FACTS:

Mr. Ramesh Sanka, the petitioner, is a former employee of Respondent No. 12, a Limited Company.

He worked as the CEO of the company from June 2014 to December 31, 2016.

The petitioner alleges financial irregularities by Respondent No. 12, its directors, and employees in their business dealings.

Allegations extend to other companies, individuals, and firms associated with Respondent No. 12 (Respondent Nos. 13 to 22, 24, and 25).

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioner can seek enforcement of personal contractual rights through a writ petition under Article 32.

Validity of the allegations made by the petitioner against Respondent No. 12 and others.

HELD:

The writ petitioner cannot seek relief under Article 32 for personal contractual matters. Civil suit or other civil law remedies are the appropriate avenues.

Ongoing civil suits between the parties should be pursued in accordance with the law.

The court refrains from expressing opinions on factual issues raised by the parties.

The dismissal of the writ petition does not influence ongoing inquiries or proceedings.

DECISION: The writ petition is dismissed, and the parties are directed to pursue their grievances through appropriate legal channels.

Facts:

The case involves the appointment of Adhoc Judges under Andhra Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 2007, specifically Rule 6. The candidates, including Sunitha Busireddy and S. Sarada Devi, had secured marks close to the qualifying threshold in a written examination and viva voce for the purpose of regularizing their positions as Additional District and Session Judges.

Issues:

Whether the candidates qualified for the written examination and viva voce, considering the rounding off of marks.

Whether the imposition of minimum qualifying marks for viva voce was in accordance with the relevant Rules.

Held:

The Court observed that Sunitha Busireddy and S. Sarada Devi, with rounded-off marks, should be treated as having qualified both the written examination and interview.

The Court held that the decision of the Selection Committee imposing minimum qualifying marks for viva voce was illegal and arbitrary. The Court directed the High Court to conduct another examination within six months for candidates who fell short of aggregate qualifying marks.

Decision: The Court, exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the High Court to reevaluate the candidates' performance and conduct another examination. Sunitha Busireddy and S. Sarada Devi were deemed qualified, and the other candidates were given another chance to appear in the examination.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of cheating in the sale of agricultural land owned by a regimental Welfare Trust. The appellant, Brig. Sukhjeet Singh (Retd.), sought to introduce additional evidence, including a Trust Deed dated October 18, 1989, and Resolution No.112, during the appellate stage.

Issues:

Admissibility of additional evidence at the appellate stage.

Jurisdiction under Section 391 Cr.P.C. to accept additional evidence.

Allegations of malafide motive in filing applications for additional evidence.

Held:

The appellant filed an application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. to introduce a certified copy of the Trust Deed dated October 18, 1989, and Resolution No.112. The trial court had noted the availability of a photocopy of the Trust Deed but did not consider it proved.

The facts indicate that the prosecution took twelve years to present its evidence, leading to the appellant's conviction on October 7, 2013, for offenses under Section 420/34 IPC. The appellant filed a criminal appeal on October 8, 2013.

The Appellate Court rejected applications under Section 391 Cr.P.C., deeming them belated and filed with ulterior malafide motive. The High Court upheld this decision, but the Supreme Court found it unjustified.

Observations by the High Court that filing additional evidence was belated and for delaying the decision of the appeal were deemed misplaced and incorrect.

The second Trust Deed dated October 18, 1989, which was part of the record and referred to by the trial court, was not proved by the appellant. The application before the High Court sought to accept the certified copy and allow the appellant to lead evidence.

The Court emphasized that when necessary, taking additional evidence is not confined to a fixed formula but depends on the facts of each case. The lapse in proving the second Trust Deed was attributed to the appellant and his counsel.

The High Court's observation that the appellant intended to delay the appeal to eternity was criticized, given the twelve years taken by the prosecution to present evidence.

The Appellate Court erred in not exercising jurisdiction under Section 391 Cr.P.C. The Trust Deed and Resolution were crucial for understanding the conduct of the appellant and other trustees in the sale of agricultural land.

Facts:

The appellant sought declarations regarding the non-applicability of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development) and Regulation Act, 1963 to certain items, including sugar, cashew nuts, refined oil, vanaspati, and dry fruits.

The question in consideration was whether the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 are applicable to the products "edible oil," "Vanaspati," and "sugar."

Issues:

Interpretation of the term "Agricultural Produce" under Section 2(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963.

Applicability of the Act to "edible oil," "Vanaspati," and "sugar."

Jurisdiction of the Market Committee to levy market fees on sugar procured from outside the market area.

Held:

The term "agricultural produce" under Section 2(1)(a) of the Act includes all produce specified in the Schedule.

"Sugar" was held to be an agricultural produce as it is a produce of sugarcane, listed separately in the Schedule.

"Edible oil," "Vanaspati," and "sugar" fall within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) of the Act.

The Market Committee has the power to levy market fees on the marketing of sugar within its market area.

The appellant must provide records to show that sugar was procured from outside the market area, and the Market Committee shall have the authority to levy market fees only on the quantity purchased within its market area.

The direction of the High Court to approach the concerned authority is limited to the issue of sugar and is restricted to the period from 01.07.1988 to 03.03.2004.

Facts:

Advertisement issued on 26 August 1991 for the post of Projectionist at Dr. S.N. Medical College and Associated Group of Hospitals.

Appellant appointed as Projectionist, challenged by the third respondent via a writ petition.

Main contention: Appellant lacked qualification as he did not possess a license for a cinema projector.

Issues:

Whether the appellant fulfilled the requirement of holding a license for a cinema operator on the last date for submission of applications.

Held:

The third respondent argued that Rule 68(2) of the Rajasthan Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1959, requires possessing a license. The Court examined Rule 68, emphasizing sub-rule (2)(f), which allows obtaining a certificate within three months from the date of appointment.( Para 11)

Clause (f) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 68 clarifies that possession of a license on the date of appointment is not mandatory. Acquisition within three months of the appointment is permissible. The appellant acquired the license after the date of his appointment, validly complying with the rule.( Para 13)

The Division Bench erred in setting aside the appellant's appointment, as he validly obtained the required license within the stipulated period. The appellant has served for 28 years.( Para 15)

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment. The writ petition filed by the third respondent stands dismissed.( Para 16)

Facts:

A protracted dispute over ancestral property between two families, specifically accused no. 5 and CW-29, resulted in litigation. The Survey Department officials conducted a property survey, leading to an altercation between 'KR,' a son of CW-29, and accused no. 5. Subsequently, the accused returned armed, causing injuries, including the fatal stabbing of 'KR' and another individual, 'KE.'

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the Trial Court's acquittal of eleven accused persons, the High Court's partial reversal of the acquittal, and the application of Section 149 IPC in the context of an unlawful assembly.

Held:

In appeals against acquittal, the High Court should refrain from interference unless the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence is capricious or lacks evidentiary support. The High Court may intervene if the order of acquittal is inconsistent with the law and results in a miscarriage of justice.

PW-1's narration of the incident, corroborated by other eyewitnesses, provided a consistent account. The Trial Court's acquittal based on inadequately explained injuries on the accused was flawed.

Injuries sustained by the accused were explained, with pellet injuries attributed to a bomb blast caused by one of the accused. The Trial Court's judgment suffered from manifest perversity.

The Trial Court's focus on injuries as fatal, despite no deaths on the accused side, demonstrated a manifest error. The contradictions highlighted by the Trial Court were not sufficient to discredit the entire prosecution case.

The Trial Court's reasoning based on the height of the deceased and accused no. 1 was flawed. The High Court's reversal of the acquittal was justified, considering the evidence on record.

The High Court's application of Section 149 IPC was correct, considering the assembly's common object evident in the armed return of the accused after the initial altercation.

The High Court's conviction under Section 304 Part I and Section 324 read with Section 149 IPC was affirmed, with an enhancement of the sentence to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. Accused Nos. 10 and 12 were acquitted due to inconsistent depositions.

Facts:

Incident occurred at Jagdamba Hotel, where a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased.

Alleged assault with chilly powder and subsequent chase and assault with a knife on Captain Vinod Rawat.

Police Constable Divakar Shinde (PW-13) witnessed the incident and reported the details.

Dying declaration (Exh. 21) recorded at the Civil hospital.

Accused arrested, blood-stained clothes seized, and chemical analysis conducted.

Issues:

Discrepancies in the investigation, lack of effort to produce accused for victim identification, and doubts on the identity of the assailant (appellant).

Witnesses turning hostile, including PW-3 and PW-9, and panch witnesses.

Non-examination of Lt. Melvin Desouza, the victim's colleague, and the absence of the accompanying beat constable in court.

Held:

High Court reversed the acquittal of the appellant under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

Emphasized the credibility of PW-13's eyewitness account, the dying declaration, and the recovery of blood-stained clothes.

Blood group on seized clothes matched the deceased's blood group, establishing the identity of the assailant.

Non-examination of Lt. Melvin Desouza and the accompanying beat constable deemed justifiable due to military service and the natural course of police duty.

Trial court's reliance on surmises and failure to refer to crucial evidence deemed a grievous error by the High Court.

Conviction upheld, and appellant sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of INR 2,000/-

Decision: The appeal stands dismissed, and the appellant is ordered to surrender to undergo the sentence.

Facts:

The dispute involved the Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Limited and M/S Ganesh Containers Movers Syndicate. The terms of the contract provided for arbitration by the Managing Director of the appellant-Corporation or his nominee. The respondent participated in the arbitral proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the Managing Director became ineligible to act as an arbitrator by virtue of Section 12 of the Amendment Act.

Whether the High Court was right in terminating the mandate of the arbitrator appointed as per the agreement.

Whether the award passed by the arbitrator dated 21.01.2016 is sustainable.

Held:

Managing Director's Eligibility as an Arbitrator The court held that the Managing Director was not ineligible to act as the sole arbitrator. The agreement was entered into before the Amendment Act of 2015, and the proceedings commenced long before its enactment. The court emphasized that the statutory provisions in force before the Amendment Act governed the matter.

High Court's Termination of Arbitrator's Mandate The court held that the High Court erred in appointing an independent arbitrator without considering the terms of the agreement between the parties. Section 15 dealt with termination of the mandate and substitution of an arbitrator, and the High Court's appointment was not sustainable.

Sustainability of the Award The court set aside the award dated 21.01.2016. Considering the prolonged proceedings and the respondent's repeated requests for adjournment, the court invoked Article 142 to ensure complete justice. The present Managing Director was directed to continue the proceedings and pass the final award within four months.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the applicability of the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, when the contract for supply was entered into before the enforcement of the Act on September 23, 1992. The central issue revolves around the retrospective operation of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the Act is applicable when the contract for supply was entered into before the enforcement of the Act.

Whether the Act can be deemed to have retrospective operation.

Whether the suit filed by the appellants for the recovery of only interest, with the principal amount already paid, is maintainable.

Whether the High Court, even after expressing that the Act is not applicable, could have allowed 9% interest to the plaintiff.

Held:

The liability of the buyer under the Act arises upon the supply of goods or rendering of services, irrespective of whether the agreement was entered before or after the enforcement of the Act. The interpretation that the liability arises only if the agreement is made subsequent to the Act is not in line with the statutory scheme.

The Act is prospective in operation and not retroactive. The liability of the buyer and the day from which payment and interest become payable do not relate to events that occurred before the enactment of the Act.

The suit filed by the appellants for the recovery of interest is maintainable, even when the entire principal amount was paid before filing the suit. Section 6 of the Act supports the recovery of interest along with the amount due from the buyer.

The Limitation Act, 1963, is fully applicable, and the limitation for the suit for the recovery of interest under the 1993 Act falls under Part X Article 113 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and the Court affirms the findings on the issues mentioned above.