Facts:

The Complainant, an industrial unit, suffered a fire incident and claimed Rs. 54,93,865 under a fire insurance policy.

Three surveyors were appointed successively, with varying assessments of the claim.

The Insurance Company repudiated the claim based on the third surveyor's report, alleging fraud and manipulation.

Issues:

Validity of successive appointments of surveyors.

Acceptance of the first surveyor's report and subsequent repudiation based on the third surveyor's findings.

Held:

The Court scrutinized whether the Insurance Company had valid reasons or identified inherent defects in the first surveyor's report. It emphasized that the right to appoint another surveyor should be exercised for valid reasons or if the report was found to be arbitrary.( Paragraph 20)

The Court observed that there was no valid reason for the Insurance Company to reject the first surveyor's report and no proof of arbitrariness. Successive appointments of surveyors were deemed unjustified, and their purpose appeared to be repudiating the claim.( Paragraph 24)

While dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal, the Court noted that the Commission failed to grant interest on the amount due to the Complainant. Accordingly, interest at 6% per annum was allowed from the date of filing the petition till the payment of the amount.( Paragraph 27)

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a public interest litigation raising issues of transparency in the AAI. The High Court passed orders for the appointment of an Administrator and amendments to the AAI Constitution. The present appeals challenge the decision of the High Court and subsequent actions of the Administrator.

Issues:

Validity of the amendments made by the Administrator beyond the approved ones.

Legitimacy of the elections conducted by the Administrator based on the amended Constitution.

Compliance with the National Sports Code.

Held:

The court declared the Constitution of AAI amended only to the extent of four amendments approved by the court, treating it as amended by the court's order. The additional amendments by the Administrator were declared null and void. The elections conducted on the basis of the Administrator's Constitution were also declared null and void. The court directed reversion to the position after the four approved amendments and ordered fresh elections to be conducted by a Committee appointed by the court.

The appeals are allowed in the aforementioned terms. All the applications are disposed of.

Facts:

The appellant floated a scheme in 1982 for Economically Weaker Sections. The respondent registered in 1982, deposited Rs 500, and an additional Rs 500 in 1985. The registration explicitly stated no guarantee of allotment. The respondent filed a consumer complaint in 1993, 11 years post-registration. Despite Rule 30 requiring written consent for the draw, none was provided by the respondent. Multiple developments, including an enhanced registration amount and an office order in 2002, occurred over the years.

Issues:

Whether mere registration conferred an entitlement to allotment and if the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) could compel the appellant to allot a flat to the respondent.

Held:

The Registration Booklet's Clause 5, Rule 15, and Rule 30 of the Rules of 1979 were crucial in determining that mere registration did not guarantee allotment. The respondent had the obligation to show readiness for participation in the draw, which was not fulfilled. The NCDRC's direction to allot a flat for a specified sum was against the principles of contract law governing the case.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the NCDRC's order. No costs were imposed.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the amended Recruitment Rules equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of JCIF.

Issues:

The dissimilarity in the nature of duties, responsibilities, and powers exercised by officers holding the posts.

Held:

The High Court, relying on previous decisions, dismissed the writ petition, upholding the tribunal's decision to quash the amended rules.

The tribunal and the High Court failed to consider relevant factors that led to the amendment, including the concurrence of the UPSC and government deliberations.

The UPSC's conscious decision, considering pros and cons, amounted to a policy decision, rendering the tribunal's decision unjustified.

Duties of JCIF and Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) were found to be identical or similar, further justifying the amendment.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was quashed, and the order of the tribunal was set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a suit for title and permanent injunction based on a sale deed. The defendants claimed that the suit property had been part of a partition and fell into the share of the husband of defendant no.1 and father of defendant no.2 and 3. The trial court dismissed the suit, asserting collusion in executing a sham document. The first appellate authority upheld this decision.

Issues:

The admissibility of the partition deed and the authenticity of the sale deed. The trial court and the first appellate court found the sale deed to be nominal, while the High Court, in appeal, held that the partition deed required registration and, therefore, was inadmissible.

Held:

The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC, post the 1976 amendment, is confined to second appeals involving a substantial question of law. The substantial question framed by the High Court was not substantial at all. Both lower courts had given reasoned decisions based on evidence, and the High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence, which was impermissible under Section 100 of the CPC.

The father of defendants was not a signatory to the sale deed, making it not binding on him or his heirs. The sale deed was not acted upon, and even if it were registered, a defendant could challenge its validity. The High Court's interference with the findings of the lower courts on this matter was unwarranted.

The partition deed relied upon by the defendants was deemed a family arrangement and did not require registration. The execution of this document was established and proved by witnesses, including the plaintiff's admission of the oral partition. The High Court's finding on its inadmissibility was not justified.

The sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff had discrepancies in the stated consideration, and both lower courts had found it to be sham. The High Court should not have interfered with these findings.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Subramanian, challenged the High Court's decision in Second Appeal Nos. 4 and 5 of 2009, wherein the High Court set aside the findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, decreeing the suits in favor of the respondent, S. Ramasamy.

Issues:

Whether the suit property, initially self-acquired by Sengoda Gounder, retained its character or became joint family property through voluntary blending.

The High Court re-evaluated the evidence, including settlement deeds and a will, to arrive at a different conclusion than the lower courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court, while allowing the appeals, held that the High Court erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The Court emphasized that the High Court should not substitute its opinion for that of the First Appellate Court unless the findings were erroneous, contrary to law, or based on inadmissible evidence.

The Court further stated that the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court were not substantial, and the High Court's interference with the findings on blending of the suit property was impermissible. The Court reinstated the judgments of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, dismissing the suits.

Facts:

The respondent, serving as Deputy Commissioner, faced allegations of corruption related to a land acquisition matter. The complainant filed a case with the Lokayukta Police, leading to a series of events, including a spy camera recording of a meeting between the complainant and the respondent.

Issues:

Admissibility of electronic evidence without a certificate under Section 65B.

Validity of preliminary inquiry before lodging an FIR.

Whether the prosecution had enough evidence beyond electronic records.

Compliance with the principles of Section 239 regarding the discharge of the accused.

Held:

The failure to produce a certificate under Section 65B at the charge sheet stage is a curable defect. The necessity for the certificate arises when electronic records are presented as evidence during the trial.

The preliminary inquiry conducted before lodging an FIR was consistent with the decision in Lalita Kumari, as it aimed to ascertain whether the information disclosed a cognizable offence.

The High Court erred in concluding that the absence of a Section 65B certificate was fatal to the prosecution, overlooking other material on which the prosecution relied.

The trial court should proceed on the assumption that the material brought by the prosecution is true while evaluating whether the facts disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. A mini-trial is not permitted at the discharge stage.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The order of the trial judge dismissing the discharge application is maintained.

Facts:

Appellant joined Syndicate Bank in 1979 as a Law Officer.

Went on deputation to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, and Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad.

Applied for the post of Presiding Officer at Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, during the deputation.

Received appointment letter but faced delays and lack of response from Syndicate Bank.

Respondent Bank sought retirement, alleging unauthorized absence due to failure to join immediately after deputation.

Appellant's resignation accepted by the Bank, but pension benefits denied.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's failure to immediately join the bank after deputation constitutes unauthorized absence.

Validity of denying pensionary benefits based on the interpretation of Pension Regulations.

Held:

The court found the Bank's stance unjustified and unsustainable, considering the technicality of the appellant's immediate return after deputation.

Emphasized that there was no interruption in service, and the appellant had obtained a 'No Objection Certificate' for the new position.

Criticized the Bank for an unjustified ego issue and laxity in responding to the appellant's request for permission to take over the new post.

Quashed the impugned orders and allowed the Writ Petition, directing the Bank to remit the appellant's dues with interest within two months.

Imposed costs of Rs.25,000 on the respondent No.1 Bank.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The appellant, Kalabai, threw a burning stove on the deceased during a quarrel between the deceased and her husband.

The incident resulted in serious burn injuries to the deceased, leading to her death.

Issues:

The offense committed by the appellant—whether it constituted murder under Section 302 IPC or a lesser offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

The appellant argued for a reduction in the offense based on a precedent, Hari Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355, where a similar act was downgraded from murder to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court considered the dying declaration of the deceased, stating that the appellant threw a burning stove on her during a quarrel.

The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating any intention or motive to kill on the part of the appellant.

Relying on the precedent, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances warranted reducing the offense from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's conviction and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for five years.