Facts:

The dispute arose from a document titled "Multimodal Transport Document/Bill of Lading" dated 25.10.2008, where Premier Sea Foods Exim Pvt Ltd was the shipper and Caravel Shipping Services Pvt Ltd acted as the agent facilitating transport. Caravel Shipping Services Pvt Ltd (the appellant) filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, stating that an arbitration clause was included in the printed terms annexed to the Bill of Lading. The Sub-Judge's Court in Kochi dismissed the application, and the High Court also dismissed the Original Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, affirming the lower court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading, even though it was a printed condition annexed to the document and not signed by the respondent, should be enforced.

Held:

The Court held that the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading should be enforced, despite the respondent's argument that it was not signed by them.

The Court emphasized that the Bill of Lading explicitly mentioned that the Merchant (which included the respondent) agreed to be bound by all the terms, conditions, clauses, and exceptions on both sides, whether typed, printed, or otherwise. The Court clarified that an arbitration agreement need not necessarily be signed but must be in writing, as specified in Section 7(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of the High Court, and upheld the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading.

Facts:

The appellant was appointed by Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. as a Diploma Engineer Trainee Grade II (Electrical).

He informed the Corporation about difficulties in obtaining the original caste certificate and requested to be treated as a general category candidate.

Despite this, the Corporation initiated disciplinary proceedings against him, alleging submission of a false caste certificate.

Legal actions were taken by both parties, leading to a writ petition filed by the appellant in the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation's actions regarding the appellant's appointment and subsequent disciplinary proceedings were justified.

Whether the orders passed by the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were legally sound.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Corporation's actions were arbitrary, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable. The Court found that:

The appellant had informed the Corporation about the caste certificate issue before joining and had requested to be treated as a general category candidate.

The Corporation had multiple opportunities to address the issue but chose to proceed with the appellant's appointment and subsequent promotions.

The Corporation's actions, including initiating disciplinary proceedings and declaring the appellant's appointment void, were unjustified and excessive.

Procedural irregularities, such as the delay in taking action and the violation of rules regarding the enhancement of punishment, were noted. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's decision and restoring the Single Judge's order. As a result, the Corporation's order declaring the appellant's appointment void was quashed.

Facts:

Respondents were appointed as Adult Education Supervisors under the Non-Formal Education Scheme.

The scheme was abolished, resulting in the termination of respondents' employment.

A policy decision was made by the State Government on May 20, 2005, to adjust all retrenched employees.

Respondents were appointed pursuant to a letter dated March 16, 2007.

The respondents filed a writ petition in 2013 seeking payment of salary for the period from October 1, 2001, to July 3, 2007, and continuity of past services.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to back wages following the abolition of the Non-Formal Education Scheme.

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition constitutes laches.

Held:

The respondents neither challenged their termination nor the policy decisions regarding their employment until 2013. This delay in seeking legal remedy constitutes laches.

The appointment

letter dated March 16, 2007, clearly stated that the appointment was fresh and that past services would only be considered for pension benefits, not for reinstatement or back wages.

Without reinstatement, the question of awarding back wages did not arise. Back wages could only be linked to reinstatement, not awarded in isolation.

Since the respondents did not work during the period for which they claimed back wages and because the scheme they were employed under had been abolished, they are not entitled to back wages.

The principle of 'no work, no pay' disentitles the respondents from back wages.

The decision in Smt. Ram Laxmi Mishra case, which might have granted similar relief, is distinguishable on facts.

Finally, the respondents are not entitled to the reliefs they claimed based on the terms and conditions of their appointment.

Facts:

The appellants, ex-employees of insurance companies, retired under the General Insurance Employees' Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2004 (SVRS-2004 Scheme). They contended that they were entitled to additional benefits under the earlier General Insurance (Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995 (1995 Scheme), which included the addition of five years to the qualifying service for pension calculation purposes. However, the SVRS-2004 Scheme explicitly excluded this benefit.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to the additional benefits under the 1995 Scheme despite the clear exclusion in the SVRS-2004 Scheme?

Whether observations made in previous judgments, seemingly granting benefits contrary to the terms of the SVRS-2004 Scheme, are binding in the present case?

Held:

The court held that the appellants were not entitled to the additional five years of service for pension calculation under the SVRS-2004 Scheme. The terms of the SVRS-2004 Scheme, being statutory, must be strictly adhered to, and no concessions contrary to the explicit terms of the scheme are permissible.

The court clarified that any observations made in previous judgments, which might seem to grant benefits contrary to the terms of the SVRS-2004 Scheme, should not be construed as binding, especially if those observations were not directly related to the issue at hand.

Therefore, the appeals of the ex-employees seeking additional pension benefits under the SVRS-2004 Scheme were dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant and respondent No.1 were married and had two children. They agreed for a divorce by mutual consent, with custody of the children granted to the appellant. Dispute arose when the appellant was transferred, and respondent No.1 filed for custody, alleging coercion and fraud in the divorce decree.

Issues:

The custody of the children and whether the appellant's second marriage affected his custody rights.

Held:

In our view, it clearly emerges that the decision to give custody to the appellant, of the two children, was a conscious decision taken by the parties at the relevant stage and can hardly be categorised as a decision under force, pressure or fraud.

The second marriage of the appellant cannot be put against him, nor can the factum of the child of his second wife residing with him deprive him of the custody rights of his two children, which has been specifically conferred on him with the consent of respondent No.1.

The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Sarojini Amma, executed a document styled as a gift deed in favor of the respondent, Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar, with conditions attached, including that the gift would take effect only after the death of the appellant and her husband. Subsequently, the appellant executed a cancellation deed to revoke the purported gift. Legal proceedings ensued, initiated by the respondent, contesting the cancellation and seeking to establish his rights over the property mentioned in the purported gift deed.

Issues:

Whether a document labeled as a gift deed, but executed for consideration and with conditions attached, could be considered a formal instrument of gift.

Whether a document reserving possession and enjoyment rights for the donor, enforceable after the donor's death, constituted a gift or a will.

Held:

The Court, after examining the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, concluded that the purported gift deed did not fulfill the requirements of a completed gift.

The Court emphasized that a conditional gift only becomes complete upon compliance with the conditions outlined in the deed. Since the document was executed for consideration and was conditional upon the donor's death, it did not meet the statutory conditions for a valid gift.

Therefore, the appellant was justified in canceling the deed. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.

Facts:

Siya Ram and his son Kripal were attacked and Siyaram was killed by the appellant (Ramvir) and five others.

The appellant was acquitted by the Sessions Judge of charges under Section 148/149 IPC but was convicted under Section 302 IPC.

The High Court upheld the conviction under Section 302 IPC and additionally convicted the appellant under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against these convictions.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC.

• Whether the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC.

Held:

The appellant's conviction under Section 148/149 IPC was not legally sustainable as it had attained finality after acquittal by the Sessions Judge and the State did not appeal against it.

Since all accused, including the appellant, were acquitted of charges under Section 148/149 IPC, there was no basis for convicting the appellant under these sections.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the one who fired the shot that killed Siyaram. Evidence and the ballistic report did not support this claim.

Based on these reasons, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC, and acquitted the appellant of all charges.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was tried for offenses under two FIRs and convicted by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the accused to rigorous life imprisonment in both cases. The first case imposed a condition that the accused would not be considered for remission until serving 30 years, while the second case directed that the life sentence would begin after completing the sentence in the first case. During the appeal before the High Court, the appellant's counsel indicated that they did not intend to challenge the conviction but only the sentence. The High Court upheld the conviction but modified the sentences.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's counsel's statement before the High Court regarding not challenging the conviction was made with instructions from the appellant.

Whether the modification of sentences by the High Court was within its jurisdiction.

Whether consecutive sentences were permissible in this case.

Whether the High Court erred in removing the cap of 30 years imposed by the trial court.

Whether the appellant would be eligible for remission.

Held:

The Court found that the appellant's counsel's statement before the High Court regarding not challenging the conviction was made with instructions from the appellant, as recorded in the High Court's records. Therefore, the Court proceeded on the premise that the statement was made on the appellant's instructions.

The modification of sentences by the High Court, initially reducing them to the period already undergone, was beyond its jurisdiction, as it was not a typographical error but a deliberate decision .

The High Court correctly concluded that consecutive sentences were not permissible in this case, and the sentences should run concurrently, as provided under Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

However, the High Court erred in removing the cap of 30 years imposed by the trial court. The appellant would not be eligible for remission until completing 30 years of rigorous imprisonment.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the accused, upholding the conviction but modifying the sentences to run concurrently. The appellant would not be eligible for remission until completing 30 years of imprisonment.

Facts:

The Supreme Court invited applications for the allotment of Lawyers’ chambers on October 31, 2017, and May 16, 2018, setting various eligibility criteria. Petitioners, who were practicing advocates, some of whom were Advocates on Record (AOR), challenged the fixation of the block period and other eligibility criteria.

Issues:

Validity of the block period fixed for eligibility criteria.

Validity of Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules requiring membership of Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) for chamber allotment.

Requirement of residency in Delhi or New Delhi for chamber allotment.

Held:

The Court held that the suggestion to count the eligibility criteria from the last cut-off date in 2004 till September 30, 2018, was unacceptable as it might allot chambers to non-active advocates. Instead, the block period was modified to be from October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2018.

The Court upheld the requirement of SCBA membership for chamber allotment, as there is no fundamental or statutory right for chamber allotment, and SCBA membership is a reasonable criterion.

The Court suggested a review of the residency requirement for chamber allotment, considering changing circumstances and commuting patterns of advocates from neighboring states. The Judges’ Allotment Committee was tasked with reviewing this requirement.

Decision: The writ petitions were disposed of, upholding the validity of the Allotment Rules with modifications to the block period and suggesting a review of the residency requirement for chamber allotment.