Facts:

The appellant, Smt. S. Vanitha, claimed the house owned by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, her in-laws, as her matrimonial residence after her husband (respondent No. 4) deserted her and their daughter. The authorities directed her to vacate the house, and the High Court upheld the decision, stating her right to claim shelter was only against her husband.

Issues:

• Whether the premises in question constituted a 'shared household' under Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act.
• Whether the remedies sought under the Senior Citizens Act can preclude the woman's right to a shared household under the PWDV Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the premises in question constituted a 'shared household' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act. The remedies sought under the Senior Citizens Act should not defeat the woman's right to a shared household under the PWDV Act. The woman is duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act after obtaining relief from the Senior Citizens Act's Tribunal. The court ruled that the Senior Citizens Act's summary powers should not be used to circumvent a woman's claim of entitlement under the PWDV Act. [Para 23]

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against a decision of the High Court of Kerala in WA No. 1073 of 2020. The main issue was whether the resolutions passed by the Syndicate prescribing norms and standards for granting affiliation for additional courses were ultra vires the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015.

Issues:

• Whether the power of the Syndicate to prescribe norms and standards for affiliation is derived from Section 30(2) of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015?
• Whether the absence of Statutes (till 07.08.2020) meant the power under Section 30(2) could not be exercised?
• Whether the Vice Chancellor had the power to regulate matters in the absence of Statutes, as per Section 14(6) of the Act?
• Whether the norms prescribed by the Syndicate for granting affiliation were within the scope of their authority?
• Whether the Universities could enhance norms and standards prescribed by AICTE?

Held:

The source of power for the Syndicate to prescribe norms and standards for affiliation lies in Section 30(2) of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015. The absence of University Statutes until 07.08.2020 does not render the Syndicate's power under Section 30(2) inoperative. The Syndicate can exercise its power freely when the Statutes do not prescribe conditions for affiliation. The High Court's ruling on the ultra vires nature of the Syndicate's resolutions was erroneous. (Para 28, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40)

Universities cannot dilute AICTE norms and standards, but they have the authority to prescribe enhanced norms. The AICTE's processing of applications based on self-disclosure raises concerns about infrastructural discrepancies and student compensation in case of false information provided by colleges. (Para 47, 56, 57, 58)

Facts:

Seven accused persons, one of whom died during the trial, attacked the victim-complainant. Six accused, including the three appellants, were convicted for the offense under sections 307 read with 149 and section 148 of the IPC. The High Court upheld the appellants' conviction under section 307 and reduced the sentence from seven to five years, while the other three co-accused persons were acquitted.

Issues:

• Permissibility of alteration of charges under ss.211-224 and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Difference between ss.34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
• Examination of independent witnesses and its impact on the prosecution's case.
• Sentencing and leniency in cases of violent crimes.

Held:

The Court held that the framing of charges can be altered, and Courts have the flexibility to rectify charges under Sections 211 to 224 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The controlling objective is to ensure justice is not defeated by technicalities, and Courts can weigh evidence to determine individual convictions even when group prosecution under Section 149 fails. The appellants did not suffer any adverse effect when individually held guilty for attempted murder without the aid of Section 149.

The Court discussed the difference between Sections 34 and 149 of the IPC, emphasizing that Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of minds, while Section 149 assigns liability merely by membership of an unlawful assembly.

Regarding the non-examination of independent witnesses, the Court stated that adverse inference needs to be assessed based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is unfair to expect the presence of third parties in every case, especially in violent crimes that are seldom anticipated.

The Court found no justification to show leniency and reduce the sentence. The appellants were armed with deadly weapons, brutally attacked the complainant causing severe injuries, and have not served even half of their sentence.

Facts:

The writ petitioners challenged the validity of chapter-VI of guidelines issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, restricting the number of tax audit assignments a practicing member could accept in a financial year.

Issues:

• The court was the constitutionality of the said guidelines under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court, recognizing the issue's public importance affecting both Chartered Accountants and citizens requiring tax audits, allowed the transfer of the writ petitions to the Supreme Court. The Court aimed to settle the law and provide clarity on the matter, and thus, the interim orders in the transferred writ petitions were allowed to continue until the Supreme Court renders a final decision.

 Facts:

A writ petition (Civil) No. 1213 of 2020 was filed, seeking the quashing of the decision to affix posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive individuals under home isolation.

Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on 02.07.2020 were presented in the case, but they did not contain any provisions regarding the pasting of posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive individuals.

The Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, issued a D.O. (Demiofficial) letter dated 19.11.2020, which was relevant to the matter.

Issues:

• Whether the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare empower the authorities to paste posters outside the houses of COVID-19 patients under home isolation.

Held:

The guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare are related to the exercise of power under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. These guidelines do not include any requirement of pasting posters outside the houses of COVID-19 patients.

The Union of India has already issued a D.O. letter dated 19.11.2020 to guide the States and Union Territories, which clearly states that no State or Union Territory is required to paste posters outside the residence of COVID-19 positive persons, as of now.

The State Governments and Union Territories can resort to the exercise of affixing posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive individuals only when any direction is issued by the competent authority under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Decision: The writ petition was disposed of, and the court held that the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare do not authorize the pasting of posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive persons under home isolation, unless specifically directed by the competent authority under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Facts:

The appellant was initially appointed on a temporary basis as an Assistant Teacher in a school in 1985, with graduation and B.Ed degrees, falling under Category 'C' of Schedule 'F' of the Rules. Respondent no.1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the same school in 1985, but he possessed only a Senior Secondary Certificate and Diploma in Education at the time.

Issues:

• whether respondent no.1 could claim seniority and promotion as Head Master over the appellant, considering their qualifications and the relevant Rules.

Held:

 The Court held that the judgment in Bhawna v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. applied directly to the present case, establishing that the appellant, with B.A. and B.Ed. degrees at the time of her initial appointment, was qualified for her appointment. However, respondent no.1 was not qualified for appointment as an Assistant Teacher when initially appointed. His seniority cannot be claimed from the date of his initial appointment as he lacked the required qualifications.[ Para 20 to Para 25]

Decision: The judgment of the High Court in review was set aside, affirming the appellant's appointment as Head Master.

Facts:

The petitioner filed nominations from two Lok Sabha Constituencies. Her nominations were rejected on the ground that she was convicted in two criminal cases and sentenced to three years of imprisonment in each case. The High Court suspended the conviction in one case and stayed the execution of sentence in another case. After the elections, the petitioner filed two election petitions challenging the rejection of her nomination as illegal and unjustified. The High Court, noting several defects in the election petitions, including an incomplete prayer and lack of proper verification, rejected both petitions under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. The High Court also held that the petitioner was disqualified under Section 8(3) of the 1951 Act read with Article 102(1)(e) of the Constitution.

Issues:

• Whether the defects in the verification and prayer made by the petitioner were curable.
• Whether the petitioner's nominations were validly rejected due to her conviction and disqualification under Section 8(3) of the 1951 Act.

Held:

The defects in the verification and prayer made by the petitioner were curable. The High Court erred in holding them as incurable. The petitioner should have been given an opportunity to cure the defects before rejecting the petitions.

The disqualification under Section 8(3) of the 1951 Act would continue as long as there is no stay of conviction. In this case, the petitioner only obtained a stay of execution of the sentence and could not obtain a stay of conviction. Therefore, her nominations were validly rejected.

Facts:

A turtle was seized from the respondent, leading to the initiation of criminal proceedings against the respondent under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the respondent.

Issues:

• Whether the seized turtle belonged to the species "Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)" listed in Part II of Schedule I of the Act.
• Whether the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings was correct.

Held:

Section 9 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, prohibits hunting of any wild animal listed in Schedule I, II, III, and IV of the Act, except as provided under Sections 11 and 12.

The Veterinary Surgeon's letter identified the seized turtle as 'Indian Flap Shell (Lissemy's Punctata),' while the species "Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)" is the one listed in Part II of Schedule I of the Act.

Lissemys punctata is a species of which Lissemys punctata punctata is an infraspecies.

The turtle seized was not of the infraspecies "Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)" listed in Part II of Schedule I.

Consequently, the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings related to wildlife offenses was justified.

Decision: The review petition was allowed, and the appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings against the respondent, as the seized turtle was not of the specific infraspecies listed in Part II of Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

Facts:

The victim, along with other occupants, was traveling in a car driven by respondent no. 2 at night. The car collided head-on with a truck coming from the opposite direction, resulting in injuries to all occupants. The victim, after being discharged, suffered complications and eventually succumbed to injuries. The victim's dependents filed a claim petition alleging negligence by respondent no. 2.

Issues:

• Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the car driver?
• Whether the witness AW-3 is reliable?

Held :

The Court found that the High Court had overlooked certain material facts, including who lodged the FIR. The informant was not an eyewitness and had some closeness with respondent no. 2. Therefore, the informant's version was hearsay and unreliable.

The High Court's adverse inference against AW-3 for not reporting the accident to the police was unwarranted. AW-3 had taken the injured to the hospital for immediate medical aid, and it was natural that he did not simultaneously go to the police station to lodge the FIR.

The failure of the respondents to cross-examine AW-3 led to an inference of tacit admission on their part. Respondent no. 2's choice not to depose in support of his written statement suggested his involvement in the accident.

The High Court erred in applying strict principles of evidence and standards of proof applicable in criminal trials to this motor accident claim case. The standard of proof is one of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and held that the claimants were entitled to compensation as awarded by the Tribunal, along with a 40% addition in the annual income of the deceased towards 'future prospects.'