Facts:

The prosecution's case revolved around the complainant's report of his three minor children going missing. The accused was seen with the children near their school. The accused was subsequently found missing from his house and village. His location was traced using mobile phone records, leading to his discovery in the house of another individual. The accused eventually led the police to the recovery of the deceased bodies and their school bags.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution successfully proved the involvement of the accused in the murder of the three minor children based on circumstantial evidence?

Whether the sentencing of the accused to death was appropriate given the circumstances of the case?

Held:

Issue 1: The court found that the prosecution effectively established the accused's enmity with the father of the deceased children through witness testimonies. The accused was last seen with the children before they went missing, and the recovery of the bodies based on information provided by the accused further implicated him. (Para 16, 18, 19, 20)

Issue 2: The court considered both aggravating and mitigating circumstances for sentencing. Mitigating factors included the accused's emotional disturbance due to personal issues, lack of criminal antecedents, and family circumstances. The only aggravating circumstance pointed out was the brutal nature of the crime. The court decided to convert the death sentence into life imprisonment, considering the accused's mental state at the time of the crime and the overall balance of circumstances. The court also directed that there should be no remission of the sentence until the accused completes 25 years of imprisonment. The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. (Para 24, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 26)

Facts:

The case revolved around the conflict between the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) and the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) regarding their jurisdiction and authority over matters related to pharmacy education. The main issue was to decide whether the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987 would prevail in the regulation of pharmacy education, including course approvals, education standards, qualification criteria, and professional conduct.

Issues:

Which statute would take precedence in the context of pharmacy education: the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the AICTE Act, 1987?

Should the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) or the All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) have jurisdiction over matters related to pharmacy education?

Held:

The court held that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 is a specialized law exclusively governing pharmacy and is a comprehensive code pertaining to the regulation of pharmacy education and practice. This Act prevails over the AICTE Act, 1987, which is a general law dealing with technical education and institutions. (Para 15)

The court pointed out that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 covers all aspects of pharmacy education, including course approvals, eligibility criteria for students and teachers, examination standards, registration, and more. It is a comprehensive legislation intended to ensure seamless regulation of the profession. Therefore, the Pharmacy Act, being a special law, takes precedence in the field of pharmacy education. (Para 13.2)

The Pharmacy Act has established the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) as an autonomous statutory authority to regulate pharmacy education and practice. The PCI is composed of experts in the field of pharmacy and related subjects. On the other hand, the AICTE Act designates only one member from the field of pharmacy, making the PCI more suitable to regulate pharmacy education effectively. (Para 16)

It was emphasized that the existence of two regulators, PCI and AICTE, in the same field would lead to conflict and confusion. This is undesirable and unhealthy for the education sector and institutions. Given that the PCI comprises experts in pharmacy, it is in the best interest of pharmacy education that the PCI retains jurisdiction in the field. (Para 17)

Consequently, the court ruled that in the realm of pharmacy education, particularly concerning the recognition of pharmacy degrees and diplomas, the Pharmacy Act, 1948 shall prevail. The norms and regulations set by the PCI under the Pharmacy Act must be adhered to by institutions providing pharmacy education. (Para 21)

Facts:

The appellant, Suborno Bose, was involved in proceedings related to a complaint under Section 16(3) of the FEMA Act initiated by the Enforcement Directorate. A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant based on allegations of contravention of various provisions of the FEMA Act in relation to foreign exchange transactions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the Managing Director of the company in question, was liable for the contraventions alleged against the company. Additionally, the court had to interpret the relevant provisions of the FEMA Act, FEMA Regulations, and guidelines to decide on the matter.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the FEMA Act, along with related regulations and guidelines. Section 10(5) required authorized persons to ensure that transactions involving foreign exchange do not contravene provisions of the FEMA Act or related rules. Section 10(6) deemed certain circumstances to be contraventions, including failure to use foreign exchange for the intended purpose, not surrendering it within the specified period, or using it for unauthorized purposes.

The court concluded that the contravention under Section 10(6) was a continuing offense, and that even though the appellant became the Managing Director of the company after the alleged contravention took place, he was responsible for taking corrective actions upon assuming office.

The court emphasized that the requirement to surrender foreign exchange within a specified period was a civil obligation, and the appellant's awareness of the contravention meant he should have taken steps to rectify it.

Accordingly, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute regarding the application of pay upgradation benefits under the MACP Scheme. The respondents were granted beneficial pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme but sought the benefit of Grade Pay from the next promotional hierarchy based on the former ACP Scheme.

Issues:

The distinction between the MACP and ACP Schemes, the intent behind the introduction of the MACP Scheme, and the interpretation of relevant terms within the MACP Scheme.

Held:

The MACP Scheme was recommended by the Sixth Central Pay Commission to address disparities caused by varying promotional hierarchies across departments. The objective was to ensure uniform benefits for employees irrespective of their existing hierarchical positions within their organizations or cadre (Para 9, 26).

The terms used in the MACP Scheme, specifically "placement in the immediate next higher Grade Pay in the hierarchy of the recommended revised pay bands," do not include the term "Grade Pay in the next promotional post." The argument that the benefit of the MACP Scheme is tied to the promotional post is inconsistent with the language and intent of the scheme (Para 27).

The MACP Scheme and ACP Scheme have distinct features. While both aim to provide relief against stagnation, the MACP Scheme offers financial upgradations at regular intervals, without requiring traditional promotions, and aims to incentivize efficiency despite the lack of promotions (Para 27).

The expert body, the Sixth Central Pay Commission, recommended the MACP Scheme after comprehensively examining issues, representations, and disparities arising from different promotional hierarchies (Para 28, 29).

Raj Pal's case, cited as precedent, was dismissed on technical grounds and thus should not have been considered a valid precedent for the present case (Para 42).

Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding as a precedent. A principle laid down by the court after examining the matter on merits constitutes the binding precedent. The court criticized the reliance on Raj Pal's case without assessing its merits (Para 44, 51).

The government accepted the recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission and introduced the MACP Scheme to address stagnation and anomalies caused by varying promotional hierarchies (Para 28, 29).

Decision: The impugned orders were set aside, and the court ruled in favor of the Union of India and others. The court emphasized that the MACP Scheme's implementation should not be interfered with, as it was based on expert recommendations and accepted by the government (Para 35).

The court distinguished Raj Pal's case (Decision of Supreme Court dated 15.04.2013 in SLP (C) No. CC 7467 of 2013), noting that it did not examine the overall features of the MACP Scheme and was dismissed on procedural grounds (Para 42, 45).

Facts:

The petitioner participated in the revival bid for Super Bazar, investing Rs. 504 crores. The bid was accepted, and the winding-up order was suspended. The petitioner's management period saw the issuance of summons under the Employees' Provident Fund Act, followed by a committee's report indicating issues with the revival scheme's implementation.

Issues:

The petitioner's conduct in reviving Super Bazar, its claims for a refund of the investment amount, adherence to winding-up principles and statutory provisions, and the priority of claims in the distribution of assets.

Held:

The court discusses the purpose of appointing an auditor to verify income and expenditure, and it highlights that the petitioner's conduct lacked genuine efforts for revival.( Para 26 and 27)

The court clarifies that the petitioner is accountable for its management period and should be held to account based on the verification by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).( Para 30)

The court emphasizes the importance of adhering to statutory provisions and winding-up principles, rejecting the petitioner's claim for a full refund of investment.( Para 31)

The court references Section 11 of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, highlighting the priority of payment of dues towards employees' provident fund in winding-up proceedings.( Para 33)

The court concludes that the CAG's verification is final and binding, and the liquidator must evaluate claims based on statutory priorities.( Para 34)

The court directs the liquidator to evaluate claims in accordance with statutory priorities and addresses the claims of the EPFO and the Union Government.( Para 35)

The contempt petitions shall stand dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, a State Cooperative body, serves as the apex body of Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The dispute centers around the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the appellant had no role in CEO appointments, and such power lay with the Registrar only after the District Central Cooperative Bank's failure to make the appointment within a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the authority to appoint the CEO of the first respondent?

Whether the amendments brought about by the 2016 Amending Act altered the provisions of CEO appointments for Cooperative Banks?

How should the conflict between the provisions of Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) be resolved?

Held:

Section 54 deals with the appointment of Managers, Secretaries, and officers of societies. Sub-section (1) empowers societies to make appointments based on qualifications. Sub-section (2) requires Apex and Central Societies to maintain a cadre of officers as directed by the State Government.

Section 49-E pertains to CEO appointments under specific circumstances. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E override contrary provisions and apply when the State Government has contributed to share capital, given loans, etc. CEO appointments are covered under this provision.

Central Societies under Section 49-E(2) appoint CEOs from the cadre if created under Section 54.

Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify societies for cadre officers' appointment by Apex or Central Societies. The notified class must appoint cadre officers as deputed.

The 2016 Amending Act inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying CEO eligibility and the Registrar's appointment authority. Clauses (a) and (b) apply solely to Cooperative Banks, and their introduction does not negate Section 49-E.

Section 49-E(2) stipulates CEO appointment from cadre officers of Section 54 if applicable.

Notification under Section 54(3) operates regulatory control over Central Societies under Section 49-E(2), specifying CEO appointment sources.

Courts must harmonize conflicting provisions; both Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) must be upheld. Section 54(3) notifications grant State Government regulatory power.

The State Government can specify Cooperative Banks' CEO appointments from Apex Society's cadre. Notified Apex Society provides a panel; RBI eligibility criteria apply. CEO appointment from cadre is mandatory under Section 49-E(2).

First respondent is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2). Notification obligates Cooperative Banks to appoint CEOs from cadre created by State Cooperative Bank. The appointment of CEO by the appellant was ratified by the Registrar and BoD, aligning with Section 54(3).

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition challenging the detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders were made by a specially empowered officer. The detenues, represented by their counsel, contended that their right to representation against the detention orders had been violated.

Issues:

Whether the detenues had the right to make representations against the detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Whether the Detaining Authority had the obligation to consider the representation independently or wait for the Advisory Board's report.

Whether the delay in considering the representation by the Detaining Authority violated the detenues' constitutional rights.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.):

The detenues have the right to make representations against detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This right is in addition to the right to make representations to the State Government and the Central Government (Para 12).

The Detaining Authority is obliged to consider the representations without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. The specially empowered officer has no statutory role to play at the stage when the Advisory Board's report is received. The report is meant for the appropriate Government's consumption, and confidentiality is mandated (Para 22-23).

In cases where the representation is received before or after the Advisory Board's reference, the Detaining Authority must consider the representation promptly. Inaction on the Detaining Authority's part to consider the representation causes prejudice to the detenues and violates their constitutional rights (Para 26-28).

Dissenting Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.):

The Detaining Authority, whether the Central Government, State Government, or a specially empowered officer, has the jurisdiction to consider representations against detention orders independently of the Advisory Board's recommendation (Para 3).

The consideration for revocation of a detention order is distinct from the Advisory Board's assessment of sufficient cause for detention. The Detaining Authority should prudently defer the decision on the representation while the matter is being reviewed by the Advisory Board (Para 23).

Facts:

Respondent No. 2, not a party to certain court proceedings, filed an RTI application seeking information and certified copies of relevant documents. The Public Information Officer of the Gujarat High Court informed respondent No. 2 that, according to Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, an affidavit stating the grounds for requiring the certified copies was necessary. The Appellate Authority upheld this decision.

In a second appeal, the Chief Information Commissioner directed the Public Information Officer to provide the requested information. Respondent No. 1 (High Court) challenged this order, leading to conflicting decisions between the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench held that when valid rules govern a particular field, applying fresh rules under the RTI Act would create confusion.

Issues:

Can a third party seek information and certified copies of documents from the Gujarat High Court under the RTI Act?

Is Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules does not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of documents from court proceedings. The Rule simply provides a different procedure for obtaining information, requiring the third party to file an application/affidavit stating reasons for the request. This is to ensure that the information is sought for genuine reasons or public interest. (Para 27)

The Court emphasized that the RTI Act recognizes the need to protect institutional interests and confidentiality of sensitive information. It found that the procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and serves to prevent misuse of court processes and information. (Para 28)

The Court clarified that the High Court Rules' mechanism for obtaining information is not inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act. Instead, they complement each other. The information/certified copies on the judicial side should be obtained through the mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, rather than invoking the provisions of the RTI Act. (Para 38)

Facts:

The appellant challenged the grant of moderation/grace marks to certain candidates appointed on March 30, 2009, in the context of filling up six posts in the Higher Judicial Service through direct recruitment. The appellant sought his own appointment as a District Judge. The High Court set aside the moderation marks, leading to the recasting of the select list. The appellant was ultimately appointed as a District Judge.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for notional seniority and whether he should be granted seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who were appointed through the same selection process.

Held:

The appellant was entitled to be appointed along with other candidates. The appellant was excluded from the original appointment due to certain circumstances. As the select list was revised, the appellant was deemed to be part of the appointment along with other candidates.The actual date of the appellant's appointment was recognized as February 24, 2011. Although the appellant couldn't be treated as appointed on March 30, 2009, he was entitled to notional appointment from that earlier date and consequential seniority.( Para 36)

The delay in deciding the seniority claim by the High Court could not defeat the appellant's right to claim seniority from the date other candidates in the same selection process were appointed.( Para 41)

The interpretation of rules and quotas for appointments and seniority was discussed. The Full Bench judgment clarified that there is a quota for in-service candidates, contrary to the High Court's erroneous interpretation.( Para 43)

The argument that some candidates were granted selection grades earlier than the appellant did not confer better legal or equitable rights. Appointments made beyond the prescribed quota meant for appointment by transfer were not protected.( Para 44)

The appeals are allowed