Facts:

The appellants filed an appeal against the High Court's order dated September 5, 2018, which dismissed their application under Section 482 of the CrPC.

The appellants sought to quash the proceedings initiated against them under Section 498A of the IPC in Complaint Case No. 537/2018.

The proceedings were pending in the Court of 2nd Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) Judicial Magistrate, Amroha, JP Nagar.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants' application under Section 482 of the CrPC without adequately considering the factual background of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had failed to address the factual matrix of the case before dismissing the appellants' application.

The Court noted that the High Court did not provide essential details such as the nature of the complaint, the allegations made, and the grounds for challenging the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Justice Sapre, delivering the judgment, emphasized the importance of outlining the factual background of the case before applying legal principles. Without understanding the facts, it becomes difficult to assess the validity of the legal arguments presented.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the High Court for fresh consideration.

The High Court was directed to examine the application afresh on its merits after issuing notice to the respondents.

The Supreme Court refrained from delving into the merits of the case itself, leaving it to the High Court to decide uninfluenced by any observations made in the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

Manju Saxena, the Appellant, was employed by HSBC Bank as a "Lady Confidential Secretary" since 01.04.1986.

She was later promoted to "Senior Confidential Secretary" but her position became redundant in May 2005.

Despite being offered four alternative positions within the same pay scale, Saxena declined them.

Consequently, HSBC Bank terminated her services on 01.10.2005, offering a severance package and compensation.

Saxena raised an industrial dispute seeking enhancement of the severance package.

Various legal proceedings ensued, including appeals and review petitions.

Issues:

Whether Saxena's refusal to accept alternative positions constituted abandonment of her job?

Whether she was entitled to an enhanced severance package and waiver of her outstanding housing loan?

Held:

Saxena's refusal of alternative positions constituted abandonment of her job, making her ineligible for further benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This was in accordance with established precedents such as The Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. vs. Venkatiah and others, (1964) 4 SCR 265.

The amounts received by Saxena during the legal proceedings constituted a final settlement of her claims. Thus, her appeals for an enhanced severance package and waiver of her housing loan were dismissed.

The Civil Appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellants filed an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which dismissed their application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The application sought to quash proceedings in a complaint case filed against them under Sections 498-A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants' application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing arguments and examining the record, held that the High Court erred in its judgment by failing to discuss the factual matrix of the case adequately. The High Court focused solely on legal principles without considering the specifics of the case. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration. The High Court was directed to reconsider the appellants' application on its merits, taking into account the observations made by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court refrained from delving into the merits of the case itself, as its primary concern was the procedural lapse in the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Appellant entered into an agreement to sell property with the respondent.

Despite the agreement, possession of the property was not transferred.

Appellant filed for registration of a complaint when the transaction wasn't completed.

Economic Crime Cell concluded the dispute was civil.

FIR was registered under various sections of IPC.

Chargesheet filed, and charges framed against the respondent.

High Court quashed proceedings citing lack of criminal intent.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to quash proceedings was justified.

Whether the allegations made in the FIR establish criminal intent.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings. The Court noted crucial aspects emerging during the investigation, suggesting potential criminal intent on the part of the accused. It emphasized that the decision to quash criminal proceedings should not be taken lightly, especially after charges have been framed and the trial has commenced.

The Court reinstated the criminal proceedings, clarifying that its decision did not imply an opinion on the merits of the accusations, as they are to be determined through the trial process. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.

Facts:

The case involves the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) as the appellant and the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and others as respondents. The dispute centers around the determination and fixation of tariff for electricity and specifically focuses on the computation of interest on capital under Section 38 of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 38 of the DVC Act concerning interest on capital.

Whether interest due from DVC on the capital employed by participating governments, ploughed back into the capital, should be considered under Section 38 of the DVC Act.

The complaint raised by the appellant regarding the calculation of interest on the basis of cumulative depreciation reducing the loan component.

Held:

The Appellate Tribunal noted the retention and ploughing back of interest due from DVC on the capital employed by participating governments. While initially providing for this under Section 38 of the DVC Act, the Tribunal later directed its application under the same section. However, the appellant failed to adequately raise this aspect, and the particulars were not provided.

The complaint raised by the appellant primarily concerned the calculation of interest based on cumulative depreciation reducing the loan component, which was deemed unsustainable. However, the respondents argued that this contention was not raised in the initial litigation before the appellate tribunal.

The Court observed that the procedure for calculating interest, including the consideration of cumulative depreciation, had been established in previous litigation and had become final. Therefore, the appellant could not raise the same issue in the subsequent litigation.

Judicial precedents related to depreciation rates for power companies were discussed, but it was concluded that they did not support the appellant's argument.

Ultimately, the Court ruled against the appellant, holding that they were not entitled to consider the point regarding the calculation of interest on the loan.

Decision: The Court ruled against the appellant, denying their request for reconsideration of the calculation of interest on the loan based on cumulative depreciation.

Facts:

The case involved appeals against the final judgment and order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla. The High Court allowed the revision petitions filed by the respondents, which led to the appeals before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether there were sufficient grounds to interfere with the remand order issued by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments presented by the appellant's counsel and examining the case record, found no substantial ground to interfere with the impugned order. The High Court had only remanded the case to the first Appellate Court to decide the first appeal and cross-objection afresh on merits in accordance with the law. The Court opined that such an order of remand did not warrant any interference, especially considering that the High Court found it necessary. However, the Court noted that the High Court's decision was overly verbose, devoting 60 pages to writing the impugned order. The Court emphasized the virtue of brevity and suggested that the examination should have been limited to the issue of remand without citing several decisions in detail. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals in limine.

Facts:

The U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad invited applications for the allotment of a plot of land.

The appellant participated in the bidding process, offering the highest bid initially.

The Parishad decided to re-auction the land, leading to the appellant filing a writ petition challenging this decision.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, stating that he had no standing in the matter since he did not participate in the re-auction.

The Parishad executed the sale deed in favor of another party during the pendency of the writ petition.

Issues:

Whether the appellant has standing to challenge the re-auction of the land.

Whether the execution of the sale deed during the pendency of the writ petition affects the appellant's rights.

Held:

The appellant has standing to challenge the re-auction as the Parishad did not adequately publicize the auction, and the reserve price was deemed too low.

A fresh auction should be conducted to ensure fairness and maximize the value of the land.

The Parishad must give wide publicity to the auction, consult experts to determine an appropriate reserve price, and ensure transparent conduct of the auction.

The appellant and the successful bidder are entitled to refunds of their deposits, along with interest.

Respondent No. 5, the successful bidder, is entitled to claim a refund of the stamp duty paid on the void sale deed.

Both the appellant and respondent No. 5 are allowed to participate in the fresh auction proceedings.

The deadline for completing the fresh auction proceedings is set at six months from the date of the Court's order.

Facts:

The accused-respondents were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 21 or Section 22 of the NDPS Act for possession of manufactured drugs. They appealed to the High Court seeking suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which was granted. The State filed appeals against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the accused-respondents amounted to a violation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act.

Whether the accused-respondents should be tried under the NDPS Act or the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 for possession of manufactured drugs.

Whether the High Court's decision to suspend the sentence and grant bail to the accused-respondents was justified.

Held:

The accused-respondents' actions amounted to a prima facie violation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which prohibits possession of narcotic substances except for medical or scientific purposes.

The High Court's decision to try the accused-respondents under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 instead of the NDPS Act was incorrect. The NDPS Act operates in addition to the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, and it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute offenders accordingly.

The High Court's order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the accused-respondents was unsustainable in law due to the gravity of the offence alleged against them. The High Court should have expedited the appeals instead.

The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside. The accused-respondents were directed to be taken into custody, and the High Court was requested to expedite the appeals.

Facts:

The appellant, Omveer Singh, filed an appeal against the dismissal of his application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The application sought to quash the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 2540 of 2017, which involved charges under IPC Sections 498A, 323, 376, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellant's application under Section 482 of the Code.

Held:

The Division Bench, after hearing the counsels and examining the record, held that the High Court had not adequately considered the factual matrix of the case before dismissing the appellant's application. The Division Bench observed that the Single Judge focused on legal principles without delving into the specific facts. Therefore, the Division Bench decided to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits in accordance with the law.

The Division Bench refrained from delving into the merits of the case and directed the High Court to decide the application uninfluenced by any observations made in their order.

In conclusion, the Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits.