Facts:

Respondents had booked flats with the appellant-builder, but the flats were not delivered on time. They filed a consumer complaint before the National Commission, seeking a refund of their money. The appellant received the notices in June 2020 and filed a written statement/reply on 31 August 2020, which was beyond the 45-day period prescribed under Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act.

Issues:

• Whether the National Commission can allow the filing of a written statement beyond the prescribed 45-day period?
• Whether the order dated 23 March 2020, passed by the Supreme Court for the extension of the limitation period due to the Covid-19 pandemic, applies to the present case?

Held:

The court observed that while it is true that a written statement cannot be allowed to be filed beyond the period of 45 days as per Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act, the Supreme Court's order dated 23 March 2020 extended the limitation period in all proceedings, irrespective of whether it was prescribed under general or special laws and whether it was condonable or not. This extension was effective from 15 March 2020 until further orders.

The court further noted that the original 30-day limitation period for filing the written statement had expired on 12 August 2020, and the extended period of 15 days expired on 27 August 2020, while the order dated 23 March 2020 was still in effect. Thus, the limitation for filing the written statement in the present proceedings before the National Commission would be deemed to have been extended by the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

 The appellant's daughter died an unnatural death, and the respondent-accused claimed it to be a suicide. However, the appellant lodged an FIR alleging that his deceased daughter was pressurized to bring money, and he had paid money on several occasions to the in-laws of the deceased. The Session Judge noted an incident where the deceased was allegedly assaulted by her in-laws, leading to a complaint at the police station. The FIR also mentioned that the father-in-law of the deceased had telephonically threatened the appellant and demanded money. On the same day, the deceased informed the appellant of a threat to her life. Unfortunately, before the appellant could reach his daughter's matrimonial house, he was informed of her hospitalization, and she later passed away.

Issues:

• Whether the FIR was engineered to falsely implicate the accused?
• Whether there was a lack of correlation between the allegations in the FIR?
• Whether the allegations were general without assigning a specific role to the accused?
• Whether the grant of anticipatory bail would obstruct the investigation?

Held:

The Single Judge of the High Court erred in arriving at the findings that the FIR was engineered to implicate the accused and lacked correlation between allegations. The FIR contained specific allegations related to dowry demands, assault incidents, and monetary transactions, making the Single Judge's conclusions unreasonable (Para 14).

The grant of anticipatory bail in such a serious offense would obstruct the investigation. The Court found deficiencies in the investigation, and the status of the accused as influential persons diminished the Court's faith in further investigation by the same authorities (Para 19).

In light of the flawed investigation, the Court decided to entrust further investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under Article 142 of the Constitution (Para 23).

Facts:

The case involved an appeal challenging the denial of anticipatory bail to the appellant, who was the mother-in-law of a Muslim woman to whom triple talaq was pronounced by her husband. The appellant was accused under the provisions of Section.498A of the Indian Penal Code based on vague and general allegations in the FIR.

Issues:

• Whether the provisions of Section.7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, would bar the grant of anticipatory bail to the mother-in-law of a Muslim woman upon whom triple talaq was pronounced by her husband.
• Whether Section.7(c) of the Act, 2019, restricts the court's power to grant anticipatory bail under s.438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

Held:

 The offense created by Section.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, applies to the Muslim husband for pronouncing triple talaq on his wife. The mother-in-law, being a female, cannot be accused of pronouncing triple talaq under the Act, as the offense can only be committed by a Muslim man. Therefore, the mother-in-law cannot be denied anticipatory bail under Section.7(c) of the Act. (Para 8, 9)

The court's power to grant anticipatory bail is not barred by Section.7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. While entertaining an application for anticipatory bail for an offense under the Act, the court must hear the married Muslim woman who made the complaint, as prescribed under Section.7(c) of the Act. Only after giving the married Muslim woman a hearing can the court grant bail to the accused. The provisions of Section.438 CrPC are not expressly overridden by the Act. (Para 10, 18)

Facts:

An advocate, not connected to the criminal proceeding in any capacity, filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., urging the court to expedite the trial of an accused facing charges under the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The advocate identified themselves as a social activist while submitting the said application.

Issues:

• Whether a third party, devoid of any involvement in the criminal proceeding, possesses the locus standi to file an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. seeking the expedition of the trial.
• Whether the High Court has the authority to direct the trial court in expediting criminal trials for offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held :

The judgment holds that the High Court does possess the power to direct the trial court in expediting criminal trials, particularly in cases involving offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act. [Para 11]

However, the application filed by the third-party advocate was deemed to lack bona fide intentions, and subsequently, the advocate had no locus standi to file such an application. [Para 14]

The court clarified that applications of this nature, brought forward by third parties in the guise of Public Interest Litigation, cannot ordinarily be entertained by the High Court. [Para 15]

The responsibility of ensuring the expeditious conduct of criminal trials lies with the State and the prosecution. Thus, the application filed by the third-party advocate under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was dismissed by the Supreme Court. [Para 16]

Nonetheless, the judgment states that the trial court retains the discretion to expedite the criminal trial, taking into account the gravity of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act, subject to any orders passed by the High Court in pending proceedings. [ Para 16]

FACTS:

The charge against the petitioner was framed under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, which includes Section 376(2). The petitioner pleaded that the charge was under Section 376(1) and not Section 376(2). The victim, a six-year-old, was allegedly raped by the petitioner, and evidence from the victim and her mother, who was an eyewitness, was present on record.

ISSUES:

• Whether the charge framed against the petitioner was under Section 376(1) or Section 376(2) of the IPC.
• Whether the evidence on record supports the allegation of the rape of a six-year-old victim by the petitioner.

HELD:

The Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4206 of 2020 was dismissed by the court. The concurrent finding of fact supported the charge framed under Section 376 of the IPC, which includes Section 376(2). The evidence provided by the victim and her mother, who was an eyewitness, was crucial in establishing the commission of the offense.

Facts:

The case involves a winding up petition filed by ACTION ISPAT AND POWER PVT. LTD. against SHYAM METALICS AND ENERGY LTD. The issue revolves around whether the winding up proceedings can be transferred from the Company Court to the NCLT and the applicability of the Companies Act, 2013, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and relevant rules.

Issues:

• Permissibility of transferring winding up proceedings to NCLT after admission of the winding up petition.
• Interpretation of Section 434(1)(c), fifth proviso, and Section 290 of the Companies Act, 2013.
• The applicability of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016, and the Company (Court) Rules, 1959.

Held:

The Code (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016) provides a beneficial result in winding up proceedings, making them compulsorily transferable to the NCLT if the petition has not been served in the pre-admission stage.

Even post-admission of a winding up petition and after the assets of the company sought to be wound up become in custodia legis and are taken over by the Company Liquidator, the Company Liquidator may continue the business for the beneficial winding up of the company.

Unless irreversible steps towards winding up have been taken, the Company Court has discretion to transfer the proceedings to the NCLT under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c).

In this specific case, the Court found that no irreversible steps towards winding up have taken place, justifying the transfer of the winding up petition to the NCLT.

Facts:

 An advocate filed a writ petition before the High Court, seeking directions to the Department of AYUSH to allow homeopathic practitioners to perform in accordance with the advisory issued on 06.03.2020. The advisory suggested the use of AYUSH systems in responding to COVID-19, but the State of Kerala and the Department of AYUSH, Trivandrum, did not implement it. The High Court disposed of the writ petition, stating that the advisory was being followed by the government, and AYUSH practitioners were only allowed to prescribe immunity boosters. Any claim of curing COVID-19 by homeopathic practitioners, except those mentioned in the advisory, could lead to action under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Issues:

• Whether homeopathic practitioners can advertise their ability to cure COVID-19 when statutory regulations prohibit such advertisements.
• Whether the High Court's observations and directions in paragraph 14 of the judgment were appropriate.

Held :

The Homeopathic Practitioners (Professional Conduct, Etiquette, and Code of Ethics) Regulations, 1982, clearly prohibit advertisement by homeopathic practitioners. Since regulations already bar advertising, there is no basis for homeopathic medical practitioners to claim that they can cure COVID-19. The observations in paragraph 14 of the High Court's judgment were unwarranted in this context. (Para 18-19)

The writ petition before the High Court sought only limited relief, i.e., a direction to implement the advisory dated 06.03.2020 issued by the Ministry of AYUSH, and there was no occasion for the High Court to make additional observations and issue directions as it did in paragraph 14. The guidelines issued by the Ministry of AYUSH after 04.04.2020 provide specific guidance on homeopathy's approach to COVID-19, and qualified practitioners can prescribe medicines accordingly. While the High Court was correct in stating that no medical practitioner can claim to cure COVID-19, it failed to fully comprehend the advisory and guidelines issued by the Ministry of AYUSH. The Homeopathy is contemplated to be used in preventing and mitigating COVID-19, as reflected by the advisory and guidelines. (Para 20-23)

Facts:

The informant, Samir Agrawal, filed a complaint before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging a violation of Section 3 of the Competition Act. The CCI dismissed the case, holding that no contravention of Section 3 was made out. The informant appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), which upheld the CCI's decision. Subsequently, the informant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

• Whether the informant had the locus standi to move the CCI with the information.
• Whether the actions of Ola and Uber constituted cartelization or anti-competitive practices between drivers.

Held:

The Court held that "any person" may provide information to the CCI, and the definition of "person" under Section 2(l) of the Competition Act is inclusive and wide, encompassing individuals and artificial juridical persons. Therefore, the informant (Samir Agrawal) was competent to approach the CCI with the information. (Para 13, 14, 16, 20, 22)

The Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact by the CCI and NCLAT, stating that Ola and Uber's actions did not facilitate cartelization or anti-competitive practices between drivers. As a result, no contravention of Section 3 of the Act was established. (Para 23)

Facts:

The appellant, Smt. S. Vanitha, claimed the house owned by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, her in-laws, as her matrimonial residence after her husband (respondent No. 4) deserted her and their daughter. The authorities directed her to vacate the house, and the High Court upheld the decision, stating her right to claim shelter was only against her husband.

Issues:

• Whether the premises in question constituted a 'shared household' under Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act.
• Whether the remedies sought under the Senior Citizens Act can preclude the woman's right to a shared household under the PWDV Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the premises in question constituted a 'shared household' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act. The remedies sought under the Senior Citizens Act should not defeat the woman's right to a shared household under the PWDV Act. The woman is duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act after obtaining relief from the Senior Citizens Act's Tribunal. The court ruled that the Senior Citizens Act's summary powers should not be used to circumvent a woman's claim of entitlement under the PWDV Act. [Para 23]