Facts:

Appellant-defendant, a businessman, approached the respondent-plaintiff for financial assistance.

A sum of Rs. 45,00,000/- was lent with no documentation.

Dispute arose when the appellant failed to repay, and post-dated cheques were dishonored.

Civil suit filed, leading to an ex-parte decree on 09.10.2015.

Issues:

Condonation of delay in filing the first appeal (546 days delay).

Setting aside the ex-parte decree.

Interplay between Section 96(2) CPC and Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

Held:

The appellant showed bona fide by depositing Rs. 25,00,000/- as ordered by the Court.

The delay of 546 days in filing the first appeal was condoned with a condition to deposit the balance amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- before the trial court.

Failure to deposit would result in the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay.

The deposited amount would be invested in a nationalized bank.

The decision emphasized the statutory right of appeal under Section 96(2) CPC, which cannot be denied merely due to dismissal of an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the matter.

Facts:

The appellant, Rekha Murarka, sought permission for her counsel to cross-examine witnesses after the Public Prosecutor in a murder trial where she was the de facto complainant. The trial court rejected the application, and the High Court affirmed this decision.

Issues:

Whether the victim's counsel has the right to make oral arguments or examine and cross-examine witnesses independently?

What is the extent of the victim's counsel's role in assisting the prosecution, particularly in the absence of proper actions by the Public Prosecutor?

Held:

The Court held that the victim's counsel should not have the unbridled right to make oral arguments or examine and cross-examine witnesses independently. The role of the victim's counsel is limited to assisting the prosecution, with a focus on suggesting questions to the Court or the prosecution. The Court emphasized that the victim's counsel must operate within the directions of the Public Prosecutor to maintain consistency in the case presented. If the Public Prosecutor overlooks important aspects, the victim's counsel can route questions or arguments through the Public Prosecutor or bring them to the Court's notice. The High Court's decision to dismiss the application seeking permission for the victim's counsel to cross-examine witnesses was affirmed.

Facts:

The State Government issued a notification on 27.02.1998, providing tax exemptions to industrial units using fly ash in Uttar Pradesh.

Subsequently, on 14.10.2004, the State issued a new notification rescinding the earlier one.

Industrial units, having commenced production based on the 1998 notification, challenged the 2004 notification.

Issues:

Validity of the State's power to rescind the tax rebate notification.

Applicability of the 2004 notification to industrial units with accrued rights under the 1998 notification.

Held:

The Court held that the State lacks explicit authority to rescind the rebate facility retrospectively.

Section 21 of the 1897 Act is not applicable for withdrawing the rebate retrospectively.

The impugned notification dated 14.10.2004 cannot be construed as having retrospective effect, preserving the accrued rights of industrial units.

The Court rejected the State's claim of supervening public interest, emphasizing the enforceable rights of industrial units.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 filed a suit for specific performance against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a written statement and later filed a counter-claim. The trial court rejected the objections to the counter-claim. The High Court quashed the counter-claim. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Interpretation of Or. VIII, r.6A regarding the timing of filing counter-claims by defendants in a civil suit.

Held:

Per N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, and Ajay Rastogi, JJ.:

Order VIII Rule 6A does not impose an embargo on filing counter-claims after the written statement. However, there is a restriction on the accrual of the cause of action.

The court has discretion to allow counter-claims after evaluating factors like delay, limitation period, reason for delay, and more. This discretion is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and ensure justice.

The court must not permit filing of counter-claims after issues are framed to uphold the principle of speedy justice.

Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J. (Partly Supplementing and Partly Dissenting):

Order VIII Rule 9 allows the court discretion to allow subsequent pleadings, including counter-claims, after the written statement.

The court can also exercise its power under Order VI Rule 17 for amendments, subject to the court's discretion.

The court has the discretion to allow filing of counter-claims even after the written statement, considering the overall scheme of the rules.

Decision: The Court held that Order VIII Rule 6A does not bar the filing of counter-claims after the written statement, but the court has the discretion to consider factors before allowing it. Filing counter-claims after the framing of issues is generally not permissible to uphold the principle of speedy justice.

Facts:

The Department of Agriculture forwarded three names to the State Screening Committee.

The State Screening Committee recommended ten names, including the appellant and respondent No. 9, but not respondent No. 1.

Two officers were selected to the IAS by the UPSC, one of whom was the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the State Screening Committee's failure to record and disclose reasons for its decision was a serious violation of statutory rules?

Whether the order of placement of candidates' names in the lists prepared by the departmental and state committees was relevant to the selection process?

Held:

The High Court's jurisdiction to address questions of comparative merit of candidates is limited. The Court may only examine serious violations of statutory rules, bias, mala fides, or arbitrariness in the selection process. (Para 5.3)

The order of placement of candidates' names in the lists by departmental and state committees was irrelevant to the selection process. The High Court wrongly weighed this factor. (Para 9)

The procedure of adding respondent No. 1's name to the list without proper authority was irregular and violated the applicable rules, regulations, and guidelines. However, no malice or bias was found in the non-consideration of respondent No. 1's name by the State Screening Committee. (Para 9.1)

The High Court's conclusion that the State Screening Committee's decision was arbitrary for non-disclosure of reasons was disagreed with. Natural justice principles do not mandate the disclosure of reasons unless specified by rules or regulations. (Para 9.2)

As there was no requirement for the disclosure of reasons in the relevant rules, regulations, and guidelines, the State Screening Committee's procedure was not faulty. (Para 9.3)

The High Court's direction to recommend respondent No. 1's name to the UPSC was without jurisdiction. If arbitrariness was found, the Court should have directed the State Screening Committee to reassess all candidates, not substitute its reasoning for that of the Screening Committee. (Para 11)

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the Final Seniority list of MPS Grade II Officers, where promotees who entered the cadre on 01.03.2007 were placed below direct recruits who joined on 14.08.2007 and 24.11.2007, respectively. The Single Judge of the High Court held that promotees should be given seniority above direct recruits. The Division Bench upheld this decision.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the determination of inter-se seniority amongst direct recruits and promotees in the Manipur Police Service Grade-II Officers Cadre.

Held:

Seniority Determination: The Manipur Civil Service Rules, 1965 dictate that seniority shall be reckoned from the date of appointment, not from the date of vacancy. The Court emphasized that the term "Recruitment Year" does not refer to the year in which the recruitment process initiates or the vacancy arises. Paragraphs: 33, 47

Effect of N.R. Parmar's Case: The decision in N.R. Parmar's case, which suggested general principles for determining seniority in Central Government service, was overruled. The Court declared that seniority cannot be claimed from a date before the incumbent is in the cadre. However, the decision would apply prospectively unless seniority is to be fixed under relevant rules from the date of vacancy or the date of advertisement. Paragraphs: 40

Inconsistency in Judgment: The Single Judge and the Division Bench were consistent in their conclusion that promotees must be given seniority over direct recruits. Any suggestion of conflict between the two judgments is rejected. Paragraphs: 41

Compliance with Court Orders: The State Government was directed to prepare a seniority list, taking into account the Court's observations. However, the government, in violation of the Court's orders, gave seniority to direct recruits over promotees in a revised list. The Court held that such actions were not in conformity with its directions. Paragraphs: 44, 48

Directive to the State: The Court upheld the orders of the High Court and directed the State to prepare a revised inter-se seniority list in the MPS Grade-II cadre in accordance with the High Court's decisions. Paragraphs: 50

Facts:

The prosecution establishes that five accused, armed with various weapons, entered the deceased's house at midnight. Two of them with sharp cutting weapons caused the death. The other three respondents were armed with a Ballam and lathis. The deceased had two fatal injuries.

Issues:

Whether the other three accused, despite not using their weapons, can be absolved of responsibility and vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC?

Held:

The respondents' liability is fully established based on the principles of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC. Their presence, being armed, entering the house, and the commission of the crime by other accused are indicative of their membership in the unlawful assembly.( Paragraph 12)

Merely not using their weapons doesn't absolve the respondents of vicarious liability. Membership in an unlawful assembly with a common criminal object is key.( Paragraph 13)

The High Court erred in entertaining doubt. The clear and cogent testimony of eyewitnesses, the wife, and son, leaves no room for doubt.( Paragraph 14)

FACTS:

Share Purchase Agreement dated 10.07.2006 between various parties.

Corporate debtor (Respondent No. 4) shut down its factory on 08.05.2007.

Various legal proceedings initiated, including Writ Petitions and Insolvency Petition under IBC.

National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) declared moratorium on 04.06.2019.

High Court orders on 14.08.2019 and 05.09.2019 for auction of assets of Respondent No. 4.

Vast chunk of land (330 acres) involved, including railway lines and buildings.

ISSUES:

Conflict between High Court orders for auction and the moratorium declared by NCLT.

Whether the High Court was justified in passing orders for auction during the pendency of insolvency proceedings under IBC.

HELD:

The High Court was not justified in passing orders for auction after the moratorium declared by NCLT. Assets' alienation during insolvency proceedings jeopardizes stakeholders' interests.( Para 9)

The impugned Interim Orders dated 14.08.2019 and 05.09.2019 passed by the Odisha High Court are set aside.( Para 10)

Respondent No. 13 (Hirakud Workers Union) has the liberty to file an application under Regulation 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 for payment of arrears, salaries, and other dues.( Para 12)

Parties are granted liberty to pursue remedies available in accordance with the law.( Para 13)

Facts:

The case involves the Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited and Satish Kumar Gupta and Others. The central issue revolves around the time-limit for the completion of the insolvency resolution process as per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues:

The court is the mandatory nature of the 330-day time limit for the insolvency resolution process. The court is tasked with determining the constitutionality and reasonableness of this time frame.

Held:

In a decision rendered on 15th November 2019, the Full Bench addressed the constitutional aspects of the insolvency resolution process time limit. The court struck down the term "mandatorily" from the provision, declaring it manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution and an excessive restriction on the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g). The ruling clarifies that the 330-day limit is not mandatory, providing flexibility for extension based on case-specific factors.

The court held that, while the general rule is that the insolvency resolution process should be completed within 330 days, extensions can be granted in exceptional cases. Factors such as a short period left for completion, the interest of stakeholders, and delays attributed to the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal can warrant extensions.

The decision emphasizes that the extension of time is only applicable in exceptional cases, with the overarching rule being the completion of the resolution process within 330 days. This ensures that the corporate debtor is not unnecessarily pushed into liquidation.