Facts:

The Public Works Department of the State issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for the construction of an Elevated Corridor (Flyover) of a length of 7.473 Km.

Eleven companies, including UPSBC, 'R' Builders, and 'Ra' Construction Co., bid for the project.

The State rejected UPSBC's bid of Rs. 306.27 crores, alleging that the bidder suppressed information required under paragraph 13 of Appendix-I-A and clause 7(b) of Annex-I of the NIT.

'Ra' Construction Co.'s bid of Rs. 293.25 crores was considered non-responsive as it did not fulfill the criteria under clause 2.2.2.2(ii) of the NIT.

'R' Builders had bid for Rs. 315.80 crores.

Issues:

• Whether UPSBC's bid was rightly rejected on the ground of suppression of facts relating to a pending investigation.
• Whether 'Ra' Construction Co.'s bid was rightly rejected for not fulfilling the criteria under clause 2.2.2.2(ii) of the NIT.

Held :

UPSBC's bid was correctly rejected as it failed to disclose the fact of indictment against it, even though the investigation was no longer pending, and there was no conviction by a court of law. The omission of such a relevant fact constituted suppression, disqualifying the bid.[ Para 19]

The Court upholds the rejection of 'Ra' Construction Co.'s bid since it would not be appropriate for the Constitutional Court to substitute its view for that of the tendering authority. The construction of the clause in question was not rendered perverse, and 'R' Builders' argument in support of the State was taken into consideration.[ Para 23]

Facts:

The petitioner, Amish Devgan, hosted a debate on a news channel about the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. During the debate, he made derogatory remarks about Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, a religious figure, which led to the filing of several FIRs against him in various states. The petitioner sought the quashing of these FIRs and also requested the transfer of all cases to a specific police station in Rajasthan.

Issues:

• Whether the petitioner's statements during the debate amounted to hate speech as defined under relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code.
• Whether the FIRs filed against the petitioner suffer from a jurisdictional defect.
• Whether the petitioner's defense of "trifle" under Section 95 of the Penal Code is applicable in this case.
• Whether the petitioner's right to freedom of speech was violated, and if so, to what extent.
• Whether the quashing of the FIRs is justified at this stage of the proceedings.

Held:

The Court explained the three elements that define hate speech - content-based element, intent-based element, and harm-based element. It emphasized that criminality under relevant sections requires deliberate and malicious intent to outrage religious feelings, not merely offensive speech. (Para 65)

The Court ruled that Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits prosecution at the place where the consequences of the offense have ensued. It clarified that the impugned FIRs do not suffer from a jurisdictional defect. (Para 84)

The Court held that the defense of "trifle" under Section 95 of the Penal Code cannot be accepted without ascertaining facts and evidence. The defense was not applicable in this case without proper examination. (Para 67, Para 71)

The Court recognized the importance of dignity, unity, and integrity of the nation while dealing with hate speech cases. It emphasized that hate speech can have long-term negative effects and must be addressed with caution to protect the rights of all citizens. (Para 69)

The Court declined the petitioner's prayer for quashing the FIRs but granted interim protection against arrest during the investigation. It held that the investigation should continue to ascertain relevant facts. The Court also accepted the transfer of all FIRs to a specific police station in Rajasthan where the first FIR was registered. (Para 79, Para 85)

Facts:

The dispute arose following the division of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh into two States, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. The power utilities of the two newly formed States could not agree on the modalities for the allocation and distribution of personnel. Telangana unilaterally relieved 1157 employees working with power utilities in Telangana to join the power utilities in Andhra Pradesh based on the principle of nativity. Writ petitions were filed before the High Court, which set aside Telangana's actions and issued further directions. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment and entrusted the task of personnel distribution to a One-Man Committee. The Committee submitted its Final Report on 26.12.2019, supplemented by a Supplementary Report on 11.03.2020, and a Concluding Report on 20.06.2020, approving an allocation list submitted by Andhra Pradesh utilities.

Issues:

• The objection to the Concluding Report not being the final report and the authorization to modify the list.
• The objection regarding the reciprocity of 655 employees' allocation between the two States.

Held:

The objection regarding the Concluding Report's status: The direction in the Concluding Report, stating that employees attaining the age of 58 in 2020 would be kept out of the allocation process, was an extension of the agreement between both parties before the One-Man Committee. This direction was found to be equitable, and the Committee had taken into account all relevant factors before making this decision.

The objection regarding the reciprocity of 655 employees' allocation: The Court found no error in the reciprocity decision, as the One-Man Committee's choice to allocate 655 employees from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh and vice versa was based on a reasonable approach. The final allocation list annexed to the Concluding Report was clear and unambiguous.

Challenge to the allocation made by the One-Man Committee: The Court clarified that the allocation finalized by the One-Man Committee could not be challenged by any employee, officer, or utility before any forum.

Facts:

The appellant, Chaman Lal, was accused of committing rape and criminal intimidation against his own daughter, who was mentally challenged. The victim used to go to the jungle to graze goats and cattle when the appellant allegedly forced himself upon her during these visits. A First Information Report (FIR) was filed against Chaman Lal, charging him under Sections 376 (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, the trial court acquitted the accused, reasoning that there was a delay in filing the FIR, and the victim was not of unsound mind as claimed. Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, the State appealed to the High Court.

Issues:

• Whether the victim's mental illness rendered her incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of the sexual assault.
• Whether the accused's defense of total denial during the trial was false and taken advantage of the victim's mental illness.
• Whether the High Court was justified in re-evaluating the evidence and reversing the trial court's acquittal.

Held :

The High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal and convicted Chaman Lal for rape and criminal intimidation based on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. As the first appellate court, the High Court had the authority to re-examine the evidence and the reasoning provided by the trial court.

The High Court relied on the deposition of doctors, who were examined as prosecution witnesses (PW11 and PW22), to determine that the victim's IQ was 62, indicating mild mental retardation. The medical evidence supported the conclusion that the victim was not in a position to comprehend the good and bad aspects of sexual assault. The accused took advantage of her mental illness, as he was the biological father of the child delivered by the victim.

During the trial, Chaman Lal presented a false defense of total denial. At no point did he claim that the intercourse was consensual, further supporting the prosecution's case that he exploited the victim's mental sickness and low IQ.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and the conviction of the accused under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC by the High Court is upheld.

Facts:

The appellants were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10 of the Civil Regulations. Two other individuals, Shri Kirpal Singh Mangat and Shri Raj Kumar Garg, who were junior to the appellants in the category of Assistant Engineer (Civil), were appointed through direct recruitment based on their qualifications under Regulation 7(a)(i) of the Civil Regulations. Two circulars, dated 23.04.1990 (First Circular) and 24.05.1990 (Second Circular), were issued by the Punjab State Electricity Board for granting time-bound promotional scales.

Issues:

• Whether the appellants are entitled to time-bound promotional scale after completing 9-16 years of service, at par with the directly recruited Assistant Engineers?
• Whether the Second Circular applies to the appellants who were promoted within 9 or 16 years from their initial appointment?

Held :

The appellants were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers based on their seniority in the cadre of Junior Engineer. They claimed entitlement to the time-bound promotional scale after completing 9-16 years of service, seeking parity with directly recruited Assistant Engineers. However, the Second Circular, applicable to directly recruited Assistant Engineers, does not apply to the appellants who are covered by the First Circular. The appellants are not entitled to claim any parity with directly recruited Assistant Engineers. (Para No. 5-9)

The appellants were promoted as Assistant Engineers under Regulation 7(a)(ii) after 12 years of service. Since they were not promoted through direct recruitment, the Second Circular does not apply to them. The appellants are entitled to the time-bound promotional scale as per the First Circular. Employees promoted within the initial 9 years cannot claim the next promotion after 3 years. (Para No. 20-22)

The High Court's decision denying time-bound promotional scale to the appellants, based on Krishan Kumar Vij, was correct. The appellants are not entitled to time-bound promotional scale on the basis of parity with directly recruited Assistant Engineers or any other cases. No error found in the High Court's order, and this Court dismisses the appeals. (Para No. 23, 25)

Facts:

The Magistrate suo motu directed the registration of an FIR for illegal mining, storage, and transportation of minerals. The private appellants filed applications to quash the FIRs for offenses under Sections 379, 414 of the IPC, Sections 4, 21 of the MMDR Act, and Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules. The High Court dismissed their applications.

Issues:

• Whether the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is attracted at the stage of the Magistrate directing the registration of an FIR for offenses under the Act and its rules.
• Whether the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act applies to offenses under the MMDR Act that have been compounded by the competent authority.
• Whether criminal complaints/proceedings for offenses under the IPC (Sections 379, 414) can be proceeded with even after compounding offenses under the MMDR Act.

Held:

The bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is attracted only when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offenses under the Act and orders issuance of process/summons. At the stage of directing the registration of an FIR, the bar is not attracted (Para 8.1).

The Magistrate's order directing the registration of an FIR does not affect the power of the authorized person to compound the offense under the MMDR Act. It is a pre-cognizance stage (Para 10).

The bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act is attracted when the offender compounds the offenses under the Act or its rules. Proceedings for such compounded offenses shall not be continued. However, the bar does not apply to offenses under the IPC, which are distinct and separate offenses (Para 11).

The appeals of the private appellants are partly allowed, quashing the proceedings for offenses under Sections 4 and 21 of the MMDR Act only. The State of Madhya Pradesh's appeal is dismissed (Para 13).

Facts:

The 2nd Respondent-Director General of Police invited applications for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive) in the State.

The 2nd respondent published the select list province-wise, and unsuccessful candidates challenged it in a writ petition.

A fresh redrawn State-wise merit list was notified by the Division Bench of the High Court, appointing 259 candidates and canceling the appointment of 47 candidates.

The ousted candidates challenged the redrawn list in a second round of litigation, and the High Court held that those not within the merit zone cannot continue.

The Supreme Court, without examining the inter se dispute, accommodated all 47 ousted candidates and 22 impleaded candidates on the post of Sub-Inspector based on a statement by the Advocate General of the State.

Candidates higher in the order of merit than the 22 appointed candidates filed a writ petition, claiming they were denied their legitimate right of fair consideration.

Issues:

• Whether the appointments of the 22 candidates were legally sustainable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
• Whether the appointments of 22 candidates were irregular and could be considered legal.

Held:

The Court held that appointments are to be made strictly in the order of merit in accordance with the select list prepared by the competent authority. Any appointment made in contravention is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The appointments of the 22 candidates were irregular and not in conformity with the recruitment rules, but the Court refused to disturb their appointments due to their 12 years of service and rich experience in the field.

The reasoning that appointments were made by the Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the Constitution was not approved. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioner, Skill Lotto Solutions Pvt. Ltd., filed a writ petition alleging violation of Article 14 and impugning the definition of 'goods' under Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner contested the inclusion of actionable claim in the definition and argued that it was contrary to the legal meaning of goods and unconstitutional. The petitioner also challenged the exclusion of lottery, betting, and gambling from Item No.6 of Schedule III, claiming it to be hostile discrimination.

Issues:

• Whether the writ petition challenging the provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, under Article 32 alleging violation of Article 14 is maintainable.
• Whether the inclusion of actionable claim in the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of the Act is contrary to the legal meaning of goods and unconstitutional.
• Whether the Constitution Bench judgment in Sunrise Associates has held that lottery is an actionable claim, and if so, whether it is a binding declaration of law or obiter dicta.
• Whether the exclusion of lottery, betting, and gambling from Item No.6 of Schedule III of the Act is hostile discrimination and violative of Article 14.
• Whether prize money should be excluded for determining the face value of lottery tickets for the purpose of levying GST.

Held :

The Court held that the writ petition under Article 32 alleging violation of Article 14 with respect to a parliamentary Act is maintainable.( Para 14-16:)

The Court held that the inclusion of actionable claim in the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is not contrary to the legal meaning of goods and is not unconstitutional. The definition of goods in Article 366(12) of the Constitution is inclusive, and the Constitution framers did not intend to give a restrictive meaning to the term "goods."( Para 20, 24, 33, and 34:)

The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution Bench judgment in Sunrise Associates was merely an obiter dicta. It held that the judgment categorically held that lottery is an actionable claim after due consideration, and hence, it is a binding declaration of law.( Para 38:)

The Court ruled that the exclusion of lottery, betting, and gambling from Item No.6 of Schedule III of the Act is not hostile discrimination and does not violate Article 14. The Parliament had the power to include these three actionable claims for GST purposes while leaving others.( Para 49, 57, and 58:)

The Court held that prize money should not be excluded while determining the face value of lottery tickets for levying GST. The value of taxable supply is governed by statutory provisions, and it is not permissible to exclude prize money for this purpose.( Para 63, 70, and 71:)

 Facts:

 The appellant, Sumedh Singh Saini, applied for anticipatory bail after an FIR was lodged against him for offenses under various sections of the IPC, including section 302, based on statements from co-accused who were alloed to become approvers. The appellant contended that the present FIR was not maintainable as it was a second FIR on the same facts, and it was registered after a delay of 29 years from the alleged incident. The appellant referred to the quashing of a similar FIR in the case of *Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar.

Issues:

• Whether the delay in filing the present FIR renders it maintainable?
• Whether the addition of charges under section 302 IPC is justified based on statements from approvers?

Held:

The Court considered the delay of 29 years in filing the FIR and observed that the brother of the deceased, who was the informant, had not initiated any criminal proceedings during this period. The Court held that the appellant made out a case for anticipatory bail based on this delay. (Para 8)

The Court noted the appellant's retirement as Director General of Police, Punjab, and the fact that the initial FIR did not include charges under section 302 IPC. The Court found that the section 302 IPC charge was added solely based on the statements of approvers. Considering these factors, the Court held that the appellant was eligible for anticipatory bail. (Para 9)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and granted anticipatory bail to the appellant based on the delay in filing the FIR and the subsequent addition of charges under section 302 IPC. (Para 9)