Facts:

The flat buyers entered into an Apartment Buyers Agreement (ABA) with the developer, which obligated the developer to hand over possession of the flats within 36 months. However, the developer failed to do so, resulting in a delay of two to four years. The ABA contained one-sided terms that allowed the developer to charge high penal interest for delayed payments by flat buyers but provided only minimal compensation at a fixed rate for delays in handing over possession.

Issues:

Whether the delay in handing over possession constitutes a deficiency of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Whether the compensation provided in Clause 14 of the ABA is sufficient recompense to the flat buyers.

Whether the court can award just compensation beyond the rate prescribed in an unfair bargain.

Whether flat buyers are entitled to compensation for the failure of the developer to provide the promised amenities.

Held:

The court held that the delay in handing over possession constitutes a deficiency of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as there was a fault, shortcoming, or inadequacy in the nature and manner of performance.

The one-sided nature of the ABA, which heavily favored the developer, and the gross delay in handing over possession justified awarding compensation beyond the rate prescribed in Clause 14.

The court rejected the contention that flat buyers should indefinitely defer obtaining a conveyance of the premises to claim compensation and allowed the claim for compensation for delayed possession.

The court also held that the developer's failure to provide promised amenities constituted a deficiency of service.

The court, however, held that flat buyers who entered into specific settlement deeds with the developer and those who transferred their interest in the apartments are not entitled to compensation under this judgment.

The court upheld the collection of charges towards electricity and parking as per the terms of the ABA.

Decision: The court set aside the impugned judgment of the NCDRC and held that the flat buyers are entitled to compensation for the delayed handing over of possession and the failure to provide promised amenities. The court directed the developer to provide just and reasonable compensation to the flat buyers.

Facts:

The case involved owners of disputed land executing an agreement to sell in favor of a Society. A General Power of Attorney (GPA) was also executed, authorizing the Society's office bearers to enter into a sale transaction for the property. Sale deeds were executed in favor of the appellants. The respondents, claiming to be co-owners of the property, filed suits seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell.

Issues:

• whether the appellants, who were not parties to the suit seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell, could maintain an appeal against the decree of the trial court.

Held:

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or from a decree in appeal, respectively, but do not specify the categories of persons eligible to file an appeal. However, a stranger to the proceedings cannot file an appeal unless they can demonstrate that they fall within the category of aggrieved persons. An appeal can be preferred only if a judgment and decree prejudicially affect a person who is not a party to the proceedings, with the leave of the Appellate Court. (Para 15)

The appellants cannot be considered aggrieved persons and are not bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The relief claimed in the suit was the cancellation of the agreement to sell, while the sale deeds forming the basis of the appellants' claim were executed based on the GPA and were unrelated to the agreement to sell. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court were not judgments in rem and were binding only between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, not upon the appellants. The appellants failed to demonstrate any adverse impact on their legal rights that would entitle them to be considered 'persons aggrieved' and maintain an appeal against the decree. (Para 21-23)

Decision: The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved owners of disputed land executing an agreement to sell in favor of a Society. A General Power of Attorney (GPA) was also executed, authorizing the Society's office bearers to enter into a sale transaction for the property. Sale deeds were executed in favor of the appellants. The respondents, claiming to be co-owners of the property, filed suits seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell.

Issues:

whether the appellants, who were not parties to the suit seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell, could maintain an appeal against the decree of the trial court.

Held:

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or from a decree in appeal, respectively, but do not specify the categories of persons eligible to file an appeal. However, a stranger to the proceedings cannot file an appeal unless they can demonstrate that they fall within the category of aggrieved persons. An appeal can be preferred only if a judgment and decree prejudicially affect a person who is not a party to the proceedings, with the leave of the Appellate Court. (Para 15)

The appellants cannot be considered aggrieved persons and are not bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The relief claimed in the suit was the cancellation of the agreement to sell, while the sale deeds forming the basis of the appellants' claim were executed based on the GPA and were unrelated to the agreement to sell. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court were not judgments in rem and were binding only between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, not upon the appellants. The appellants failed to demonstrate any adverse impact on their legal rights that would entitle them to be considered 'persons aggrieved' and maintain an appeal against the decree. (Para 21-23)

Decision: The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

There were conflicting claims between two factions, including the alleged removal of the first respondent as a trustee of the Diwan. Two inquiry applications under Section 22 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act (MPT Act) were pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The State Government, through a notification, nominated four members to the Board under Section 6(1)(viii) of the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1956. The High Court set aside the notification.

Issues:

• The interpretation of Section 6(1)(viii) and the validity of the State Government's notification.

Held:

The Court clarified that there are two distinct entities involved: a public trust registered under the MPT Act, and a statutory body established under the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1956. The exclusive statutory authority for nominating four members under Section 6(1)(viii) lies with the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, and not the State Government. The statute does not define the term "Diwan," but it refers to the collective body of all members who together constitute the Diwan. The authority to nominate members rests with this collective body.

The Court instructed the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, to initiate the nomination process within three months to fill the vacancies on the Board. The pending inquiry applications before the Assistant Charity Commissioner must be expedited and concluded within three months. The notification issued by the State Government on June 21, 2019, was deemed invalid, and the High Court's decision was upheld.

The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

There were conflicting claims between two factions, including the alleged removal of the first respondent as a trustee of the Diwan. Two inquiry applications under Section 22 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act (MPT Act) were pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The State Government, through a notification, nominated four members to the Board under Section 6(1)(viii) of the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1956. The High Court set aside the notification.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 6(1)(viii) and the validity of the State Government's notification.

Held:

The Court clarified that there are two distinct entities involved: a public trust registered under the MPT Act, and a statutory body established under the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1956. The exclusive statutory authority for nominating four members under Section 6(1)(viii) lies with the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, and not the State Government. The statute does not define the term "Diwan," but it refers to the collective body of all members who together constitute the Diwan. The authority to nominate members rests with this collective body.

The Court instructed the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, to initiate the nomination process within three months to fill the vacancies on the Board. The pending inquiry applications before the Assistant Charity Commissioner must be expedited and concluded within three months. The notification issued by the State Government on June 21, 2019, was deemed invalid, and the High Court's decision was upheld.

The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

A Share Subscription Agreement (SSA) and Shareholders' Agreement (SHA) were entered into between the claimant and the appellants, both containing an identical arbitration clause. The appellants allegedly made false representations about a contract with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to induce the claimant to invest USD 60 million in their equity capital. The claimant later found that the BBC contract was non-existent, and the investment proceeds were siphoned off to companies in which the appellants had a stake. Disputes arose, and the claimant initiated arbitral proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal awarded USD 60 million plus interest and costs in favor of the claimant.

Issues:

• Whether the fraud alleged in the SSA would vitiate the arbitration clause?
• Whether the issues raised and answered in the Foreign Final award are civil or criminal in nature?
• Whether the claimant made a strong prima facie case in the section 9 proceedings?
• Whether the division bench's reduction of USD 60 million to USD 30 million was justified?

Held:

The Court referred to the Foreign Final Award dated September 27, 2014, and found that the siphoning off of USD 60 million into companies controlled by the appellants was established. As a result, the claimant was entitled to damages in the total amount of USD 60 million plus interest and costs as awarded.

The Court held that the issues raised and answered in the Foreign Final Award were of a civil nature, and the fraud alleged in the SSA did not vitiate the arbitration clause, which was an independent clause.

The Court also found that the claimant made a strong prima facie case in the section 9 proceedings. The USD 60 million awarded to the claimant should be kept apart for enforcement purposes, as irreparable loss would be caused if the award was not enforced.

The Court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 5145 of 2016 and allowed Civil Appeal No. 5158 of 2016, Civil Appeal no. 9820 of 2016.

Facts:

The cases revolve around multiple assesses who allegedly undervalued the goods they manufactured and cleared, leading to evasion of excise duty. The Customs, Excise, and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) upheld the finding of undervaluation and evasion of excise duty in all the cases but remanded the matters for re-quantification of duty.

Issues:

• Adjudication was to determine the value of the goods removed by the assesses for sale to or through dealers. The cases involved two different methods of valuation, one before and one after the amendment to Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which took place on July 1, 2000.

Held:

 The Court confirmed the finding of undervaluation and evasion of excise duty recorded by CESTAT in all the cases, as it had attained finality, and was not challenged by the assesses. The Court then explained the changes brought about by the amendment to Section 4. Before the amendment, the method of valuation focused on normal price for an ordinary sale in the course of wholesale trade. After the amendment, the emphasis shifted to "transaction value" for sales covered by Section 4(1)(a). For cases not covered by Section 4(1)(a), the Central Government issued the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000, in supersession of the 1975 Valuation Rules. The valuation as per the Rules is permissible only in cases covered by Section 4(1)(b) and not by Section 4(1)(a).

The Court disposed of the appeals and confirmed the impugned orders of CESTAT setting aside the Orders-in-Original passed by the Adjudicating Authorities and remanded the matters back for re-adjudication. However, the Court pointed out the failure of the Adjudicating Authorities and CESTAT to determine specific factors related to the method of valuation before and after the amendment. The Court provided principles for adjudicating authorities to keep in mind while re-adjudicating the matters, depending on whether the period of assessment was prior to or after July 1, 2000.

Facts:

The appellant and respondent no. 2 entered into an agreement to develop a portion of the appellant's land. Later, respondent no. 2 assigned the execution of the agreement to respondent no. 1, which contained an arbitration clause. Subsequently, a deed of confirmation was executed. The appellant filed a suit alleging fraud by respondent no. 3, representing himself as an authorized partner of respondent no. 1, seeking the cancellation of the agreements as null and void. Respondent no. 1 relied on the arbitration clause and filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking referral to arbitration.

Issues:

• Whether the subject matter of the agreements is arbitrable, considering Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872, and the fraud exception?
• Whether Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allows actions in rem or in personam?
• Whether the judgment of the District Court and the High Court requires interference?

Held:

The court observed that if the subject matter of the agreement falls within Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872, or involves fraud amounting to deceit in the performance of the contract, it would be arbitrable. The presence of criminal overtones does not make the matter non-arbitrable. In the present case, a valid arbitration agreement exists as the agreements sought to be cancelled were not stated to be non-existent. The suit being inter parties with no public overtones, the fraud exception does not apply. Post-amendment, Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, mandates referral to arbitration unless no valid arbitration agreement is prima facie found. The court found a valid arbitration agreement in this case. [Para 4, 6]

Section 26(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allows rectification of a contract through fraud or mutual mistake, and such rectification can be the subject matter of a suit for specific performance, making it arbitrable. Section 27(1) allows a party interested in a contract to sue for its rescission, and the relief granted is in personam. Section 31(1) of the Act pertains to actions inter parties or by persons with derivative title from the parties, making it an in personam action. [Para 11-13]

Section 31(2) does not change the in personam nature of actions under Section 31(1). The reasoning in certain cases to the contrary is overruled. The judgments of the District Court and the High Court do not require interference. This appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. [Para 17-18, 20-22, 25-26]

Facts:

Ghanshyam Upadhyay, the petitioner, relied on a newspaper report to make allegations against two members of the Commission of Inquiry constituted to investigate the 'Vikas Dubey' encounter case. He contended that the Chairman and a Member of the Commission had held high Constitutional positions and had relatives involved with the party in power and law enforcement agencies.

Issues:

• Whether the allegations of 'conflict of interest' and 'bias' against the two members of the Commission, based solely on a newspaper report, are substantiated.
• Whether the petitioner's apprehensions about the fairness of the inquiry process hold merit.

Held:

The Court noted that the entire basis for the petitioner's allegations was a newspaper article, which, without further proof, lacked evidentiary value. It emphasized that relying solely on newspaper reports was insufficient for making such serious allegations.( Para 6)

The Court further examined the petitioner's specific claims regarding the relatives of the Chairman and the Member of the Commission. It held that the mere fact that the Chairman's brother was a legislator supporting the party in power and the Member was related to a high-ranking police officer did not automatically lead to bias or conflict of interest. The Court found no evidence of any dominant influence by these relatives.( Para 8-9)

The Court clarified that the Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was not meant for an inter se determination of legal issues but for a fact-finding exercise. The recommendations of such commissions were not enforceable proprio vigore, and the proceedings were conducted in the public domain.( Para 10)

The Court observed that the petitioner was a lawyer practicing in Mumbai and had no direct connection to the incident under inquiry in Uttar Pradesh. The allegations of bias made solely on the basis of newspaper reports and nothing more were rejected outright.( Para 14)

The Court concluded that the petitioner's repeated applications and unnecessary apprehensions were hampering the inquiry process. It emphasized that sufficient safeguards were in place for ensuring a fair inquiry, and the report of the inquiry would be filed before the Court in the relevant petitions. For all the aforestated reasons we are of the opinion that the instant petition/application is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. ( Para 15 ,16)