Facts:

The case involved multiple suits, including ones for partition of properties and specific performance of an agreement of sale. The appellants contested the validity of the Wills presented by the defendants, as well as the right of the defendants to alienate the properties they purchased from Veeraswamy. Additionally, challenges were raised against a specific performance suit, citing escalation in property prices.

Issues:

Validity of the Wills presented by the defendants.

Right of the defendants to alienate the properties purchased from Veeraswamy.

Challenges to the specific performance suit, including the escalation in property prices.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Wills presented by the defendants were valid, thereby conferring ownership of the properties to Veeraswamy. Since Veeraswamy was the owner of the properties, he had the right to alienate them, and the defendants who purchased properties from him were considered bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. The challenges to the specific performance suit were dismissed, as the appellants lacked the right to question the agreement of sale and failed to prove hardship.

The court further held that due to the absence of legal representatives of deceased parties and deleted parties, the appeals could not proceed without the necessary parties.

Allowing the appeals to proceed could result in conflicting decrees, violating the principle of avoiding inconsistent decrees about the same subject matter. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed both on the ground of non-maintainability due to abatement and on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of sexual assault by the respondent-accused on the prosecutrix, a minor girl aged about nine years.

The prosecutrix alleged that the accused, her cousin, had been sexually assaulting her for about three years.

The prosecutrix disclosed the incidents to her school teachers and the president of the Gram Panchayat.

The Trial Court convicted the accused based on the prosecutrix's testimony and medical evidence, but the High Court reversed the conviction on the grounds of lack of confidence in the prosecutrix's testimony and inconclusive medical evidence.

Issues:

Whether the prosecutrix's testimony inspires confidence and is reliable.

Whether the medical evidence is conclusive regarding the sexual assault.

Whether the non-examination of the prosecutrix's aunt is fatal to the prosecution's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix's testimony was credible and reliable, emphasizing that corroboration is not mandatory in rape cases if the victim's testimony is trustworthy.

The absence of injuries on the prosecutrix's private parts did not negate the possibility of sexual assault, especially considering her young age.

The Court dismissed the argument regarding the non-examination of the prosecutrix's aunt, stating that it was not fatal to the prosecution's case.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the conviction of the respondent-accused under Section 376 IPC was restored, along with the sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The respondent-accused was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence, failing which he would be taken into custody.

Facts:

The appellant lodged FIR No.35/2015 against the first respondent alleging harassment and abetment to suicide.

The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur quashed the proceedings instituted against the first respondent.

The appellant appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings against the first respondent.

Whether the investigation being incomplete and no charge-sheet filed justified the High Court's delve into the intention of the respondent.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was not justified in delving into questions of the respondent's intention to abet suicide at that stage, especially when the investigation was incomplete and no charge-sheet had been filed. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the concerned authorities to complete the investigation promptly.

The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it to be considered at the appropriate stage. The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court under various sections of the Indian Penal Code for murder, causing grievous injuries, criminal intimidation, and house trespass. The High Court confirmed the conviction and awarded the death penalty. However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals and commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in confirming the death penalty without properly applying established legal principles.

Whether mitigating circumstances were adequately considered.

Whether the conduct of the appellant in prison and the possibility of reform were properly weighed.

Whether a psychological assessment was necessary.

Whether there was procedural impropriety in the sentencing process.

Held:

The High Court erroneously confirmed the death penalty without correctly applying the law laid down in previous cases such as Bachan Singh, Machhi Singh, Santosh Bariyar, and Shankar Kisanrao Khade.

Mitigating circumstances, including the appellant's lack of a significant criminal record and positive conduct in prison, were not adequately considered by the High Court.

The conduct of the appellant in prison, indicating the possibility of reform, should have been taken into account while deciding the appropriate punishment.

A proper psychological or psychiatric evaluation should have been conducted to assess the probability or possibility of the appellant's reform.

Procedural impropriety occurred as the Trial court failed to conduct a separate hearing for sentencing, denying the appellant an opportunity to present relevant evidence for mitigation.

Decision: The Supreme Court commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment, emphasizing that imprisonment for life was a suitable alternative and that the death penalty was not the only option in this case.

Facts:

The Ministry of Women and Child Development was in the process of preparing an SOP for children who are victims of violence. An interim advisory had been issued, and reports from the NCPCR were being shared with some states. Additionally, progress on the Child Protection Policy and the establishment of a National Institution for the benefit of Children was discussed. Status reports regarding Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards were also examined.

Issues:

The Court identified six key issues that required consideration, including the implementation of protocols for child victims, the sharing of reports by the NCPCR.

The development of a Child Protection Policy, strengthening of the National Institution for the benefit of Children, status reports on Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards, and the review of reports furnished by the States.

Held and Decision:

Regarding SOPs for child victims, an interim advisory had been issued by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. The Court directed the learned Amicus to review the advisory.

The NCPCR had submitted an interim report, but it was unclear if all states had received it. The Court instructed State Governments to complete registration of child care institutions and provide necessary information to the NCPCR within two weeks.

The first draft of the Child Protection Policy was expected by December 2018, and the Court emphasized wide circulation and inviting suggestions.

The matter of the National Institution for the benefit of Children was referred to the Department of Expenditure.

The status report provided on Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards was deemed incomplete, and the Court directed the ASG to provide a comprehensive report and address the issue with State Governments.

The Court noted that reports furnished by some States were incomplete and urged the Ministry of Women and Child Development to address this with the States.

Facts:

Kamala (PW-1), the mother of the deceased Sankar, witnessed the brutal murder of her son. On August 19, 1996, while visiting her elder son's newborn baby in Harikesavanallur, Kamala and Sankar were attacked by a group of individuals armed with weapons. The attackers, including the appellant, inflicted fatal injuries on Sankar, leading to his death.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the credibility of Kamala's testimony as the sole eyewitness to the murder.

The defense challenged her account, citing various factors such as the location and circumstances of the attack.

Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the delay in lodging the complaint and registering the FIR, as well as alleged discrepancies between the oral and medical evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Kamala's testimony was credible and consistent, supported by medical evidence and other corroborative evidence. Despite attempts by the defense to discredit her account, the severity of the victim's injuries lent weight to her testimony. The court also found the delay in lodging the complaint and registering the FIR reasonable given the circumstances of the incident.

Furthermore, the court emphasized that motive, while relevant, was not essential in cases where eyewitness testimony was strong and supported by other evidence. The defense's arguments regarding discrepancies between the oral and medical evidence were deemed insignificant, as such variances did not undermine the prosecution's case.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's conviction and sentence were upheld. The appellant was directed to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of his sentence if he had not already done so.

Facts:

Gagandeep Singh, the appellant, was third on the select list for appointment to the post of District Programme Officer.

A vacancy arose when the person appointed against the reserved vacancy resigned from the post.

The appellant contended that the vacancy should be filled from the same community, and as he was next in line after the resignation, he should be appointed.

The Department rejected the appellant's claim, stating that once an appointment is made, the reserved point is consumed, and thus, the appellant cannot be considered.

The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether a vacancy created by a candidate from the reserved category, and subsequently vacated, should be filled from the candidates available in the select list.

Whether the purpose of preparing a select list would be frustrated if vacancies were not filled from the list when they arose.

Held:

The purpose of preparing a select list would be frustrated if vacancies were not filled from the list when they arose.

Referring to the guidelines issued by the welfare department, the Court emphasized that a vacancy created by a candidate from the reserved category, and subsequently vacated, should be filled from the candidates available in the select list.

The Court directed the respondents to make the appointment from the merit list published on 20.06.2012, within a period of two months.

It was clarified that the appointed candidate would get seniority only from the date of appointment.

Facts:

The complainants had booked residential flats in a project named "White Spring Building" in Mumbai.

The possession of the flats was delayed beyond the agreed date.

The agreement between the parties contained Clause 17 specifying various contingencies that would extend the possession date.

The original allottees transferred their allotment within the family to the present respondents.

The appellant cited delays due to mandatory requirements such as resubmission of plans and obtaining fresh NOC for fire safety permission.

The appellant also claimed a reduction in the availability of sand due to restrictions on sand mining activities.

Issues:

Whether the complaints filed by subsequent transferees within the family were maintainable.

Whether the appellant was entitled to an extension of the possession period due to mandatory requirements and reduced availability of sand.

Held:

The court held that the complaints filed by subsequent transferees within the family were maintainable, distinguishing the case from instances where transfers were made to strangers (referring to Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Raje Ram, (2008) 17 SCC 407).

The court accepted the appellant's argument regarding delays due to mandatory requirements, granting a six-month extension for the period from 21.12.2012 to 07.05.2013.

While acknowledging the appellant's claim regarding the reduced availability of sand, the court did not fully accept the argument.

The court modified the directions issued by the Commission, ordering a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to each respondent in respect of each case, in addition to other directions regarding payment and interest. With these directions civil appeals stand disposed of. No costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority, demanded betterment charges, building construction charges, etc., from the respondents, including Birla Super Bulk Terminal (now a unit of UltraTech Cement Ltd.), for land allotted by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) for the construction of a Bulk Cement Terminal. The respondents challenged this demand through a writ petition, arguing that as the land was allotted by the KIADB, they were not liable to pay development charges under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the Planning Authority under the KTCP Act has jurisdiction to levy betterment charges on development activities within industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act.

Whether there is any conflict between the provisions of the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act regarding the authority to regulate land use and development.

Held:

The Court examined the objects and scope of both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act and found that they operate in different fields. The KIAD Act is focused on securing the establishment of industrial areas and promoting orderly development of industries, while the KTCP Act regulates planned growth of land use and development, including town planning schemes.

The levy of prescribed fees under Section 18 of the KTCP Act encompasses both changing land use and development of land or building.

The Planning Authority constituted under the KTCP Act is empowered to grant approval for development on land within its jurisdiction, including land acquired and allotted by the KIADB under the KIAD Act.

Both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act must be harmoniously construed to give effect to their respective provisions, and there is no inconsistency or overlapping between them.

The High Court's findings regarding the applicability of the KTCP Act to industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act were contradictory, and the Planning Authority has the authority to levy betterment charges as per the law.

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the respondents are directed to pay the demanded charges to the appellant authority with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the demand, within the stipulated period.