Facts:

The case involves the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) as the appellant and the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and others as respondents. The dispute centers around the determination and fixation of tariff for electricity and specifically focuses on the computation of interest on capital under Section 38 of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 38 of the DVC Act concerning interest on capital.

Whether interest due from DVC on the capital employed by participating governments, ploughed back into the capital, should be considered under Section 38 of the DVC Act.

The complaint raised by the appellant regarding the calculation of interest on the basis of cumulative depreciation reducing the loan component.

Held:

The Appellate Tribunal noted the retention and ploughing back of interest due from DVC on the capital employed by participating governments. While initially providing for this under Section 38 of the DVC Act, the Tribunal later directed its application under the same section. However, the appellant failed to adequately raise this aspect, and the particulars were not provided.

The complaint raised by the appellant primarily concerned the calculation of interest based on cumulative depreciation reducing the loan component, which was deemed unsustainable. However, the respondents argued that this contention was not raised in the initial litigation before the appellate tribunal.

The Court observed that the procedure for calculating interest, including the consideration of cumulative depreciation, had been established in previous litigation and had become final. Therefore, the appellant could not raise the same issue in the subsequent litigation.

Judicial precedents related to depreciation rates for power companies were discussed, but it was concluded that they did not support the appellant's argument.

Ultimately, the Court ruled against the appellant, holding that they were not entitled to consider the point regarding the calculation of interest on the loan.

Decision: The Court ruled against the appellant, denying their request for reconsideration of the calculation of interest on the loan based on cumulative depreciation.

Facts:

The appellant participated in an auction conducted by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Nainital, in 1990 for the residential quarter No. 6.

Despite claiming to be the highest bidder and occupying quarter No. 6 since June 1990, the appellant did not receive a sale deed from the Nagar Palika.

Instead, the Nagar Palika decided to sell quarter No. 6 along with other quarters through public auction in 2001.

Legal proceedings ensued, leading to a writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court at Nainital, which was dismissed.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's possession of quarter No. 6 was legal.

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the appellant's appeal was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant's possession of quarter No. 6 was unauthorized and amounted to trespassing. Several reasons supported this conclusion:

Lack of an allotment letter issued to the appellant during the 1990 auction.

Failure to produce any acceptance letter from the Nagar Palika indicating acceptance of the bid.

Inability to demonstrate the amount paid towards the sale/auction price for quarter No. 6.

Absence of a privity of contract between the appellant and the Nagar Palika justifying his entry into quarter No. 6.

Lack of any legal document or title executed by the Nagar Palika in the appellant's favor before occupying quarter No. 6.

The Court emphasized the legal principle that possession of immovable property must be legitimate, either as an owner, lawful tenant, or with the express consent of the true owner. Since the appellant failed to establish any of these legal grounds for possession, his occupation was deemed unauthorized.

Consequently, the Court ordered the appellant to vacate quarter No. 6 within three months and pay damages to the Nagar Palika for wrongful use and occupation since June 1990. The damages were set at Rs. 3000 per month from June 1990 until the appellant vacates the premises.

Failure to comply with the Court's order would result in further legal action by the Nagar Palika against the appellant. Thus, the appeal was finally disposed of in accordance with these directions.

Facts:

Manju Saxena, the Appellant, was employed by HSBC Bank as a "Lady Confidential Secretary" since 01.04.1986.

She was later promoted to "Senior Confidential Secretary" but her position became redundant in May 2005.

Despite being offered four alternative positions within the same pay scale, Saxena declined them.

Consequently, HSBC Bank terminated her services on 01.10.2005, offering a severance package and compensation.

Saxena raised an industrial dispute seeking enhancement of the severance package.

Various legal proceedings ensued, including appeals and review petitions.

Issues:

Whether Saxena's refusal to accept alternative positions constituted abandonment of her job?

Whether she was entitled to an enhanced severance package and waiver of her outstanding housing loan?

Held:

Saxena's refusal of alternative positions constituted abandonment of her job, making her ineligible for further benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This was in accordance with established precedents such as The Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. vs. Venkatiah and others, (1964) 4 SCR 265.

The amounts received by Saxena during the legal proceedings constituted a final settlement of her claims. Thus, her appeals for an enhanced severance package and waiver of her housing loan were dismissed.

The Civil Appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Manimaran, the respondent, was accused of running a medical shop without a valid drug license.

Drugs Inspectors seized drugs stored without a valid license during an inspection of Manimaran's shop.

Manimaran was charged under Sections 27(b)(ii) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

The trial court convicted Manimaran based on his admission in a memo where he confessed to not having a valid license.

Manimaran appealed, but the appellate court upheld his conviction.

Manimaran filed a revision petition before the High Court, which acquitted him based on non-examination of key witnesses.

Issues:

Whether the non-examination of certain witnesses was fatal to the prosecution's case.

Whether the admission made by Manimaran in the memo was sufficient evidence to convict him.

Whether the carbon copies of documents were admissible as evidence.

Whether Manimaran's claim of signing blank papers was credible.

Held:

The Supreme Court reinstated Manimaran's conviction, emphasizing the importance of his admission in the memo.

Non-examination of certain witnesses was not fatal to the prosecution's case, as Manimaran's admission was sufficient evidence.

Carbon copies of documents were admissible evidence under Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Manimaran's claim of signing blank papers lacked credibility, as he failed to provide evidence to support it.

The Supreme Court reduced Manimaran's sentence from one year to three months considering factors such as the passage of time since the offense, lack of prior convictions, and his admission of ignorance regarding the need for a license.

Facts:

The writ petitioners were employed in various capacities within the State of Bihar.

Their appointments were found to be irregular or illegal due to violations of recruitment procedures and the use of false or forged documents.

The State Government initiated proceedings to terminate their services based on these irregularities.

The matter was challenged before the High Court, leading to a series of appeals and legal proceedings.

The Supreme Court of India heard the case and considered the findings of the State Committee regarding the legality of the appointments.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the writ petitioners were legal and valid.

Whether the termination of their services was justified.

Held:

The Court upheld the findings of the State Committee, which concluded that many of the appointments were illegal and void ab initio. The Court emphasized the importance of adherence to recruitment rules and procedures, particularly in public employment, to ensure fairness and equality. It cited the judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) and others, which established that appointments made without following due process do not confer any right on the appointees. The Court also clarified that regularisation or permanent employment cannot be granted to individuals whose initial appointments were illegal or irregular.

Based on these findings, the Court dismissed the civil appeals filed by the writ petitioners and allowed the appeals filed by the State of Bihar. The orders of the High Court directing reinstatement of the writ petitioners were set aside, and their writ petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

The High Court allowed a post-award application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, requiring the appellant to release the amount covered by the arbitral award along with interest, subject to the respondent furnishing a Bank Guarantee equal to the awarded amount for one year. The appellant argued that the High Court's order was premature as the period for challenging the award under Section 34 had not yet expired.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was premature given the pending period for challenging the award under Section 34.

Held:

The Court set aside the High Court's order dated 22 August 2016. It clarified that its judgment should not be construed as an expression of opinion on the correctness of the High Court's order, particularly considering the submission that the High Court might have exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Civil Appeal was disposed of with no costs, and all rights and contentions of the parties concerning the challenge to the arbitral award were kept open to be argued in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The fifth respondent filed a PIL before the Allahabad High Court seeking the construction of a new tehsil building for Tehsil Hasanpur.

The High Court directed the State Government to take steps for the construction based on the petition.

The appellant challenged this order, alleging that the PIL was filed to serve the personal interest of the fifth respondent, as the proposed land belonged to his family.

Issues:

Whether the PIL filed by the fifth respondent was genuinely in the public interest or intended to serve personal interests.

Whether the decision regarding the construction of government buildings is within the jurisdiction of the judiciary or the executive.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the PIL was not genuinely in the public interest but was intended to serve personal interests, as the proposed land belonged to the fifth respondent's family (Paragraph 8).

The Court emphasized that decisions regarding the construction of government buildings are administrative matters and should be left to the executive. It highlighted the misuse of PILs for extraneous and motivated purposes (Paragraph 9).

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's directions to construct the new Tehsil office and clarifying that the State Government should make the decision in accordance with the law (Paragraph 11).

Facts:

The case involved allegations of sexual assault by the respondent-accused on the prosecutrix, a minor girl aged about nine years.

The prosecutrix alleged that the accused, her cousin, had been sexually assaulting her for about three years.

The prosecutrix disclosed the incidents to her school teachers and the president of the Gram Panchayat.

The Trial Court convicted the accused based on the prosecutrix's testimony and medical evidence, but the High Court reversed the conviction on the grounds of lack of confidence in the prosecutrix's testimony and inconclusive medical evidence.

Issues:

Whether the prosecutrix's testimony inspires confidence and is reliable.

Whether the medical evidence is conclusive regarding the sexual assault.

Whether the non-examination of the prosecutrix's aunt is fatal to the prosecution's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix's testimony was credible and reliable, emphasizing that corroboration is not mandatory in rape cases if the victim's testimony is trustworthy.

The absence of injuries on the prosecutrix's private parts did not negate the possibility of sexual assault, especially considering her young age.

The Court dismissed the argument regarding the non-examination of the prosecutrix's aunt, stating that it was not fatal to the prosecution's case.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the conviction of the respondent-accused under Section 376 IPC was restored, along with the sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The respondent-accused was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence, failing which he would be taken into custody.

Facts:

The appellant lodged FIR No.35/2015 against the first respondent alleging harassment and abetment to suicide.

The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur quashed the proceedings instituted against the first respondent.

The appellant appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings against the first respondent.

Whether the investigation being incomplete and no charge-sheet filed justified the High Court's delve into the intention of the respondent.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was not justified in delving into questions of the respondent's intention to abet suicide at that stage, especially when the investigation was incomplete and no charge-sheet had been filed. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the concerned authorities to complete the investigation promptly.

The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it to be considered at the appropriate stage. The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid terms.