Facts:

The petitioner, Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecological Societies of India (FOGSI), challenged the constitutional validity of Section 23(2) of the Act, contending that it presumes guilt before conviction and violates the fundamental right under Article 21. Additionally, the petitioner sought relief regarding paperwork anomalies, asserting violations of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of Section 23(2) of the Act.

Decriminalization of paperwork anomalies under the Act.

Held:

The court underscored that Section 23(2) is not an isolated provision but operates in conjunction with other Act provisions. Dilution of this section, which penalizes medical practitioners violating the Act, would compromise the Act's fundamental purpose of curbing female foeticide. The court emphasized that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 is not a mere formality and must be actively safeguarded through stringent provisions.( Para 1-23)

In scrutinizing Form 'F,' the court highlighted its significance in ensuring compliance with the Act. The court dismissed the petitioner's assertion that Form 'F' is merely clerical, emphasizing that it is a vital tool for overseeing the usage of ultrasound machines and regulating the Act's objectives. Incomplete Form 'F' not only raises doubts about the medical practitioner's conduct but also poses a severe threat to the Act's effectiveness in preventing gender-based prenatal practices.( Para 24-58)

The court rejected the petitioner's plea to read down Section 4(3), emphasizing the mandatory nature of maintaining records. The court reiterated that non-maintenance is not a trivial clerical lapse but a violation of the Act's core provisions. Section 4(3) and its proviso reflect the pivotal role records play in preventing sex-determination, with any deficiency amounting to a contravention of other Act sections.( Para 59-77)

Upholding the validity of Section 23(1) and Section 23(2), the court justified these provisions as reasonable restrictions. The court highlighted that the suspension of registration under Section 23(2) serves as a deterrent against potential violators. In emphasizing the gravity of female foeticide and its impact on the overall sex ratio, the court found these provisions necessary and not violative of the right to equality or the right to practice any profession.( Para 78-94)

The court concluded that any dilution of the Act's provisions, particularly Section 23, would defeat its fundamental purpose of preventing female foeticide. Such dilution would relegate the right to life of the girl child, enshrined under Article 21, to a mere formality. The court reaffirmed the Act's status as a social welfare legislation designed to rectify the skewed sex ratio in India.( Para 95)

Facts:

TPC, the distribution licensee for the entire Mumbai, supplied electricity to BSES/REL, a distribution licensee for the suburbs of Mumbai, from 1998 to 2006.

Standby charges were part of the tariff paid by BSES/REL to TPC. TPC, in turn, recovered standby charges from its customers.

Government of Maharashtra ordered BSES/REL to pay TPC Rs.3.5 crores per month as standby charges.

Dispute arose over the quantum of standby charges payable by BSES/REL to TPC.

Issues:

Disagreement on the quantum of standby charges. TPC claimed a 50:50 sharing ratio; MERC and APTEL decided on 23:77 ratio for BSES/REL and TPC, respectively.

Held:

Standby facility was provided by TPC in case of power failure in its generation of 1777 MW. BSES/REL purchased electricity from TPC between 29% to 37%, and standby charges were included in the tariff.

Committee formed by the Government of Maharashtra stipulated Rs.3.5 crores per month as standby charges payable by BSES/REL to TPC.

Principles of Agreement settled the basis for payment, and MERC had the authority to adjudicate disputes under the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998.

APTEL upheld the decisions of MERC, determining the ratio of standby charges as 23:77 for BSES/REL and TPC.

Majority opinion accepted that 90% of the time, energy was drawn by BSES/REL from TPC, justifying the 23:77 ratio. TPC's claim for a 50:50 sharing ratio was rejected.

Implementation of APTEL's order was not stayed, and the plea of non-implementation by TPC was not accepted. The order had been worked out, and the corresponding liability had been factored into tariffs.

FACTS:

Farid Ahmad Tak, a Junior Engineer, faced corruption charges.

A Committee, chaired by the Chief Secretary, recommended his compulsory retirement under Article 226(2) of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Regulations.

The decision was challenged in the High Court, arguing it relied solely on the criminal case and neglected performance records.

The Single Judge ruled in favor of Tak, questioning the validity of the retirement order.

The State appealed to the Division Bench.

ISSUES:

Was Tak's compulsory retirement solely based on a criminal case, without considering his performance records?

Did the decision align with the principles of Baikuntha Nath Das and relevant regulations?

HELD:

The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's decision, stating that the retirement decision relied heavily on the criminal case and ignored performance records.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing public interest and financial loss due to Tak's actions.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that the High Court misunderstood key facts and principles.

The case is remitted to the Division Bench for a fresh look, as the basic premise and regulatory perspective were not adequately considered.

REFERRED CASES:

Baikuntha Nath Das and Another vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Another, (1992)2 SCC 299

M/s. Rup Diamonds and others vs. Union of India & Ors, (1989) 2 SCC 356

State of Gujarat and another vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529

Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India and another, (1989) 4 SCC 187

Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury and others vs. Union of India and others, (1996) 7 SCC 1

Facts:

The case revolves around an incident on 23.11.1997, where accused persons, involved in a land dispute, allegedly fired shots at the complainant party during a confrontation, resulting in death and injuries.

Issues:

Identification discrepancies and contradictions in witness statements, along with doubts about the recovered weapons, raised questions about the prosecution's case.

The High Court specifically questioned the identity of accused No.2-Kalusinh.

Held:

The trial court convicted accused No.1-Ashok Singh and accused No.2-Kalu Singh, but the High Court acquitted accused No.2, citing doubts about his identity.

Contradictions in witness statements, uncertainties in weapon recovery, and lack of clarity on the type of firearm used raised reasonable doubts.

The High Court's decision to acquit accused No.2 was deemed a plausible view, not warranting interference.

The appeal by the State of Gujarat was dismissed.

Facts:

The case pertains to the participation of an MP in a Panchayat Samiti's special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh. The dispute arose regarding the interpretation of relevant sections, rules, and articles governing the composition and functioning of the Panchayat Samiti.

Issues:

Whether the MP, being an ex-officio member of the Panchayat Samiti, is entitled to participate and vote in the special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh.

Held:

Constitutional Framework: The judgment begins by elucidating the constitutional framework regarding the composition of Panchayats, emphasizing the freedom of the State legislature to make laws in accordance with Article 243C. (Para 12-15)

Election of Chairperson: It clarifies that the chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti is elected by the elected members, distinguishing them from other persons mentioned in Article 243C(3). (Para 18)

Composition of Panchayat Samiti: Section 107(3) explicitly includes the MP as a member with the right to vote in the Panchayat Samiti meetings. (Para 16)

Regulation and Rules: The judgment delves into the Regulation and Rules, outlining the specific provisions for moving and carrying forward a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 21-23)

Quorum Requirement: The court emphasizes the quorum requirement of not less than two-thirds of the "total membership," including ex-officio members. (Para 24-25)

Who Can Vote on 'No Confidence Motion': It dismisses the notion that only directly elected members can vote, asserting that the law allows all members to participate in the process. (Para 26)

Inclusive Nature of Regulation: The judgment defends the inclusivity of the Regulation, expressly permitting all members, including those from Section 107(3), to participate and vote. (Para 28)

Conclusion: The court concludes by reiterating the statutory right of elected representatives, including the MP, to participate in and vote on a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 32)

Facts:

The case involved appeals filed against the High Court of Karnataka's order dated February 26, 2016, where a series of appeals were disposed of concerning the appellant (assessee) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Revenue) under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The court was the failure of the High Court to frame specific questions of law as required by Section 260-A(3) of the Act.

Held:

The court, referring to a similar case (Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 2019), emphasized the distinction between questions proposed by the appellant for admission and questions framed by the court. It highlighted that the appeal is heard on merits only on the questions framed by the High Court. The court observed that if the High Court considered the appeal devoid of substantial questions of law, it should have explicitly recorded such findings. In the absence of this, the court concluded that the High Court did not adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 260-A of the Act. The court allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that ten accused persons, armed with various weapons, attacked the complainant's son and the victim-deceased. After initial investigations, a report against only four accused was submitted, stating that the appellants were not present at the scene. Subsequent investigations also cleared the appellants. The Magistrate directed the release of the appellants, and the trial proceeded against the remaining accused. Later, the complainant filed an application under Section 319, asserting that the appellants were present during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate was justified in summoning the appellants under Section 319 based on the complainant's application during the trial.

The impact of earlier discharge orders by the Magistrate on the subsequent summoning under Section 319.

Held:

During the trial, depositions of PW-1 and PW-2 were recorded. Their specific statements against the appellants, attributing a role to them in the incident, constituted evidence. The Magistrate, on application under Section 319, found a prima facie case and summoned the appellants. The High Court confirmed this decision.( Para 6.1)

The orders dated 01.09.2016 and 28.10.2016, regarding the discharge of appellants by the Magistrate, were not orders of discharge in stricto sensu. They pertained to discharging the appellants from custody. Therefore, the Magistrate retained the power to summon the appellants under Section 319, despite earlier discharge orders.( Para 7.10)

Before accepting a closure report, the Magistrate must issue notice to the complainant, allowing an opportunity to submit a protest application. This procedure ensures fairness and gives the complainant a chance to contest the closure report.( Para 8)

The statements of PW-1 and PW-2 during the trial constituted evidence. Even if the complainant was not given an opportunity to protest the non-filing of a charge sheet against the appellants, the trial court could summon them based on emerging evidence during the trial.( Para 9)

Facts:

The appellant and respondent were married in 1998, and due to a strained relationship, they lived separately. The appellant filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, which was initially dismissed by the Trial Court, and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful.

Issues:

The dissolution of the marriage and the dismissal of the appellant's appeal by the High Court.

Held:

The matter was referred to mediation by the court, where the parties amicably settled. The appellant agreed to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000 to the respondent for settlement of claims, including maintenance. Additionally, provisions were made for the daughter's future expenses, and the parties agreed to withdraw or quash all pending cases.

The parties settled the matter amicably during the court-mandated mediation.

The terms of settlement included financial arrangements and withdrawal of pending cases.

The court, invoking its powers under Article 142, dissolved the marriage based on the mutual consent of the parties.

Decision: The marriage was dissolved, and the terms of compromise formed part of the judgment, including financial settlements, withdrawal of pending cases, and provisions for the daughter's future.

Final Result : Disposed

Facts:

The Complainant, an industrial unit, suffered a fire incident and claimed Rs. 54,93,865 under a fire insurance policy.

Three surveyors were appointed successively, with varying assessments of the claim.

The Insurance Company repudiated the claim based on the third surveyor's report, alleging fraud and manipulation.

Issues:

Validity of successive appointments of surveyors.

Acceptance of the first surveyor's report and subsequent repudiation based on the third surveyor's findings.

Held:

The Court scrutinized whether the Insurance Company had valid reasons or identified inherent defects in the first surveyor's report. It emphasized that the right to appoint another surveyor should be exercised for valid reasons or if the report was found to be arbitrary.( Paragraph 20)

The Court observed that there was no valid reason for the Insurance Company to reject the first surveyor's report and no proof of arbitrariness. Successive appointments of surveyors were deemed unjustified, and their purpose appeared to be repudiating the claim.( Paragraph 24)

While dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal, the Court noted that the Commission failed to grant interest on the amount due to the Complainant. Accordingly, interest at 6% per annum was allowed from the date of filing the petition till the payment of the amount.( Paragraph 27)