Facts:

The case revolves around allegations that a vehicle belonging to the father of the parties was sold after the father's death using forged signatures on relevant documents.

Issues:

Whether a second complaint is maintainable when the first complaint was dismissed on merits?

Whether the second complaint, filed with additional supporting material, is valid when the core allegations are the same as those in the first complaint?

Held:

The court laid down the principles established in earlier cases like Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur, and Poonam Chand Jain. These principles indicate that the maintainability of a second complaint depends on how the first complaint was dismissed.

If the first complaint was dismissed on merits, a second complaint on nearly identical facts may not be maintainable. However, if the dismissal of the first complaint was due to the complainant's absence, a second complaint could be filed on the same facts.

In the present case, the first complaint was rejected by the Judicial Magistrate on merits. The core allegations, involving forged signatures and the sale of a vehicle, remained unchanged. The complainant sought to withdraw the revision of the first complaint and file a fresh complaint.

The court referred to an order from the Revisional Court, which indicated that the complainant could present a new complaint without requiring permission from the court, if new facts emerged.

The second complaint included additional material, such as a credit note and Registration Certificate, in support of the core allegations. However, the court noted that these additional materials could have been obtained earlier with reasonable diligence.

Considering the principles established by previous judgments, the court concluded that the core allegations in both complaints were the same. As the first complaint was rejected on merits, the second complaint, filed with almost identical facts and additional material, was not maintainable.

The court held that the High Court's decision to deem the second complaint maintainable was not justified. Accordingly, the second complaint was dismissed as not being maintainable.

These cases provided the framework for assessing whether a second complaint on the same or similar facts is permissible based on how the first complaint was disposed of.

Appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The dispute revolves around a property situated at D-1090, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. The property was originally owned by late Sh. S. L. Sethi and was subsequently passed on to Smt. Krishna Sethi, the mother of the parties, through a will. A subsequent will dated 27.01.2005 specified the distribution of the property among the two sons, with ground and first floors allotted to each and an equal division of the second floor.

Issues:

Whether the respondent-plaintiff had the right to partition the second floor and terrace rights.

Whether the appellant-defendant had a claim over the common areas in the property, despite the suit being limited to the second floor and terrace rights.

Held:

The Court, after considering the pleadings and evidence, ruled as follows:

The appellant-defendant, despite the suit being limited to the second floor and terrace rights, had raised a dispute regarding common areas in the property.

The Trial Court framed relevant issues on the common areas due to the appellant's dispute.

The High Court, while acknowledging that a driveway on the ground floor would typically be a common area, considered the specific layout of the property.

The High Court found that the appellant's portion had a direct entrance from a side lane, reducing the need for access through the driveway.

The High Court ruled that the appellant had no right to use the driveway but could use the water pipes and booster pump/motor in the rear courtyard.

Additionally, the High Court allowed the respondent to use a part of the staircase landing on the second floor for specific access.

Facts:

The dispute in this case revolved around a property owned by K.F. Pvt. Ltd., with a shareholding division between the plaintiffs (PA Group) and the defendants (RA Group). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had entered into a Development Agreement without their knowledge, leading to financial benefits that the plaintiffs were excluded from. This resulted in the filing of a lawsuit.

During the proceedings, the parties reached a settlement through consent terms. However, a dispute arose during the execution of the settlement, specifically concerning the transfer of 8 apartments to the plaintiffs as outlined in 'Annexure E'. The defendants refused to comply with the consent terms, leading to subsequent appeals.

Issues:

The execution of the consent decree, the validity of partial execution, the importance of supplemental consent terms, and the responsibilities of both parties in implementing the settlement.

Held:

The court held that the entire consent decree must be implemented by both parties, and partial execution was not permissible. The objective of resolving all disputes among the parties could be frustrated if only certain aspects of the settlement were executed. Both parties were directed to fully comply with the consent terms and execute the further supplemental consent terms and family arrangement as per the settlement's modalities.

The court referenced a previous case that highlighted the significance of family settlements, emphasizing their role in maintaining peace and goodwill among family members. The court observed that technicalities should not hinder the implementation of such settlements, which are essential for family harmony.

The court noted that there was an implied term in the settlement that both parties intended to enter into further supplemental consent terms while also transferring 8 flats to the plaintiffs. Any other interpretation would render the settlement unworkable and defeat its purpose.

To balance the parties, the court directed the RA Group to counter-sign the 'Annexure E' letter for the 8 flats allotted to the PA Group. However, until the further supplemental consent terms were executed, the PA Group was restrained from selling or transferring those flats. Both parties were instructed to abide by the restraint order in the consent terms. The court also extended an existing injunction until the execution of the further supplemental consent terms.

The court referred to a previous case involving family settlements to emphasize the importance of maintaining peace and harmony in families through such arrangements.

Facts:

The appellants (original accused nos. 2 to 5) were tried for the murder of Bal Kishan and convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The prosecution relied on the sole eyewitness, PW8 - Mullo Bai, who stated that she saw the appellants and other accused with weapons near the crime scene around 4-5 a.m. The trial court convicted them, and the High Court confirmed the conviction.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of the appellants based on the sole eyewitness's testimony is sustainable?

Whether the contradictions and omissions in PW8's statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC and her deposition before the Court impact the reliability of her testimony?

Whether the statement under Section 161 CrPC can be relied upon to establish the presence of lathis with the accused?

Held:

The Court analyzed the contradictions and omissions in PW8's testimony. While she claimed to have identified the accused by their torchlight and voices, the circumstances of the dark night, the absence of torch recovery, and material discrepancies cast doubt on her identification. Her statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC indicated the accused carrying lathis, but the Court ruled such statements inadmissible for conviction. The High Court's error in relying on this statement to conclude the accused had lathis was highlighted.

Considering the discrepancies, omissions, and improvements in PW8's statement and her deposition, the Court found her evidence unreliable for convicting the appellants. The Court stressed that PW8's testimony is the only evidence against the appellants, and no other independent witness supported the prosecution's case. The enmity between the parties further increased the likelihood of false implication.

As the evidence failed to establish a common object or conspiracy among the accused, the Court concluded that the benefit of doubt must favor the appellants. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction of the appellants was set aside. They were acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, and it was ordered that they be released.

FACTS:

On 10.04.2004, ASI-PW7 and other police officials noticed the appellant and another accused carrying a bag in a suspicious manner.

The accused turned back upon seeing the police and started walking briskly, arousing suspicion.

The ASI intercepted them and suspected the bag to contain narcotic items.

The accused were informed about their right to have the search witnessed by a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate.

The appellant chose a search by a Gazetted Officer, and the DSP arrived at the spot.

The bag was found to contain 6 kilograms 300 grams of opium.

Samples were taken, and formal FIR was registered. The charge-sheet was filed after completing the investigation.

The appellant denied the allegations during questioning under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUES:

Discrepancy in the timing of DSP's presence and its impact on the prosecution's case.

Non-production of the seized contraband before the court.

Compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act in relation to personal search.

Non-association of independent witnesses with the investigation.

HELD:

Issue 1: Discrepancy in DSP's Presence The appellant raised a discrepancy in the DSP's timing of presence at the spot. However, the Court found no merit in this argument, highlighting the lapse of time from the incident to witness examination and the possibility of discrepancies in the evidence due to such lapse. The Court relied on the testimony of the DSP and ASI to confirm the DSP's presence during the search.

Issue 2: Non-Production of Seized Contraband The appellant contended that non-production of the seized contraband violated her conviction. The Court referred to earlier judgments on this matter and noted that while non-production could be fatal in some cases, it was not sufficient singularly to grant acquittal. Since the samples were produced, there was no tampering with the seals, and the appellant did not raise this issue in lower courts, the Court rejected this contention.

Issue 3: Compliance with Section 50 The appellant argued that personal search required compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The Court referred to previous judgments and found that when contraband is recovered from a bag, compliance with Section 50 is not necessary. As there was no recovery from the appellant's person and only from the bag, the requirement for Section 50 compliance was not applicable.

Issue 4: Non-Association of Independent Witnesses The appellant contended that independent witnesses were not associated with the investigation. The Court referred to the ASI's testimony and found that efforts were made to involve independent witnesses, but they were reluctant to cooperate. The Court upheld the confidence placed by lower courts in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Facts:

The appellant, the Superintendent of Post Office, Bolangir Division, Bolangir, Odisha, appealed against a decision of the National Commission. The case involved a complaint filed by the respondent, Jambu Kumar Jain and others, who claimed that 88 IVPs purchased by his father were lost in 2001. They requested payment of maturity value, alleging deficiency in service by the Post Office.

Issues:

Whether, according to the Indira Vikas Patra Rules, 1986, the lost or stolen IVPs were eligible for replacement by the Post Office.

Held:

The court referred to the relevant provisions of the Indira Vikas Patra Rules, 1986. It noted that according to Rule 5, IVPs could be purchased using various modes including cash, and no formal application was required. Rule 6 governed the issuance of certificates, and Rule 7 addressed replacement of certificates. It emphasized that Rule 7(2) clearly stated that certificates lost, stolen, mutilated, defaced, or destroyed beyond recognition would not be replaced by any Post Office.

The court held that the refusal of the Department to entertain requests for maturity sum in cases where IVPs were lost or stolen was justified. The absence of registered identity for cash-purchased IVPs meant that there was no way to establish the identity of the purchaser. The court compared IVPs to currency notes, emphasizing that a lost currency note cannot be replaced, and thus, the same principle applied to IVPs.

The court concluded that if the Department refused to encash certificates upon presentation or made short payments, there could be a grievance about service deficiency. However, in cases where the certificates themselves were lost and the initial holder's identity could not be established, the Department was well within its rights to deny the return of maturity sum.

The court referred to the case of Central Government of India and others vs. Krishnaji Parvetesh Kulkarni, (2006) 4 SCC 275. In that case, it was ruled that an IVP is similar to a currency note and a lost IVP cannot be replaced, in line with the rules.

The Appeal is Allowed.

Facts:

Advocates in the District of Dehradun and several districts of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand, were boycotting courts on all Saturdays. The High Court directed the District Bar Associations to end the strike and resume court attendance. The State Bar Council was instructed to take disciplinary action against the office bearers. District Judges were to report non-compliance for possible contempt action.

Issues:

Whether the right to strike/boycott courts is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Whether the strikes/boycotts unjustifiably interfere with the justice delivery system and violate the rights of litigants and the principles of speedy justice.

Held:

The Court noted that despite prior decisions (Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, Common Cause v. Union of India, Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of M.P.) discouraging lawyer strikes, such actions persisted. The advocates were boycotting courts on Saturdays in various districts. The Court highlighted that litigants were the ultimate sufferers and expressed shock at the data showing frequent strikes. The Court opined that working on these days would have served the interest of speedy justice and timely criminal trial completion.

The petitioner's argument that strikes are a form of peaceful expression under Article 19(1)(a) was addressed. The Court ruled that the right to freedom of speech can't detrimentally affect litigants or the justice system. Strikes cannot be justified as an exercise of this right and nobody has an absolute right to boycott courts. Such actions also compromise the rights to speedy justice enshrined in Articles 14 and 21. The Court upheld the High Court's directions and concluded that boycotting courts amounted to contempt.

Facts:

The Maharashtra State Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC) quashed several circulars issued by the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (MSEDCL) before its formation. These circulars aimed to impose "take or pay" obligations, minimum off-take requirements, and additional tariffs for captive power plant holders. MSEDCL was directed to make refunds to certain parties (respondents 3 to 7).

Issues:

Whether MERC had the authority to invalidate circulars issued by MSEDCL before its establishment.

Whether the circular dated 2.9.1999, which remained in force until 28.4.2000, should be considered in light of MERC's earlier order and observations.

Whether a refund of charged amounts should be ordered and whether it would lead to unjust enrichment.

Held:

Issue 1: Validity of Circulars: The Court held that circulars issued before the establishment of MERC could not be quashed based solely on the argument that MSEDCL lacked the power to issue them without the Commission's approval. The Court relied on the precedent set by Binani Zinc Limited v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors. (2009) 11 SCC 244, which stated that the State Electricity Board held the power before the Commission's formation.

Issue 2: Merits of Circular dated 2.9.1999: The Court noted that the circular dated 2.9.1999 needed to be considered in light of MERC's previous order and observations. MERC and APTEL were required to examine the impact of their prior orders on the circulars and to consider MSEDCL's submissions for circular approval. The Court emphasized that circulars were integral to tariff proposals.

Issue 3: Unjust Enrichment and Refund : Considering the period during which the circular dated 2.9.1999 was in effect, the Court observed that respondents 3 to 7 had used the supplied electricity to manufacture products whose costs were passed on to consumers. Ordering a refund would result in unjust enrichment, as these costs were already part of product prices. Therefore, the Court held that a refund would not be appropriate in this context.

Decision (Para 28): The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside MERC's and APTEL's orders. It deemed that the circulars and policy decisions issued before MERC's establishment were wrongly invalidated. Moreover, in light of the circumstances, the Court held that the order regarding the refund of the recovered amount should also be set aside.

Facts:

Brindavan Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd. (the respondent) applied for credit facilities from Bank of India (the appellant) and revised its credit requirements multiple times. The bank debited processing charges from the respondent's account, which the respondent objected to.

Issues:

Whether the bank's actions were consistent with its procedures and circulars regarding processing charges.

Whether the respondent's request for waiver of 50% of charges was valid.

Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) orders were justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the bank's actions were in accordance with its procedures and circulars. The respondent was aware of the processing charges and had sought a waiver of only 50% of the charges. The orders of NCDRC and SCDRC were set aside, and the bank's appeal was allowed. However, the court directed the bank to refund a specific amount (Rs. 9.16 lakhs) within two months from the date of the order.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the bank's appeal, set aside the orders of NCDRC and SCDRC, and directed the bank to refund Rs. 9.16 lakhs to the respondent within two months.