Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute concerning a marine insurance claim for cargo. The insurer denied the insurance claim, leading to a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service.

Issues:

Whether the breach of the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) occurred.

Whether the insurer had waived the breach of warranty.

Whether the insurer was justified in repudiating the insurance claim.

Held:

The Marine Cargo Cover Note and Marine Insurance Policy explicitly stated that the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) was one of the warranties/terms of insurance. The ICC sets standards for the seaworthiness of the vessel carrying the cargo, and compliance with it is crucial for determining the issuance of the policy and the premium.

The ICC 01/01/2001 version imposes two main requirements: classification with a recognized Classification Society and compliance with age limitations for the insured vessel.

In this case, neither was the subject vessel in compliance with the ICC, nor did the insured provide prompt notification to the insurer about the non-compliance. The appellant's contention regarding the vessel's classification was not sustained.

The appellant's notification regarding the vessel's classification did not constitute "prompt notification," and the insurer only learned of the breach later. No evidence of the vessel's classification was provided to the insurer.

The breach of the warranty occurred when the appellant informed the insurer about the vessel's classification. Even if the vessel was classed with the International Register of Shipping, it did not meet the ICC requirements, and the appellant was aware of this non-compliance.

Section 35(3) of the Marine Insurance Act makes it clear that a breach of warranty needs to be complied with, leading to the automatic discharge of the insurer's liability. Section 36(3) allows the insurer to waive the breach of warranty under certain conditions.

The issuance of the General Average Guarantee did not constitute a waiver because it was based on incorrect information provided by the insured, and the insurer withdrew the Guarantee upon discovering the breach.

The insurer's conduct and representations did not demonstrate an intent to waive the breach of warranty. Therefore, the insurer was justified in repudiating the insurance claim.

The impugned judgement of the NCDRC stands confirmed, and the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose over the selection process for the post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak in the Panchayat of the Rewa District in Madhya Pradesh. The selection process was governed by guidelines issued on June 2, 2012, by the Madhya Pradesh State Employment Guarantee Parishad, a registered institution under the Panchayat and Rural Development Department. These guidelines specified the qualifications and criteria for selection.

However, the Collector of Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, issued a Revised Time Schedule for the recruitment process on June 17, 2014. This schedule included a computer efficiency test as part of the selection process, even though it was not mentioned in the original guidelines.

Some candidates who had already been selected or were in the process of selection challenged the introduction of the computer efficiency test, arguing that it was not part of the original guidelines and should not be added mid-way through the selection process.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of the computer efficiency test was valid when it was not part of the original guidelines.

Whether candidates who participated in the computer efficiency test without objection could later challenge the process.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the introduction of the computer efficiency test after the selection process had already begun was not in accordance with the guidelines issued on June 2, 2012. Therefore, the candidates who had participated in the test could not be considered to have accepted it as a valid part of the selection process.

The Supreme Court also cited the principle that candidates who participate in an examination or selection process without objection cannot later challenge the process. However, it clarified that this principle did not apply in this case because the computer efficiency test had been introduced in a manner inconsistent with the original guidelines.

The appeals were dismissed, and the High Court's decision was upheld.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the regularization of workers employed by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) based on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of ONGC's Certified Standing Orders. Four impugned orders upheld the regularization of workers relying on a judgment in the "PCLU case," while one impugned order declined regularization, distinguishing it from the "PCLU case."

Issues:

Whether the construction placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of ONGC's Certified Standing Orders in the "PCLU case" is correct.

Whether the decision in the "PCLU case" should be reconsidered.

The applicability of principles from the "Umadevi case" in the context of industrial adjudication.

Held:

The Supreme Court made the following observations and held as follows:

The decision in the "PCLU Case" held that workers completing 240 days' service in a period of 12 calendar months are entitled to regularization of their services into permanent posts of the corporation. The Court further held that under clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders, upon the completion of 240 days of service in a calendar year, the workers have acquired a valid statutory right and should have been granted the status of regular employees of the corporation. The Court found that the construction placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) in the "PCLU Case" prima facie does not appear to be correct. Additionally, it noted that the "PCLU Case" did not consider an earlier judgment in the "Engineering Mazdoor Sangh Case," which pertained to ONGC's Certified Standing Orders.( Para 17)

The second aspect to be considered is the applicability of the principles set out in the "Umadevi Case" in the context of industrial adjudication. The Supreme Court found that this issue also needs to be placed before a larger bench for consideration.( Para 18)

The "PCLU Case" needs reconsideration to align its position in law with the principles emerging from earlier precedents. Specific areas for reconsideration include: (i) the interpretation of clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders; (ii) the meaning and content of an unfair labor practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the ID Act; (iii) limitations, if any, on the power of the Labor and Industrial Courts to order regularization in the absence of sanctioned posts.( Para 24)

Decision: The Supreme Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the "PCLU case" and for clarification on various aspects of labor law related to the regularization of workers.

Facts:

This case involves a tripartite agreement between farmers, Canara Bank, and a cold store, wherein farmers' agricultural produce was stored. The cold store obtained insurance coverage for these goods from M/S United India Insurance Co. Ltd. The farmers had hypothecated their produce to the bank, and loans were issued based on this collateral. A fire incident led to the destruction of the agricultural produce.

Issues:

• Whether the fire was accidental, and if so, whether the farmers can be considered consumers under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
• The liability of the insurance company for compensating the loss.
• The role of the tripartite agreement and whether its non-disclosure affects the insurance policy's validity.

Held:

The court held that as long as the insured (the cold store) was not responsible for causing the fire, the insurance company cannot escape its liability under the insurance policy. The contention that the fire was caused by the use of kerosene and, therefore, not covered by the policy, was rejected.

The court emphasized that insurance policies should be interpreted broadly to fulfill the reasonable expectations of all parties involved, including the insured and beneficiaries. Coverage provisions should be read broadly, while exclusion clauses should be read narrowly. The intention of the parties in this case was clear - they expected compensation from the insurance company in the event of a loss.

The definition of "consumer" under Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is broad and includes beneficiaries benefiting from the insurance availed by the insured. Farmers were considered beneficiaries under the policy and, therefore, consumers.

The court determined that the goods were not held "in trust" but were held by the cold store as a bailee for consideration. Possession of the farm produce was transferred from the farmers (bailor) to the cold store (bailee) as per the contract.

The court noted that the insurance policy itself acknowledged the interest of other parties besides the cold store and the insured. The insurance company should have verified the details before issuing the policy and could not presume that all the goods belonged to the cold store.

The court stated that the non-disclosure of the tripartite agreement or the names of the owners did not make the policy void or voidable. To make a contract void, the non-disclosure should be of a very material fact.

The court found some deficiency on the part of the bank for not providing necessary information to the insurance company. The bank was entitled to charge simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of granting the loan.

The court directed that the bank could recover the principal amount along with simple interest from the farmers. The insurance company was held liable to pay the value of goods along with simple interest to the farmers, with any excess payable to the farmers along with interest.

Facts:

The case revolves around an incident where the accused appellant and the main accused, Khilai, were involved in a quarrel with the complainant. During this altercation, Khilai fired a country-made pistol, injuring the complainant. The prosecution alleged that the accused appellant had a common intention with Khilai to murder the complainant.

Issues:

• Whether there was a pre-arranged common intention between the accused appellant and Khilai to murder the complainant, and if Section 34 IPC could be applied to establish joint liability.

Held:

The court emphasized that Section 34 IPC is a rule of evidence that establishes joint criminal liability but does not create a distinct substantive offense. It applies when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention. Pre-arrangement and consensus of minds must be proved.

The court observed that there was no evidence to establish any common, premeditated, or prearranged intention between the accused appellant and Khilai to kill the complainant. Even though Khilai had fired the pistol, the Prosecution failed to prove that the accused appellant had instigated the shooting.

The court concluded that discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses, coupled with the lack of evidence for pre-arrangement, raised serious doubts about the case against the accused appellant. The appeal was allowed, and the accused appellant was acquitted.

FACTS:

The case involved a dispute between M/S. Edelweiss Asset Construction Company Limited (appellant) and R. Perumalswamy and others (respondents). The dispute centered around the acquisition of land by the State of Tamil Nadu and subsequent claims by the first respondent.

WS Industries (India) Ltd. (WSIL), the appellant in Civil Appeal No 1319 of 2017, acquired land, and the State Government issued a deed of assignment on February 26, 1964, stating that the land vested absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances.

In 2004, the State of Tamil Nadu empowered the DRO to rectify defects in land records.

The dispute arose in 2015 when the first respondent filed an application before the DRO to rectify the revenue records for certain lands. The first respondent claimed that his father had purchased the land in 1929 and had leased it to WSIL in 1962 for fifty years.

The DRO ordered the patta (land record) to be canceled in favor of the first respondent based on his claims.

ISSUES:

• Whether the DRO had the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the title of the land, and whether the DRO's order exceeded its authority.
• The validity of the first respondent's claims regarding land ownership and lease.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the DRO had exceeded its jurisdiction by engaging in an exercise of investigating the title to the disputed land and substituting the first respondent with the appellant in the land records. The DRO's role was to rectify defects in land records, not to determine land title disputes.( Para 20)

The Court also noted that once the land had been acquired by the State Government and assigned to WSIL, any pre-existing claim to the land was extinguished.( Para 21)

The Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restored the judgment of the learned Single Judge.( Para 22)

The Court clarified that it had not made any observations on the merits of the show cause notice issued by the State of Tamil Nadu to WSIL for land resumption.( Para 23)

Facts:

The case revolves around an incident where the accused appellant and the main accused, Khilai, were involved in a quarrel with the complainant. During this altercation, Khilai fired a country-made pistol, injuring the complainant. The prosecution alleged that the accused appellant had a common intention with Khilai to murder the complainant.

Issues:

Whether there was a pre-arranged common intention between the accused appellant and Khilai to murder the complainant, and if Section 34 IPC could be applied to establish joint liability.

Held:

The court emphasized that Section 34 IPC is a rule of evidence that establishes joint criminal liability but does not create a distinct substantive offense. It applies when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention. Pre-arrangement and consensus of minds must be proved.

The court observed that there was no evidence to establish any common, premeditated, or prearranged intention between the accused appellant and Khilai to kill the complainant. Even though Khilai had fired the pistol, the Prosecution failed to prove that the accused appellant had instigated the shooting.

The court concluded that discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses, coupled with the lack of evidence for pre-arrangement, raised serious doubts about the case against the accused appellant. The appeal was allowed, and the accused appellant was acquitted.

Facts:

This case involves a tripartite agreement between farmers, Canara Bank, and a cold store, wherein farmers' agricultural produce was stored. The cold store obtained insurance coverage for these goods from M/S United India Insurance Co. Ltd. The farmers had hypothecated their produce to the bank, and loans were issued based on this collateral. A fire incident led to the destruction of the agricultural produce.

Issues:

Whether the fire was accidental, and if so, whether the farmers can be considered consumers under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

The liability of the insurance company for compensating the loss.

The role of the tripartite agreement and whether its non-disclosure affects the insurance policy's validity.

Held:

The court held that as long as the insured (the cold store) was not responsible for causing the fire, the insurance company cannot escape its liability under the insurance policy. The contention that the fire was caused by the use of kerosene and, therefore, not covered by the policy, was rejected.

The court emphasized that insurance policies should be interpreted broadly to fulfill the reasonable expectations of all parties involved, including the insured and beneficiaries. Coverage provisions should be read broadly, while exclusion clauses should be read narrowly. The intention of the parties in this case was clear - they expected compensation from the insurance company in the event of a loss.

The definition of "consumer" under Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is broad and includes beneficiaries benefiting from the insurance availed by the insured. Farmers were considered beneficiaries under the policy and, therefore, consumers.

The court determined that the goods were not held "in trust" but were held by the cold store as a bailee for consideration. Possession of the farm produce was transferred from the farmers (bailor) to the cold store (bailee) as per the contract.

The court noted that the insurance policy itself acknowledged the interest of other parties besides the cold store and the insured. The insurance company should have verified the details before issuing the policy and could not presume that all the goods belonged to the cold store.

The court stated that the non-disclosure of the tripartite agreement or the names of the owners did not make the policy void or voidable. To make a contract void, the non-disclosure should be of a very material fact.

The court found some deficiency on the part of the bank for not providing necessary information to the insurance company. The bank was entitled to charge simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of granting the loan.

The court directed that the bank could recover the principal amount along with simple interest from the farmers. The insurance company was held liable to pay the value of goods along with simple interest to the farmers, with any excess payable to the farmers along with interest.

FACTS:

The case involved a dispute between M/S. Edelweiss Asset Construction Company Limited (appellant) and R. Perumalswamy and others (respondents). The dispute centered around the acquisition of land by the State of Tamil Nadu and subsequent claims by the first respondent.

WS Industries (India) Ltd. (WSIL), the appellant in Civil Appeal No 1319 of 2017, acquired land, and the State Government issued a deed of assignment on February 26, 1964, stating that the land vested absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances.

In 2004, the State of Tamil Nadu empowered the DRO to rectify defects in land records.

The dispute arose in 2015 when the first respondent filed an application before the DRO to rectify the revenue records for certain lands. The first respondent claimed that his father had purchased the land in 1929 and had leased it to WSIL in 1962 for fifty years.

The DRO ordered the patta (land record) to be canceled in favor of the first respondent based on his claims.

ISSUES:

Whether the DRO had the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the title of the land, and whether the DRO's order exceeded its authority.

The validity of the first respondent's claims regarding land ownership and lease.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the DRO had exceeded its jurisdiction by engaging in an exercise of investigating the title to the disputed land and substituting the first respondent with the appellant in the land records. The DRO's role was to rectify defects in land records, not to determine land title disputes.( Para 20)

The Court also noted that once the land had been acquired by the State Government and assigned to WSIL, any pre-existing claim to the land was extinguished.( Para 21)

The Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restored the judgment of the learned Single Judge.( Para 22)

The Court clarified that it had not made any observations on the merits of the show cause notice issued by the State of Tamil Nadu to WSIL for land resumption.( Para 23)