Facts:

Col. (TS) P.D. Poonekar, a doctor serving in the Army Medical Corps, was granted study leave to pursue specialization in Prosthetic Surgery at the University of Miami, Florida, for a period of twenty-four months.

Upon the respondent's request, the study leave was extended by twelve months on special dispensation by the President of India.

Despite the extension being sanctioned, the Union of India discontinued the payment of allowances to the respondent during the extended period of study leave.

The respondent filed a petition challenging this decision, leading to a judgment by the Armed Forces Tribunal in his favor, directing the Union of India to release the pay and allowances for the extended period of study leave.

Issues:

Whether the respondent, Col. (TS) P.D. Poonekar, was entitled to pay and allowances during the extended period of study leave as granted by the President of India.

Interpretation of relevant Army Instructions governing study leave and entitlement to pay.

Held:

The Court, in analyzing the relevant Army Instructions, particularly Army Instructions 13/1978, which stipulate that officers on study leave shall draw full pay of their substantive rank, upheld the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal.

The Court noted that the respondent was entitled to pay and allowances during the original period of study leave, and the extension granted by the President should not have affected this entitlement. The Court directed the Union of India to release all outstanding dues, including interest at the rate of nine percent per annum, within a period of two months.

Additionally, it ordered that the entire period of study leave should count towards retiral benefits, with a recomputation of these benefits to be conducted within two months. Costs quantified at Rs. 50,000 were awarded to the respondent.

Facts:

A petition was filed to modify the judgment dated 17.7.2018 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 895-896/2018.

The accused no. 2/respondent no. 1 was incorrectly stated as a government servant in the judgment.

Currency notes of Rs.500/- were recovered from the accused, along with signs of anthracene powder from his shirt pocket.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, should be modified based on the recovered currency notes.

Held:

The accused no. 2/respondent no. 1 was not a government servant, but the recovery of currency notes from him established the elements of Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was modified to a conviction under Section 8 of the said Act.

The sentence of one year imposed was reduced to six months.

Facts:

An advertisement campaign for the sale of apartments in a housing project called "Aravali Heights" was initiated by Dwarkadhish Projects Pvt Limited in 2006-2007. Several buyers entered into builder-buyer agreements, expecting possession within three years. However, possession was not delivered by the stipulated time, and various infrastructure deficiencies were observed in the project. Subsequently, a group of 19 allottees filed a joint complaint before the National Commission seeking redressal for delayed possession and other grievances.

Issues:

Whether a complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act filed on behalf of or for the benefit of only some of the numerous consumers having a common interest or grievance is maintainable.

The procedural requirements for filing a joint complaint under the Act.

The interpretation of relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the Civil Procedure Code regarding class actions.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the view taken by the National Commission, which held that a complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act must be filed on behalf of or for the benefit of all consumers having a common interest or grievance against the same service provider.

The Court emphasized the necessity of adhering to the statutory provisions and rejected arguments for a broader interpretation to facilitate an easier redressal mechanism.

However, the Court allowed the appellants to approach the concerned State Commission, provided they comply with the procedural requirements under Section 13(6) of the Act and Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC. The matter would not be proceeded de novo but from the stage at which it was before the National Commission.

Facts:

The insured's property was demolished by the Municipal Corporation, leading to a claim under an insurance policy. The insurer denied liability based on an exclusion clause stating that destruction by a lawfully constituted authority is not covered.

Issues:

Whether the exclusion clause in the insurance policy applied to the demolition carried out by the Municipal Corporation.

Held:

The Court analyzed the language of the exclusion clause and the circumstances surrounding the demolition. It found that there was no dispute that the demolition was carried out under the authority of the Municipal Corporation, which is a lawfully constituted authority under the Jammu and Kashmir Municipal Corporation Act 2000. Therefore, the destruction was by order of a lawfully constituted authority, and the exclusion under the insurance policy was attracted.

The Court referred to principles of insurance law from various cases, both Indian and international, to support its interpretation of the exclusion clause. It emphasized the duty of insurers to clearly define exceptions to their liability in insurance policies and the need to construe such clauses strictly against insurers.

Consequently, the Court held that the State Commission and the High Court were in error in allowing the insured's claim under the policy of insurance. The appeal filed by the insurer was allowed, and the insured's appeal was dismissed. The Court clarified that its decision in this case did not affect the merits of the pending suit filed by the insured against the Municipal Corporation.

FACTS:

The suit involved a dispute over the ownership of a property auctioned under the Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act 1976. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent-plaintiffs, declaring a previous order by the competent authority as null and void and granting an injunction against the defendants. The appellate court overturned this decision, citing lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court and failure to comply with notice requirements under Section 80 of the CPC.

ISSUES:

Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in light of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973?

Whether proper notice under Section 80 of the CPC was served before filing the suit?

HELD:

The court addresses the issue of jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973. It states that every order made under the Act is final, and no Civil Court can entertain a suit challenging such orders. The Court held that the suit was barred from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court due to the provisions of Section 16.

The court discusses the failure to comply with notice requirements under Section 80 of the CPC. The Court agrees with the appellate court's finding that the suit was not maintainable due to this procedural lapse.

In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court, and consequently dismissing Civil Suit No. 496 of 1985.

REFERRED CASES:

State of Haryana and Others vs. Vinod Kumar and Others, (1986) 1 PLR 222

Facts:

The respondent was appointed as a driver on a contract basis and faced a disciplinary inquiry.

Following the inquiry, his service was terminated, but he was later re-engaged on a contract basis.

The respondent approached the High Court seeking continuity of service from the date of termination until re-engagement.

The High Court granted his petition based on a previous judgment dealing with similar cases.

Issues:

Whether continuity of service could be granted to the respondent without challenging the termination or re-engagement orders.

Whether the principles of natural justice were followed in the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent.

Held and Decision:

The Court observed that continuity of service could only be granted when an order of termination is set aside. Since neither termination nor re-engagement was challenged, the grant of continuity of service was unwarranted.( Paragraph 7)

Granting continuity of service to an employee found guilty of misconduct would be unfair and place him on the same footing as other employees with a clean record.( Paragraph 10)

The Court criticized the High Court for issuing a blanket direction without considering the specific facts of each case and emphasized the need for individual assessment.( Paragraph 12)

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The respondent's seniority was to be counted from the date of his fresh appointment.( Paragraph 13)

The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms. No costs. .( Paragraph 14)

Facts:

The case revolved around the nominations made by the Central Government to the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory of Puducherry under Section 3(3) of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963.

Issues:

Whether the Central Government is obligated to consult the Council of Ministers/Chief Minister of Puducherry and obtain their concurrence before making nominations.

Interpretation of the term "Central Government" in Section 3(3) of the Act.

Determination of whether nomination to the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry constitutes business of the Government of Puducherry.

Whether the nominations made by the Central Government violate principles of federalism.

The sustainability of recommendations made by the High Court in its judgment.

Held:

The court held that the Central Government is not required to consult the Council of Ministers/Chief Minister of Puducherry or obtain their concurrence before making nominations.

The term "Central Government" in Section 3(3) refers to the President and not the administrator, as clarified under the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Nominations to the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry do not constitute business of the Government of Puducherry, but rather fall under the purview of the Central Government.

The nominations made by the Central Government do not violate principles of federalism, as the Constitution itself empowers Parliament to create a legislative body for Union Territories.

The recommendations made by the High Court were deemed unnecessary, as there were already established rules and procedures for the Central Government to follow.

Facts:

Capt. Paul Nadar Bennet Singh applied for the position of Pilot Officer at Tuticorin Port Trust and was appointed on a regular basis subject to conditions.

His appointment was terminated by the appellants citing regulations related to temporary service.

Capt. Singh challenged the termination, leading to the High Court's decision in his favor.

The appellants contended that Capt. Singh's certificate of competency as Master, issued by the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, was not recognized by the Government of India.

Issues:

Whether Capt. Singh's termination was valid due to the alleged invalidity of his certificate of competency.

Whether the High Court's decision to reinstate Capt. Singh with back wages was justified.

Held:

The Court found no substance in the appellants' contention regarding the invalidity of Capt. Singh's appointment based on his certificate of competency.

The Court noted that the advertisement for the Pilot Officer position did not specify recognition by the Government of India, and the appointment letter did not raise any objections to Capt. Singh's certificate.

The Deputy Nautical Advisor clarified that while the certificate issued by Singapore was not recognized under Indian law, the port trust could be guided by its own regulations.

Capt. Singh had passed the examination for the pilot license, and his appointment was on a regular basis, which further supported the validity of his appointment.

Therefore, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to reinstate Capt. Singh with back wages, modifying the back wages to 40% from 2012 until the date of joining.

This judgment was passed based on the specific facts of the case and was not intended as a precedent for future cases.

Facts:

Students admitted to the first year MBBS course at Respondent No. 5 College sought transfer to another institution due to concerns regarding the college's infrastructure and compliance with regulatory norms.

Issues:

Whether the students could be transferred to another institution to complete their MBBS course due to deficiencies in Respondent No. 5 College's infrastructure and compliance with regulatory norms.

Held:

The court directed Respondent No. 5 College to transfer its land, building, and assets to the State Government to address concerns regarding its infrastructure. The State Government would then apply for affiliation with Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna, Uttarakhand Medical University, Dehradun, and the university would decide on affiliation within four weeks.

Once the necessary infrastructure is set up, the State Government would apply to the Medical Council of India for permission under Section 10A of the Medical Council of India Act. If affiliation and permission are granted, students completing the first year course can sit for the first year MBBS examination conducted by the affiliating university.

The Director General of Police, Dehradun, was directed to seal the premises of Respondent No. 5 College immediately. Any future litigation regarding the college should be addressed only before the Supreme Court.