Facts:

The statutory scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 establishes the composition of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and the role of the resolution professional. Former members of the Board of Directors, though not CoC members, have the right to participate in meetings and discuss resolution plans.

Issues:

The rights of erstwhile Board of Directors members in accessing resolution plans discussed at CoC meetings, considering their vital interest in the outcomes.

Held:

The CoC is initially constituted under Section 21, consisting of financial creditors. The resolution professional conducts CoC meetings under Section 24, with notice extended to members of the suspended Board of Directors under Section 25(2)(i).

Former directors, akin to operational creditors, lack voting rights but have a right to attend and discuss resolution plans. Their interest stems from potential impacts on debts and guarantees.

Members of the erstwhile Board of Directors, often guarantors, are significantly affected by resolution plans, which may scale down debts or modify security interests.

Relevant regulations underscore the vital interest of former directors in resolution plans, supporting their right to access such plans as part of the documents furnished before CoC meetings.

Confidentiality concerns can be addressed through undertakings, aligning with Regulation 7(2)(h) and paragraph 21 of the First Schedule of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016.

Decision: Former Board of Directors members must be provided with copies of resolution plans as part of the documents for CoC meetings, affirming their right to effective participation. Confidentiality measures can be implemented through undertakings.

Facts:

A complaint was lodged on 01.09.1998, stating an attack on the complainant on 29.08.1998 by the respondents and others.

The complainant alleged injuries and hospitalization, leading to the filing of FIR No. 1165/1998.

After the trial, all accused were acquitted on 06.09.2005.

Issues:

The State of Maharashtra sought leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of CrPC, which was rejected by the High Court on 13.06.2008.

Held:

The appellant argued based on the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (2008) 9 SCC 475, emphasizing the scope of Section 378(3), CrPC.

The High Court's rejection was based on the alleged absence of injuries as per medical evidence, contrary to the record.

The Court found the rejection flawed and prima facie established a case for the State to appeal.

Considering a cross-complaint and pending appeal in another case related to the incident, the Court granted leave.

The impugned order dated 13.06.2008 was set aside, allowing the State's appeal.

Facts:

The dispute originated in the Court of Superintendent of land records and subsequently progressed through appellate stages, culminating in a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

Issues:

The primary issue revolves around the entries made in the revenue records concerning the disputed land.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that mutation of land in revenue records does not affect the title of the land; it merely facilitates the payment of land revenue by the person in whose favor the mutation is ordered. This principle is consistent with previous judgments, including Sawarni(Smt.) vs. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. Vs. Daulat Singh(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1997) 7 SCC 137, and Narasamma & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 591.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the order of the High Court. The Court found no merit in the argument that mutation entries could impact the title of the parties involved, emphasizing that civil suits related to the land were still pending.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondents for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the first Appellate Court overturned the decision. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, stating it lacked substantial questions of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal on the ground that it does not involve any substantial question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in holding that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. It emphasized that the appeal did involve a substantial question of law, and such questions should have been framed at the time of admission of the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of the Code for its final hearing. The Court decided to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framing appropriate substantial question(s) of law arising in the case.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s) of law in terms of Section 100 (4) of the Code. The High Court is directed to decide the second appeal on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with the law without being influenced by any of the Supreme Court's observations on merits.

Facts:

The appellant purchased a Hydraulic Excavator in 2007 for Rs. 51,74,000 and insured it under a policy.

The Excavator was damaged in a fire in 2010, and the insurance claim was contested over the calculation of depreciation and sum insured.

Surveyors appointed by both the appellant and the insurance company assessed the loss differently.

Issues:

Calculation of depreciation for the damaged Excavator.

Discrepancy in the assessed sum insured between the appellant and the insurance company.

Held:

The court held that the parties are bound by the stipulated sum insured. The surveyor appointed by the insurance company was not justified in disregarding the agreed sum insured and calculating depreciation for a period prior to the policy date. The National Commission's decision was set aside, and the State Commission's judgment was restored.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the National Commission, and restored the judgment of the State Commission.

Facts:

The Anugraha Narayan Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna (Institute), governed by the Anugraha Narayan Sinha Institute of Social Studies Act, 1964, implemented a retirement benefit scheme from its own resources. The State Government was directed by the High Court to provide financial assistance for payment of arrears and current pension to the employees of the Institute.

Issues:

Whether the State Government is obligated to bear the financial burden of the retirement pension scheme implemented by the Institute?

Is the resolution of the Board of the Institute binding on the State Government?

Held:

The money contributed by the State Government is one source of the Institute's fund, but the obligation to bear the amount of the pension fund is not mandated by Section 8 or Section 9 of the Act.

The retirement pension scheme can be considered a part of the obligation to utilize funds, but the State Government is not mandated to pay pension to the Institute's employees.

The resolution of the Board to implement the retirement benefit scheme from its resources does not bind the State Government to pay the pension.

The employees of the Institute cannot be treated at par with the State Government employees, and the State cannot be burdened with the responsibility to pay pension to the Institute's employees.

The order of the Division Bench directing the State Government to provide financial assistance for pension is not legally sustainable.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and possession, relying on a rent note from 1967.

A fire incident in 1967 was alleged as the cause for the land being vacant, leading to a claim of dispossession in 1972.

The defendant asserted possession based on sale deeds, and the dispute revolved around the ownership and possession of the property.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had better title over the property?

Whether the plaintiff was in settled possession of the property, justifying dispossession?

Held:

The plaintiff lacked documentary proof of possession and title.

The Court emphasized settled possession as a prerequisite for possessory title and found the evidence of the plaintiff insufficient.

The sale deeds presented by the defendants indicated ownership and possession over the disputed property.

The High Court's interference with the First Appellate Court's findings was deemed unjustified.

The appeal succeeded, and the judgment of the First Appellate Court was restored, leading to the dismissal of the suit.

Facts:

An advertisement was issued for direct recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (UPHJS). The petitioners applied but were debarred on grounds of age, not complying with the age limit prescribed in Rule 12 of the 1975 Rules.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of Rules 8(1) and 12 of the 1975 Rules was challenged. The contention included the impact of these rules on candidates who exceeded the age limit between the last recruitment and the present recruitment.

Held:

The directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan, which aim to fill vacancies in the district judiciary, do not override the prevailing rules governing selections to the HJS. These directions do not create an enforceable right in any candidate for selection or the right to assert age relaxation in violation of the rules.

The validity of both Rules 8 and 12 has been upheld by Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court in separate judgments.

The power to fix a cut-off date or age limit is incidental to the regulatory control over the selection process. A cut-off is not arbitrary if it has a rational basis and is not manifestly unreasonable, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

Rolling back the date for the upper age limit is impermissible. The determination of cut-off dates lies in the realm of policy, and it is the rule-making authority's function, not the court's, to discharge that duty.

No merit in the grievance of discrimination as the cut-off dates for distinct requirements, such as practice years and age criteria, serve different purposes.

No case of discrimination or arbitrariness is established by comparing the Higher Judicial Service Rules with the Rules governing Nyayik Sewa, as they cater to different cadres.

Decision: The writ petitions and the appeal challenging the constitutional validity of Rules 8(1) and 12 of the 1975 Rules are dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, a landlord, challenged the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which set aside the eviction order passed by the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal. The dispute involved the arrears of rent demanded by the landlord and the tenant's contention that the rent paid was sufficient.

Issues:

Whether the tenant could unilaterally revise the rent based on Section 6 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001?

Whether the tenant's payment covered the demanded arrears, preventing eviction under Section 9(a)?

Held:

The Court examines the statutory scheme of Act 2001, noting changes from the previous Act of 1950. Section 6 is highlighted, emphasizing the landlord's right to seek revision of rent under this section.( Para 7)

The Court considers the tenant's argument to re-determine the rent as per Section 6, concluding that the tenant cannot unilaterally revise the rent and must follow the procedure outlined in Section 6.( Para 14)

Addressing the High Court's observation, the Court reaffirms that the landlord cannot claim a revision of rent exceeding 5% after the enforcement of Act 2001.( Para 18)

The Court clarifies that if the landlord does not invoke Section 6, the agreed rent between the parties remains, and the tenant cannot unilaterally reduce it.( Para 20)

The Court criticizes the High Court for not appreciating the true import of Sections 6 and 7, stating that the tenant is, indeed, in default.( Para 21)

Analyzing Section 9(a) of the Act, the Court explains that the tenant's payment must cover the arrears demanded by the notice for the last four months to avoid eviction.( Para 23)

Reiterating the tenant's default, the Court asserts that the demanded arrears, despite partial payment, establish a valid ground for eviction under Section 9(a).( Para 24)