Facts:

The appellant, Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd., filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, seeking various reliefs related to the classification of their sugar factory for price determination under the Sugar (Price Determination for 1984-85 Production) Order, 1984, and Sugar (Price Determination for 1985-86 Production) Order, 1985. The appellant argued that their sugar mill should have been placed in the eastern zone for price fixation, similar to other sugar factories in the same district (Sitapur). The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the classification decision was a policy decision made by the Central Government, and there was no evidence of arbitrariness or hostile discrimination.

Issues:

Whether the classification of the appellant's sugar mill for price determination under the Sugar Control Orders was arbitrary or discriminatory.

Whether Section 3(2)(f) and Section 3(3c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, were ultra vires of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The price of levy sugar was fixed for different zones with the intention of ensuring a reasonable return for sugar manufacturers, provided their units were running economically and efficiently. Sugar was a controlled commodity during the relevant time, covered by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The price of levy sugar was determined based on Control Orders, and the Central Government considered various factors, including expert recommendations and cost schedules. The Court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate invidious discrimination or statutory violation. The policy decisions regarding classification were made based on expert reports and were not discriminatory or unreasonable. (Para 7)

The Court concluded that there was no merit in the appeals and dismissed them. The appellant had made deposits and provided bank guarantees as per interim orders, and the Court allowed the respondent-Government to withdraw the deposited amount and accrued interest. (Para 8)

These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the regularization of workers employed by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) based on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of ONGC's Certified Standing Orders. Four impugned orders upheld the regularization of workers relying on a judgment in the "PCLU case," while one impugned order declined regularization, distinguishing it from the "PCLU case."

Issues:

Whether the construction placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of ONGC's Certified Standing Orders in the "PCLU case" is correct.

Whether the decision in the "PCLU case" should be reconsidered.

The applicability of principles from the "Umadevi case" in the context of industrial adjudication.

Held:

The Supreme Court made the following observations and held as follows:

The decision in the "PCLU Case" held that workers completing 240 days' service in a period of 12 calendar months are entitled to regularization of their services into permanent posts of the corporation. The Court further held that under clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders, upon the completion of 240 days of service in a calendar year, the workers have acquired a valid statutory right and should have been granted the status of regular employees of the corporation. The Court found that the construction placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) in the "PCLU Case" prima facie does not appear to be correct. Additionally, it noted that the "PCLU Case" did not consider an earlier judgment in the "Engineering Mazdoor Sangh Case," which pertained to ONGC's Certified Standing Orders.( Para 17)

The second aspect to be considered is the applicability of the principles set out in the "Umadevi Case" in the context of industrial adjudication. The Supreme Court found that this issue also needs to be placed before a larger bench for consideration.( Para 18)

The "PCLU Case" needs reconsideration to align its position in law with the principles emerging from earlier precedents. Specific areas for reconsideration include: (i) the interpretation of clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders; (ii) the meaning and content of an unfair labor practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the ID Act; (iii) limitations, if any, on the power of the Labor and Industrial Courts to order regularization in the absence of sanctioned posts.( Para 24)

Decision: The Supreme Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the "PCLU case" and for clarification on various aspects of labor law related to the regularization of workers.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute concerning a marine insurance claim for cargo. The insurer denied the insurance claim, leading to a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service.

Issues:

Whether the breach of the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) occurred.

Whether the insurer had waived the breach of warranty.

Whether the insurer was justified in repudiating the insurance claim.

Held:

The Marine Cargo Cover Note and Marine Insurance Policy explicitly stated that the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) was one of the warranties/terms of insurance. The ICC sets standards for the seaworthiness of the vessel carrying the cargo, and compliance with it is crucial for determining the issuance of the policy and the premium.

The ICC 01/01/2001 version imposes two main requirements: classification with a recognized Classification Society and compliance with age limitations for the insured vessel.

In this case, neither was the subject vessel in compliance with the ICC, nor did the insured provide prompt notification to the insurer about the non-compliance. The appellant's contention regarding the vessel's classification was not sustained.

The appellant's notification regarding the vessel's classification did not constitute "prompt notification," and the insurer only learned of the breach later. No evidence of the vessel's classification was provided to the insurer.

The breach of the warranty occurred when the appellant informed the insurer about the vessel's classification. Even if the vessel was classed with the International Register of Shipping, it did not meet the ICC requirements, and the appellant was aware of this non-compliance.

Section 35(3) of the Marine Insurance Act makes it clear that a breach of warranty needs to be complied with, leading to the automatic discharge of the insurer's liability. Section 36(3) allows the insurer to waive the breach of warranty under certain conditions.

The issuance of the General Average Guarantee did not constitute a waiver because it was based on incorrect information provided by the insured, and the insurer withdrew the Guarantee upon discovering the breach.

The insurer's conduct and representations did not demonstrate an intent to waive the breach of warranty. Therefore, the insurer was justified in repudiating the insurance claim.

The impugned judgement of the NCDRC stands confirmed, and the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants in this case were appointed under the Adult Education and Non-Formal Education Project, a government project sponsored by both the Central Government and the State Government in the undivided state of Bihar between 1978 and 1990. Following the bifurcation of the state into Jharkhand and Bihar, the Central Government closed the project. The Government of Jharkhand declared these project employees as surplus, and in 2007, they were absorbed into various departments. A notification accompanying the absorption stated that these employees would be considered new appointees, and their past service would not be counted for seniority or pay protection.

Issues:

Whether the services rendered by the appellants under the Adult Education and Non-Formal Education Project could be counted towards pensionary benefits under the relevant rules.

Held:

The High Court of Jharkhand, in its order, concluded that the services rendered under the project did not qualify as government service under the relevant rules. Therefore, the employees were not entitled to pension benefits based on their past service. The High Court also referred to Rule 59 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, which empowers the State Government to declare certain services as qualifying for pension. However, the notification for absorption did not include such a provision, and the Circular dated 12th August 1969, which applied to temporary government servants, did not apply to these project employees.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the employees appointed under the project could not claim pension benefits for their past service, as they were treated as fresh appointees without seniority or pay protection under the government's policy.

Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

Laxman was given in adoption to Saraswati on 2nd November, 1935. At the time of his adoption, he had three sons, Gangadhar, Dattatraya, and Manohar. After adoption, Laxman and his wife, Padmavati, joined Saraswati's family along with their three sons. A daughter, Kalindi, was born to Laxman and Padmavati in 1938. Laxman was excluded from the partition of his natural family's property in 1948. After Laxman's death in 1987, his daughter Kalindi applied to include herself and her mother Padmavati as owners in the village revenue record. This was granted in 1987.

Issues:

Whether Laxman's sons, born before his adoption, had the right to inherit his property in the adoptive family after his death, especially in contrast to his daughter Kalindi, who was born after his adoption.

Held:

The judgment upholds the rights of all the children, both those born before and after the adoption, to inherit the property of their natural father and mother in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Act doesn't make any distinction between sons born before or after the father's adoption, and there is no provision barring natural-born sons from inheriting their father's property.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court.

Facts:

The dispute arose over the selection process for the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak in the Panchayat of the Rewa District in Madhya Pradesh. The selection process was governed by guidelines issued on June 2, 2012, by the Madhya Pradesh State Employment Guarantee Parishad, a registered institution under the Panchayat and Rural Development Department. These guidelines specified the qualifications and criteria for selection.

However, the Collector of Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, issued a Revised Time Schedule for the recruitment process on June 17, 2014. This schedule included a computer efficiency test as part of the selection process, even though it was not mentioned in the original guidelines.

Some candidates who had already been selected or were in the process of selection challenged the introduction of the computer efficiency test, arguing that it was not part of the original guidelines and should not be added mid-way through the selection process.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of the computer efficiency test was valid when it was not part of the original guidelines.

Whether candidates who participated in the computer efficiency test without objection could later challenge the process.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the introduction of the computer efficiency test after the selection process had already begun was not in accordance with the guidelines issued on June 2, 2012. Therefore, the candidates who had participated in the test could not be considered to have accepted it as a valid part of the selection process.

The Supreme Court also cited the principle that candidates who participate in an examination or selection process without objection cannot later challenge the process. However, it clarified that this principle did not apply in this case because the computer efficiency test had been introduced in a manner inconsistent with the original guidelines.

The appeals were dismissed, and the High Court's decision was upheld.

Facts:

The appellant, Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (formerly known as Maruti Udyog Ltd.), is engaged in the manufacturing of automobiles, which are subject to Excise Duty under the Central Excise Act, 1994. For the assessment year 1999-2000, the appellant claimed deductions under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act for two specific amounts:

Deduction of Rs. 69,93,00,428/- representing unutilized MODVAT credit of Excise Duty.

Deduction of Rs. 3,08,88,171/- in respect of Sales Tax Recoverable Account.

Issues:

Whether the unutilized MODVAT credit of Excise Duty qualifies for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the amount in the Sales Tax Recoverable Account is eligible for deduction under Section 43B.

Held:

Unutilized MODVAT Credit of Excise Duty: The court held that unutilized MODVAT credit under the MODVAT scheme does not qualify for deductions under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act. The scheme of the Central Excise Act and Rules imposes the liability to pay Excise Duty on the manufacturer of raw materials and inputs, not on the purchaser (the appellant). While the appellant could credit the Excise Duty paid on raw materials and inputs to their account under the MODVAT scheme, this did not mean that they were liable to pay Excise Duty on these materials. The liability to pay Excise Duty was on the manufacturer of the raw materials and inputs. Hence, the unutilized MODVAT credit did not represent a sum payable by the appellant by way of tax, duty, cess, or fee, as required by Section 43B.

Sales Tax Recoverable Account: The court upheld the disallowance of the deduction claimed for the Sales Tax Recoverable Account under Section 43B. The appellant had the option to set off the sales tax paid against its liability on the sales of finished goods. Since the sales tax paid was not actually paid but merely recorded in a separate account, it did not meet the conditions of Section 43B, which requires actual payment of the sum. Therefore, the deduction was rightly disallowed.

Proviso to Section 43B: The court rejected the appellant's claim under the first proviso to Section 43B. The proviso allows a deduction if a sum is actually paid on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income for the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred. In this case, the liability to pay Excise Duty on the manufactured vehicles was incurred in the subsequent year, not in the assessment year in question. Therefore, the proviso did not apply.

The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between C.S. Venkatesh (the appellant) and A.S.C. Murthy (the plaintiff), who filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of reconveyance concerning a property in Bangalore. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that a sale deed executed by him in favor of the defendants was null and void. The plaintiff's claim was based on the contention that the sale deed served as security for a loan advanced by the defendants, and there was an agreement of reconveyance.

Issues:

Is the sale deed nominal or an outright sale?

Has the plaintiff demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?

Held:

The sale deed was not nominal but constituted an outright sale. The language and recitals within the deed indicated an unequivocal intention to transfer ownership. (Para 12)

To establish readiness and willingness for specific performance, the plaintiff must demonstrate continuous preparedness to fulfill the contractual obligations throughout the relevant period. Mere pleadings are insufficient; proof of the plaintiff's ability to generate the necessary consideration is required. In this case, the plaintiff's pleadings were not substantiated by evidence, and the plaintiff's financial situation did not support the claim of readiness and willingness. (Para 15-20)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and reinstated the trial court's decision in favor of the defendant, C.S. Venkatesh.

Facts:

The respondent occupied the 16th floor of a building since February 1, 2012, without paying any lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity charges, or other dues.

The appellant claimed lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019, which the respondent did not seriously dispute.

Disputes arose over the maintenance charges, with the respondent arguing that they should not be liable to pay due to the absence of air-conditioning.

The appellant also claimed electricity charges, including minimum demand charges and additional fees, which the respondent disputed, asserting they only used minimal electricity and were not provided with invoices.

The respondent did not make any payments despite occupying the premises for over seven years.

Issues:

Whether the respondent is liable to pay lease rent and maintenance charges.

How to calculate maintenance charges in the absence of air-conditioning.

Whether the respondent is liable to pay electricity charges.

How to determine the electricity charges owed by the respondent.

Whether the electricity disconnection was justified due to non-payment by the respondent.

Held:

The respondent is liable to pay the appellant:

Lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019.

Maintenance charges of Rs. 2,11,20,000 at a rate of Rs. 7.50 per sq. ft. per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

Minimum electricity charges of Rs. 1,10,000 per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

The respondent is required to pay Rs. 1,00,00,000 within one month, with the remaining amount in three equal installments.

The appellant must restore electricity within three days of receiving the initial payment.

Monthly bills for lease rent, electricity charges, maintenance charges, and other charges must be sent by the appellant to the respondent. Payment must be made by a specified date each month, with a portion to be paid even in case of a dispute.

If any of the conditions set by the court are violated, the appellant has the right to disconnect electricity.