Facts:

Mohammed Abdulla Khan (the Appellant) filed a defamation complaint against Prakash K. (the Respondent) regarding a news item published in the "Jaya Kirana" Kannada Daily Newspaper, owned by the respondent.

Despite filing a complaint with the police, no action was taken, leading the appellant to file a private complaint before the Magistrate.

The proceedings initiated by the appellant were later quashed by the Karnataka High Court through a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issues:

The High Court quashed the proceedings without providing sufficient reasoning.

The question of vicarious liability in criminal law, particularly concerning defamation offenses, requires examination.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) pertaining to defamation (Sections 499-502) and emphasized the need to establish the elements of defamation to constitute an offense. The court clarified distinctions between making, publishing, printing, and selling defamatory material. It noted that the High Court failed to properly examine the legal precedent set by K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham, (2002) 6 SCC 670, which established the liability of individuals other than the editor for defamatory material published in newspapers. The court directed the trial court to proceed with the case according to the law, emphasizing that prosecutions and legal decisions should not be handled casually.

Facts:

The petitioner, Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms, sought a writ petition to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by a retired Chief Justice of India to investigate alleged conspiracy and bribery in a matter pending before the Supreme Court.

The petitioner also requested the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to hand over all materials/evidence collected in the FIR to the proposed SIT.

Issues:

Whether an FIR can be lodged against a sitting judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

Whether the judiciary's independence can be safeguarded amidst allegations of corruption and conspiracy.

Held:

The Court held that No FIR can be registered against a sitting judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of India, as per the law laid down in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India.

The petition was frivolous, contemptuous, and aimed at scandalizing the judiciary without reasonable basis.

The petition was dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 25 lakhs to be deposited by the petitioner within six weeks, to be transferred to the Supreme Court Bar Association Advocates' Welfare Fund.

Facts:

The land of the appellants was acquired in 1981 for the construction of a dam. In 2011, they sought its release based on a government resolution allowing re-grant of land deemed of no use for public purpose.

Issues:

Whether the re-grant of land acquired for public purpose is permissible under law, and whether the state's re-grant policy violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the re-grant of acquired land is not permissible. It directed the state to frame appropriate policies for the rehabilitation of displaced persons within three months, ensuring compliance with constitutional principles. The disposal of state-owned property must adhere to Article 14.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal by United India Insurance Co. Ltd. against Sunil Kumar regarding the release of compensation in a motor vehicle accident case.

Issues:

The release of 50% of the compensation amount that was deposited in the court registry to the claimant, Sunil Kumar.

Held:

The court ordered the release of 50% of the compensation amount that was deposited in the registry to the claimant, upon due identification. However, upon mention by the learned counsel for the respondent, the court clarified that the amount should be released from the deposit in the trial court.

Facts:

The dispute involved ownership and possession of a piece of land. The plaintiff sought to withdraw the suit after obtaining a temporary injunction, which was allowed by the Trial Court on payment of costs to the defendant. The defendant challenged this decision through revisions and a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the lower court's orders.

Issues:

Whether the lower courts were justified in permitting the plaintiff to withdraw the suit under Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC, and if the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in its decision.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Trial Court and Revision Court were justified in allowing the plaintiff to withdraw the suit, as the plaintiff had applied under Order 23 Rule 1(1) without seeking permission to file a fresh suit. The High Court erred in delving into matters beyond the withdrawal of the suit and ordering possession of the land. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the decisions of the lower courts.

Facts:

The case of Dr. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India & Ors. involved a PIL seeking the enforcement of road safety norms and proper treatment for victims of road accidents.

Issues:

The implementation of recommendations by the Committee on Road Safety and the response of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) to suggestions regarding road safety.

Held:

The Court issued various directions regarding road safety policies, the establishment of road safety councils and lead agencies, the creation of road safety funds, preparation of road safety action plans, and the formation of district road safety committees.

States and Union Territories were directed to take necessary steps for engineering improvements, traffic calming measures, road safety audits, and the implementation of drivers' training programs.

Specific instructions were given regarding lane driving, the use of road safety equipment, regulations on alcohol and road safety, and the inclusion of road safety education in school curricula.

The Court emphasized the importance of emergency medical care, the provision of a universal accident helpline number, and the establishment of permanent road safety cells.

Directions were issued for data collection, GPS tracking in vehicles, adherence to bus/truck-body building codes, and fitment of ABS, airbags, and headlights in vehicles.

Decision: The directions issued by the Court were agreed upon by the involved parties and were deemed essential for saving lives and reducing compensation payouts. States were granted the liberty to seek clarification or guidance from the Committee on Road Safety if needed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the validity of a trademark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of civil courts versus statutory authorities in deciding trademark validity.

Interpretation of Section 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and its implications.

The procedure to be followed in cases where the issue of trademark invalidity is raised independently or within the context of a pending lawsuit.

Consequences of abandoning a rectification plea or failing to comply with statutory timelines.

Held:

The court clarified that all questions regarding the validity of a trademark must be decided by the Registrar, High Court, or Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), not by the Civil Court .

Section 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, should be interpreted in its entirety, rather than narrowly based on its heading .

Different procedures are outlined in the Act for situations where the issue of trademark invalidity is raised independently or within a pending lawsuit .

If a party abandons a rectification plea or fails to initiate the prescribed action within the statutory timeframe, the right to raise the issue of trademark invalidity ceases to exist between the parties .

Satisfaction of the Civil Court regarding the existence of a prima facie case of invalidity and framing of an issue is not permission for the statutory authority to handle the issue; it is a procedural requirement to eliminate baseless claims .

Proceedings under Sections 46 and 56 of the Act do not run parallel to proceedings under Sections 107 and 111 when the issue of trademark invalidity is raised in a lawsuit .

Decision: The court dismissed certain appeals while allowing others based on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

Facts:

The appeal arises from a judgment by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana concerning a dispute over external development charges for flats and infrastructure development obligations.

The developer firm, M/S Sai Apartments and Infrastructure Ltd., failed to comply with conditions for obtaining a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) for permanent electricity connection.

The High Court issued various directions, including auctioning personal properties of the partners/ex-partners of the developer firm and directing individual consumers to file complaints against them.

The appellants, partners in the developer firm, contested that they were not made parties to the writ petition in their individual capacity nor issued any show cause notice for attachment of their personal properties.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's orders regarding auctioning personal properties of the partners/ex-partners of the developer firm were justifiable.

Who should bear external development charges and infrastructure costs?

Held:

The Supreme Court decided not to delve into the merits of the dispute but instead remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration, ensuring both parties are afforded sufficient opportunity. The appeal was allowed, expressing no opinion on the merits of the case. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The petitioner challenged the appointment of Shri Rakesh Asthana as the Special Director of the CBI, alleging illegality and violation of principles of integrity.

Concerns were raised about Asthana's involvement in ongoing investigations, suggesting a conflict of interest.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of Shri Rakesh Asthana as the Special Director of CBI was made illegally, arbitrarily, and in violation of principles of integrity.

Whether the established procedure for appointments to the CBI was followed in this case.

Held:

The court analyzed the procedure for appointments to the CBI, as established in previous judgments and relevant statutes. It emphasized the importance of consultation and the role of the Selection Committee in making appointments. The court concluded that the appointment of Shri Rakesh Asthana as the Special Director of CBI did not suffer from any illegality. It found that due consideration was given to all relevant factors, including concerns raised about Asthana's involvement in ongoing investigations. The decision to recommend Asthana's appointment was unanimous and based on relevant materials. Thus, the court dismissed the petition challenging the appointment.