Facts:

The case involved the construction of a multi-storey residential complex by DLF on the bank of Chilavannurkayal (back waters) in Kerala. The Single Judge of the High Court deemed the construction illegal and ordered its demolition. However, the Division Bench of the High Court overturned the demolition order and directed regularization on payment of Rs. 1 crore as a fine.

Issues:

Whether DLF violated the CRZ Notification and whether the construction could be regularized.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of strict enforcement of environmental laws.

It noted the creation of specialized bodies like the Kerala Coastal Zone Management Authority (KCZMA) to deal with CRZ Regulations.

The Court rejected the argument that lack of an enforcement mechanism hindered action by authorities.

It highlighted the need for clarity in the permission process and prompt action by authorities.

The Court criticized the contradictory stance of authorities, which put large investments at risk.

DLF had legally purchased the land and obtained requisite permissions, including environmental clearance and Floor Area Ratio (FAR) permissions.

The delay in obtaining CRZ permission led to the perception of a deemed permission case.

The Court clarified that Clause 8(3) of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification of 2006 should imply a prior clearance in the future.

The Rs. 1 crore fine was directed to be transferred to KCZMA for better enforcement and development of CRZ areas .

Decision: The findings of the lower courts regarding violations alleged against DLF were set aside, except for the issue of not obtaining prior clearance. The Court directed the Rs. 1 crore fine to be transferred to KCZMA for better enforcement and development of CRZ areas. It emphasized the need for simplification of the permission process to reduce uncertainty and improve enforcement.

Facts:

The appellant, Lavghanbhai Devjibhai Vasava, was convicted under Section 302 IPC by the Trial Court for causing the death of his wife during an altercation.

The High Court upheld the conviction, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

The incident occurred when the deceased and her mother returned home from agricultural work, and an argument ensued between the appellant and his wife over lunch preparation delay.

The appellant struck his wife with a wooden object during the altercation, resulting in her death.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC is justified or should be converted to one under Section 304 IPC.

Determination of the appropriate punishment considering the circumstances of the incident.

Held:

The Court analyzed the factors laid down in the case of Dhirendra Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand (2015) to determine the nature of the offense.

After considering the circumstances of the incident, including the sudden provocation, nature of the weapon used, and lack of premeditation, the Court concluded that the offense falls under Section 304 Part-II IPC.

The Court noted that the incident occurred due to a sudden altercation and in a heat of passion, without any undue advantage taken by the appellant.

Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, altering the conviction to Section 304 Part-II IPC and reducing the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant, which was approximately 9 years and 3 months.

The appellant was ordered to be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.

Facts:

The appellant, I.C. Sharma, had purchased a householder insurance policy from the Oriental Insurance Company, which was later renewed. A burglary occurred at the appellant's premises, resulting in loss of valuables. The appellant filed a claim with the Insurance Company, which was initially rejected. Various consumer dispute redressal forums adjudicated on the matter, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

The court was the concept of under-insurance and its implications on insurance claims.

The court also examined the obligations of the insurance company regarding policy terms and proper guidance to policyholders.

Held:

The court held that under-insurance occurs when the insured value is less than the actual value of the insured item. The appellant is entitled to the insured amount, even if it's less than the actual value, if all insured goods are lost. However, if only some goods are lost, the principle of under-insurance applies, and the insured receives an amount proportionate to the extent of insurance compared to the actual value of the goods insured. The insurance company cannot deny liability based on insufficient details provided by the insured if the policy terms were changed from item-wise details to consolidated amounts.

The court reviewed the appellant's claims for various categories of items and determined the entitlement based on the principles of under-insurance. It awarded compensation and interest to the appellant, along with the approved claim amounts.

Facts:

The petitioner, a public-spirited individual, approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking various directives related to the National Anthem. This included mandamus or appropriate directions commanding the authorities to inculcate proper respect for the National Anthem, specifying actions to be taken when it is played or sung, and restraining its commercial exploitation.

Issues:

The court included determining the appropriate measures for respecting the National Anthem, considering the provisions of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, and the relevant constitutional provisions.

Held:

The court issued several directions regarding the playing and respect of the National Anthem. It clarified that while respect for the National Anthem is mandatory, the playing of it in cinema halls before feature films would be optional until a final decision was taken by a Committee appointed by the Union government.

The court emphasized the duty of citizens to show respect for the National Anthem as required by executive orders and prevailing laws. The exemption granted to disabled persons from standing during the National Anthem was affirmed until a final decision was made by the competent authority.

Facts:

Kanhaiya Kumar, an Army personnel, was dismissed from service due to fraudulent enrollment based on a fake relationship certificate.

He challenged his dismissal under section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal under section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950 was justified when there is a specific provision (section 122(4)) dealing with fraudulent enrollment cases.

Held:

The Court analyzed relevant sections of the Army Act, 1950, along with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, 1954, which outline procedures for dismissal or removal. It noted that Kanhaiya Kumar was given an opportunity to defend himself, and he admitted to using a fake relationship certificate.

The Court emphasized that employment obtained through fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer, citing previous judgments supporting this principle.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the dismissal was valid, as the authorities were within their right to exercise power under section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The respondents were denied employment as constables in the Chandigarh Police due to their involvement in criminal cases, despite subsequent acquittal.

The Screening Committee, after examining the cases, found the respondents unsuitable for the post of constable.

The respondents challenged this decision before the Tribunal and High Court, which directed the consideration of their candidature.

Issues:

Whether involvement in criminal cases, followed by acquittal, renders a candidate unsuitable for the post of constable.

Whether the decision of the Screening Committee to cancel the candidature of the respondents was justifiable.

Held:

The court held that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a person to a job, especially in the police force where impeccable integrity and track record are essential. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless shown to be mala fide.

The court upheld the cancellation of the respondents' candidature based on the Screening Committee's assessment of their suitability. The judgments of the Tribunal and High Court directing the consideration of respondents for the post were set aside.

Facts:

The deceased, Meena Devi, was living with her son, daughter, and the accused Raj Kumar in a joint family house.

On 23.08.2007, the accused, in a drunken state, threatened Meena Devi and her children, and later, Meena Devi was last seen alive with the accused.

Meena Devi's body was found hanging from a tree on 25.08.2007.

The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence, but the High Court acquitted him due to alleged improvements in witness testimony and lack of specific motive.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the High Court's acquittal was justified based on the alleged improvements in witness testimony and lack of a specific motive.

Held:

The circumstances must conclusively point towards the guilt of the accused, forming a complete chain without any gaps. The burden is on the accused to provide a reasonable explanation, and failure to do so can be considered a strong indication of guilt.

The court upheld the credibility of key prosecution witnesses, including the deceased's son, despite alleged improvements in his testimony. The witness's evidence was found to be consistent with the prosecution's case and inspired confidence.

The accused's motive, including previous disputes and assaults against the deceased, was considered along with his failure to report her disappearance. These factors formed significant circumstantial evidence against the accused.

The High Court's decision to acquit the accused was criticized for failing to properly appreciate the evidence and disregarding significant circumstantial factors. The acquittal caused a miscarriage of justice, leading to the Supreme Court setting aside the High Court's judgment and affirming the trial court's conviction.

Facts:

The suit involved plaintiff No.1 filing on behalf of himself and his minor brother, plaintiff No.2, against their father, defendant No.1, seeking a declaration regarding property shares and the validity of a sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant No.2. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it. However, the High Court dismissed the suit, stating that plaintiff No.1 could not act as the guardian of plaintiff No.2 without court permission during the lifetime of their father, who was the natural guardian of plaintiff No.2.

Issues:

Whether plaintiff No.1's representation of plaintiff No.2 without court permission was valid.

Whether the provisions of the Hindu Guardianship Act apply to the present case.

Whether the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit on grounds of lack of proper representation was justified.

Held:

The Court clarified that plaintiff No.1 did not fall under the definition of "Guardian" as specified in the Hindu Guardianship Act. The case, however, was governed by Order XXXII of the CPC.

It was established that every suit by a minor must be instituted by a "next friend" as per Order XXXII Rule 1 CPC, and the next friend need not necessarily be a guardian as defined under the Hindu Guardianship Act.

The distinction between a "next friend" representing a minor plaintiff and a "guardian ad litem" representing a minor defendant was emphasized under Order XXXII Rules 1 and 3 CPC.

The Court held that a decree cannot be set aside merely due to formalities not being observed in appointing a guardian ad litem, unless prejudice is caused to the minor defendant.

It was clarified that the concept of a "Guardian" under the Hindu Guardianship Act is different from that of a "next friend" or a "guardian ad litem" appointed under CPC.

The Court reiterated that the rights and restrictions of a natural guardian provided under the Hindu Guardianship Act do not conflict with the procedure for filing a suit by a next friend on behalf of the minor.

Order XXXII Rules 12, 13, and 14 CPC empower a minor plaintiff to decide whether to proceed with or abandon the suit upon attaining majority.

The Court concluded that the High Court's decision to non-suit plaintiff No.2 based on provisions of the Hindu Guardianship Act was not justified, and the matter was remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits.

Facts:

The purchase orders referred to standard terms and conditions containing an arbitration clause.

The Respondent accepted all terms except the delivery period.

A dispute arose over the quality of supplied cables.

The Appellant sought arbitration, but the Respondent resisted, claiming that the arbitration clause was not incorporated into the contract.

The High Court dismissed the Appellant's application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, stating there was no evidence of an arbitration agreement.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause from another document could be incorporated into the contract by reference.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the interpretation of Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which deals with the incorporation of arbitration clauses from other documents. It referred to the case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited v. Som Datt Builders Limited, establishing principles for incorporating arbitration clauses by reference.

The Court concluded that a general reference to a standard form of contract, even if not by a trade association or professional body, is sufficient for incorporation of the arbitration clause. The appeal is allowed.