Facts:

The case involves the prosecution of the Municipal Commissioner and Chief Officer of the City Municipal Council by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board for offenses under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Issues:

Whether City Municipal Councils can be considered a Department of the Government.

The liability of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers under the Water Act.

The interpretation of Sections 47, 48, and 49 of the Water Act.

Held:

The Water Act, 1974, enacted by Parliament, aims to prevent and control water pollution. It establishes Boards for these purposes and confers powers on them. (Para 7)

Section 48 of the Water Act is applicable when offenses are committed by any Department of Government. City Municipal Councils, created under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, are considered bodies corporate, distinct from government departments. (Paras 11, 15)

Municipal Councils, including City Municipal Councils, are created by State enactments and are controlled by the Government, receiving financial assistance. However, they are not considered Departments of the Government. (Para 14, 18)

The Scheme of the Water Act indicates separate representation for the Government, local authorities, and companies or corporations owned, controlled, or managed by the State Government. Municipalities, including City Municipal Councils, do not qualify as Departments of the Government. (Paras 15)

Article 243P of the Constitution defines "Municipality" as an institution of self-Government. City Municipal Councils cannot be treated as Departments of the State Government. They are entrusted with Municipal functions, including ensuring a clean environment and controlling pollution. (Paras 16, 18)

Section 47 of the Water Act pertains to offenses by companies, defining "company" broadly as "any body corporate." City Municipal Councils fall under this definition. (Paras 19, 20)

Section 47 can be applied to offenses by body corporates like City Municipal Councils. The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board's complaint under Section 49 for the prosecution of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers is deemed appropriate. (Paras 29, 31)

Facts:

The spouse of the appellant, a tenant, faced a suit for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997.

Issues:

Whether the spouse of a deceased original tenant is entitled to protection from eviction for non-residential premises beyond a period of five years from the date of the original tenant's death.

Held:

Discusses the interpretation of Section 2(g) and the differentiation between protection for residential and non-residential premises. Highlights the omission in the legislation regarding the spouse's entitlement under the second proviso.( Para 10)

Expresses agreement with the High Court's conclusion that legislative amendment is necessary to include the spouse in the protection granted to other heirs under the second proviso. Acknowledges the inadvertent omission and calls for attention from lawmakers.( Para 12)

Grants time to the appellant to vacate the premises until 30 June 2020 but upholds the eviction decree. Urges legislative consideration for the inclusion of the spouse in the protective provisions.( Para 13)

Facts:

The applicant, a contractor company, filed an application under Sections 11(12)(a) and 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator. The grounds cited included the alleged failure of the competent authority to appoint the sole arbitrator within the prescribed period and the necessity for an independent and impartial arbitrator.

Issues:

The maintainability of the application under Sections 11(12)(a) and 11(6) concerning the termination of the contract and the appointment of a sole arbitrator.

The validity of the appointment of the sole arbitrator and concerns about independence and impartiality.

Whether the arbitration qualifies as an International Commercial Arbitration.

Held:

The Court found the application maintainable given the facts of the case, considering it an International Commercial Arbitration. However, the delay in appointing the arbitrator was not of such magnitude to warrant the exercise of power under Section 11.

In cases where only one party has the right to appoint a sole arbitrator, the person with an interest in the outcome must not have the power to appoint. Justifiable doubts about independence and impartiality can warrant the court's appointment of an independent arbitrator.

Considering the circumstances, the application was deemed entertainable, and a retired Judge of the Supreme Court was appointed as the sole arbitrator.

Decision: The application was accepted, annulling the effect of the respondent's appointment of the arbitrator. In the exercise of power under Section 11(6) of the Act, Dr. Justice A.K. Sikri, a former Judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide all disputes arising from the agreement between the parties.

FACTS:

Post the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections, no single party had the majority.

Efforts were made by the Governor to explore government formation, leading to President's Rule imposition.

Subsequent developments involved invitations to various parties to form the government, ultimately resulting in the swearing-in of Devendra Fadnavis as Chief Minister.

The Shiv Sena, NCP, and INC challenged the Governor's actions, claiming that the oath of office to Fadnavis was unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

The constitutional validity of the Governor's actions in inviting Fadnavis to form the government.

Whether a floor test should be conducted to determine the majority support for the Chief Minister.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the need to protect democratic values and ordered an immediate floor test to ascertain if the Chief Minister had majority support. Referring to precedents, the Court highlighted the importance of timely floor tests in such situations to prevent horse-trading and ensure a stable government.( Paragraphs 17-20)

The Court issued specific directions for the floor test, including the appointment of a Pro-tem Speaker, administering oaths to elected members, conducting the floor test without secret ballot, and live telecasting the proceedings.( Paragraph 26)

REFERRED CASES:

Anil Kumar Jha vs. Union of India, (2005) 3 SCC 150

Chandrakant Kavlekar vs. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 758

G. Parmeshwara vs. Union of India, (2018) 16 SCC 46

Jagdambika Pal vs. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 95

S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

Union of India vs. Sh. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC Online SC 442

Union of India vs. Shri Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC OnLine SC 618

Facts:

A group of individuals (Accused no. 1 to 16) armed with sticks and iron rods trespassed into a newspaper office, vandalized it, and set it on fire. Three employees lost their lives. Accused were charged under various sections, including IPC, Explosive Substances Act, and Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act. Appellant (Accused No.17), the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the time, faced charges under Sections 217 and 221.

Issues:

The appellant's alleged failure to prevent the crime, intentional disobedience of law, and allowing the accused to escape formed the crux of the case.

Held:

Bandobust Duty and Superior Officer (Para 24): Ex.-P82, the bandobust duty list, indicated that PW-30, the Additional Superintendent of Police, was the superior officer. The appellant, as Deputy Superintendent of Police, acted under PW-30's direction during the incident.

Immediate Police Action (Paras 25, 26): Evidence from PW-2 (News Editor) and PW-3 (COO) affirmed the appellant's prompt response to their calls for help. The appellant assured swift action, indicating diligence in his duties.

Disobedience and Intention (Paras 30, 31): No evidence suggested that the appellant disobeyed orders from PW-30, the officer in charge of the bandobust. Section 217 IPC requires intentional disobedience with the intention to save the accused, which was not established.

Conviction under Section 221 IPC (Para 33): For intentional omission to apprehend or aiding escape, the prosecution failed to show that the appellant intentionally avoided apprehending the accused on the spot.

Judicial View (Para 34): The trial court's plausible view that the ingredients of Sections 217 and 221 were not met should not have been substituted by the High Court. The appellant's conviction was not sustainable.

Facts:

The case revolves around an agreement to sell a disputed property in 1986 between the original vendor and original vendees. Subsequently, in 1987, the original vendees executed agreements to sell different portions of the property to the respondents in this case. Legal proceedings ensued, involving withdrawal of suits, impleadment applications, and amendments seeking execution of the 1986 agreement.

Issues:

Privity of contract between the appellants (original vendors) and respondent No.1 (vendees in 1987 agreement).

Assignability of contracts without the consent of the promisee.

Validity and enforceability of the 1987 agreements.

The impact of withdrawal of the suit for specific performance of the 1986 agreement.

Held:

The court observed that there was no privity of contract between the appellants and respondent No.1. To seek specific performance, respondent No.1 had to sue as 'representatives-in-interest' under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

The term 'representative-in-interest' includes the assignee of a contractual interest, but assignability requires the consent of the other party. Section 15(b) clarifies conditions for specific performance by an assignee.

Contracts may involve intertwined rights and obligations. Promisors cannot contract out their responsibility to a stranger without the promisee's consent, especially in contracts of a personal nature.

The 1986 agreement, while not expressly barring assignability, required consideration of the context and the parties' intentions regarding assignability.

The 1986 agreement was a contract combining mutual rights and obligations. The 1987 agreements were not a simple assignment but involved assuming obligations akin to a development agreement.

Respondent No.1 could seek specific performance only by proving appellants' knowledge and consent. The court emphasized that the 1987 agreements were contingent and unenforceable after the cancellation of the 1986 agreement.

Consent for assignment was not established, and the 1987 agreements were void. Respondent No.1 could not seek specific performance against the appellants.

The original vendees' rights under the 1986 agreement lapsed due to non-payment. The withdrawal of the specific performance suit indicated an abandonment of rights.

The court acknowledged collusion to frustrate the 1987 agreements and directed compensation for the loss of opportunity and inconvenience suffered by the respondents.

Facts:

Appellant, a resident of village Saini, objects to the attempted takeover of a 'common-pond' by private entity Sharp.

Appellant claims the water bodies were vested in Gram Sabhas per Section 117 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Appellant alleges environmental clearances not obtained, and statutory authorities neglected to assess the project's impact.

Disputed land's status contested due to the repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, by the UP Revenue Code, 2006.

Issues:

Legality of the allotment of water bodies to private industrialists.

Repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and its impact on the disputed land.

Held:

The repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and vesting of ponds in the State by the UP Revenue Code, 2006, does not change the nature of land or defeat local rights.

Schemes extinguishing water bodies, as per the 2016 Government Order, are violative of Constitutional principles and struck down.

Allotment of water bodies to Respondent No. 6 and any similar third party declared illegal and quashed.

The court directs restoration, maintenance, and protection of subject-water bodies in village Saini, removing obstructions from the catchment area within three months.

Facts:

Ownership of land by 'S.'

'S' had two sons, 'J' and 'P.'

Appellant's father predeceased 'J' and 'S.'

After 'S's death, 'J' and 'P' partitioned the property.

The suit property came into the exclusive share of 'J.'

'J' executed a registered sale deed in favor of his grandsons.

Appellant sought a share in the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being the daughter of a predeceased son, has a claim to the ancestral property.

The validity of the partition and the registered sale deed.

Held:

Considering the factual matrix, the court noted that 'S' inherited ancestral property, and the appellant's father predeceased him in 1957. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, during 'J's lifetime, the appellant's father could not have succeeded to the property. The court held that the appellant, being the daughter, couldn't claim any right higher than that of her father.

The court affirmed the view that the grandchild is excluded from heirs in Class-I. After the partition in 1967 and the registered sale deed in 1979, which were unchallenged, the suit property became the exclusive share of 'J.' The court upheld the decision that the appellant couldn't claim a higher right than her father.

Facts:

Genpact India Private Limited disputed the assessment order related to Section 115QA of the Income Tax Act, denying liability. The High Court disposed of the writ petition, citing the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 246A.

Issues:

Whether determination under Section 115QA falls under Section 246(1)(a)?

Is an appeal maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA?

Is a writ petition under Article 226 maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 246A?

Held:

Scope of Sections 246(1)(a) and 246A(1)(a):

The expression "denies his liability to be assessed" in Section 246(1)(a) encompasses cases where the assessee denies liability under the Act. It is not confined to issues arising solely from assessment proceedings under Section 143 or 144.

Section 115QA falls within the ambit of the first contingency in Section 246(1)(a), involving determination of liability or quantification of the distributed income. The scope of such expression should not be restricted to issues related to Sections 143 or 144.

Appeal against Determination under Section 115QA:

An appeal is maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA. The issues may extend beyond the company's liability to include questions of extent and computation. Denying an appeal would deprive the assessee of regular channels of challenges available under the Act.

Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226:

The High Court rightly refused to entertain the writ petition. Preliminary objections were not conclusively disposed of, and the matter was still open. The High Court's consideration of the alternate remedy issue was not incorrect, as the preliminary objection had not been conclusively addressed.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The Court upholds the High Court's decision, stating that an appeal is maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA, and the High Court rightly refused to entertain the writ petition.