FACTS:

Smt. Randhir Kaur gifted a property to Doaba Public School through a registered Gift Deed.

An oral exchange of land occurred in 1988, purportedly between the Principal of the school and the President of the Doaba Education Society.

The exchanged land included the portion originally donated by Smt. Randhir Kaur.

The Respondents executed a Lease Deed, making the school a Lessee and the Principal the owner of the suit property.

Legal proceedings ensued challenging the exchange and seeking restoration of ownership to the school.

ISSUES:

Validity of the oral exchange and subsequent transactions.

Ownership rights over the suit property.

HELD:

The Court held that the exchange was collusive, unauthorized, and illegal. The purported reason for the exchange, benefiting students in a remote village, was a mere ruse. The school continued to operate from the original property, and the exchange was an attempt to transfer valuable land to the Principal. The Court quashed the exchange, set aside the related documents, and directed the restoration of ownership to the Doaba Public School. Costs of Rs. 1 lac were awarded to the Appellants. The Appeals are allowed.

Facts:

Appellant charged with strangulating his wife, leading to her death.

Incident occurred on the rooftop of the premises on the night of 31.08.2010 and 01.09.2010.

Prosecution's case supported by the evidence of a child witness (PW-7), who is the son of the accused and deceased.

Issues:

Reliability of the child witness (PW-7) questioned by the appellant.

Presence of the appellant at the crime scene disputed.

Challenge to the preservation of the deceased's body before postmortem.

Assertion of false implication and lack of inquiry into the child witness's background.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 IPC, rejecting the appellant's plea under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The Supreme Court, on reevaluation, found that the act occurred in a sudden fight without premeditation. The strangulation, while severe, did not meet the criteria of extreme cruelty. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Section 302 conviction, modifying it to Section 304 Part II, IPC, and imposing a sentence of 10 years' simple imprisonment. The appeal is partly allowed.( Para 13,14,15)

FACTS:

Uttar Pradesh created the Minority Welfare Department in 1995.

Appellants applied for the post of District Minority Welfare Officer in 1996 through deputation/transfer.

Appellants were selected and appointed in 1997 for a temporary period of two years.

UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 came into force in 2001.

Appellants sought absorption in the Minority Welfare Department, but the State rejected the request based on the 2001 Rules.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants, appointed before the 2001 Rules, can claim absorption under the said rules?

The applicability of the judgments in Saeed Ahmad Khan & Ors. v. State of U.P. and Chandrabhan Srivastava and Another vs. State of U.P. in the present case.

HELD:

The court observed that the appellants' appointment was not on deputation but by transfer of service, indicating selection and appointment in the Department of Minority Welfare.( Para 12)

The court cited Managing Director, UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. P.K. Bhatnagar and others, emphasizing that the mere fact of spending several years on deputation does not alter the position from that of a deputationist to a regular employee.( Para 14)

The court noted that Rule 3(h) of UP Minority Welfare Department Gazetted Officers Service Rules 2001 defines 'Member of the Service' as a person substantively appointed under these rules or the rules in force prior to their commencement.( Para 15)

The court concluded that the appellants, having been appointed before the 2001 Rules, cannot be deprived of their rights of absorption in the Minority Welfare Department.( Para 16)

The court directed the absorption of the appellants as District Minority Welfare Officers in the Department of Minority Welfare and Waqf from the date of their appointment. For retired employees, the court directed compliance with pension-related matters.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Managing Director, UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. P.K. Bhatnagar and others (2007) 14 SCC 498

FACTS:

Nirval Singh, the respondent, sought compassionate appointment after the death of his father who was working with the appellants.

The policy for compassionate appointment dated 21.11.2002 was in force when the application was submitted.

The respondent did not receive compassionate appointment as the implementation of the policy was kept in abeyance for the consideration of a new policy.

ISSUES:

The delay in approaching the courts for redressal after a period of 7 years.

The change in policy from the earlier one to the new one.

The options offered to the respondent under the new policy, which he declined.

HELD:

Addresses the delay in approaching the courts and the change in policy. The Court held that the delay of 7 years extinguished the objective of providing immediate amelioration to the family. The abolishment of the earlier policy and the introduction of the new one meant that the application had to be considered under the new policy. The respondent failed to avail the options offered under the new policy.( Paragraph 7 )

Concludes the decision by stating that the offer of solatium could be the only remedy available at this stage. The Court directed the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs to the respondent within two months, considering the revised policy.( Paragraph 9 )

Facts:

The Respondent applied for the allotment of a flat under the Self-Financing Housing Scheme.

The Board allotted a flat, and after various proceedings, the matter reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court passed an order on 19.09.2012, conclusively determining the rights and obligations of the parties.

Subsequently, the Respondent initiated execution proceedings to enforce the Supreme Court's order.

Issues:

Whether a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is maintainable before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings?

Held:

The nature of execution proceedings is independent and different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint.

Execution proceedings cannot be considered a continuation of the original consumer dispute.

Revision Petition is not maintainable under Section 21(b) against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

The National Commission erroneously entertained the Revision Petition, which was not maintainable.

The Delhi High Court rightly set aside the Order passed by the National Commission on the ground that a Revision Petition was not maintainable against the Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

Facts:

The Appellants sought permission under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC to introduce additional evidence before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The evidence, comprising two documents, came into existence after the filing of the appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission rejected the application, deeming the documents "not necessary." The matter reached the National Commission, which affirmed the State Commission's decision.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants should be allowed to introduce additional evidence at the appellate stage.

Whether the rejection by the State Commission was justified.

Held:

The court observed that under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC, a party can produce additional evidence at the appellate stage if it establishes the evidence's unavailability despite due diligence when the decree was passed. The two documents were crucial to the Appellants' case, showing their inability to obtain the Occupancy Certificate due to unauthorized structures.

The State Commission's rejection was deemed an error as it merely stated the documents were "not necessary" without a reasoned explanation. The National Commission's affirmation of this decision was set aside. The Civil Appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the State Commission to consider the additional documents and decide the appeal on its merits expeditiously.

Facts:

The respondent was appointed as a conductor on a contractual basis by the appellant. The contractual appointment allowed termination at any time without notice. The services were terminated on 21 March 2007. The respondent challenged the termination, citing a breach of natural justice.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the respondent's contractual appointment was in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Whether there was a breach of the principle of natural justice.

Held:

The Court found that the nature of the appointment was purely contractual and allowed termination without notice. The terms of the agreement explicitly granted the appellant the right to terminate at any time. The Court distinguished the present case from Hari Ram Maurya v Union of India, where the removal was based on a charge of bribery. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and the writ petition was dismissed. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

Appellants challenged the High Court's orders allowing candidates with research and development experience in drugs to be considered for the post.

Dispute arose over the interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications mentioned in the advertisements dated 04.01.2012 and 31.03.2015.

Issues:

Whether candidates with research and development experience can be considered eligible for the post of Assistant Commissioner (Drugs) and Drug Inspectors.

The interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications as per the advertisements.

Held:

The essential qualifications for the post are at the discretion of the employer, and the court cannot reinterpret them.

Desirable qualifications do not automatically confer eligibility; they are preferences.

Research experience in a research and development laboratory does not equate to essential eligibility for the post.

The experience of testing in a research and development laboratory is different from the testing carried out in the manufacturing process.

The preference clause means additional weightage for candidates with research experience, not automatic eligibility.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders and allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The appellant, Ganesan, was declared entitled to Ambalam right in his village by the Joint Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board. The third respondent filed an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, accompanied by a delay condonation application for a delay of 266 days. The Commissioner condoned the delay. The appellant challenged the order condoning the delay through a writ petition.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appeal proceedings before the Commissioner, and whether the Commissioner could be considered a court under the statutory scheme of the Act, 1959.

Held:

The court held that the Commissioner, while hearing an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, is not a court as defined in Section 6(7). The Commissioner is an appointed authority entrusted with various functions, including hearing appeals.( Paragraph 15)

Section 70 of the Act further provides that any party aggrieved by the Commissioner's order under Section 69 can file a suit in the court. The Commissioner is not considered a court under the statutory scheme.( Paragraph 16-17)

The judgment clarifies that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals, and applications to be filed in a court and not before statutory authorities like the Commissioner.( Paragraph 54)

The court decided that Section 29(2) cannot be invoked concerning filing suits, appeals, and applications before statutory authorities. Consequently, the Commissioner cannot condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.( Paragraph 55)

The court emphasized that a special or local law can determine the applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act, including Section 5. The Act, 1959, does not indicate an intention to apply Section 5.( Paragraph 56)

Section 115 of the Act, dealing with limitation, only provides for the computation of limitation, excluding the time for obtaining a certified copy. The judgment concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of the Act, 1959.( Paragraph 63)