Facts:

The case involved large-scale environmental degradation in the districts of Bellary, Chitradurga, and Tumkur in Karnataka due to illegal mining activities.

The Supreme Court had previously ordered ameliorative and mitigative measures to address this environmental damage.

The orders included directing mining lessees to contribute 10% of their sale proceeds to a Monitoring Committee for eventual transfer to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) responsible for executing the measures. Subsequently, the State of Karnataka established District Mineral Foundations (DMFs) in the affected districts, directing lessees to make payments to the DMF as well.

Issues:

Whether the establishment of DMFs in the affected districts affects the requirement for mining lessees to contribute to the SPV.

Approval of the Comprehensive Environment Plan for the Mining Impact Zone (CEPMIZ) prepared by the State Government in consultation with the Central Empowered Committee (CEC).

Held:

The Court held that the establishment of DMFs did not negate the requirement for mining lessees to contribute to the SPV. Despite the overlap in objectives between DMFs and the SPV, the extraordinary and unprecedented nature of the environmental degradation necessitated continued contributions to the SPV for executing ameliorative and mitigative measures.

The Court decided that approval of the entire CEPMIZ scheme need not be granted all at once. Instead, approval could be considered and accorded in phases.

Priority was given to initial activities such as the construction of conveyor belt systems, railway sidings, and railway sub-lines, as these were deemed crucial steps towards controlling environmental pollution caused by the open movement of iron ore. Approval for other socio-economic measures under the CEPMIZ would be granted once significant progress was made in implementing the prioritized infrastructure projects.

Facts:

Vasanthi, the appellant, filed a suit seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of a property against Venugopal, the respondent.

Vasanthi claimed to have purchased the property through a registered sale deed, while Venugopal asserted his possession based on an agreement of sale with the original owner.

The Trial Court dismissed Vasanthi's suit, holding that Venugopal's possession was protected under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Vasanthi's appeal to the High Court was also dismissed, and her Letters Patent Appeal was rejected.

Issues:

Whether Venugopal's possession was protected under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Whether Vasanthi's Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable under Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Venugopal and his heirs were not entitled to the protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court found insufficient evidence to establish that Venugopal or his heirs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, and it was not proven that Vasanthi had notice of the agreement for sale at the time of her purchase.

Therefore, the Court allowed Vasanthi's civil appeal, decreeing her suit for declaration of title and possession.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of Vasanthi's Letters Patent Appeal, holding that no further appeal would lie from the judgment and decree of a Single Judge of a High Court under Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code.

Facts:

IMAX Corporation entered into an agreement with E-City Entertainment (I) Pvt. Ltd. for the supply of large format projection systems for cinema theatres in India.

The agreement included an arbitration clause stating that any dispute would be settled by arbitration pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration.

IMAX filed a request for arbitration with the ICC, and the ICC chose London as the seat of arbitration.

Several awards were made by the Arbitral Tribunal, all in favor of IMAX, with the seat of arbitration being London.

E-City Entertainment challenged these awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Bombay High Court, questioning the maintainability of the petition under Section 34.

Issues:

Whether the challenge under Section 34 was maintainable before an Indian court.

Whether the choice of London as the seat of arbitration by the ICC excludes the applicability of Part-I of the Arbitration Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that when parties agree to have arbitration conducted according to the ICC Rules and the ICC chooses a seat of arbitration outside India, it implies an agreement to exclude Part-I of the Arbitration Act.

The significance of the seat of arbitration in determining the law applicable to the arbitration and related matters cannot be overstated.

In this case, the parties agreed to exclude Part-I of the Arbitration Act by agreeing to arbitration conducted according to the ICC Rules and leaving the seat of arbitration to be chosen by the ICC.

The ICC, after consulting the parties, chose London as the seat of arbitration. Therefore, the challenge under Section 34 was not maintainable before the Bombay High Court.

The judgment of the Bombay High Court was set aside, and the petition filed by E-City Entertainment under Section 34 was dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appeal was lodged by Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and M/s. Raipur Construction Pvt. Ltd. against the judgment and order of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, which had quashed the contract awarded to M/s. Raipur Construction Pvt. Ltd. by CSIDC for the upgradation of infrastructure in Sirgitti.

The respondent, Amar Infrastructure Ltd., contested the contract's validity on the grounds of the disqualification of the L-2 bidder, M/s. Arcons Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., alleging that its financial bid had been unlawfully opened.

Issues:

Whether there was any merit in the respondent's petition challenging the contract awarded to M/s. Raipur Construction Pvt. Ltd.?

Whether the disqualification of the L-2 bidder, M/s. Arcons Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., was legally justified?

Held:

Found that the respondent, Amar Infrastructure Ltd., itself was disqualified and hadn't challenged the qualification of the successful bidder.

Observed that the dispute lacked any element of public interest and was essentially between rival tenderers.

Noted that Amar Infrastructure Ltd. sought disqualification of the L-2 bidder to secure a re-tendering process, solely in its business interest.

Concluded that there was no merit in the respondent's petition in the High Court and set aside the judgment, order, and directions passed by the High Court, thereby allowing the appeal.

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute over a Will dated September 27, 1968, executed by a husband and wife (testator and testatrix) in which they intended to devote their properties to charities. Subsequently, challenges arose regarding the character of the Will, the validity of alienations made by the survivor, and the creation of a trust.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred under Section 108 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959.

Interpretation of the nature and content of the Will dated September 27, 1968, including its character as a joint and mutual Will.

Validity of alienations made by the survivor and the subsequent Will dated November 27, 1980.

Creation and administration of a trust as per the provisions of the original Will.

Held:

The Court held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not barred under Section 108 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. The Act's bar pertained to suits or legal proceedings concerning the administration or management of a religious institution. Since the suit did not relate to such an institution, the bar under Section 108 was not applicable.

The Court determined that the Will dated September 27, 1968, was a joint and mutual Will, as both the testator and testatrix intended to devote their properties to charities. The Will explicitly outlined their intention and specified the charities and committee responsible for their execution. The survivor was granted absolute rights over the properties, including the right of disposition, with the obligation to fund charities from the income derived from the properties.

The Court found that alienations made by the survivor during her lifetime were fully covered by the provisions of the original Will. However, the subsequent Will dated November 27, 1980, bequeathing properties to defendant nos. 4 and 5, was held invalid as it was not proved to be executed by the survivor in a sound state of mind. Alienations made by defendant nos. 4 and 5 were declared null and void, and those properties were deemed part of the Trust property.

The Court observed that there was no evidence to suggest any inability of the testator and survivor to carry out the charity during their lifetime. However, upon the death of the survivor, the committee was obligated to carry out the charities as per the provisions of the Will, thereby establishing the trust. The judicial officer was directed to frame a scheme for the Trust expeditiously. All the appeals are decided accordingly.

Facts:

The appellants were in custody in two separate cases. In the first case, they were accused under Section 21(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. In the second case, one of the appellants was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the appeal against the conviction was pending in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to bail pending trial or appeal under Article 21 of the Constitution, based on the right to speedy trial.

Whether the delays in the trial and appeal process warranted intervention from the court.

Held:

The Court referred to previous decisions regarding the grant of bail pending appeal, citing the cases of Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P. and Surinder Singh alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab.

While emphasizing the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, the Court also cited the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and others v. R.S. Nayak and another, highlighting that in case of a violation of this right, the higher court can direct the conclusion of proceedings within a fixed time.

In the interest of the administration of justice, the Court issued directions to expedite the disposal of cases and ensure timely justice delivery. These directions included timelines for the disposal of bail applications and trials, as well as measures to address delays.

Decision: The Court directed the pending trial in the first case and the appeal in the second case to be disposed of within six months. Additionally, the Court issued comprehensive directions to High Courts and subordinate courts to ensure timely disposal of cases and adherence to the fundamental right to a speedy trial.

Facts:

Krishna Veni Nagam, the appellant, filed a transfer petition seeking the transfer of a matrimonial case filed by Harish Nagam, the respondent, from Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, to Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, citing various difficulties including physical and mental torture, as well as the presence of a minor child. The appellant argued that contesting the proceedings in Jabalpur would cause hardship due to her residence in Hyderabad and the need to care for her minor daughter.

Issues:

Whether the court should transfer matrimonial cases solely based on the convenience of one party, and if not, what alternative measures could be implemented to ensure access to justice for both parties.

Held:

The court acknowledged the flood of transfer petitions and the resulting hardship faced by litigants. It invoked the principle of forum non conveniens, considering the convenience of both parties and the interest of justice. While recognizing the difficulties faced by the appellant, the court explored alternative solutions to transferring cases, such as the use of video conferencing facilities, provision of legal aid services, and communication via email and telephone.

The court issued guidelines incorporating these measures to ensure access to justice in matrimonial cases involving parties residing outside the court's jurisdiction. The specific transfer petition was allowed, and the case was transferred to Hyderabad.

The court also appreciated the assistance of the Additional Solicitor General and the Senior Advocate in the case.

Facts:

M/s. Hindustan Polymers Limited (HPL) had become a sick industrial company and owed significant debts to banks and financial institutions.

Proceedings were initiated before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA).

Petitions for amalgamation of HPL with M/s. McDowell and Company Limited, the appellant, were filed in the High Courts of Bombay and Madras.

The High Courts approved the scheme of amalgamation, and HPL was amalgamated with the appellant from April 1, 1977.

HPL had accrued interest on loans from financial institutions, which was treated as expenditure in its books.

The financial institutions waived the interest accrued prior to April 1, 1977, resulting in a question of whether the waived interest should be treated as income under Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

• Whether the waived interest should be treated as income of the appellant under Section 41(1) of the Act.

• Whether the accrued income under Section 41(1) should be accounted for while calculating accumulated losses for the purpose of availing benefits under Section 72A of the Act in the context of amalgamation.

Held:

The Court held that the waived interest should indeed be treated as income of the appellant for the purpose of adjusting accumulated losses under Section 72A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that while Section 41(1) deals with taxation of income, Section 72A provides for the carry forward and set off of accumulated losses in cases of amalgamation.

Therefore, when an amalgamated company is allowed the benefit of accumulated losses, the income accrued to the amalgamated company must be adjusted to calculate the actual accumulated losses.

The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 72A was to facilitate the merger of sick industrial units with sound ones by providing incentives and removing impediments. Thus, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the treatment of waived interest as income of the appellant for adjusting accumulated losses under Section 72A.

Facts:

The appellant, MIS. YESHWANT GRAMIN SHIKSHAN SANSTHA, operates schools and colleges and employs part-time workers with the approval of the State Government. It challenged the applicability of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Central Act) to its part-time employees, arguing that their service conditions are governed by State laws.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the Central Act apply to part-time employees of the appellant's schools and colleges, which are governed by State laws.

Whether the appellant is deemed to have defaulted in depositing Provident Fund contributions for its part-time employees.

Held:

The court interpreted Section 1 of the Central Act, which applies to various establishments, including educational institutions like schools and colleges. The Central Government had issued a notification including educational institutions under the Central Act, subject to Section 16 exemptions.

The appellant claimed exemption under Section 16(1)(b) of the Central Act, which exempts establishments under the control of the Central or State Government, whose employees are covered by government provident fund schemes.

The court found that the appellant's schools were 100% grant-in-aid and under State Government control, fulfilling the conditions of Section 16(1)(b). Therefore, the Central Act did not apply to them.

Exemption under Section 16 applies to the entire establishment, and any action taken under the Central Act against exempted establishments is unauthorized.

Initiation of recovery proceedings against the appellant, despite its exemption status, was deemed unauthorized.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.