Facts:

The appellants were Deputy General Managers in Canara Bank, accused of causing wrongful loss to a complainant in a loan transaction. The complainant's loan was classified as a 'Non-Performing Asset' (NPA), leading to auction proceedings for a secured asset. The complainant alleged under-valuation of the property and challenged auction notices in various legal forums.

Issues:

Whether the complainant's allegations against the appellants merit a criminal complaint and investigation, given the recourse available under the SARFAESI Act for addressing grievances related to loan transactions and auction proceedings.

Held:

The Court, after reviewing the facts and legal provisions, observed that the SARFAESI Act is a comprehensive legal framework that regulates the actions of secured creditors like banks, including the process of auctioning secured assets. It notes that the Act provides remedies and forums for addressing disputes and grievances related to loan transactions and auctions. The Court also highlighted the principle that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases.

The Court refers to a previous writ petition filed by the complainant challenging an auction notice and highlights that the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court had considered the matter and rejected the complainant's contentions, while affirming the recourse available under the SARFAESI Act.( Para 10)

The Court further emphasizes that the SARFAESI Act is not immune to challenge or questioning, as it provides checks and balances. The Court cites a relevant decision that indicates the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to set aside actions taken by secured creditors, thereby validating the avenues for addressing disputes.( Para 17)

The Court observes that the present complaint and investigation initiated by the complainant appear to be an intimidatory tactic and an abuse of process, especially given that the complainant had previously pursued legal remedies and failed to diligently avail the available avenues under the SARFAESI Act.( Para 18)

Decision: The Court quashes the complaint, order, and FIR against the appellants, citing that the proceedings initiated are not justified in light of the available legal avenues for addressing the grievances. The Court allows the complainant to pursue remedies under the SARFAESI Act if desired and allows the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant-wife and respondent-husband were parties to the case. They had previously initiated proceedings against each other. The wife sought the restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, while the husband sought dissolution of their marriage under Section 13 of the Act. The Trial Court dismissed the husband's petition, and the First Appellate Court affirmed this decision. Subsequently, the High Court allowed the husband's Second Appeal and dissolved the marriage, primarily based on a criminal complaint filed by the wife.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's conclusion of mental cruelty based on the criminal case was justified.

Whether the lower courts' judgments dismissing the divorce petition were sustainable.

Whether the criminal prosecution's acquittal could form a basis for granting divorce.

Whether the lower courts' judgments were perverse.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court. It observed that the questions did not qualify as substantial questions of law as they essentially sought to re-appreciate the evidence. The Court emphasized that the husband's original petition for dissolution of marriage was not based on the criminal case, but rather on the wife's alleged intemperate behavior. The Court found that the High Court was not justified in granting divorce based on a different ground than what the husband initially presented. The Court restored the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing the husband's divorce petition and upholding the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The Court also noted that considering the parties' background, the minor child, and the nature of the differences, dissolution of marriage was not justified.

Facts:

The respondents exchanged land with a Scheduled Tribe member using a registered exchange deed. The exchange involved the respondents giving 4½ Muthi of land in return for 12 Nali of agricultural land. The Assistant Collector declared the exchange void under Section 161(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as it violated the provisions of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the exchange violated Section 161(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Whether the land in question is an "agricultural land" as defined in Section 3(14) of the Act.

Whether the restrictions on land transfer in Sections 157-B and 157-A apply to the case.

Whether the exchange could be upheld based on grounds of equity.

Held:

The exchange between the respondents and the Scheduled Tribe member was executed in violation of Section 157-B of the Act, which prohibits transfer of land from a Scheduled Tribe member to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. As per Section 166 of the Act, transfers in contravention of its provisions are void. Thus, the exchange was held void, and the land was deemed to be vested in the State Government. The absence of a declaration as stipulated in Sections 143 and 144 meant the land remains "agricultural land" as per Section 3(14), and the Act's provisions are applicable.

Section 161 of the Act deals with land exchange and requires prior permission from an Assistant Collector. This permission is mandatory for valid exchanges. In this case, no such permission was sought, making the exchange void. The language in Sections 157-B and 157-A indicates a clear prohibition on transferring land in any manner from a Scheduled Tribe member to another person.

The contention that prior permission under Section 161 is unnecessary is unfounded. The requirement for calculating rental value clearly implies that permission is a prerequisite for a valid exchange.

The respondents failed to explain the drastic difference in land size exchanged, raising suspicions about the exchange's genuineness. The exchange deed also lacked mutuality in mutation, undermining its validity.

The U.P. ZA & LR Act is a beneficial legislation to safeguard rural interests. The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the Act is void. No justification exists to consider respondents' requests based on their hotel operations or equity. The High Court's interpretation is contrary to the Act and constitutional empowerment provisions, thus unsustainable.

Facts:

The appellants (original accused nos. 2 to 5) were tried for the murder of Bal Kishan and convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The prosecution relied on the sole eyewitness, PW8 - Mullo Bai, who stated that she saw the appellants and other accused with weapons near the crime scene around 4-5 a.m. The trial court convicted them, and the High Court confirmed the conviction.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of the appellants based on the sole eyewitness's testimony is sustainable?

Whether the contradictions and omissions in PW8's statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC and her deposition before the Court impact the reliability of her testimony?

Whether the statement under Section 161 CrPC can be relied upon to establish the presence of lathis with the accused?

Held:

The Court analyzed the contradictions and omissions in PW8's testimony. While she claimed to have identified the accused by their torchlight and voices, the circumstances of the dark night, the absence of torch recovery, and material discrepancies cast doubt on her identification. Her statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC indicated the accused carrying lathis, but the Court ruled such statements inadmissible for conviction. The High Court's error in relying on this statement to conclude the accused had lathis was highlighted.

Considering the discrepancies, omissions, and improvements in PW8's statement and her deposition, the Court found her evidence unreliable for convicting the appellants. The Court stressed that PW8's testimony is the only evidence against the appellants, and no other independent witness supported the prosecution's case. The enmity between the parties further increased the likelihood of false implication.

As the evidence failed to establish a common object or conspiracy among the accused, the Court concluded that the benefit of doubt must favor the appellants. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction of the appellants was set aside. They were acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, and it was ordered that they be released.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala in FAO (RO) No.229/2014. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court in AS No.186/2011, and restoring the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S. No.288/2009. The dispute involved property ownership and possession between the plaintiff (respondent) and the defendant (appellant).

Issues:

The property ownership, possession, and the appropriateness of remanding the case for further consideration, especially in the context of producing additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.

Held:

The lower appellate court's decision to remand the case for reconsideration by the trial court, allowing the defendant to produce additional evidence, was found to be appropriate. The High Court's focus solely on possession in a suit for perpetual injunction was deemed incorrect, as the nature of contentions raised in the suit and the issues framed by the trial court involved both ownership and possession aspects. Therefore, the conclusion of the lower appellate court was upheld, setting aside the judgment of the High Court.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the judgment of the lower appellate court was restored. The parties were to bear their own costs.

The judgment referred to the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 729, which considered the relevance of possession in a suit for perpetual injunction, including adverse possession claims.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to two Constitution Orders issued by the President on August 5, 2019, which applied the Constitution of India in its entirety to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, akin to other states in India.

Issues:

Whether the present matter needed to be referred to a larger Bench due to differing opinions from two different Constitution Benches in the cases of Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict centered on the interpretation of Article 370.

Held:

The doctrine of precedents and stare decisis are integral to the legal system, ensuring certainty, stability, and continuity. A judgment comprises the ratio decidendi (essential legal reasoning) and obiter dictum (non-essential remarks), which must be understood in the context of the case's facts.

The decision in Prem Nath Kaul case dealt with the legislative competence of the Yuvaraj in passing an enactment before the formulation of the Constitution of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It indicated that decisions of the Constituent Assembly of the State under Article 370(2) were final, limited to decisions taken by the State Government before the Constituent Assembly's convening. It did not address the continuation or cessation of Article 370 after the Constituent Assembly's dissolution.

The rule of per incuriam (judgment passed in ignorance of relevant authorities) is an exception to the doctrine of precedents, applicable only to the ratio of the judgment. No conflict existed between the judgments in Prem Nath Kaul and Sampat Prakash cases. No reason was found to refer the present matter to a larger Bench.

Facts:

The Agriculture Department of the Government of Sikkim sought to acquire 8.36 acres of land for a regional center. The land was owned by Man Bahadur Basnett and the acquisition was disputed. Late Man Bahadur Basnett's property fell to the appellant, represented by his two sons, after his death. The appellant alleged wrongful encroachment and trespass by the respondents, claiming they used the land as an agricultural farm without proper acquisition proceedings. The suit was filed in 2002, challenging the acquisition process and seeking possession.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition process had been followed properly under the Sikkim Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1977?

Whether the respondents had acquired possession through adverse possession?

Whether the respondents had established proper acquisition and compensation procedures?

Whether the appellant was entitled to damages for wrongful use and occupation of the land?

Held:

Issue 1: Compliance with Acquisition Process The Court noted that no notification was produced showing intent to acquire the land under Section 4 of the Act. The respondents claimed that the acquisition process was followed and compensation paid, but lacked evidence. The Court emphasized that compliance with due process was essential, citing the importance of strict interpretation. The respondents failed to prove proper acquisition process or compensation, and the appellant's claim was supported.

Issue 2: Adverse Possession The respondents did not claim adverse possession. The Court did not consider this issue relevant and did not engage in a discussion on it.

Issue 3: Proper Acquisition and Compensation Procedures The Court highlighted the significance of evidence and primary/secondary proof for acquisition and compensation. The respondents failed to provide primary evidence of withdrawal of compensation or possession. The letter from the landowner consenting to acquisition did not negate the need for proper acquisition process and compensation proof. The Court held that the state must comply with the procedure for acquisition under Article 300A of the Constitution.

Issue 4: Damages for Wrongful Use and Occupation Citing LAO vs. M. Ramakrishna Reddy, the Court ruled that the owner can claim damages for wrongful use and possession of unacquired land. The respondents were found liable for damages for illegal use and occupation of the land.

Conclusion and Relief: The respondents failed to prove proper acquisition and compensation procedures. The appellant was entitled to possession of the land and damages for wrongful use and occupation. The respondents were given three months to decide whether to properly acquire the land or surrender possession. Mesne profits would be determined by a Court Commissioner.

Facts:

The case concerned the issue of pension entitlement for employees under the State Bank of India Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) framed in 2000. The central question was whether employees completing 15 years of service were entitled to pension benefits as per the terms of the scheme.

Issues:

Whether the Central Board of Directors' acceptance of the memorandum for pension payment created a binding obligation on the State Bank of India (SBI) to provide pension benefits to employees completing 15 years of service?

Whether the SBI's reliance on its failure to amend the rules and its unilateral decision to deny pension benefits were valid arguments to invalidate its earlier decision?

Held:

The court held that once the Central Board of Directors of the SBI accepted the memorandum proposing pension payment to employees completing 15 years of service, the SBI was bound by a binding obligation to implement the pension scheme. The court criticized the SBI's attempt to invalidate its own decision by claiming a failure to amend the rules. The court emphasized that the SBI could not act unfairly or unreasonably based on misrepresentation.

The court interpreted the contractual nature of the scheme in the context of the facts and decisions made by the Board of Directors. There was no ambiguity regarding the admissibility of pension when considering the memorandum and the scheme together. In case of ambiguity, the court ruled in favor of employees, and any clarification denying pension benefits was deemed unenforceable, illegal, and contrary to the law.

The eligibility clause of the VRS scheme explicitly stated that employees with 15 years of pensionable service were entitled to benefits, including pension. The court rejected the SBI's claim that the draft scheme did not stipulate 15 years of service as eligibility. The court held that various documents and correspondence confirmed that the decision to grant pension benefits upon completion of 15 years of service was well-established.

Facts:

The dispute revolves around a property situated at D-1090, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. The property was originally owned by late Sh. S. L. Sethi and was subsequently passed on to Smt. Krishna Sethi, the mother of the parties, through a will. A subsequent will dated 27.01.2005 specified the distribution of the property among the two sons, with ground and first floors allotted to each and an equal division of the second floor.

Issues:

Whether the respondent-plaintiff had the right to partition the second floor and terrace rights.

Whether the appellant-defendant had a claim over the common areas in the property, despite the suit being limited to the second floor and terrace rights.

Held:

The Court, after considering the pleadings and evidence, ruled as follows:

The appellant-defendant, despite the suit being limited to the second floor and terrace rights, had raised a dispute regarding common areas in the property.

The Trial Court framed relevant issues on the common areas due to the appellant's dispute.

The High Court, while acknowledging that a driveway on the ground floor would typically be a common area, considered the specific layout of the property.

The High Court found that the appellant's portion had a direct entrance from a side lane, reducing the need for access through the driveway.

The High Court ruled that the appellant had no right to use the driveway but could use the water pipes and booster pump/motor in the rear courtyard.

Additionally, the High Court allowed the respondent to use a part of the staircase landing on the second floor for specific access.