Facts:

The case involved a complaint filed by Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJIL) alleging anti-competitive practices by three major telecom operators (IDOs) and the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI). RJIL asserted that the IDOs intentionally ignored requests for Point of Interconnection (POI) augmentation, causing network congestion and call failures. Allegations were also made regarding the denial of Mobile Number Portability (MNP) requests by IDOs and COAI's alleged bias towards IDOs.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the CCI to handle the matter, considering the specialized regulatory framework governing the telecom sector under the TRAI Act.

Additionally, the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority was in question.

Held:

The court held that TRAI, as a specialized regulator for the telecom sector, should initially address disputes related to telecom regulations, including interconnection agreements and compliance with license conditions. These issues fall within TRAI's expertise and statutory mandate. Therefore, CCI's jurisdiction is limited until TRAI determines jurisdictional aspects. [

While TRAI deals with regulatory aspects, the CCI retains authority to investigate and address anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector. The CCI's role is crucial in ensuring fair competition and preventing practices that adversely affect competition.

The court affirmed the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority, emphasizing the importance of judicial review in such matters.

CCI's order directing an investigation based on prima facie evidence was administrative in nature. The High Court couldn't adjudicate on the merits of the case but could review jurisdictional issues.

Decision: The court upheld the High Court's decision to quash CCI's order, as it was premature for CCI to proceed before TRAI resolved jurisdictional aspects. However, the court emphasized that CCI's role in addressing anti-competitive practices remains significant, complementing TRAI's regulatory functions.

Facts:

The respondent, a teacher in an aided Higher Secondary School, challenged the direct recruitment of the appellant to the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics). The State Government had directed the management to fill the post by transfer of the respondent, but the appellant contested this decision.

Issues:

Whether the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics) should be filled by direct recruitment or transfer.

Whether Rule 5 of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958, applied to the appointment process.

Whether the management erred in appointing the appellant directly.

Held:

The Court held that the Kerala Education Rules, specifically Chapter XXXII, governed the appointment process for teachers in aided Higher Secondary Schools. Rule 4(2) stipulated that vacancies in Higher Secondary School Teacher posts should first be offered to Junior Lecturers in the subject concerned under the management. The Court determined that the cadre strength of Higher Secondary School Teachers was not relevant for apportioning vacancies, as specified by Rule 4(2).

The Court also clarified that Rule 5(3) of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958, did not apply to appointments under Chapter XXXII. Citing previous judgments, the Court emphasized that where a later general rule conflicts with an earlier special rule, the later rule prevails. Therefore, the respondent was entitled to the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Economics) by transfer, as directed by the State Government and upheld by the Division Bench.

The Court directed the management to appoint the respondent by a specified date and offered the appellant an alternative post if accepted. The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited (Appellant) was awarded a construction contract by the State of Himachal Pradesh (Respondent).

An arbitration clause (Clause 65) was included in the contract for the resolution of disputes.

Dispute arose between the parties, and the appellant requested the appointment of an arbitrator.

The Chief Engineer, HPPWD appointed the Superintendent Engineer, Arbitration Circle, HPPWD as the arbitrator, in accordance with Clause 65 of the agreement.

The appellant challenged this appointment before the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of the Superintendent Engineer as the arbitrator was valid under Clause 65 of the contract?

Whether the appointment of an arbitrator by designation rather than by name was permissible?

Whether Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, applies to the appointment of the arbitrator?

Whether the appellant's failure to file a statement of claim before the arbitrator warranted termination of the arbitration proceedings?

Held:

The appointment of the Superintendent Engineer as the arbitrator was valid and in accordance with the arbitration clause. Appointment by designation is permissible as per clause (65) of the agreement. The contention regarding the applicability of Section 12(5) of the Act was dismissed as the arbitration proceedings commenced prior to the Amendment Act, 2015.

The appellant's challenge to the appointment of the arbitrator after the proceedings had already commenced was rejected, as the arbitration agreement had already been invoked, and the remedy would lie under Section 13 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The proceedings terminated due to the appellant's failure to file a statement of claim before the arbitrator. The order of termination was set aside, and the Chief Engineer, Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department, was directed to appoint an arbitrator as per clause (65) of the agreement.

The appellant was given the opportunity to file their claim before the newly appointed arbitrator, and proceedings were to continue accordingly. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the appellant's claim.

Facts:

Three individuals, namely Rameshwar Singh (A-1), Surendra Singh (A-2), and Ram Singh (A-3), were prosecuted for the murder of Rajendra Prasad.

The prosecution's case relied on circumstantial evidence due to the absence of eyewitnesses.

The trial court found all three accused guilty, and their appeals to the High Court were unsuccessful.

Surendra Singh (A-2) and Ram Singh (A-3) appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging their convictions.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts were legally sustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after a thorough examination of the evidence and legal arguments, upheld the convictions of Surendra Singh (A-2) and Ram Singh (A-3) for the murder of Rajendra Prasad. The Court found no reason to overturn the concurrent findings of the lower courts, as the prosecution's evidence was deemed sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court concluded that the appellants were involved in the commission of the crime based on various circumstantial evidence, including motive, presence near the crime scene, recovery of stolen articles, and identification of the perpetrators.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions of Surendra Singh (A-2) and Ram Singh (A-3) for murder.

Facts:

Dispute arose between Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (Appellant) and Pratibha Industries Ltd. (Respondent) regarding a tender contract.

Respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking an interim injunction.

An arbitrator was appointed based on an oral agreement between the parties during the Section 9 petition hearing.

Appellant filed a notice to recall the order appointing the arbitrator, arguing that the clauses cited by the Respondent did not constitute arbitration clauses but were in-house procedures.

Single Judge of the High Court recalled the order appointing the arbitrator, but the Division Bench overturned this decision.

Issues:

Whether the clauses cited by the parties constituted arbitration clauses or in-house procedures.

Whether the High Court had the inherent power to recall its own orders in this context.

Whether the Arbitration Act's self-contained nature precluded a review or recall application in the absence of a valid arbitration agreement.

Held:

The clauses cited by the parties did not constitute arbitration clauses but were related to in-house procedures. The oral agreement during the Section 9 petition hearing could not supersede the absence of arbitration clauses in the contract (Para. 10).

High Courts, as courts of record, have the inherent power to recall their own orders to prevent miscarriage of justice or correct errors. This power has been recognized in previous judgments (Para. 11).

The Arbitration Act's self-contained nature did not preclude a review or recall application in this case, as there was no valid arbitration agreement (Para. 15).

The Division Bench's decision was set aside, and the original order appointing the arbitrator was continued for four weeks, allowing the parties time to approach the appropriate forum (Para. 16).

Facts:

Mahabir Prosad Choudhary was an Accountant at Octavius Tea and Industries Ltd since 1986.

He was not allowed to work from May 2, 2005, following a change in management in 2004.

The State of West Bengal referred the industrial dispute between the company and the appellant to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal.

The Tribunal proceeded ex parte after the company failed to appear despite summons being issued.

An ex parte award was passed in favor of the appellant, granting him reinstatement with full back wages.

The company filed an application to recall the ex parte award, which was rejected by the Tribunal.

The company filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court, which set aside the award and directed the Tribunal to reconsider the issue.

The appellant appealed this decision before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was subsequently dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the application for recall of the ex parte award should have been entertained despite being filed after 30 days from the publication of the award.

Whether there was a violation of Rule 20B(5) of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958.

Held:

The application for recall of the ex parte award should have been entertained despite being filed after 30 days from the publication of the award. The Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute until the award becomes enforceable under Section 17 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

There was a violation of Rule 20B(5) of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, as the Tribunal failed to fix a date for the service of the written statement and failed to intimate the same to the party concerned.

The High Court's decision to set aside the ex parte award and direct the Tribunal to proceed afresh was upheld by the Supreme Court.

The appeal was dismissed, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The case involved appeals against the final judgment and order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla. The High Court allowed the revision petitions filed by the respondents, which led to the appeals before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether there were sufficient grounds to interfere with the remand order issued by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments presented by the appellant's counsel and examining the case record, found no substantial ground to interfere with the impugned order. The High Court had only remanded the case to the first Appellate Court to decide the first appeal and cross-objection afresh on merits in accordance with the law. The Court opined that such an order of remand did not warrant any interference, especially considering that the High Court found it necessary. However, the Court noted that the High Court's decision was overly verbose, devoting 60 pages to writing the impugned order. The Court emphasized the virtue of brevity and suggested that the examination should have been limited to the issue of remand without citing several decisions in detail. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals in limine.

Facts:

The U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad invited applications for the allotment of a plot of land.

The appellant participated in the bidding process, offering the highest bid initially.

The Parishad decided to re-auction the land, leading to the appellant filing a writ petition challenging this decision.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, stating that he had no standing in the matter since he did not participate in the re-auction.

The Parishad executed the sale deed in favor of another party during the pendency of the writ petition.

Issues:

Whether the appellant has standing to challenge the re-auction of the land.

Whether the execution of the sale deed during the pendency of the writ petition affects the appellant's rights.

Held:

The appellant has standing to challenge the re-auction as the Parishad did not adequately publicize the auction, and the reserve price was deemed too low.

A fresh auction should be conducted to ensure fairness and maximize the value of the land.

The Parishad must give wide publicity to the auction, consult experts to determine an appropriate reserve price, and ensure transparent conduct of the auction.

The appellant and the successful bidder are entitled to refunds of their deposits, along with interest.

Respondent No. 5, the successful bidder, is entitled to claim a refund of the stamp duty paid on the void sale deed.

Both the appellant and respondent No. 5 are allowed to participate in the fresh auction proceedings.

The deadline for completing the fresh auction proceedings is set at six months from the date of the Court's order.

Facts:

The accused-respondents were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 21 or Section 22 of the NDPS Act for possession of manufactured drugs. They appealed to the High Court seeking suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which was granted. The State filed appeals against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the accused-respondents amounted to a violation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act.

Whether the accused-respondents should be tried under the NDPS Act or the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 for possession of manufactured drugs.

Whether the High Court's decision to suspend the sentence and grant bail to the accused-respondents was justified.

Held:

The accused-respondents' actions amounted to a prima facie violation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which prohibits possession of narcotic substances except for medical or scientific purposes.

The High Court's decision to try the accused-respondents under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 instead of the NDPS Act was incorrect. The NDPS Act operates in addition to the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, and it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute offenders accordingly.

The High Court's order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the accused-respondents was unsustainable in law due to the gravity of the offence alleged against them. The High Court should have expedited the appeals instead.

The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside. The accused-respondents were directed to be taken into custody, and the High Court was requested to expedite the appeals.