Facts:

The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents (original plaintiff) filed a suit against the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants (original defendant) for possession of a scheduled property. The original plaintiff claimed to be the full and absolute owner of the property and sought directions for the defendant to remove a temporary structure and deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff. The defendant resisted the suit, claiming that the plaintiff's brother had executed a sale agreement in favor of the defendant's wife in 1976, putting her in possession of the property. The sale deed, however, was not registered. The defendant also pleaded adverse possession.

Issues:

Whether the defendant had perfected their title to the schedule property through continuous possession since 1976.

Whether the plea of adverse possession could be established based on the presented documents.

Whether the claim of title and adverse possession simultaneously from 1976 was tenable.

Held:

The trial Court held in favor of the defendant, stating that they had perfected their title to the schedule property through continuous possession since 1976, thereby denying the plaintiff's relief of possession. However, the judgment showed inconsistencies in the presented documents, such as the agreement of sale and General Power of Attorney.

The High Court upheld the findings of the trial Court regarding the inconsistencies in the presented documents. It also noted that the General Power of Attorney dated 08.08.1988 indicated that the plaintiff's brother was in possession of the property on that date. The non-registration of the sale deed was not supported by evidence proving a bar on land transfer.

The Court found no reason to disturb the concurrent findings of the lower Courts, and even an independent examination of the evidence led to the same conclusion.

The plea of the defendant's wife possessing title to the property was not established based on the presented documents, and her absence as a party to the proceedings was noted.

The Court observed that the claim of title from 1976 and plea of adverse possession from the same date could not coexist. The starting point of adverse possession needed clarification, but this crucial fact was not proven in the case.

For a plea of adverse possession to be accepted, the possession must be public and known to the true owner. In this case, the plea of adverse possession was lacking in material particulars.

Thus, the plea of title and adverse possession simultaneously from 1976 was not tenable, and the appellants were directed to hand over vacant possession of the schedule property.

Facts:

The case involves the validity of Rule 55-A of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 (MP Rules), which deals with the reservation of distinctive marks (registration numbers) for motor vehicles. The High Court had declared Rule 55-A ultra vires the State's power under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act) and Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

Issues:

Whether Rule 55-A is within the State's authority under the Act and Central Rules.

Whether the reservation of distinctive marks involves a distinct service for which a prescribed fee can be charged.

Whether the State of M.P. was competent to make the legislation.

Held:

The High Court misinterpreted Section 211 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which empowers the State Government to claim or charge amounts for certain services and functions. The State has the authority to prescribe a fee for reserving specific numbers or distinguishing marks as registration numbers. Rule 55A is not in excess of the powers conferred upon the State by the Act or Central Rules, and the State was competent to make the legislation under the provisions of the Act. (Para 29, 40)

The assignment of numbers by the registering authority is an important step and indicative of State policy. The State can regulate the assignment by prescribing specific procedures. The availability and reservation of certain numbers are essential considering the socio-cultural needs of the people of the state. Rule 55A of the MP Rules, which prescribes fees for reserving certain registration marks, follows a valid first-come-first-serve principle. (Para 30, 31)

Section 65(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, along with Section 211, is sufficient to conclude that the State Government has the authority to prescribe a fee for reserving certain numbers as registration numbers. The reservation of numbers is not arbitrary or unreasonable. (Para 33)

The State's power to frame rules under the Motor Vehicles Act is general and not limited by specific provisions. The particularization of powers in the Act is only illustrative and does not subsume the general power. (Para 34)

The assignment of distinctive marks (registration numbers) is a distinct service for which the State is entitled to charge a prescribed fee. Rule 55A is not in excess of the State's powers conferred by the Act or Central Rules. (Para 39)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and upheld the validity of Rule 55-A of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. The State Government has the authority to prescribe a fee for reserving certain numbers or distinguishing marks to be assigned as registration numbers. The Court ruled that the rule was not in excess of the powers conferred upon the State by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

Facts:

The appellant, V. Sukumaran, was a Casual Labor Roll (CLR) worker and was later absorbed into Seasonal Labor Roll (SLR) posts through different Government Orders. He claimed pensionary benefits for the period of service rendered as a CLR worker. However, the State Government denied his claim, arguing that the benefit could not be granted as he was not directly absorbed from CLR Service but was regularized through the regular employment process. The State Government's view was upheld in the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal.

Issues:

Whether the period of service rendered as a CLR worker should be counted for determining the appellant's pensionary benefits?

Whether denying the benefit of the period spent as a CLR worker is justified when other CLR workers have received such benefits?

Held:

Pension is a post-retirement entitlement and a social welfare measure to maintain the dignity of the employee. Therefore, pensionary provisions should be given a liberal construction. The appellant should not be unreasonably denied pensionary benefits based on technicalities. (Para 1 and 19)

Denying the appellant the benefit of his service as a CLR worker would treat his case as inferior to that of other CLR workers, which is unfair since he spent more than seven years in that capacity. (Para 21)

The appellant's claim arises from the Government Orders (G.O.s) issued for the regularization of CLR workers, which aimed to improve working conditions and provide monetary benefits. The appellant is entitled to the same benefit on parity with other CLR workers. (Para 22)

The appellant is being deprived of the maximum pensionable service permissible if his CLR service is recognized as qualifying service. Rule 13 of the Service Rules supports the rationale for counting such service. (Para 23)

Consequently, the impugned orders are set aside, and the benefit of the service rendered as a CLR worker is liable to be counted for determining the appellant's pensionary benefits on par with other CLR workers. (Para 24)

The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout.

 Facts:

A land was on lease with a college, and the lease was to expire on 31.08.1967.

The college sought compulsory acquisition of the land from the State Government.

A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued on 15.05.1968, followed by the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

The Land Acquisition Collector made the award on 29.09.1970.

The question arose concerning the date of accrual of capital gains from the land acquisition compensation.

Issues:

• Whether the transfer of the capital asset (land) resulting in capital gains was complete on the date of notification (15.05.1968) or the date of award (29.09.1970)?
•  Whether the facts of the present case are similar to the appellant's case for the assessment year 1975-1976, where the ITAT decided in favor of the appellant with reference to the date of taking possession?

Held:

The completion of transfer for capital gains depends on the vesting of the land in the Government, not merely the right to receive compensation.

The decisions cited by the parties on the right to receive compensation are not directly applicable to the issue of transfer completion.

Capital gains in compulsory acquisition cases accrue upon completion of transfer with the vesting of land in the Government, usually correlated with the taking over of possession by the Government.

In cases where possession is taken over before the relevant stage for such taking over, capital gains shall be deemed to have accrued upon the arrival of the relevant stage and not before.

In the present case, the land was acquired through the ordinary process leading to an award under Section 11, so capital gains accrued upon taking over possession after making the award.

The appellant's claim that the land vested in the Government on the date of initial notification is baseless, as possession was with the college until the award date.

The transfer of land reached its completion only on 29.09.1970, the date of award, and the capital gains were rightly charged to tax with reference to this date.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The transfer of the capital asset (land) for the purpose of Section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was complete on 29.09.1970, the date of award, and not on 15.05.1968, the date of notification.

Facts:

A land was on lease with a college, and the lease was to expire on 31.08.1967.

The college sought compulsory acquisition of the land from the State Government.

A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued on 15.05.1968, followed by the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

The Land Acquisition Collector made the award on 29.09.1970.

The question arose concerning the date of accrual of capital gains from the land acquisition compensation.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the capital asset (land) resulting in capital gains was complete on the date of notification (15.05.1968) or the date of award (29.09.1970)?

Whether the facts of the present case are similar to the appellant's case for the assessment year 1975-1976, where the ITAT decided in favor of the appellant with reference to the date of taking possession?

Held:

The completion of transfer for capital gains depends on the vesting of the land in the Government, not merely the right to receive compensation.

The decisions cited by the parties on the right to receive compensation are not directly applicable to the issue of transfer completion.

Capital gains in compulsory acquisition cases accrue upon completion of transfer with the vesting of land in the Government, usually correlated with the taking over of possession by the Government.

In cases where possession is taken over before the relevant stage for such taking over, capital gains shall be deemed to have accrued upon the arrival of the relevant stage and not before.

In the present case, the land was acquired through the ordinary process leading to an award under Section 11, so capital gains accrued upon taking over possession after making the award.

The appellant's claim that the land vested in the Government on the date of initial notification is baseless, as possession was with the college until the award date.

The transfer of land reached its completion only on 29.09.1970, the date of award, and the capital gains were rightly charged to tax with reference to this date.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The transfer of the capital asset (land) for the purpose of Section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was complete on 29.09.1970, the date of award, and not on 15.05.1968, the date of notification.

Facts:

The flat buyers entered into an Apartment Buyers Agreement (ABA) with the developer, which obligated the developer to hand over possession of the flats within 36 months. However, the developer failed to do so, resulting in a delay of two to four years. The ABA contained one-sided terms that allowed the developer to charge high penal interest for delayed payments by flat buyers but provided only minimal compensation at a fixed rate for delays in handing over possession.

Issues:

• Whether the delay in handing over possession constitutes a deficiency of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
• Whether the compensation provided in Clause 14 of the ABA is sufficient recompense to the flat buyers.
• Whether the court can award just compensation beyond the rate prescribed in an unfair bargain.
• Whether flat buyers are entitled to compensation for the failure of the developer to provide the promised amenities.

Held:

The court held that the delay in handing over possession constitutes a deficiency of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as there was a fault, shortcoming, or inadequacy in the nature and manner of performance.

The one-sided nature of the ABA, which heavily favored the developer, and the gross delay in handing over possession justified awarding compensation beyond the rate prescribed in Clause 14.

The court rejected the contention that flat buyers should indefinitely defer obtaining a conveyance of the premises to claim compensation and allowed the claim for compensation for delayed possession.

The court also held that the developer's failure to provide promised amenities constituted a deficiency of service.

The court, however, held that flat buyers who entered into specific settlement deeds with the developer and those who transferred their interest in the apartments are not entitled to compensation under this judgment.

The court upheld the collection of charges towards electricity and parking as per the terms of the ABA.

Decision: The court set aside the impugned judgment of the NCDRC and held that the flat buyers are entitled to compensation for the delayed handing over of possession and the failure to provide promised amenities. The court directed the developer to provide just and reasonable compensation to the flat buyers.

Facts:

The flat buyers entered into an Apartment Buyers Agreement (ABA) with the developer, which obligated the developer to hand over possession of the flats within 36 months. However, the developer failed to do so, resulting in a delay of two to four years. The ABA contained one-sided terms that allowed the developer to charge high penal interest for delayed payments by flat buyers but provided only minimal compensation at a fixed rate for delays in handing over possession.

Issues:

Whether the delay in handing over possession constitutes a deficiency of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Whether the compensation provided in Clause 14 of the ABA is sufficient recompense to the flat buyers.

Whether the court can award just compensation beyond the rate prescribed in an unfair bargain.

Whether flat buyers are entitled to compensation for the failure of the developer to provide the promised amenities.

Held:

The court held that the delay in handing over possession constitutes a deficiency of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as there was a fault, shortcoming, or inadequacy in the nature and manner of performance.

The one-sided nature of the ABA, which heavily favored the developer, and the gross delay in handing over possession justified awarding compensation beyond the rate prescribed in Clause 14.

The court rejected the contention that flat buyers should indefinitely defer obtaining a conveyance of the premises to claim compensation and allowed the claim for compensation for delayed possession.

The court also held that the developer's failure to provide promised amenities constituted a deficiency of service.

The court, however, held that flat buyers who entered into specific settlement deeds with the developer and those who transferred their interest in the apartments are not entitled to compensation under this judgment.

The court upheld the collection of charges towards electricity and parking as per the terms of the ABA.

Decision: The court set aside the impugned judgment of the NCDRC and held that the flat buyers are entitled to compensation for the delayed handing over of possession and the failure to provide promised amenities. The court directed the developer to provide just and reasonable compensation to the flat buyers.

Facts:

The case involved owners of disputed land executing an agreement to sell in favor of a Society. A General Power of Attorney (GPA) was also executed, authorizing the Society's office bearers to enter into a sale transaction for the property. Sale deeds were executed in favor of the appellants. The respondents, claiming to be co-owners of the property, filed suits seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell.

Issues:

• whether the appellants, who were not parties to the suit seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell, could maintain an appeal against the decree of the trial court.

Held:

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or from a decree in appeal, respectively, but do not specify the categories of persons eligible to file an appeal. However, a stranger to the proceedings cannot file an appeal unless they can demonstrate that they fall within the category of aggrieved persons. An appeal can be preferred only if a judgment and decree prejudicially affect a person who is not a party to the proceedings, with the leave of the Appellate Court. (Para 15)

The appellants cannot be considered aggrieved persons and are not bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The relief claimed in the suit was the cancellation of the agreement to sell, while the sale deeds forming the basis of the appellants' claim were executed based on the GPA and were unrelated to the agreement to sell. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court were not judgments in rem and were binding only between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, not upon the appellants. The appellants failed to demonstrate any adverse impact on their legal rights that would entitle them to be considered 'persons aggrieved' and maintain an appeal against the decree. (Para 21-23)

Decision: The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved owners of disputed land executing an agreement to sell in favor of a Society. A General Power of Attorney (GPA) was also executed, authorizing the Society's office bearers to enter into a sale transaction for the property. Sale deeds were executed in favor of the appellants. The respondents, claiming to be co-owners of the property, filed suits seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell.

Issues:

whether the appellants, who were not parties to the suit seeking cancellation of the agreement to sell, could maintain an appeal against the decree of the trial court.

Held:

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or from a decree in appeal, respectively, but do not specify the categories of persons eligible to file an appeal. However, a stranger to the proceedings cannot file an appeal unless they can demonstrate that they fall within the category of aggrieved persons. An appeal can be preferred only if a judgment and decree prejudicially affect a person who is not a party to the proceedings, with the leave of the Appellate Court. (Para 15)

The appellants cannot be considered aggrieved persons and are not bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The relief claimed in the suit was the cancellation of the agreement to sell, while the sale deeds forming the basis of the appellants' claim were executed based on the GPA and were unrelated to the agreement to sell. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court were not judgments in rem and were binding only between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, not upon the appellants. The appellants failed to demonstrate any adverse impact on their legal rights that would entitle them to be considered 'persons aggrieved' and maintain an appeal against the decree. (Para 21-23)

Decision: The appeals were dismissed.