Facts:

Late Sagar Naik, the respondent's husband, retired on 6.7.1996 due to mental incapacity and passed away on 24.7.1996.

The widow sought family pension and claimed entitlement to invalid pension for her late husband.

The government contended that the deceased employee did not meet the ten years qualifying service requirement for regular or invalid pension.

Issues:

Whether the respondent's husband, not completing the ten years qualifying service, is entitled to invalid pension under Rule 39.

The interplay between Rule 39 and Rule 47 of the Pension Rules regarding qualifying service.

Held:

The Court held that the respondent's husband, having served for less than ten years, is not entitled to regular or invalid pension. The Court emphasized the importance of harmoniously construing different provisions of the Pension Rules, asserting that the requirement of qualifying service is relevant for claiming various service benefits. The Tribunal's and High Court's orders were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a Charter Party Agreement between a company (ship owner) and the Mangalore Port Trust for a six-month period. The Revenue notified the company to register as a dealer under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, asserting that the agreement attracted tax under section 5C of the Act. The company contested this, claiming it had not transferred rights to the Port Trust.

Issues:

Whether the Karnataka Sales Tax Act extends to territorial waters.

Whether the Charter Party Agreement constitutes a deemed sale under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court ruled that the Charter Party Agreement amounted to a deemed sale as there was a transfer of the right to use the vessel, satisfying the conditions under Article 366(29A)(d) read with section 5C or section 2(j) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. The terms and conditions of the agreement clearly indicated a transfer of exclusive right to use the vessel for a specified period, making it liable for taxation.( Para 1.1 - 1.10)

For the realization of tax under Article 366(29A)(d), the Court emphasized that the situs of the agreement, not the location of goods, is determinative. The location of delivery cannot be the basis for tax levy, and in this case, the situs of the deemed sale was in Mangalore where the agreement was signed.( Para 2)

The Court left open the question of the extent of power of coastal states with respect to territorial waters, as the High Court had already provided specific findings on this matter.( Para 3)

Facts:

The tenants, represented by Harbhajan Singh and others, challenged the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, asserting their entitlement to protection against eviction under the East Punjab Rent Act. The contention was that the Religious Premises Act, a special enactment concerning landlord-tenant relationships, cannot supersede existing enactments like the East Punjab Rent Act.

Issues:

Challenge to the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, in light of existing enactments governing general landlord-tenant relationships.

Whether withdrawal of protection to tenants of land and buildings belonging to religious institutions under the Religious Premises Act is justified.

Held:

The State legislature has the authority to enact separate laws on a similar subject if they serve different objectives and protect distinct sets of rights. The Religious Premises Act, specific to premises of religious institutions, is distinct from the East Punjab Rent Act, which deals with general landlord-tenant relationships.

Section 3 defines "unauthorized occupation of religious premises," emphasizing that valid grants, leases, and allotments protect occupants from being deemed unauthorized. The crucial criterion is adherence to the terms of the grant, lease, or allotment.

Eviction proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 empower the Collector to order eviction after due process, with a subsequent right of appeal and judicial review. The Collector must be satisfied that the premises are in unauthorized occupation.

Properties of religious institutions form a separate and distinctive class, justifying differential treatment under the law. Granting exemption to such properties from rent control legislation is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and serves public purposes.

Various central and state legislations treat religious institutions as a separate class, further supporting the validity of such classification.

Exempting buildings belonging to charities, religious, or secular institutions from rent control legislation does not violate Article 14, as it is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and serves public purposes.

The legislative intent behind rent control legislations is to remedy specific issues without unduly curtailing landlords' rights.

The legislature can provide special procedures for eviction as long as they have a reasonable nexus to the legislative objective and the class of landlords justifies such treatment.

The Religious Premises Act, being a specific enactment, prevails over the East Punjab Rent Act, and the classification of "religious institutions" aligns with the underlying public interest.

Facts:

Hindustan Zinc Limited had four high tension electricity connections for its units.

Dispute arose over unscheduled interchange charges in open access agreements dated 10.03.2005.

Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission initially decided to resolve the dispute but later appointed an arbitrator under Section 86(1)(f) read with Section 158.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of the arbitrator under Section 86(1)(f) was valid.

The scope of arbitration proceedings under the Electricity Act.

Held:

The High Court rightly held that the arbitrator's appointment under Section 86 was not valid as the dispute involved a consumer (Hindustan Zinc Limited) and a distribution licensee (Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited). Section 86(1)(f) only allows arbitration between licensees and generating companies.

The court also clarified that the word 'and' in Section 86(1)(f) should be read as 'or' to avoid an anomalous situation where the State Commission cannot both decide a dispute and refer it to arbitration.

The High Court's finding on the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator under Section 86 was upheld, rendering the arbitration award non est in law.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly

Facts:

The Vainganga Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. defaulted on loan repayment to the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank.

The bank initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, leading to the sale of mortgaged properties.

Employees filed for unpaid salaries recovery under the MRTU & PULP Act.

The Industrial Court issued a recovery certificate against the Karkhana but not the bank.

The High Court modified the order, directing the Collector to recover from the bank's sale proceeds, citing Section 529A of the Companies Act.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 529A of the Companies Act to co-operative societies under Section 167 of the Societies Act.

Priority of employees' dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue under MRTU & PULP Act against the claims of a secured creditor under SARFAESI Act.

Held:

Applicability of Section 529A of the Companies Act: The Court held that Section 529A of the Companies Act does not apply to co-operative societies under Section 167 of the Societies Act. The specific bar in Section 167 prevents the application of the Companies Act to such societies.

Priority of Employees' Dues: The Court clarified that employees' dues, recoverable as arrears of land revenue under MRTU & PULP Act, do not constitute a paramount charge under Section 169(1) of the Land Revenue Code. Such dues have priority only over unsecured claims as per Section 169(2).

Distribution of Sale Proceeds under SARFAESI Act: The Court considered the sale letter dated 08.03.2010 and sale certificate dated 14.09.2010 as a contract between the bank and the subsequent purchaser, forming a contract to the contrary under Section 13(7) of the SARFAESI Act.

Conclusion and Enforcement: The recovery certificate was held valid against the bank for employees' dues. The bank was directed to pay employees' dues from the sale proceeds. The subsequent purchaser was liable for other dues within six months.

The instant appeal is disposed

FACTS:

The appellant entered into an agreement to sell a property and subsequently a Memo of Compromise was entered into between the parties. The assessing officer detected this and issued notices. As the appellant did not respond appropriately, a Best Judgment Assessment Order was passed treating the entire sale consideration as capital gain.

ISSUES:

Applicability of Section 2(47)(v) of the Income Tax Act.

Applicability of Section 2(47)(vi) of the Income Tax Act.

Relevance of the compromise deed in determining capital gain for Assessment Year 2004-2005.

HELD:

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act: The Court emphasized that for Section 53A to be applicable, the transferee must have taken possession of the property in part performance of the contract. The permission granted for construction does not constitute possession as envisaged by Section 53A.

Section 2(47)(vi) of the Income Tax Act: The Court, referring to Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Balbir Singh Maini, clarified that Section 2(47)(vi) aims to bring within the tax net a de facto transfer of immovable property. The crucial test is whether there is a de facto transfer of title in fact. In this case, as of the agreement to sell, the owner's rights remained intact, and thus, Section 2(47)(vi) was not attracted.

Relevance of Compromise Deed: The compromise deed, confirming the agreement to sell and the Power of Attorney, along with the encashment of all cheques mentioned, indicated a transaction effecting the transfer of immovable property. The Court concluded that the relevant pigeonhole for the case was Section 2(47)(ii) and (vi) of the Income Tax Act.

We dismiss this appeal but for the reasons stated by this judgment.

REFERRED CASES:

Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Balbir Singh Maini, (2018) 12 SCC 354

Facts:

CBI registered a corruption case against known and unknown suspects, including the appellant's son. The appellant was not initially named in the FIR.

The Directorate of Enforcement registered a money laundering case based on the same allegations as the CBI case. The appellant was not named in this case either.

Anticipating arrest, the appellant sought anticipatory bail, which was denied.

The appellant was arrested in the CBI case, and later in the Enforcement Directorate case, on grounds related to financial transactions involving his son's companies.

The High Court declined bail, citing the gravity of the allegations and the appellant's purported key role in the offenses.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being available for custodial interrogation for over 45 days, warrants further custody.

Whether the appellant's age, health conditions, and previous denial of anticipatory bail justify granting regular bail.

Whether the gravity of economic offenses should be a decisive factor in bail applications.

Held:

The Single Judge rightly considered the triple test and addressed concerns of flight risk, tampering of evidence, and influencing witnesses in favor of the appellant.

The Court recognized that even economic offenses fall under the category of "grave offenses," but bail considerations must be on a case-by-case basis.

The Court disapproved the manner in which the High Court recorded conclusions on the alleged offense, emphasizing that bail must not be denied solely based on the nature of the offense.

The Judge's finding based on materials in a sealed cover was deemed unjustified, as the appellant was not named in the Enforcement Directorate case, and the allegations against him needed trial examination.

Considering the appellant's age, health, and previous availability for custodial interrogation, the Court granted bail, emphasizing the absence of flight risk or evidence tampering.

Facts:

The appellants owned a piece of land.

The respondent company proposed a joint venture for construction.

An agreement was signed, and the respondent was to complete construction within three years.

Construction commenced but was abandoned in 1999.

The appellants terminated the agreement in 2001.

A compromise and cancellation agreement was executed in 2004, and a portion of the security deposit was returned.

Dispute arose, leading to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator provided adequate opportunity for evidence and cross-examination.

Determination of the cost incurred by the respondent for the construction.

Validity of the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

The Court, after a detailed examination of the proceedings, held that the arbitrator's procedure was flexible, and the parties had agreed to rely on affidavits and documents without cross-examination. The Court rejected the contention that the arbitrator denied proper opportunity for cross-examination. The Court also found that the arbitrator had considered the claim of the respondent regarding construction costs and rejected it due to lack of reliable evidence. The Court further emphasized that the delay and breach by the respondent had consequences, and the appellants were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 45,00,000 to the respondent, allowing them possession of the land.

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of appellants (accused no. 1 and 2) under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code for inflicting fatal knife blows on the stomach of the victim-deceased. Six accused were initially charged, and the incident occurred when the deceased, riding a motorcycle, was obstructed by all accused, leading to the fatal injuries.

Issues:

The quality of evidence, the credibility of eyewitness testimonies (PW-1 and PW-2), and the convictions of appellants in contrast to the acquittals of other accused. The defense raised concerns about deficiencies in the investigation, delay in FIR registration, and the absence of evidence regarding previous enmity.

Held:

The Supreme Court, under Article 136, refrains from reappreciating evidence unless a manifest error of law or procedure is demonstrated or the conclusion of lower courts is evidently perverse. (Para 12)

The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, the eyewitnesses, were extensively cross-examined but remained unshaken regarding the appellants' involvement in inflicting fatal injuries. The Court upheld their credibility, emphasizing the distinct role of the appellants. (Paras 15-16)

Discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses about the condition of the deceased when admitted to the hospital do not undermine the case, considering medical reports confirming the semi-conscious state. The Court rejects the argument of uniformity in witness reactions. (Para 23)

The Court dismisses the appeal, upholding the concurrent view of the Trial Court and the High Court on the appellants' guilt. The so-called deficiencies pointed out by the appellants in the investigation are deemed insignificant. (Para 22)

The delay in registering FIR was considered and rejected by the Trial Court, with the Supreme Court upholding this finding. The Court relies on the contemporaneous record to support the absence of delay. (Paras 24-26)

The defense's contradictory stands regarding the cause of injuries were dismissed as baseless, with the Court highlighting the lack of evidence supporting these claims. The acquittal of accused in cross-cases related to another incident does not impact the appellants' guilt in the present case. (Paras 27-28)