Facts:

The respondent, Col Ran Singh Dudee, faced General Court Martial proceedings, which were later quashed by the court.

After reinstatement, Col Dudee received promotions but contested the promotion of a junior officer to the rank of Brigadier, claiming unfair treatment.

Issues:

Whether Col Dudee was entitled to promotions based on comparative merit and selection.

Whether the Selection Board's decision regarding Col Dudee's promotion was valid.

Held:

The court clarified that while benefits such as loss of salary and emoluments were compensable due to the court martial proceedings, promotions were not automatically guaranteed.

Promotions based on comparative merit and selection were not necessarily entitled to the officer, as per previous rulings (K.D. Gupta case).

The Selection Board found Col Dudee unfit for promotion to the rank of Colonel after considering various parameters, including disciplinary history. The court found this decision valid and not perverse.

The Selection Board's consideration of Col Dudee's disciplinary record, including a reprimand, was consistent with the Selection Policy and not illegal.

Despite sympathy for Col Dudee's nine years of service loss and imprisonment due to the court martial, the court upheld the decision of the Selection Board and rejected his challenge to the promotion of a junior officer.

Facts:

The deceased, aged 39 and employed with the Food Corporation of India, died in a road accident involving a Canter truck.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation based on the deceased's gross monthly salary and disregarded his income tax returns showing a higher income.

The High Court considered the income tax assessment and increased the compensation.

Issues:

Whether the income tax returns should be considered in determining the compensation for the deceased's family in a fatal accident case.

Held:

The Court held that both the salary certificate and the income tax returns should be considered in determining the compensation for the deceased's family. The Court disagreed with the Tribunal's approach of solely relying on the salary certificate and upheld the High Court's decision to consider the income tax assessment. It was stated that the claimants provided reliable evidence of the deceased's income tax returns, which was not discredited. Therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the High Court's judgment, and the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

The petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenged the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) and Vigilance Commissioner (VC) on grounds of alleged illegality and violation of principles of 'impeccable integrity' and 'institutional integrity'.

Allegations were made against the appointees regarding their conduct, including meetings with other officials, handling of specific cases, and accusations of fabricating/forging reports.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the CVC and VC were influenced by extraneous considerations or made in breach of statutes or rules.

Whether the allegations against the appointees were substantiated and affected their integrity.

Held:

The court clarified that judicial review is limited to examining the integrity of the decision-making process. It can set aside decisions influenced by extraneous considerations or made in violation of statutes or rules. However, the court does not have the authority to interfere with the government's choice of appointees.

The court found the allegations against the CVC regarding meetings with other officials and handling of specific cases unsubstantiated. It noted that no wrongdoing or impropriety was found in the actions of the CVC.

Similarly, allegations against the VC regarding fabricating/forging reports were examined. The court found no formal findings against the VC in this regard and concluded that his integrity was not affected.

Emphasizing the importance of thoroughly examining complaints, the court stated that allegations alone cannot be taken as serious aspersions on integrity. It declined to interfere with the appointments based on the findings presented.

Decision: The court upheld the appointments of both the CVC and VC, concluding that the integrity of the decision-making process was not compromised, and no illegality was found in the appointments.

Facts:

The Government of India, Ministry of Finance, decided to extend certain benefits to officers in service in the North Eastern Region, including Special (Duty) Allowance.

Respondents, pharmacists in CRPF, were posted in different places in India, including the North Eastern Region.

A letter dated 31.03.1987 extended the benefit of Special (Duty) Allowance to CRPF personnel posted in the North Eastern Region, provided their headquarters were in that region.

The respondents filed an application claiming the allowance but were denied due to their headquarters being outside the North Eastern Region.

An Office Memorandum dated 03.08.2005 clarified the allowance would be admissible to personnel actually working in the North East Region.

Issues:

Whether the respondents were entitled to Special (Duty) Allowance from the date of their posting in the North Eastern Region or only from 03.08.2005 when the Office Memorandum was issued.

Held:

The Court held that the purpose of granting Special (Duty) Allowance was to attract and retain competent officers in the North Eastern Region. The denial of this allowance to personnel posted in the region, but with headquarters outside, was found unjustified and against the purpose of the allowance. The classification made in the Government Order dated 31.03.1987, differentiating between personnel based on the location of their headquarters, did not pass the test of valid classification under Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the subsequent clarification in the Office Memorandum dated 03.08.2005, allowing the allowance to all personnel posted in the North Eastern Region, irrespective of the location of their headquarters, was considered corrective of this error. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the judgment of the High Court, and directing the grant of Special (Duty) Allowance to the respondents for the period they were actually posted in the North Eastern Region.

Facts:

The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, along with other authorities and the Commissioner of Income Tax, appealed against a judgment by the Delhi High Court. The case involved the non-deduction of tax at source under Section 194-I of the Income Tax Act by a private limited company engaged in real estate activities, which had entered into a long-term lease with Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority.

Issues:

Whether Noida and Greater Noida are considered "local authorities" under Section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the income of Noida and Greater Noida is exempt from tax deduction at source under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f).

Whether the circular dated 30.01.1995 applies to exempt Noida and Greater Noida from tax deduction at source under Section 194-I.

Held:

The Court held that Noida and Greater Noida are not considered "local authorities" under Section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act, as amended by the Finance Act, 2002. The Court also affirmed that Noida's income is exempt under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f) by virtue of a notification. However, the circular dated 30.01.1995, which exempted government and certain statutory authorities from tax deduction at source, is not applicable due to subsequent amendments in the law.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the Delhi High Court's judgment that tax deduction at source is applicable on lease rent payments to Greater Noida under Section 194-I of the Income Tax Act.

Facts:

Appellant lent a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 to the respondent for business purposes, with a promise of repayment within a month.

Respondent issued a post-dated cheque of Rs. 2,00,000 to the appellant, but it bounced twice due to insufficient funds.

After receiving a notice demanding payment, the respondent accused the appellant of stealing the cheque.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was justified.

Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Act was correctly applied and rebutted.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellant and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court found that:

The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by setting aside the conviction.

The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rightly raised against the respondent, and the respondent failed to rebut this presumption with evidence.

Mere denial of the existence of debt or liability by the accused is insufficient to rebut the presumption. The Supreme Court restored the judgment of the trial court, affirming the conviction of the respondent.

Facts:

A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was initiated in the Punjab & Haryana High Court concerning the payment of fees to empanelled advocates by insurance companies.

The issue arose when empanelled advocates did not appear in court for a case involving a motor accident claim, leading to the PIL being initiated.

The PIL focused on allegations of manipulation of fee structures by insurance companies and delays in fee payments to advocates.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in entertaining the dispute regarding the payment of fees to empanelled advocates.

Whether the Circular dated 21.02.2005 issued by GIPSA regarding fee structure should be adhered to by insurance companies.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the dispute regarding fee payments in a PIL, especially when subsequent circulars of 2009 and 2014 were being adhered to by the insurance companies.

The direction of the High Court to adhere to the Circular dated 21.02.2005 was set aside, and it was held that payments made as per said Circular shall be treated as final and not reopened.

Insurance companies were directed to adhere to the fee schedules framed by GIPSA in 2009 and 2014, as admitted by them before the High Court.

The direction issued by the High Court regarding the payment of interest was also set aside.

Facts:

Devidas Loka Rathod, the appellant, was accused of assaulting individuals with a sickle, resulting in injuries and the death of one person. The trial court and the High Court rejected Rathod's defence of unsoundness of mind. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's defence of unsoundness of mind was valid.

Whether there were gaps in the prosecution's case regarding the appellant's mental state.

Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the exception under Section 84 of the IPC.

Whether proper care and support should be provided to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court examined the evidence and found gaps in the prosecution's case regarding the appellant's mental state. It concluded that there was sufficient doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence based on medical evidence and other factors.

Therefore, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the exception under Section 84 of the IPC. As a result, the Court acquitted the appellant of all charges and directed his release from custody.

Additionally, the Court emphasized the need to provide the appellant with proper care and support in accordance with his right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Facts:

The Respondent Bank, Canara Bank, paid interest to the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) in the form of Fixed Deposits (FDs) or deposits. However, it did not deduct tax at source. The Assessing Officer deemed the respondent as an assessee in default and issued a demand notice. The bank filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), relying on a notification dated 22.10.1970 issued under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f) of the Income Tax Act. The appellant-Revenue argued that NOIDA was not entitled to the benefit of the notification as it was not established directly by the 1976 Act but was established under it.

Issues:

Whether NOIDA is entitled to the benefit of the notification dated 22.10.1970 issued under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Held:

The court observed that Section 194A(3)(iii) uses both the expressions "by or under." In the Dalco Engineering case, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "established by or under the Act" denotes a statutory corporation brought into existence by or under the statute. Comparing the provisions of Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, with those of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, it was evident that NOIDA had been established by the 1976 Act. The notification dated 22.10.1970 was issued under the power of Section 3 of the 1976 Act, and NOIDA was constituted by the Act itself. Therefore, NOIDA was entitled to the benefit of the notification, and the High Court's decision in dismissing the appeal filed by the Revenue was upheld.

Decision: The appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), Kanpur, was dismissed, affirming that NOIDA was entitled to the exemption under the notification.