Facts:

Sadhna Chaudhary, a judicial officer, was dismissed from service after allegations of misconduct arising from her decisions in two land acquisition cases. The High Court rejected her writ petition challenging the dismissal, leading to her appeal in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the allegations of misconduct against Sadhna Chaudhary were substantiated and justified based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the high standard of integrity and probity expected from judicial officers. The court acknowledged that errors in judgment may not necessarily constitute misconduct, but conduct inconsistent with ethical standards must be addressed. The court further discussed the importance of a fair disciplinary process and the necessity for concrete evidence rather than mere suspicion to establish misconduct.

The court reviewed the charges against Sadhna Chaudhary and noted that they were primarily based on the outcomes of her judgments. However, the court highlighted that both judgments were subsequently affirmed by higher courts, which undermined the foundation for the charges. The court emphasized that the charges failed to provide sufficient evidence of extraneous considerations or unbecoming conduct.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and ordered the reinstatement of Sadhna Chaudhary with all consequential benefits.

Facts:

The appellant (Amyra Dwivedi's mother) filed a petition for custody of her child. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, dismissed the custody petition but granted the appellant visitation rights under specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the granted visitation rights were in the best interest of the child's welfare.

The adequacy and appropriateness of the conditions under which the visitation was allowed.

Held:

The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the granted visitation rights. The Court reiterated the principle that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration in custody matters, as established in the case of Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) AIR SC 577 (Para 4).

The Court emphasized that visitation rights should facilitate a comfortable and natural interaction between the child and the visiting parent. It noted that such an atmosphere could not be created in the office of the District Legal Services Authority, where the visitation was initially directed to take place (Para 5).

Based on the child's circumstances and needs, the Court issued revised directions for visitation and contact rights. These included specific timings, weekends, festivals, summer vacations, and provisions for school functions.The Court granted the appellant the right to attend school functions and participate in the child's education. The school was instructed to recognize her as the child's parent and afford her the same privileges as other parents (Para 6).

The Court acknowledged the appellant's right to seek custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and allowed for potential adjustments in visitation rights during the custody petition's pendency (Para 7).

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur, and M/S Universal Ferro & Allied Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. The respondent is a 100% EOU engaged in the manufacture/processing of Ferro Manganese and Silicon Manganese. The Revenue alleged that the respondent engaged in job work converting raw materials supplied by TISCO. A show cause notice was issued, claiming violations of Circulars related to job work permissions.

Issues:

Whether the transactions between the respondent and TISCO can be classified as "sales" and whether they violate the provisions of the EXIM Policy.

Whether the duty exemptions applicable to goods produced by EOUs apply to the present case.

Held:

Issue 1: Classification as "Sales" and Compliance with EXIM Policy The court examined the definition of "sale" and "purchase" under the Central Excise Act and ruled that these terms should be construed more broadly in the context of the Act than under the Sale of Goods Act. The court rejected the argument that the transactions were not "sales" due to the absence of property transfer. It found that the transactions met the criteria of transfer of possession for valuable consideration, thus qualifying as "sales" under the Act.

The court also analyzed the relevant provisions of the EXIM Policy, including paragraphs 9.9(b), 9.17(b), and 9.20. It concluded that the respondent was entitled to undertake job work for TISCO as per the permission from the Development Commissioner. The circulars issued by the Board, including the one dated 22.5.2000, supported the respondent's eligibility for job work under the applicable exemptions.

Issue 2: Applicability of Duty Exemptions to EOUs The court discussed the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Central Excise Act and the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5A. It clarified that while the latter provision limited the Central Government's power to grant exemptions to EOUs, the amendments did not render the relevant exemption notifications invalid. The court concluded that the exemption notification (No.21/97-C.E.) specifically applied to goods produced by EOUs and sold in India as per EXIM Policy provisions.

Conclusion: The court held that the respondent was entitled to carry out job work for TISCO and avail of duty exemptions. It rejected the Revenue's arguments and upheld the decision of the CESTAT that dismissed the Revenue's appeal.

Facts:

The dispute arises from a practice in Punjab where government agencies allocate paddy for custom milling to rice mills, which then supply processed rice to FCI. Quality issues led to an investigation by the CBI, resulting in blacklisting and recommendations for banning defaulting rice millers from the allocation process. In response, the defaulting millers allegedly leased their mills to new entities to evade the ban. These lease agreements were unregistered.

Issues:

Whether the new lessees of blacklisted rice mills are entitled to allocation of paddy for custom milling, given the unregistered lease agreements and the attempt to evade blacklisting.

Held:

The Supreme Court rules that the unregistered lease agreements do not satisfy the requirements of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and therefore cannot be accepted as evidence of a valid transfer of possessory rights. The Court acknowledges the FCI's argument that these agreements were likely executed to escape liabilities and, while the question of intent is a factual one, the High Court should not have opined on the legal sufficiency of the lease deeds. The Court holds that even if a proprietorship/partnership firm takes over a defaulting mill, it cannot claim allocation of paddy without settling the previous liabilities. Consequently, the Court sets aside the High Court's decision and dismisses the writ petitions filed by the respondent-lessees. However, it grants them the liberty to pay dues with penalty/interest of the original rice millers and seek allocation of paddy after obtaining a 'No Dues Certificate' from the original millers.

Facts:

The Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) filed a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of specific provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011.

INSAF contended that these provisions violated their fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution.

Issues:

Whether Sections 5(1) and 5(4) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 were violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), and 21 of the Constitution.

Whether Rules 3(i), 3(v), and 3(vi) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011 were vague, arbitrary, and overbroad, and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(1) of the Act, stating that it did not confer unbridled power on the executive. It noted that sufficient guidance was provided in the Act for specifying grounds for declaring an organization of a political nature.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 5(4) of the Act was unconstitutional solely due to the unspecified authority for making representations.

Rule 3(i) of the Rules, which concerned organizations with avowed political objectives, was found not to be vague or unconstitutional.

Regarding Rule 3(v) of the Rules, dealing with organizations with objectives of political interests, the Court applied the doctrine of "reading down" and interpreted it to align with active politics or party politics, excluding organizations primarily working for social and economic welfare.

Rule 3(vi) of the Rules, related to organizations engaged in common methods of political action, was clarified to apply only to methods associated with active politics or party politics.

The Court emphasized that organizations using foreign funds for political parties should not evade regulations if there is concrete evidence. The Central Government must follow the proper procedure before denying organizations the right to receive foreign contributions.

Facts:

The case revolved around the conflict between the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) and the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) regarding their jurisdiction and authority over matters related to pharmacy education. The main issue was to decide whether the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987 would prevail in the regulation of pharmacy education, including course approvals, education standards, qualification criteria, and professional conduct.

Issues:

Which statute would take precedence in the context of pharmacy education: the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987?

Should the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) or the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) have jurisdiction over matters related to pharmacy education?

Held:

The court held that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 is a specialized law exclusively governing pharmacy and is a comprehensive code pertaining to the regulation of pharmacy education and practice. This Act prevails over the AICTE Act, 1987, which is a general law dealing with technical education and institutions. (Para 15)

The court pointed out that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 covers all aspects of pharmacy education, including course approvals, eligibility criteria for students and teachers, examination standards, registration, and more. It is a comprehensive legislation intended to ensure seamless regulation of the profession. Therefore, the Pharmacy Act, being a special law, takes precedence in the field of pharmacy education. (Para 13.2)

The Pharmacy Act has established the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) as an autonomous statutory authority to regulate pharmacy education and practice. The PCI is composed of experts in the field of pharmacy and related subjects. On the other hand, the AICTE Act designates only one member from the field of pharmacy, making the PCI more suitable to regulate pharmacy education effectively. (Para 16)

It was emphasized that the existence of two regulators, PCI and AICTE, in the same field would lead to conflict and confusion. This is undesirable and unhealthy for the education sector and institutions. Given that the PCI comprises experts in pharmacy, it is in the best interest of pharmacy education that the PCI retains jurisdiction in the field. (Para 17)

Consequently, the court ruled that in the realm of pharmacy education, particularly concerning the recognition of pharmacy degrees and diplomas, the Pharmacy Act, 1948 shall prevail. The norms and regulations set by the PCI under the Pharmacy Act must be adhered to by institutions providing pharmacy education. (Para 21)

Facts:

The appellant, Suborno Bose, was involved in proceedings related to a complaint under Section 16(3) of the FEMA Act initiated by the Enforcement Directorate. A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant based on allegations of contravention of various provisions of the FEMA Act in relation to foreign exchange transactions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the Managing Director of the company in question, was liable for the contraventions alleged against the company. Additionally, the court had to interpret the relevant provisions of the FEMA Act, FEMA Regulations, and guidelines to decide on the matter.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the FEMA Act, along with related regulations and guidelines. Section 10(5) required authorized persons to ensure that transactions involving foreign exchange do not contravene provisions of the FEMA Act or related rules. Section 10(6) deemed certain circumstances to be contraventions, including failure to use foreign exchange for the intended purpose, not surrendering it within the specified period, or using it for unauthorized purposes.

The court concluded that the contravention under Section 10(6) was a continuing offense, and that even though the appellant became the Managing Director of the company after the alleged contravention took place, he was responsible for taking corrective actions upon assuming office.

The court emphasized that the requirement to surrender foreign exchange within a specified period was a civil obligation, and the appellant's awareness of the contravention meant he should have taken steps to rectify it.

Accordingly, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed

FACTS:

The erstwhile partnership firm, M/s. Chetak Enterprises, had an agreement with the Government of Rajasthan for road construction and toll collection. The firm was converted into a private limited company under Part IX of the Companies Act before the commencement of the relevant assessment year. The partnership firm had communicated its intention of conversion to the Chief Engineer, and the agreement with the government was executed with this understanding. The company was granted registration, and its properties were vested in it as per Section 575 of the Companies Act.

ISSUES:

• Whether the conversion of the partnership firm into a company met the conditions set by Section 80-IA, including:

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) of Section 80-IA regarding ownership by a registered company.

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(b) of Section 80-IA regarding entering into an agreement with the government.

HELD:

The Court analyzed the legal implications of the conversion of the partnership firm into a private limited company and the effect of the agreement with the government. It observed that the company's memorandum of association clearly indicated its intent to continue the partnership business and acquired its assets, movables, immovables, rights, debts, and liabilities. The agreement executed with the government was effectively transferred to the company after conversion. The Court concluded that the conditions of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) and (b) of Section 80-IA were met, as the company was owned by a registered company and had a valid agreement with the government for developing and maintaining the infrastructure facility.

In view of the above, the appeal stands dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Mankastu Impex Private Limited (Appellant) and AirVisual Limited (Respondent). The MOU pertained to the sale and distribution of air quality monitoring products. The arbitration clause in the MOU stated that disputes would be resolved through arbitration administered in Hong Kong.

Issues:

Whether the parties' choice of Hong Kong as the place of arbitration also signified the seat of arbitration?

Whether the laws of India or Hong Kong would govern the arbitration proceedings and judicial review of the award?

Held:

The Court delved into the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the related clauses in the MOU. It noted that the arbitration clause stated that disputes would be "referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered in Hong Kong." This phrase indicated the parties' agreement that the arbitration proceedings would be seated in Hong Kong, and the laws of Hong Kong would apply.

The Court emphasized the distinction between the "place of arbitration" and the "governing law" in the MOU. While the MOU was governed by Indian laws, the arbitration proceedings were seated in Hong Kong as explicitly mentioned in the arbitration clause.

The Court further referenced the importance of the seat of arbitration, which determines applicable laws, arbitration procedure, and judicial review. It noted that the term "place of arbitration" was used to indicate the seat, which indicated the intention of the parties to have Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration.

The Court addressed the argument that Clause 17.1 of the MOU specified the laws of India and New Delhi courts having jurisdiction. It held that this did not affect the application of Hong Kong law to the arbitration proceedings since the parties had chosen Hong Kong as the seat.

As per the Court's interpretation, Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not applicable in this case, as the seat of arbitration was in Hong Kong. The Indian courts lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6).