with the intention of targeting the victim because of her caste identity, as required by Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Held:

The Court upheld the conviction and ten-year sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC for rape, based on the evidence provided by the prosecution, including the victim's testimony and medical evidence.

However, the Court set aside the conviction and life imprisonment sentence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, as the evidence did not establish that the appellant committed the offense specifically because the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. This section required proof of intention to target the victim based on her caste identity, which was lacking in this case.

Therefore, the appellant's appeal was partially allowed, with the conviction and sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC and other offenses upheld, while the conviction and sentence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act were set aside.

As the appellant had already served more than ten years in prison, the Court ordered his immediate release unless he was required in any other case.