Facts:

Mr. Anil Lunia, an industrialist, conducted illegal mining activities in the State of Chhattisgarh, specifically in Bhainsakanhar, District Kanker, without adhering to approved plans and conditions. Despite warnings and complaints, Mr. Lunia continued his operations, which included illicit felling of trees in violation of the Forest Conservation Act. A Central Empowered Committee (CEC) investigated the matter and found significant irregularities and violations committed by Mr. Lunia.

Issues:

The legality of Mr. Lunia's mining activities, the actions taken by the State Government in response to these violations, and the necessity of further investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

Held:

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the CEC's findings and the actions taken by the State Government, concluded that further investigation by the CBI was unnecessary. The Court acknowledged the State Government's efforts in addressing the violations, including initiating disciplinary proceedings against erring officials and blacklisting Mr. Lunia. Therefore, the Court disposed of the applications concerning Mr. Lunia accordingly.

Facts:

The 4th respondent faced criminal charges under Sections 195A and 506 of the IPC. The Public Prosecutor filed a petition to withdraw from the prosecution during the proceedings. The Chief Judicial Magistrate permitted the withdrawal, which was challenged by the appellant in Criminal Revision Petitions. The High Court upheld the withdrawal but the appellant contested it, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the withdrawal from prosecution was properly considered under Section 321 of the CrPC.

Whether the Public Prosecutor acted independently and in the interest of justice.

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the revision petitions was appropriate.

Held:

The Court held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court failed to properly apply the test stipulated under Section 321 of the CrPC and relevant judicial precedents. The Public Prosecutor did not exercise independent judgment but merely submitted the government's notification. The Court emphasized the Public Prosecutor's duty to act independently and assist the court, rather than being solely guided by government instructions. Consequently, the orders of the High Court and the Chief Judicial Magistrate were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for reconsideration in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The private respondents, operating under the names Mitra Prakashan Ltd. and Maya Press Ltd., faced financial difficulties and owed significant dues to their workers.

The property of the private respondents was attached and put up for auction, with the appellant, Pravesh Kumar Sachdeva, emerging as the highest bidder.

One of the private respondents, Alok Mitra, initially raised objections to the auction sale, which were later withdrawn.

Subsequent actions were taken by other private respondents seeking payment of the difference between the auction sale price and the outstanding dues, which was granted to them.

Legal proceedings ensued, resulting in the setting aside of the auction sale by the Competent Authority and the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition by the Allahabad High Court.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised to the auction sale were valid, and if the Allahabad High Court was correct in setting aside the confirmed auction sale.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the facts and found that objections were raised only by Alok Mitra and were subsequently withdrawn. The Court noted that the other private respondents did not authorize Alok Mitra to file objections on their behalf. Additionally, the conduct of the private respondents indicated acceptance of the auction sale proceeds.

Based on the legal principles of waiver and estoppel, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, thereby reinstating the auction sale in favor of Pravesh Kumar Sachdeva.

Facts:

The case pertains to the enforceability of a foreign award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly regarding the requirement of stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899.

Issues:

Whether a foreign award not bearing stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899 would render it unenforceable.

Whether the term "award" under Item 12 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act includes foreign awards.

Whether the imposition of stamp duty on foreign awards aligns with the public policy of India.

Held:

The court clarified that the Stamp Act, 1899 only applies to awards made within the territory of British India and does not encompass awards made in princely states or foreign countries. Therefore, foreign awards are not subject to stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899.

The term "award" under Item 12 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act refers only to decisions made within British India, and it has never included foreign awards. Thus, foreign awards are not liable for stamp duty.

The court emphasized that the Stamp Act is a fiscal statute and must be construed literally. Any ambiguity in the statute benefits the party liable to pay stamp duty.

The court rejected arguments equating the imposition of stamp duty on foreign awards with the public policy of India. It held that the Stamp Act, being a fiscal statute, does not render foreign awards unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.

The court concluded that the Stamp Act, 1899 reflects the fundamental policy of Indian law as it deals with the economy of India. Therefore, the absence of stamp duty on foreign awards does not contravene the public policy of India.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the absence of stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899 does not render a foreign award unenforceable under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Remote location of firearms or recovery from a remote place does not automatically exonerate the accused.

Conscious possession and control of objects at the time of recovery are essential for conviction.

Constructive possession requires proof of intention, consciousness, or knowledge of possession.

Joint occupation or control under Section 35 of the Arms Act requires evidence of awareness of the existence of arms or ammunition.

Case refers to Gunwantlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh regarding possession and control of prohibited items.

Facts:

Illegal weapons and ammunition were discovered in a car and a house.

Accused A-2 was the owner of the car where live cartridges were found.

Accused A-4 was the occupier of the house where firearms and ammunition were discovered.

A-2 was not present near the car during the discovery, and A-4 was in prison at the time of the raid.

Issues:

Whether accused A-2 and A-4 can be convicted under the Arms Act, 1959.

Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish possession and control of the illegal weapons and ammunition by A-2 and A-4.

Whether joint occupation or control under Section 35 of the Arms Act is applicable to A-2 and A-4.

Held:

The court held that mere ownership of the car was not sufficient to establish possession of the prohibited ammunition by A-2.

Lack of evidence regarding A-2's knowledge or control over the cartridges led to the setting aside of his conviction.

A-4's conviction was also set aside as there was no evidence linking him to the firearms found in the house.

The court emphasized the importance of proving intention and consciousness of possession for constructive possession charges.

Section 35 of the Arms Act was found inapplicable to A-2 and A-4 due to insufficient evidence of joint occupation or control.

The appeals of both A-2 and A-4 were allowed, and their convictions under the Arms Act, 1959, were set aside.

Facts:

N.C. Medical College & Hospital (hereafter referred to as "the college") obtained an Essentiality Certificate and affiliation from the University, enabling it to admit 150 students for the academic session 2016-2017.

The Medical Council of India (MCI) conducted inspections and found deficiencies in faculty, residents, facilities, and patient care.

Despite repeated assessments and recommendations for improvement, deficiencies persisted.

A writ petition was filed in the High Court, leading to interim orders and directions for provisional admissions.

The Supreme Court set aside the interim orders but subsequent inspections and recommendations maintained the deficiencies.

The High Court, relying on a provisional order from the Government of India, allowed the college to admit students for the academic year 2018-2019.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in relying on a provisional order from the Government of India to allow the college to admit students.

Whether the deficiencies found by MCI justified withholding permission for the academic year 2018-2019.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court erred in relying on a provisional order from the Government of India to permit admissions, as the Supreme Court had already set aside the interim orders. The deficiencies found by MCI were significant and justified withholding permission for the academic year 2018-2019. The Court emphasized that compliance reports and self-serving assertions by the college could not substitute for actual improvements and inspections.

Therefore, the judgment and order of the High Court were set aside, and the college was advised to apply for permission for the next academic year. This decision is in line with previous judgments emphasizing the importance of genuine compliance and adherence to regulations in medical education institutions.

Facts:

The case revolves around the attempt by the State Government of Kerala to regularize admissions to MBBS courses in certain colleges following the quashing of admissions by the Admission Supervisory Committee (ASC) and subsequent affirmation of this decision by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The State Government sought to achieve this regularization through the Kerala Professional Colleges (Regularization of Admission in Medical Colleges) Ordinance, 2017.

Issues:

Whether the Ordinance enacted by the State Government to regularize admissions infringed upon the principles of separation of powers and judicial review.

Whether the Ordinance was in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution.

Whether the Ordinance sought to nullify court judgments and thus interfere with the judicial process.

Whether the judgments of the Supreme Court have binding effect, and the extent of the Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Held:

The impugned Ordinance clearly encroaches upon the field of judicial review.

It seeks to nullify court judgments, which is impermissible and beyond the legislative competence of the State.

Such legislative action violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

The independence of the judiciary is fundamental to the rule of law. Legislation that interferes with the judicial process can be invalidated, as it negates equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The attempt to regularize admissions that were deemed irregular by the courts constitutes an impermissible interference with the judicial process. The Ordinance had the effect of perpetuating illegality and arbitrariness committed by the colleges.

Judgments of the Supreme Court have a binding effect on all parties and authorities. Orders refusing leave to appeal, if they contain reasons, constitute a declaration of law under Article 141. The Court's power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to nullify its own judgments or perpetuate illegality.

Decision: The Court held the impugned Ordinance to be ultra vires and an encroachment upon the judicial domain. It declared the Ordinance invalid and affirmed the binding nature of court judgments, while emphasizing the limitations of the Court's powers under Article 142.

Facts:

A grocery shop named "Ambika Stores" was inspected by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer along with the accused, during which the accounts book was seized.

The prosecution alleged that one of the accused demanded a bribe from the owner of the shop for the return of the seized accounts book.

The owner of the shop lodged a complaint with the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Wing, based on which a trap was arranged.

The accused were caught receiving the bribe during the trap.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused under the relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Whether the lower courts' findings of guilt and subsequent conviction were justified.

Held:

The Division Bench, comprising R. Banumathi and Indira Banerjee, JJ., held that the appeals were to be dismissed and the conviction upheld. The Bench noted the following:

The evidence provided by PW-2 was corroborated by the testimony of PW-3 and PW-6.

PW-3, in his Chief Examination, stated that he witnessed the accused directing the payment of the bribe.

The office assistant, PW-6, corroborated PW-2's version of events.

The Trial Court and the High Court had found the accused guilty based on this evidence and the test conducted with sodium carbonate solution.

The Bench found no grounds to take a different view from the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were directed to surrender to custody within eight weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The applicant-company undertook construction activities under an exemption granted by Section 23 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975.

A notification dated 18.08.1992, issued under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, prohibited construction activities on certain notified lands, including those of the applicant.

The Town and Country Planning Department of the State of Haryana supported the illegal activities of the applicant despite resistance from the Forest Department.

Issues:

Whether the construction activities carried out by the applicant violated environmental regulations and statutory notifications.

The role of the Town and Country Planning Department in supporting illegal construction activities.

Held:

The notified land under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, must be treated as forest land, and construction activities on such lands are prohibited.

The actions of the Town and Country Planning Department were criticized for disregarding environmental concerns and statutory notifications.

The court emphasized the application of the "Polluter Pays" principle, directing the applicant to pay for rehabilitation of damaged areas.

Construction carried out prior to the notification date (18.08.1992) was saved, but illegal constructions made afterward were ordered to be demolished.

The applicant was directed to refund investments made by individuals who purchased land from them after the notification date.

Compensation was ordered to be paid for the cost of construction to those affected by the demolition, to be shared by the applicant company and the Town and Country Planning Department.

Decision: The court's ruling focused on enforcing environmental regulations, holding the applicant accountable for the damage caused by its illegal activities, and compensating affected parties.