Facts:

The appellant, Rajasthan State Electricity Board Jaipur, is a Government Company defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant filed a return for the assessment year 1991-92, reporting a loss. However, due to a bonafide mistake, the appellant claimed 100% depreciation instead of the correct 75%, resulting in a disallowed amount of 25% depreciation. The Assessing Officer issued an intimation disallowing 25% of the depreciation and demanded additional tax under Section 143(1-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant contested this demand, stating that the reduction in depreciation was not an attempt to evade tax but was due to a genuine mistake.

Issues:

Whether the demand for additional tax under Section 143(1-A) was justified in the given circumstances.

The court needed to determine whether the reduction in depreciation was a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the appellant.

Held:

The court considered the purpose and intent of Section 143(1-A) of the Income Tax Act, which aims to prevent tax evasion. The court referred to the precedent set by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Gauhati vs. Sati Oil Udyog Limited and another, (2015) 7 SCC 304, which held that the burden of proving an attempt to evade tax is on the Revenue. The court reiterated that the provision should only be invoked when the lesser amount stated in the return is a result of an intentional attempt to evade tax.

In the present case, the court observed that the reduction in depreciation was due to a bonafide mistake and not an intentional evasion of tax. The court emphasized that mechanical application of Section 143(1-A) was unwarranted in these circumstances. The court also noted that the Commissioner's order did not suggest any intent to evade tax on the appellant's part.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and the demand for additional tax. The court held that Section 143(1-A) should not be mechanically applied when there is no evidence of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee.

Facts:

The appellant sought the disqualification of the respondent, a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha), based on allegations that he had given up his membership of the Janata Dal (United) [JD(U)] political party. The appellant's petition for disqualification was filed on 02.09.2017, and the Chairman of Rajya Sabha ordered the respondent's disqualification on 04.12.2017.

Issues:

Whether subsequent events, specifically the formation of a new political party by the respondent on 18.05.2018, could be introduced as additional evidence to challenge the disqualification order. The appellant sought to present this evidence in a writ petition before the Delhi High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the application seeking to introduce additional evidence. The Court emphasized that the disqualification order was based on events that occurred prior to its issuance, and the subsequent events were not the basis for seeking the respondent's disqualification initially. The Court acknowledged the general principle that subsequent events might not be relevant for challenging an order, but exceptions could apply when such events affect the state of affairs at the time of disqualification.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the Court upheld the High Court's decision, subject to its observations. The Supreme Court clarified that while subsequent events might not typically be relevant, in some cases, exceptions could be made based on fairness and justice. The Court directed the High Court to dispose of the writ petition promptly.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit seeking relief and injunction related to a property dispute. The respondents were accused of disobeying the injunction orders issued by the Single Judge, which led to the initiation of contempt proceedings. Repeated undertakings were given by the respondents but not adhered to. The respondents' compliance with court orders, their residence details, and the clearance of charges on the property were under question.

Issues:

The breach of injunction orders, validity of undertakings, surrender of passport, and compliance with court directions. The question of jurisdiction and appropriateness of the Single Judge's orders were also addressed.

Held:

The learned Single Judge, observing the respondents' failure to comply with undertakings and injunction orders, directed respondent No.1 to surrender his passport to ensure his presence in court and compliance with court orders. The Division Bench set aside this order, which led to this appeal. The Supreme Court reinstated the Single Judge's order, emphasizing that the intent was to secure respondents' presence and order compliance. The Court confirmed that the authority to direct passport deposit lies with the court to ensure parties' presence during proceedings.

The Court ordered an expeditious disposal of the civil suit while maintaining the passport directive for respondent No.1. The Division Bench's decision was overturned, and the appeal was allowed.

Cases Referred

David Jude vs. Hannah Grace Jude and Another, (2003) 10 SCC 767

Facts:

On 21st April, 2007, during a marriage ceremony, the appellant fired celebratory gunshots that resulted in injuries to five individuals, leading to the deaths of two. The appellant's defense was accidental firing caused by a ball hitting the gun. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's act constituted 'culpable homicide' or 'murder'?

Whether celebratory firing with unintended consequences falls under Section 304 Part-2 of the IPC?

Held:

The appellant's act of firing towards the roof during the marriage ceremony, although unintentional, was found to be an act of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 of the IPC, punishable under Section 304 Part-2. The appellant carried a loaded gun in a crowded event, aiming towards the roof, which resulted in injuries and fatalities. While he may not have intended to kill, his actions invited risk and likely consequences. The sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC was reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, and the conviction under Section 307 IPC was altered to Section 308 IPC. The fine remained unchanged.

The Court referred to the case of Kunwar Pal vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 12 SCC 434, wherein the intention to kill was not proven, and the accused was given the benefit of doubt, resulting in a lesser conviction.

Facts:

A notice inviting tender was issued by the appellant, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), for hiring Heavy Earth Moving Machinery (HEMM) for coal extraction and transportation. The bidding was conducted online, and technical issues led to connectivity problems during the auction. The last bid by respondent No. 1 went unresponded for thirty minutes, resulting in the auction's automatic closure. The auction was later restarted due to technical issues and communicated to all bidders. Respondent No. 6 was ultimately declared the successful bidder.

Issues:

The scope of judicial review in tender matters.

Allegations of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

Whether larger public interest was affected by the auction process.

The existence of technical problems and connectivity issues during the auction.

Interpretation of contractual terms and authority's decision-making process.

Held:

The scope of judicial review in tenders has been extensively discussed. Courts are concerned with lawfulness, not soundness, of decisions. Allegations of illegality and procedural impropriety warrant judicial intervention. The decision-making process is subject to scrutiny, but not the end result.

Writs are appropriate remedies when a constitutional right is infringed, such as treating all equally or challenging actions in contravention to trade and commerce freedom. Writs are impermissible when allegations concern contractual rights or duties.

The Division Bench of the High Court failed to evaluate whether larger public interest was affected. Respondent No. 1's interest was private and monetary, not a public law right.

After an inquiry report by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), it was clear that BCCL and others acted bona fide. Technical issues and connectivity problems were established, and no fraudulent decisions were proven .

The Division Bench erred in holding no technical difficulties existed, contrary to the findings of various entities. Multiple bids were received after the resumption of the auction process, indicating technical issues

The uniform communication about the extension of the auction time placed all bidders on equal footing. Respondent No. 1's interpretation was moot since they did not object to the email's wording during the resumed auction .

Courts must defer to the authority's interpretation of contractual terms unless it is patently perverse or mala fide. BCCL's interpretation was plausible, and mere differences in interpretation are not grounds for finding illegality.

Facts:

The appellant, Ex-Gunner Virender Prasad, was found guilty of murdering Gunner-Sushil Kumar while posted in a sensitive area during a time of heightened terrorist threats. The appellant claimed he had shot the deceased under the belief of a militant attack.

Issues:

Whether Section 433-A of the CrPC applies to a case tried under Section 69 of the Army Act, regarding the minimum imprisonment term before release for a life convict.

To determine an appropriate sentence for the appellant considering factors such as the nature of the offence, circumstances, prior criminal record, age of the offender, rehabilitation prospects, and community needs.

Held:

The Court confirmed the appellant's guilt but focused on the sentence.

The Court referred to previous cases, such as Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, which established that a proper sentence involves considering multiple factors.

The Court acknowledged that Section 433-A of the CrPC, which mandates a minimum imprisonment term before release for life convicts, applies to cases under Section 69 of the Army Act. However, the appellant had already served over 16 years and 6 months in prison, exceeding the 14-year requirement.

Taking into account the appellant's conduct, the circumstances, and the time served, the Court found that the sentence served was proportionate to the offence. As a result, the Court ordered the appellant's immediate release.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's release was directed.

FACTS:

The appellant, Jeetendra, had been in custody since January 5, 2019, under charges related to Sections 420, 177, 181, 193, 200, and 120-B of the IPC.

An earlier case was filed by the appellant's wife, which led to his arrest. He was released on bail after the matrimonial dispute was resolved.

A new complaint was filed alleging forgery of documents submitted as personal bond for the appellant's release in the previous case.

A closure report was filed, but further investigation was ordered by a Judicial Magistrate after five years.

ISSUES:

The appellant's bail application was rejected by the High Court based on the pending acceptance of the closure report.

The appellant contended that bail should be granted as per the principles of "Bail is rule and jail is exception."

HELD:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the grant or rejection of bail should not be mechanical as it concerns an individual's liberty. In this specific case, where a closure report had been filed twice and the examination of witnesses was linked to the fate of the report, the High Court's denial of bail was not appropriate. (Paragraph 7)

The Court reiterated the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and, considering the nature of the allegations and the time spent in custody, the appellant deserved to be released on bail. (Paragraph 7)

The High Court's order was set aside, and the interim bail granted earlier was made absolute. The appellant was to be released on regular bail, based on the bail bonds already furnished. The appeal is allowed. (Paragraph 8)

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1, a judicial officer, was appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate. During the probationary period, allegations of misdemeanour and corruption in discharge of judicial functions were received. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the Rajasthan High Court submitted a report detailing these allegations. The Full Court evaluated probationary judges' suitability, based on integrity, knowledge, conduct, and behaviour. Respondent No. 1's services were not confirmed based on overall assessment.

ISSUES:

• Whether the termination during the probationary period was punitive or due to unsatisfactory performance?

• Whether specific allegations or overall performance were the basis for the termination?

• Whether principles of natural justice apply in this case of non-confirmation?

HELD:

The purpose of probation is to evaluate suitability for a position, and probationers do not have an indefeasible right to continue in employment.

The High Court's role in judicial review of administrative decisions is cautious and should not substitute for an appellate role.

Termination based on overall performance during probation, rather than specific misconduct, may not be treated as punitive.

In this case, the termination was based on an overall assessment of performance, not specific misconduct.

The Court can consider overall suitability and relevant factors when assessing probationers' performance.

DECISION:

The appeals are allowed. The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the order of discharge of Respondent No. 1's services during probation is approved.

FACTS:

The case involved the West Bengal Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd. as the appellant and M/S. Sona Promoters Pvt. Ltd. as the respondent.

The dispute centered around whether the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent were valid under the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.

The Corporation leased out three plots of land to the respondent, which did not have any structures on them.

The issue was whether these leased plots of land constituted "Government premises" under the Act and whether the eviction proceedings were legally justified.

ISSUES:

Whether the leased plots of land without any structures were considered "Government premises" as defined by the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.

Whether the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent were valid under the Act.

HELD:

The Corporation is a government undertaking as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act.

However, the leased plots of land without any structures do not meet the criteria for "Government premises" as defined in Section 2(a) read with Section 2(c) of the Act.

The Act's definition of "premises" includes various structures, and since the leased plots were bare land without any structures, they do not fall under the category of "Government premises."

Consequently, the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent under the Act were without jurisdiction.

The Court suggests that the Corporation should pursue eviction under the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1962.

The appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.