Facts:

The appeal relates to the appointment of the Appellant to the post of Lecturer in English in Sri Jagadaguru Annadaneshwari High School at Mundaragi, Gadag District of the State of Karnataka. The fifth Respondent challenged the appointment, claiming seniority and entitlement to the post.

Issues:

The interpretation of the reservation rules concerning a solitary post of Lecturer in English, specifically whether a single post in a particular discipline can be treated as a separate cadre for the purpose of reservation.

Held:

The Court held that the decision in K Govindappa (2009) 1 SCC 1, which dealt with the reservation in the context of the cadre, is applicable to the current case.

The principle enunciated is that reservation cannot be applied to a solitary post, and there must be a plurality of posts within a cadre for the Rule of reservation to be valid under Article 16(4) of the Constitution.

The circular of the State of Karnataka dated 31 May 1991, emphasizing unit-wise roster maintenance, was deemed irrelevant to override the binding effect of previous court decisions.

The Court directed the State of Karnataka to consider afresh the request for the creation of an additional post or a supernumerary post within two months, considering the impending superannuation of the fifth Respondent.

No recovery shall be made from the Appellant for the period she worked as a Lecturer in English.

The fifth Respondent's pay shall be fixed notionally, and she shall be considered for promotion expeditiously within one month.

Facts:

The 6th Central Pay Commission recommended pay-scale revisions in March 2008.

An Official Committee was formed by the Government of Tamil Nadu to examine and recommend pay-scales in line with the 6th Central Pay Commission.

Recommendations were accepted by the State Government through GO No.234 dated 01.06.2009.

Subsequently, a One Man Commission was constituted to rectify pay anomalies arising from the GO No.234 implementation.

The One Man Commission's recommendations were accepted through various Government Orders (GO Nos.254 to 340) in 2010.

Issues:

Subsequent to the GO No.234 and One Man Commission recommendations, the State Government issued GO No.71 in 2011, scaling down certain benefits without notice or hearing.

Various writ petitions challenged the validity of GO No.71, leading to a Single Judge's dismissal.

The Division Bench, on appeal, granted interim stay on GO No.71, except for the constitution of the Pay Grievance Redressal Cell (PGRC).

PGRC, constituted by the State Government, recommended pay-scale adjustments in 2013.

Writ petitions challenged the validity of GO No.242 issued to implement PGRC's recommendations.

Held:

The Division Bench found a violation of natural justice in reducing pay-scales without proper notice or hearing.

The Court directed the State Government to reconstitute the PGRC, this time chaired by a retired Judge.

The Court upheld the principle that a retired Judge would bring impartiality and expertise to pay-scale adjustments.

Recommendations made by the PGRC were accepted by the State Government through GO No.242.

The Court, acknowledging the violation of natural justice in the initial process, emphasized the need for a fair reconsideration.

The Division Bench directed the PGRC to review pay-scale adjustments, giving due consideration to all concerned.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between Century Rayon Limited (Appellant) and IVP Limited (First Respondent) regarding the construction of electricity transmission towers on the land owned by the First Respondent. The appellant had sought permission from the authorities, but the first respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction, claiming that the construction was done without prior approval.

Issues:

Validity of the construction of electricity transmission towers without prior approval.

Dispute over the ownership and use of the land.

Whether the interim injunction order should be continued.

Held:

The court acknowledges lapses on the part of the involved parties but emphasizes that the balance of convenience does not justify the continuation of the interim injunction order in favor of the first respondent.( Para 6)

Refers to the Power Grid Corporation case, highlighting the imperative need for unobstructed access for laying down electricity transmission lines in the larger public interest. Mentions relevant sections of the Telegraph Act, emphasizing the power of the telegraph authority and the obligation to pay compensation for any damage caused.( Para 7)

Addresses the argument that the electricity transmission line is for the benefit of the appellant and not the public at large. The court emphasizes the policy decision of the government and the public benefit aspect.( Para 8)

Mentions the failed attempts to settle the matter and the commercial aspect of the dispute, leaving the issue of monetary compensation open.( Para 9)

Sets aside the impugned order and the injunction order, subject to the appellant making an ad hoc payment of Rs. 20,00,000/- to the first respondent. Allows the continuation and completion of the work on the condition of payment. The payment is subject to the outcome of the civil suit or proceedings under the Telegraph Act for quantifying compensation.( Para 10)

The appeal is allowed.( Para 11)

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation and application of provisions related to arbitration, specifically Sections 34 to 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The matter also delves into the constitutional validity of the amendments introduced by the 2019 Amendment Act, particularly Section 87, and the relevance of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 34 to 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with a focus on the automatic stay of awards.

The impact of the 2019 Amendment Act on the judgment in the BCCI case.

The constitutional validity of Section 87, including its removal of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act.

The application and interpretation of Section 3(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, concerning the term 'Corporate person.'

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 34 to 36: The Court clarified that Section 36 does not automatically stay an arbitral award during the pendency of a challenge under Section 34. The purpose of Section 36 is to enforce a final and binding award under the CPC once the challenge period has expired or the application has been refused.( Paragraphs: 13, 22, 25-27, 30)

Removal of the Basis of the BCCI Judgment: The Court rejected arguments that the 2019 Amendment Act removes the basis of the BCCI judgment. It emphasized the need to examine the substance of the amendment, regardless of its mention in the Statement of Objects and Reasons.(Paragraphs: 41, 45, 46)

Constitutional Validity of Section 87: The Court held that the introduction of Section 87 and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act were manifestly arbitrary. It found the amendments contrary to the objectives of the 2015 Amendment Act and the Arbitration Act, 1996.(Paragraphs: 47-49, 50, 51)

Interpretation of 'Corporate person' under the Insolvency Code: The Court rejected suggestions to modify the definition of 'Corporate person' under Section 3(7) of the Insolvency Code. It clarified that entities like NHAI, performing governmental functions, cannot be subjected to insolvency proceedings. (Paragraphs: 57, 58, 59, 63, 65)

Facts:

Dispute arose between M/S. UTTARAKHAND PURV SAINIK KALYAN NIGAM LIMITED (Appellant) and NORTHERN COAL FIELD LIMITED (Respondent).

Agreement dated 21.12.2010 contained an arbitration clause.

Legal Notice issued by Appellant on 29.05.2013 demanding payment.

Notice of Arbitration sent on 09.03.2016, no response from Respondent.

Application filed under Section 11 on 20.09.2016, Respondent raised limitation as a ground to oppose the appointment of arbitrator.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application filed under Section 11 on the ground of limitation?

Held:

The Court held that, post the 2015 Amendment Act, the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 11 is limited to examining the existence of the arbitration agreement. The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz empowers the arbitrator to rule on its own jurisdiction. The exception to this rule is when the arbitration agreement is impeached as being procured by fraud or deception. In this case, the issue of limitation, being a jurisdictional issue, is required to be decided by the arbitrator under Section 16, not by the High Court at the pre-reference stage under Section 11. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the issue of limitation to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of irregularities in the procurement of ration, leading to an investigation. A prima facie case was found against 12 Army personnel, including the respondent. A hearing of the charge under rule 22 was convened, where the Commanding Officer found no prima facie case against the respondent. The respondent retired, but proceedings were continued against him invoking Section 123 of the Army Act. The General Court Martial was convened, and the respondent challenged the validity of the order through an Original Application (O.A.) under Sections 14 and 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal to entertain an appeal against the order convening the General Court Martial.

Interpretation of Sections 14 and 15 regarding the scope of "service matters" under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

Held:

The Tribunal held that an appeal under Section 15 was not maintainable as there was no order, decision, finding, or sentence by the Court Martial. However, Section 14 allows an application in any service matter, and "service matters" include conditions of service, which encompasses dismissal from service. The Tribunal emphasized a wide construction of Section 14, affirming its jurisdiction over service matters of Army personnel.

The words "relating to" in the definition of "service matters" in Section 3(o) should be interpreted broadly. The proceedings against the respondent, leading to a potential termination of service, were deemed related to his service. The Tribunal highlighted that an interpretation conferring jurisdiction should be preferred over one taking away jurisdiction.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant-Inspector demanded a bribe for providing electricity connection to a shed. A trap was laid, and currency notes were chemically treated. The raiding party, along with witnesses, proceeded to the DESU office. The appellant, upon receiving the bribe, was caught, and the tainted money was recovered from his pocket.

Issues:

The appellant challenged his conviction, citing major contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.

Held:

The deviations between the testimonies of PW2 and PW-3 do not negate the demand, payment of bribe, or the seizure of the bribe. Minor discrepancies in the details of handwash or pant wash are insufficient to justify acquittal. Para No.: 8, 9, 10, 11

The reason for the demand and payment of the bribe was established despite contradictions in the testimony of PW-6. The appellant's contention that the shed did not have an electricity connection was rejected. Para No.: 12

The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act is applicable as the conditions for drawing such a presumption were met. The appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation to rebut the presumption. Para No.: 13, 14

The validity of the sanction order was upheld. The sanctioning authority properly examined the material before granting sanction for prosecution. Para No.: 16, 17

Procedural lapses in the investigation, regarding the rank of the investigating officer, were considered irregularities. However, no prejudice was alleged or argued by the appellant. Para No.: 19

A mere error or irregularity in the sanction is not considered fatal unless it results in a failure of justice. Section 19(1) of the Act is procedural and does not affect the court's jurisdiction once cognizance has been taken. Para No.: 20, 21

Facts:

The plaintiff initially filed a suit for injunction to restrain the defendant from obstructing possession. Subsequently, a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell the property was filed. The earlier injunction suit was dismissed for default, and the later suit for specific performance was also dismissed on the grounds of non-compliance with Order 2 Rule 2.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit for specific performance is barred under Order 2 Rule 2.

Application of Order 2 Rule 2 principles regarding the inclusion of the whole claim.

Held:

Order 2 Rule 2(1) mandates the inclusion of the entire claim in a suit, but allows the plaintiff to relinquish a portion to bring it within the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff who omits or intentionally relinquishes any part of the claim is not entitled to sue for it later without court leave (Order 2 Rule 2(2) and (3)).

To invoke Order 2 Rule 2, the subsequent claim's cause of action must have arisen when the first claim was before the court.

In this case, the plaintiff's earlier suit for injunction included details of the agreement to sell, the price, earnest money, and the demand for performance. The cause of action for specific performance arose when the defendant denied contract performance, concurrent with the earlier suit. The plaintiff failed to sue for specific performance without court leave, invoking Order 2 Rule 2(3).

The bar under Order 2 Rule 2 is justified as the plaintiff was entitled to sue for specific performance when filing the earlier injunction suit but omitted to do so. The cause of action in both suits was identical.

The plaintiff, having paid a sum to the defendant, is entitled to a refund with interest for the deposited amounts.

The court issued directions under Article 142 for the refund, maintaining the judgment of the High Court.

Facts:

The prosecution established harassment under Section 498-A, alleging dowry demand as the motive. The deceased was subjected to harassment to coerce her and her parents to meet an unlawful monetary demand.

Issues:

Whether the proved cruelty under Section 498-A, along with the suicide within seven years of marriage, warrants a conviction under Section 306 with the aid of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that the accused's actions directly led to the deceased's suicide.

Held:

The evidence of PW-10, the deceased's father, corroborated by PW-13, substantiates the harassment for an unlawful demand under Section 498-A.( Para 11)

Mere guilt under Section 498-A and death within seven years doesn't automatically lead to Section 306 conviction. The prosecution must establish a direct link between the accused's act and the suicide.( Para 27)

The prosecution failed to prove that the cruelty left the deceased with no choice but suicide. No evidence showed immediate cruelty prior to the suicide, and a two-month gap existed between the last visit and the suicide.( Paras 33-34)

Unlike previous cases, the charge didn't specify that the deceased was driven to suicide due to harassment. Conviction under Section 498-A is maintained, but the conviction under Section 306 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the Section 306 charge.( Paras 35-37)