Facts:

The appellant, S. Krishna Sradha, was denied admission to the MBBS course despite being more meritorious than the selected candidates. The High Court relied on the decision in Jasmine Kaur's case, denying admission benefits to the appellant due to the expiry of the cut-off date, but acknowledging lapses on the part of various authorities. The appellant approached the Court under Article 226 without delay, following the prescribed procedures for admission.

Issues:

Whether the previous decision in Jasmine Kaur's case restricting admission relief requires reconsideration by a larger bench.

Whether compensation alone is an adequate remedy for wrongful deprivation of admission, especially concerning the academic career of a student.

Held:

The decision in Jasmine Kaur's case, restricting admission relief based on the expiry of the time schedule, necessitates reconsideration by a larger bench, as it may not adequately address the grievances of meritorious students.

The Court emphasizes the importance of merit-based admissions and asserts that fundamental rights should not be denied to students due to institutional or administrative faults. The denial of admission based solely on the lapse of time may not serve the cause of justice.

Granting compensation may be an additional relief; however, it should not be the sole or adequate remedy for wrongful deprivation of admission, considering its impact on the academic career of the student. Restitution should be pursued where possible to restore the aggrieved party to their pre-wrongdoing condition.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of provisions under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, concerning the treatment of post-sale discounts granted through credit notes issued to customers.

Issues:

Whether discounts granted through credit notes can be deducted from the total turnover to determine the taxable turnover under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and held that all amounts allowed as discounts qualify for deduction from the total turnover to ascertain the taxable turnover.It was further held that the requirement for discount to be eligible for deduction includes being allowed in accordance with the regular practice of the dealer or as per terms of any contract or agreement, and such discounts should be reflected in the tax invoice or bill of sale.( Para 11-13)

The Court emphasized the importance of contemporaneous records to prove transactions allowing discounts and mandated that the final sale price after deducting trade discounts must be reflected in the accounts as stipulated under Rule 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (Para 15).

Sections 29 and 30 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, along with Rule 3, were viewed as constituents of the same scheme to determine taxable turnover and were interpreted in a manner that ensures correct computation of tax liability (Para 26).

The Court stressed the practicality of allowing trade discounts, recognizing that they may not always be reflected at the time of the original sale but should be evidenced by contemporaneous documents and reflected in relevant accounts (Para 27).

It was reiterated that while statutes should generally be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, if a literal interpretation leads to absurd results, courts may seek the underlying legislative intent and interpret accordingly (Para 34).

The interpretation of the first proviso to Rule 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, was aligned with the legislative intent to sustain the benefit of trade discounts and ensure the correct determination of taxable turnover (Para 36).

The Court concluded that the requirement of referencing discounts in tax invoices or bills of sale should be construed in relation to the transaction resulting in the final sale/purchase price, but discounts must be proven through contemporaneous records (Para 37).

Decision: The appeals were allowed, affirming the deduction of post-sale discounts from the total turnover to determine the taxable turnover under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts:

Safety Retreading Company (P) Ltd. was engaged in the retreading of tires.

The dispute arose regarding the levy of service tax on the total amount charged for retreading, including the value of materials/goods used and sold in the execution of the contract.

The appellant had paid taxes under the local Act as a Works Contractor.

Issues:

Whether service tax is leviable on the total amount charged for retreading, including the value of materials/goods used and sold in the execution of the contract.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that service tax should be levied only on the service component and not on the entire gross value. The court emphasized the provisions of Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, which exclude the cost of parts or materials sold to the customer from the taxable value. The court rejected arguments regarding insufficient evidence of the value of goods or parts used in the contract, noting the undisputed assessment of the appellant under the local Act and the details provided in the show cause notice issued by the Department.

The court set aside the majority order of the appellate Tribunal and held that the view taken by the Vice President of the appellate Tribunal was correct. The appellant was entitled to all reliefs due, and any amounts deposited were to be returned without interest. Bank guarantees related to penalties were discharged. The appeals are disposed of on the same terms.

Facts:

Anil Kumar was convicted under Section 22 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine.

He was later convicted under Section 27(b)(ii) and Section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.

An appeal was filed seeking concurrent running of sentences.

Issues:

Whether concurrent sentences should be ordered under Section 427 of the CrPC.

Held:

The power conferred on the Court under Section 427 Cr.P.C. to order concurrent sentence is discretionary.

Whether or not the discretion is to be exercised in directing sentences to run concurrently would depend upon the nature of the offence/offences and the facts and circumstances of each case.

In the present case, the appellant was earlier convicted under Section 22 NDPS Act and subsequently convicted under Section 27(b)(ii) and Section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Considering the nature of the offences for which the appellant was convicted and the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the sentences imposed on the appellant in FIR No.37 and Complaint No.638 shall run concurrently.

The substantive sentences imposed on the appellant are ordered to run concurrently and the appeal is thus allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Muthu Kumaran, was inducted into the Indian Army in 1994.

He was alleged to be involved in a fraudulent recruitment racket and obtaining illegal gratification during his posting in Jammu and Kashmir in 2006.

Despite denial and subsequent reply, the appellant's services were terminated under Section 20(3) of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

The appellant approached the Armed Forces Tribunal challenging his dismissal, but his application was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service was justified.

Whether the punishment could be modified considering the appellant's long and unblemished service.

Held:

The dismissal of the appellant from service was within the powers of the authorities under Section 20(3) of the Army Act coupled with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

However, considering the appellant's long and unblemished service of more than 17 years, the extreme punishment of dismissal could be modified.

The modification of the punishment from dismissal to discharge from service would allow the appellant to receive benefits such as gratuity and other attendant benefits for his service rendered, while not affecting his ability to seek employment outside the army.

Therefore, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and directed the respondents to release benefits available to the appellant for his service in the army. No costs were ordered.

Facts:

Meera Santosh Pal, a 22-year-old appellant, approached the Court seeking permission to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy due to fetal anencephaly, a condition incompatible with extra-uterine life.

A Medical Board was constituted to evaluate the petitioner's medical condition.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be permitted to terminate her pregnancy due to the fetal condition and potential risks to her life.

Held:

The Court considered the petitioner's plea for medical termination of her pregnancy in light of the fetal condition and potential risks to her life. The Medical Board confirmed that continuation of the pregnancy posed grave risks to the physical and mental health of the petitioner. [Para 4]

Referring to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and the Supreme Court's precedent in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1, which recognizes a woman's right to make reproductive choices as part of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized the importance of a woman's consent in matters of termination of pregnancy. [Para 9]

The Court, therefore, deemed it appropriate to allow the petitioner to terminate her pregnancy. The Solicitor General did not oppose this decision. [Para 12]

The termination of pregnancy was to be conducted by the hospital's doctors under the supervision of the Medical Board, maintaining complete records of the procedure. [Para 13]

The writ petition was allowed, permitting the petitioner to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy. The petitioners did not press other prayers mentioned in the petition. [Para 14-16]

Facts:

The case involves challenges by telecom service providers to the terms and conditions set by the Central Government for spectrum auction in 2015, particularly regarding minimum bidding criteria and capping. The Notice Inviting Application (NIA) outlined these conditions. Various aspects of the auction procedure, including spectrum allocation and eligibility criteria, were under scrutiny.

Issues:

The validity of the tender conditions imposed by the Central Government and whether they infringed upon the constitutional rights of the telecom service providers, particularly concerning Article 14.

Additionally, the role of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) recommendations in shaping government policy and the interpretation of the NIA's clauses were in contention.

Held:

The Court held that the challenge to the tender conditions was not tenable. The minimum spectrum requirement was deemed reasonable and aligned with the objective of ensuring efficient service provision.

The concept of legitimate expectation was deemed inapplicable in this case unless there was an abuse of power by the State.

The Court emphasized limited judicial review in complex auction procedures, intervening only in cases of obnoxious arbitrariness or extraneous considerations.

TRAI recommendations were considered non-binding but deserving of due weightage by the Central Government.

The interpretation of the NIA was subject to contractual principles, and the Court would not compel the State to interpret clauses in a particular way.

Spectrum allocation and capping were upheld as measures to prevent monopolies and promote healthy competition, benefiting consumers.

The auction structure and procedure were deemed within the discretion of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), considering factors like spectrum availability and market competition.

Changes in auction procedures were found not to violate legitimate expectations if they served the public interest and revenue maximization.

Facts:

The Armed Forces Tribunal allowed applications by doctors seeking DACP, relying on a previous decision.

However, the factual position regarding DACP's applicability to AMC cadre doctors wasn't adequately presented to the tribunal or the court.

Issues:

Whether the DACP scheme is applicable to medical doctors serving as Commissioned Officers in the AMC cadre of the Armed Forces.

Held:

The court recognized the importance of examining the applicability of DACP to Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces due to significant financial and structural ramifications.

The AMC cadre officers' service conditions differ from other Commissioned Officers, and extending DACP to them might create an anomalous situation.

The previous tribunal decision didn't conclusively determine DACP's applicability to AMC cadre doctors but directed authorities to consider implementing DACP in accordance with the law.

The case is remanded to the tribunal for reconsideration, instructing both parties to present their arguments and relevant documents afresh.

The tribunal should reassess the matter without being influenced by previous observations or decisions.

Both parties are allowed to submit additional pleadings and documents to the tribunal.

The appellants are instructed to file a comprehensive affidavit explaining why DACP shouldn't be extended to AMC cadre doctors, and respondents are given the opportunity to respond.

A writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is disposed of, granting the petitioner the option to intervene in the remanded proceedings or file a fresh Original Application for the relief sought.

Facts:

The appellant owned agricultural land which the Government of Kerala sought to acquire for the development of Techno Park. The acquisition process was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the appellant agreed to sell the land to Techno Park for a negotiated compensation amount.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to exemption under Section 10(37) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, considering the nature of the acquisition.

Held:

The Court determined that the acquisition of the land was compulsory as all procedures under the Land Acquisition Act were followed. It emphasized that the negotiations for compensation were solely regarding the quantum of compensation and did not alter the compulsory nature of the acquisition.( Para 9)

The Court overruled the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Info Park Kerala vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, stating that the mere execution of sale deeds does not change the compulsory nature of acquisition if statutory procedures are followed.( Para 10)

Consequently, the Court allowed the appellant's appeal and quashed the proceedings initiated by the Income Tax Department under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act.( Para 11)