Facts:

Appellant filed a private complaint alleging the commission of an offence under Section 193 of the IPC against respondents based on false affidavits filed in a contempt case.

Magistrate took cognizance, and the High Court set aside the order, stating the need for prior court complaint as per Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate's cognizance based on a private complaint under Section 193 of the IPC was valid?

Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. in the context of forgery committed outside the court.

Held:

The offences under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are distinct. The former relates to false evidence and offences against public justice, while the latter pertains to offences concerning a document produced in court.

Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. mandates prosecution under Section 195(1)(b) to be initiated only with the sanction of the court under whose proceedings the offence was allegedly committed.

Private complaints are barred in cases under Section 193 IPC, and the procedure under Section 195 Cr.P.C. is mandatory.

The case falls under Section 195(1)(b)(i), and the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance based on a private complaint.

The High Court rightly set aside the Magistrate's order, and the appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

An altercation took place on October 8, 2003, leading to the respondent shooting the victim with a firearm, resulting in bleeding injuries. The complaint highlighted a longstanding dispute between the parties over a love marriage and a disc cable connection business.

Issues:

The nature of injuries and whether they were grievous or life-threatening, impacting the applicability of Section 307 of the Penal Code.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not essential for an offense under Section 307. It cites various precedents, including State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil, to establish that the intention of the accused can be deduced from surrounding circumstances, not solely relying on the severity of injuries.

Decision: The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the Trial Court's order of conviction under Section 307, along with a sentence of three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000, is restored. The appeal by the State is allowed, and the respondent is directed to surrender to serve the sentence.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit in 2013 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, claiming wrongful dispossession from a shop.

Appellant denied the claims, asserting tenancy since 2004.

Landlady (Respondent No.2) filed a statement supporting the appellant's tenancy.

Trial court dismissed an Order 39, Rule 1 application for injunction, finding in favor of the appellant.

The appellate court affirmed, emphasizing the tenancy agreement and lack of evidence supporting dispossession.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's revisionary jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC can be invoked against interlocutory orders post the 1999 amendment.

Whether the High Court, in exercising revisionary powers, can ignore the established guidelines for granting interlocutory injunctions.

Held:

The proviso to Section 115 CPC, added in 1999, restricts the High Court's revisionary powers against interlocutory orders.

Revisional jurisdiction is to correct jurisdictional errors only. Errors of fact or law, unless affecting the court's jurisdiction, are not grounds for revision.

The judgment deviated from established legal principles and the limitations imposed by Section 115 CPC.

A Section 6 suit being a summary proceeding, the trial court is directed to dispose of the case within six months.

Decision: The impugned judgment is set aside, and the judgments of the lower courts are restored. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant (Asharfi Devi) was the owner of certain lands subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

Ceilings proceedings declared some lands in excess of ceiling limits as surplus, and the State claimed to have taken possession in 1982.

The appellant filed a writ petition in 2002, claiming that the Ceiling Act's repeal in 1999 rendered the proceedings lapsed.

The writ petition was dismissed in 2008, and a review application was filed, which was also dismissed in 2008.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was right in dismissing the review application under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

Whether the main order contained any error/mistake apparent on the face of the record.

Held:

The original appellant did not challenge the legality of the main order dated 14.03.2008 separately.

The Court refused to invoke Article 142 of the Constitution to permit challenging the main order, citing lack of reasons and legal impediment.

The appeal was confined to examining the legality of the review order and not the main order.

The High Court's finding that the main order did not contain any error/mistake under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code was upheld.

The Court concluded that the review order was passed in conformity with the requirements of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

The finding in the writ petition that the appellant failed to prove possession on the date of repeal was not subject to denovo examination in the review jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The Chairman of the Tribunal, acting singly, stayed proceedings before a two-member Bench and rendered interim orders passed by that Bench inoperative, utilizing powers under Sections 5, 24, and 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Issues:

Whether the Chairman, sitting singly, possesses the authority to nullify orders passed by a larger Bench?

What is the relevance of the Preamble of the Administrative Tribunals Act in the context of the Chairman's actions?

What are the powers and limitations of the Chairman under Sections 5, 24, and 25 of the Act?

Held:

The Chairman, sitting singly, cannot nullify orders passed by a larger Bench. The order staying proceedings before the two-member Bench was without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.( Para 40)

The reference to the Preamble of the Act is irrelevant. The Preamble does not support the contention that the Chairman, sitting singly, could stay proceedings before a Division Bench.( Para 47)

Section 5 establishes the composition of the Tribunal, distinguishing the Chairman's administrative powers from those of the Tribunal. The Chairman's powers include discharging functions of members and transferring members between Benches.( Paras 49, 50)

The proviso to Section 5(c) allows the Chairman, during the hearing, to transfer the case to a Bench consisting of two Members if deemed necessary.( Para 53)

Section 24 limits the power to pass interim orders to the Tribunal, not the Chairman. Section 25 grants the Chairman administrative power to transfer cases between Benches but doesn't confer the power to pass interim stays.( Para 58, 59, 60)

The Chairman, while exercising power under Section 25, does not function as a Tribunal and lacks the authority to pass interim stay orders.( Para 61)

The Chairman can exercise financial and administrative powers over Benches but cannot interfere with their functioning or tinker with orders through interim orders in a transfer petition.( Para 64)

Judicial decorum demands that a judicial order be vacated, varied, or reviewed by a Bench of equal or larger strength, not a smaller Bench.( Para 65)

Interim orders do not operate as precedents, but norms of judicial decorum apply to them. Principles of higher strength Benches take precedence.( Para 67)

The Division Bench rightly allowed the writ petition, asserting that the Chairman's order of stay was without jurisdiction. The Chairman, acting judicially, is equal to any other Member.( Para 68)

The Chairman's order is declared without jurisdiction, and the appellant is directed to deposit costs of Rs. 25,000 with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.( Paras 73, 74)

Facts:

G. Ratna Raj, the original appellant (now represented by legal representatives), filed a civil suit for redemption of mortgage and permanent injunction against Sri Muthukumarasamy Permanent Fund Ltd. (Respondent No.1) and others.

Defendants appeared initially, issues were framed, and plaintiff's evidence was recorded.

Defendants did not appear later, and the court proceeded ex parte against them, leading to the passing of a preliminary decree.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench was justified in setting aside the preliminary decree, treating it as an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 of CPC?

Held:

The Trial Court proceeded ex parte under Order 17, Rule 2 and Order 9, Rule 6 (a) as the defendants were absent despite summons.

The Division Bench rightly set aside the preliminary decree, treating it as an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13.

The Court clarified that an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 6 (a) can be set aside under Order 9, Rule 13 on establishing sufficient grounds by the defendants.

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The Trial Court directed to decide the Original Suit No. 131/1999 on merits within one year. The legal representatives permitted to amend the cause title and prosecute the suit.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondents for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the first Appellate Court overturned the decision. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, stating it lacked substantial questions of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal on the ground that it does not involve any substantial question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in holding that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. It emphasized that the appeal did involve a substantial question of law, and such questions should have been framed at the time of admission of the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of the Code for its final hearing. The Court decided to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framing appropriate substantial question(s) of law arising in the case.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s) of law in terms of Section 100 (4) of the Code. The High Court is directed to decide the second appeal on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with the law without being influenced by any of the Supreme Court's observations on merits.

Facts:

A complaint was lodged on 01.09.1998, stating an attack on the complainant on 29.08.1998 by the respondents and others.

The complainant alleged injuries and hospitalization, leading to the filing of FIR No. 1165/1998.

After the trial, all accused were acquitted on 06.09.2005.

Issues:

The State of Maharashtra sought leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of CrPC, which was rejected by the High Court on 13.06.2008.

Held:

The appellant argued based on the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (2008) 9 SCC 475, emphasizing the scope of Section 378(3), CrPC.

The High Court's rejection was based on the alleged absence of injuries as per medical evidence, contrary to the record.

The Court found the rejection flawed and prima facie established a case for the State to appeal.

Considering a cross-complaint and pending appeal in another case related to the incident, the Court granted leave.

The impugned order dated 13.06.2008 was set aside, allowing the State's appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, N. Sankaranarayanan, and respondent No. 2 are members of a family with disputes over family properties.

An earlier memorandum of understanding in 1998 aimed to resolve disputes, but conflicts persisted.

The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226, challenging the activities of respondent No. 2 on family land.

Issues:

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is the appropriate recourse for private property disputes among family members.

Jurisdiction of State authorities in addressing alleged illegal activities on the disputed land.

Held:

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition, citing that private property disputes among family members should be resolved in civil courts, not under Article 226 jurisdiction.( Para 15)

Emphasized that the dispute was essentially a private matter within the family and not a matter for writ jurisdiction.( Para 17)

Reiterated the settled law that writ petitions cannot address private property disputes and that remedies lie in civil courts.( Para 18)

Acknowledged pending proceedings before the Company Law Board and directed parties to pursue remedies available in those proceedings.( Para 21)