Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondents for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the first Appellate Court overturned the decision. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, stating it lacked substantial questions of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal on the ground that it does not involve any substantial question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in holding that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. It emphasized that the appeal did involve a substantial question of law, and such questions should have been framed at the time of admission of the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of the Code for its final hearing. The Court decided to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framing appropriate substantial question(s) of law arising in the case.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s) of law in terms of Section 100 (4) of the Code. The High Court is directed to decide the second appeal on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with the law without being influenced by any of the Supreme Court's observations on merits.

Facts:

The appellant, N. Sankaranarayanan, and respondent No. 2 are members of a family with disputes over family properties.

An earlier memorandum of understanding in 1998 aimed to resolve disputes, but conflicts persisted.

The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226, challenging the activities of respondent No. 2 on family land.

Issues:

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is the appropriate recourse for private property disputes among family members.

Jurisdiction of State authorities in addressing alleged illegal activities on the disputed land.

Held:

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition, citing that private property disputes among family members should be resolved in civil courts, not under Article 226 jurisdiction.( Para 15)

Emphasized that the dispute was essentially a private matter within the family and not a matter for writ jurisdiction.( Para 17)

Reiterated the settled law that writ petitions cannot address private property disputes and that remedies lie in civil courts.( Para 18)

Acknowledged pending proceedings before the Company Law Board and directed parties to pursue remedies available in those proceedings.( Para 21)

FACTS:

Dispute over land (survey Nos. 58 and 60) in Bombay suburban District.

Plaintiff claims to be the lessee; defendant claims ownership based on a lease deed executed in 1958.

Defendant served a quit notice in 1980, leading to the filing of Civil Suit No. 503 of 1980 by the plaintiff for specific performance.

ISSUES:

Validity of the lease deed and rights claimed by both parties.

Entitlement to possession and arrears of rent.

HELD:

The Single Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit for specific performance but allowed the defendant's counter-claim for possession and arrears of rent.

Division Bench set aside the judgment on the ground that the counter-claim was not maintainable under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.

Supreme Court affirms the Division Bench's decision, stating that suits between licensor and licensee or between landlord and tenant in relation to land are governed by Section 41 of the Act.

Court rejects the argument that once tenancy is determined, suits would not fall under Section 41.

Refers to the case of Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain & Ors. vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale [(1995) 2 SCC 665] for a similar interpretation of Section 41.

REFERRED CASES:

Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram, AIR 1958 SC 677

Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain & Ors. vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale, (1995) 2 SCC 665

Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli vs. Haribhai Manibhai Patel, AIR 1980 Bombay 123

Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors. vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr., (2013) 15 SCC 358

Facts:

The appellant purchased a Hydraulic Excavator in 2007 for Rs. 51,74,000 and insured it under a policy.

The Excavator was damaged in a fire in 2010, and the insurance claim was contested over the calculation of depreciation and sum insured.

Surveyors appointed by both the appellant and the insurance company assessed the loss differently.

Issues:

Calculation of depreciation for the damaged Excavator.

Discrepancy in the assessed sum insured between the appellant and the insurance company.

Held:

The court held that the parties are bound by the stipulated sum insured. The surveyor appointed by the insurance company was not justified in disregarding the agreed sum insured and calculating depreciation for a period prior to the policy date. The National Commission's decision was set aside, and the State Commission's judgment was restored.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the National Commission, and restored the judgment of the State Commission.

Facts:

The Anugraha Narayan Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna (Institute), governed by the Anugraha Narayan Sinha Institute of Social Studies Act, 1964, implemented a retirement benefit scheme from its own resources. The State Government was directed by the High Court to provide financial assistance for payment of arrears and current pension to the employees of the Institute.

Issues:

Whether the State Government is obligated to bear the financial burden of the retirement pension scheme implemented by the Institute?

Is the resolution of the Board of the Institute binding on the State Government?

Held:

The money contributed by the State Government is one source of the Institute's fund, but the obligation to bear the amount of the pension fund is not mandated by Section 8 or Section 9 of the Act.

The retirement pension scheme can be considered a part of the obligation to utilize funds, but the State Government is not mandated to pay pension to the Institute's employees.

The resolution of the Board to implement the retirement benefit scheme from its resources does not bind the State Government to pay the pension.

The employees of the Institute cannot be treated at par with the State Government employees, and the State cannot be burdened with the responsibility to pay pension to the Institute's employees.

The order of the Division Bench directing the State Government to provide financial assistance for pension is not legally sustainable.

Facts:

The Additional District Magistrate, Gwalior, issued an order externing the respondent for one year.

The respondent challenged the order, contending that the Additional District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to pass such orders under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.

Issues:

Whether the Additional District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to pass orders under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990?

Held:

The statutory scheme of the Adhiniyam, 1990 allows orders under Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 to be passed by an Additional District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

The Constitution Bench Judgment in Ajaib Singh Vs. Gurbachan Singh (AIR 1965 SC 1619) is not applicable to the present case as it dealt with a different statutory scheme.

The High Court erred in relying on Ajaib Singh's judgment, and the impugned judgment is unsustainable.

The Notification dated 05.03.2003, empowering the Additional District Magistrate, was not challenged in the writ petition.

The period of externment being one year has already expired, making consideration of other grounds unnecessary.

The appeals are allowed, and the impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside.

Facts:

The appellant, a landlord, challenged the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which set aside the eviction order passed by the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal. The dispute involved the arrears of rent demanded by the landlord and the tenant's contention that the rent paid was sufficient.

Issues:

Whether the tenant could unilaterally revise the rent based on Section 6 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001?

Whether the tenant's payment covered the demanded arrears, preventing eviction under Section 9(a)?

Held:

The Court examines the statutory scheme of Act 2001, noting changes from the previous Act of 1950. Section 6 is highlighted, emphasizing the landlord's right to seek revision of rent under this section.( Para 7)

The Court considers the tenant's argument to re-determine the rent as per Section 6, concluding that the tenant cannot unilaterally revise the rent and must follow the procedure outlined in Section 6.( Para 14)

Addressing the High Court's observation, the Court reaffirms that the landlord cannot claim a revision of rent exceeding 5% after the enforcement of Act 2001.( Para 18)

The Court clarifies that if the landlord does not invoke Section 6, the agreed rent between the parties remains, and the tenant cannot unilaterally reduce it.( Para 20)

The Court criticizes the High Court for not appreciating the true import of Sections 6 and 7, stating that the tenant is, indeed, in default.( Para 21)

Analyzing Section 9(a) of the Act, the Court explains that the tenant's payment must cover the arrears demanded by the notice for the last four months to avoid eviction.( Para 23)

Reiterating the tenant's default, the Court asserts that the demanded arrears, despite partial payment, establish a valid ground for eviction under Section 9(a).( Para 24)

Facts:

The appellant claimed rights to agricultural land after the death of Mangalram and Rukma Devi.

Allegations of collusion were made against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for recording the land in the name of respondent No. 3.

A gift deed was executed, leading the appellant to file a civil suit challenging its validity.

Issues:

Whether the relief sought falls under the jurisdiction of a revenue court, as per the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.

Whether a civil court has jurisdiction when khatedari rights are pending adjudication in a revenue court.

Held:

The Trial court dismissed objections to its jurisdiction, stating a conclusive decision can only be made after framing preliminary issues and recording evidence.

The High Court allowed revision, citing that the suit fell under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and was, therefore, barred under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The relief sought, involving khatedari rights, was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts.

The civil court cannot grant the relief until khatedari rights are decreed by the revenue court.

The High Court's decision was upheld, dismissing the appeals.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and possession, relying on a rent note from 1967.

A fire incident in 1967 was alleged as the cause for the land being vacant, leading to a claim of dispossession in 1972.

The defendant asserted possession based on sale deeds, and the dispute revolved around the ownership and possession of the property.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had better title over the property?

Whether the plaintiff was in settled possession of the property, justifying dispossession?

Held:

The plaintiff lacked documentary proof of possession and title.

The Court emphasized settled possession as a prerequisite for possessory title and found the evidence of the plaintiff insufficient.

The sale deeds presented by the defendants indicated ownership and possession over the disputed property.

The High Court's interference with the First Appellate Court's findings was deemed unjustified.

The appeal succeeded, and the judgment of the First Appellate Court was restored, leading to the dismissal of the suit.