Facts:

On September 13, 1983, the suit property was granted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, with a non-alienation clause of 15 years.

On April 23, 1990, the predecessor-in-title mortgaged the property to the plaintiff for Rs.20,000, agreeing to repay the loan within a year.

On May 15, 1990, an agreement to sell the property for Rs.46,000 was executed in favor of the plaintiff, despite the statutory prohibition on alienation for 15 years.

Issues:

The legality of the agreement to sell, considering the statutory bar on property alienation for 15 years under Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Held:

The court established that the transaction between the predecessor-in-title and the plaintiff constituted a transfer of property, falling under the purview of Section 61.

Section 61 prohibits the transfer of land within 15 years from the date of the grant, as specified in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Both the plaintiff and the predecessor-in-title were deemed equally responsible for violating the statutory provisions.

The claim of the plaintiff, relying solely on the agreement to sell dated May 15, 1990, was found to be in direct conflict with Section 61.

The court invoked the maxims "ex turpi causa non oritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis et possidentis."

The trial court's decision to dismiss the suit, considering the illegality of the agreement, was upheld.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, resulting in the quashing of the judgments of the High Court and Fast Track Court. The trial court's order dismissing the suit was affirmed.

Facts:

The case involved the execution of a share purchase agreement in 2009 between MCX, MCX–E, and a Financial Services Company. Subsequently, a 'Letter of Undertaking' was issued, leading to a dispute. A suit for specific performance was filed, and an injunction order was passed. In 2016, a winding-up petition was filed against LF under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956, which was later transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).

Issues:

The application of the Limitation Act to winding-up petitions, the trigger point for limitation, and the relevance of commercial insolvency in such proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized that a suit for recovery cannot impact the remedy of a winding-up proceeding. Time begins to run, and limitation can only be extended as provided in the Limitation Act. The Financial Services Company filed a suit in 2013 but filed the winding-up petition in 2016, making it time-barred due to the lapse of the three-year period.

The court clarified that the trigger point for limitation in a winding-up petition is the date of default in payment of the debt. Commercial solvency is considered at a later stage in the proceedings. The cause of action for limitation does not include commercial insolvency.

The court referred to Softsule (P) Ltd., Re, stating that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means for enforcing a bona fide disputed debt. The ultimatum triggering the cause of action arose in January 2013, and the statutory notice in November 2015 did not mention commercial insolvency. The company's substratum disappearance or commercial insolvency was not pleaded.

The winding-up petition, filed in 2016, was beyond the three-year limitation period mentioned in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. As a result, it was deemed time-barred, and the judgments of the NCLT and NCLAT were set aside.

Facts:

Lt. Col. Kuldeep Yadav, commissioned in the Army in 1997, was found in contact with a foreign national from 2009 to 2011. He stayed with her at the Army premises without disclosing her identity. A staff inquiry was conducted, leading to a show cause notice and subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

Issues:

The severity of Lt. Col. Kuldeep Yadav's misconduct and the appropriateness of the punishment awarded to him.

Held:

The Tribunal, although competent to interfere with departmental punishments, must do so only in exceptional cases where the awarded punishment shocks the conscience or is unreasonably disproportionate (Para 22).

The Tribunal can direct reconsideration of the penalty by the disciplinary authority or, in exceptional cases, impose a suitable punishment itself with cogent reasons (Para 23).

The Tribunal erroneously assumed that the punishment of 'Severe Displeasure (Recordable)' was chosen due to condoning minor misconduct. This was inconsistent with the applicable policy on censure for Officers and JCO’s (Para 26).

The Tribunal's emphasis on the respondent admitting allegations as an indication of fair intention overlooked the gravity of the charges, including extended contact with a foreign national and furnishing false information (Para 27).

The Tribunal misinterpreted the show cause notice, failing to recognize serious lapses, including unauthorized possession of official documents and furnishing false information in the guest list (Para 28).

The Tribunal's conclusion that 'classified' documents were not mentioned was flawed, as the show cause notice focused on unauthorized possession of 'official' documents accessible to a foreign national (Para 29).

Given the Tribunal's indefensible basis for interference, the Supreme Court held that it committed a manifest error in overturning the censure of 'Severe Displeasure (Recordable)' (Para 31).

Facts:

The case involves a challenge against the Rules framed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh regarding admission to the B. Ed. Course.

The appellant, a minority institution, contended that the impugned G.O.Ms were unconstitutional and violated their fundamental rights, particularly Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

The government imposed conditions, such as using Secondary School Certificates (SSC) as the basis for determining minority status, to address the reported issue of students obtaining religious conversion certificates overnight.

Issues:

Whether the impugned G.O.Ms violate the constitutional rights of minority institutions under Article 30(1).

Whether the government's conditions, including the use of SSC for determining minority status, are reasonable and constitutionally valid.

Held:

The court held that:

The impugned G.O.Ms do not violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

The conditions imposed by the government, including the use of SSC for determining minority status, are reasonable and aimed at preventing misuse of certificates for admissions.

The right of minority institutions is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence.

The G.O.Ms grant autonomy to Minority Educational Institutions to fill up 85% of their seats with meritorious minority students.

The G.O.Ms ensure that vacant seats are not wasted and are filled up by meritorious and deserving candidates.

The court dismissed the appeals and writ petition as being devoid of merit.

All pending applications, if any, were accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved the appointment of teachers in a linguistic minority institution that was not approved by the District Inspector of Schools due to the absence of a recommendation by the School Service Commission as mandated by Rule 28 of the Management Rules, 1969. The institution claimed its linguistic minority status under Article 30 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The primary issue was the conflict between the institution's linguistic minority status and the requirement of Rule 28. The case also involved the determination of linguistic minority status, the applicability of Article 350B, and the validity of the institution's claim.

Held:

Upon examining the Management Rules, 1969, the Court noted that no additional rules had been framed for institutions governed by Article 30. The absence of such rules supported the institution's claim to linguistic minority status.( Para 1 - 12)

The institution had applied for recognition as a minority institution, and despite the purported application of Rule 8(3), it did not waive its right to be treated as a linguistic minority institution. The special constitution demonstrated the institution's commitment to its minority character.( Para 13 - 15)

If the institution is indeed a minority institution, Rule 28 cannot apply, as it would violate the institution's right under Article 30 to administer itself with teachers of its choice.( Para 23)

The authorities under the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963, did not empower them to recognize a minority institution. The institution was started by the Sikh community for imparting education in their mother tongue and religion.( Para 24)

The institution was not estopped from claiming its minority status, and the fundamental right under Article 30 could not be waived.( Para 26)

Article 350B did not preclude a linguistic minority from claiming protection under Article 30(1) in the absence of a Special Officer's Report.( Para 29)

The linguistic minority status should be determined state-wise. The medium of instruction was irrelevant to establishing the institution's founding by a linguistic minority for education purposes.( Para 30 - 31)

Facts:

The respondent and family members applied for permission to convert agricultural land on 08.03.2013.

Amendments to the Goa, Daman & Diu Land Revenue Code were made on 22.05.2013, revising and increasing conversion rates.

Permission for conversion was granted on 19.11.2013.

The respondent later filed a writ petition seeking a refund of excess conversion charges, arguing for rates based on the application date.

Issues:

Whether conversion charges should be calculated based on rates at the time of application or the date when the conversion order was issued.

Held:

In the present case, the relevant date for fixing conversion charges is determined to be the date on which the decision to grant Sanad (permission) was made, which is 19.09.2013. The Court emphasized the importance of Section 32 of the Goa, Daman & Diu Land Revenue Code and stated that the respondent, by not filing an appeal within stipulated timelines, contributed to the delay. The Court held that the respondent's waiver of rights through an affidavit-cum-indemnity bond, along with their actions and conduct, precludes them from challenging the levy of conversion charges. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment set aside, and the writ petition dismissed.

Facts:

Appellants were tenants of a shop in Delhi.

Respondents filed an eviction petition in November 2007, citing various grounds, including non-payment of rent.

Rent Controller, in an order dated 21st April 2008, directed appellants to pay arrears and future rent.

Respondents filed an application under Section 15(7) in April 2009, seeking to strike out the defense for non-compliance.

Appellants argued that they had paid arrears and additional rent, exceeding the required amount.

Issues:

Whether the Rent Controller's power under Section 15(7) is discretionary.

Whether the tenants were guilty of contumacious conduct in withholding rent.

Whether the striking out of the defense was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the power vested in the Rent Controller under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is discretionary and not mandatory. It emphasized that this discretion must be exercised judiciously, taking into account the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court found that the tenants had paid the arrears and additional rent, and any alleged default was not deliberate or contumacious.

The Court set aside the decision of the Rent Controller and the High Court, allowing the tenants to contest the eviction application. It directed the Rent Controller to proceed with the pending eviction application expeditiously, ensuring a decision within a specified timeframe, not exceeding one year.

Facts:

The case involved Nevada Properties Private Limited through its director versus the State of Maharashtra and another. The dispute centered around the interpretation of Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically regarding the power of a police officer to seize immovable property.

Issues:

Whether the power conferred under Section 102 includes the authority to attach, seize, and seal immovable property.

The interpretation of the term 'any property' in Section 102.

The relationship between Section 102 and other relevant sections such as 451, 452, and 456.

Held:

The court held that the power under Section 102 does not extend to attaching, seizing, and sealing immovable property. Immovable property cannot be seized in its strict sense, and the language of Section 102 does not support the police officer's authority to dispossess a person of immovable property.

The expression 'any property' in Section 102 was interpreted, clarifying that it does not include immovable property. The court emphasized that Section 102 envisages the seizure of property, which, in the case of immovable property, would require dispossession, a power not expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature.

The court explained that Sections 451, 452, and 456, dealing with the disposal of property, do not directly define the scope of Section 102. These sections provide specific and clear powers to the criminal court, and their parameters are distinct from Section 102.

The judgment highlighted the importance of applying the inversion test to ascertain the ratio decidendi of a case. It clarified that the decision in the Tapas D. Neogy case did not address the specific issue of whether immovable property falls under the expression 'any property' in Section 102.

The court reiterated that Section 102 is not a general provision enabling the police officer to seize immovable property for production in a criminal court during trial. Disputes related to immovable property must be adjudicated in civil courts.

Facts:

The property in question was purchased by the grandfather of the appellants.

Through a Will, the grandfather bequeathed the property to the Donor (father of the appellants).

The appellants claimed that a family partition occurred in 1964 between the Donor and his two brothers.

Issues:

Whether the property is ancestral or self-acquired in the hands of the Donor.

Validity of the gift deed executed by the Donor in favor of the defendant-donee.

Held:

The appellants failed to prove that the property was ancestral, and the burden of proof rested on them. The grandfather purchased the property, making it self-acquired, and the Will did not indicate an intention to convey it as ancestral. (Para 10, 11, 21, and 24)

The appellants referred to a Will dated December 3, 2001, but failed to frame an issue or produce attesting witnesses, rendering the Will unproved. (Para 28)

While the Trial Court affirmed the property as ancestral, it did not address the issue of forgery related to the gift deed. The High Court, therefore, appropriately considered the evidence and ruled on Issue No.1 based on the evidence presented. (Paras 30, 31)

Order VI, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandates stating particulars in pleadings for allegations like misrepresentation and fraud. The appellants alleged forgery but failed to prove it, and no specific denial of the execution of the gift deed was made. (Paras 36, 38)

The case resembles Kannan Nambiar, and in the absence of evidence or specific denial of the execution of the gift deed, the Donee was not obligated to examine attesting witnesses. The Donee's care for the Donor was considered, and the appellants' failure to fulfill familial responsibilities was noted. (Paras 41, 42)