Facts:

The case revolves around a person who purchased property with the intention of carrying out charitable work related to the Sri Renganathaswamy sanctum. A Stone Mandapam was constructed on a portion of the property to receive blessings during Hindu festival months. The property's Deed of Settlement prohibited trustees from selling or mortgaging it.

The first respondent-trust filed a suit seeking permission to sell a part of the property while excluding the area with the 'Stone Mandapam.' The suit was decreed, and this decision was upheld on appeal. The appellant then filed a second appeal, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Deed of Settlement created a specific endowment for a religious charity.

Whether the suit filed by the first respondent-trust was maintainable under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959.

Applicability of Section 3 of the Act.

Held:

The existence of a specific endowment depends on the material terms of the Deed of Settlement. A specific endowment can result from allocating property or money for a specific charity or service in a temple. The settlor's intent to divest themselves and their legal heirs of the property for charitable activities establishes an endowment.

A specific endowment can be for a specific charity or service in a temple, or for the performance of any other religious charity. The Act defines 'religious charity' as a public charity associated with a Hindu festival. If the charity is public and associated with a festival, it qualifies as a specific endowment.

In the case, the charity benefits 'devotees' during specific Hindu festivals. As the 'devotees' aren't an identifiable group, it's a public trust. The charity's connection with the festivals qualifies it as a 'religious charity.'

While not a specific endowment favoring the appellant idol, the charity satisfies the 'religious charity' definition. The Deed creates an absolute endowment for the 'religious charity.' Section 108 bars civil courts' jurisdiction for such matters.

Section 3 applies when there's mismanagement of a Hindu public charitable endowment. As no such allegations were made, Section 3 doesn't exempt the first respondent from the Act. The suit is not maintainable under Section 34, and the Commissioner's approval is necessary for land sale.

Facts:

A partition deed was executed in 1970 involving agricultural land owned by a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). Subsequently, a portion of the land was declared surplus by the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) in 1976. The appellants filed an appeal against the SDO's decision, while two minor daughters did not appeal as they were satisfied with the order since the land they inherited was not declared surplus. The State filed cross objections challenging the exclusion of land owned by the two daughters.

Issues:

Whether the partition deed executed before the cut-off date of 26.09.1970, which allocated a share of the land to minor daughters, was against the principles of Hindu Law and therefore invalid.

Whether the Collector had jurisdiction to determine the validity of partition deeds executed before the cut-off date.

Whether the appellate authority erred in upholding the exclusion of the two minor daughters from the proceedings without affording them an opportunity to argue the validity of the partition deed.

Held:

The 1961 Act provides for the disregard of transfers and partitions made to avoid the impact of the 1972 Amending Act. The Act doesn't inherently declare such transfers void, but they can be disregarded if they are proved to be made with bona fide intent after the cut-off date. The language of Section 11 emphasizes that transfers should be "ignored" for the purpose of calculating ceiling limits. [Para 16]

The Collector's jurisdiction is limited to determining whether a true and correct return has been provided, and to impose penalties for false returns or suppressed partition deeds. However, the Collector cannot determine the genuineness of partition deeds executed before the cut-off date. [Para 17]

Section 18 does not grant the Collector the authority to determine the validity of partition deeds executed before the cut-off date. The Collector's role is to ignore certain transfers or partitions between the cut-off date and the commencement date for calculating ceiling areas. [Para 18]

The Collector's authority is to determine ceiling areas and delimit surplus land. The jurisdiction of the Collector is confined to post-cut-off date transfers and partitions. The Collector cannot replace a Civil Court in deciding the validity of partition deeds executed before the cut-off date. [Para 19]

The State's cross objection was beyond the scope of Section 33(1A), and the exclusion of the minor daughters from proceedings was unjust, rendering the appellate authority's decision incorrect. [Para 20-21]

The expressions "transfer" and "partition" in Sections 8, 10, and 11 of the Act do not inherently mean genuine transfers and partitions. Adding the term "genuine" would distort the provisions' intent, which is to allow the Collector to determine lands within the ceiling area while ignoring specific transfers. [Para 28]

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the right of pre-emption arising from a property transfer. The plaintiff and the second defendant were brothers, each possessing a half share in a common courtyard. The second defendant sold a house along with the courtyard to the first defendant.

Issues:

The determination of the right of pre-emption in the context of the property transfer. The interpretation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 was central to resolving this issue.

Held:

The right of pre-emption is a preferential right attached to the property being transferred. It allows a person to substitute the original vendee.

Section 5 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 outlines cases where the right of pre-emption does not accrue. According to Section 5(1)(c), the right of pre-emption does not accrue if the transferee has an equal or inferior right of pre-emption under Section 6.

Section 6(1) of the Act specifies the persons to whom the right of pre-emption accrues. If a person mentioned in Section 6 acquires the property, the right of pre-emption will accrue only to a claimant with a superior right of pre-emption.

The right of pre-emption is rendered imperfect if the vendor transfers the property to another person who also has a superior right of pre-emption.

In the present case, both the plaintiff and the second defendant had rights in common to the courtyard under Section 6(1)(ii) of the Act. However, the plaintiff's right was superior due to his relationship with the property transferor.

The interpretation of Section 5(1)(c) does not support a disjunctive reading, as suggested. The two segments of the provision pertain to vendees and claimants respectively, and they cannot be reinterpreted.

The concurrent findings of the lower courts correctly interpreted the provisions of the Act, and the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption prevailed over the second defendant's inferior right.

Decision: The Court upheld the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the interpretation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act 1966 and held that the plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption prevailed in this case.

Facts:

The Family Court disposed of a maintenance petition filed by the respondent-wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C., directing the appellant-husband to pay monthly maintenance and for the parties to file a divorce petition by mutual consent. The husband paid maintenance for only four months. The respondent-wife filed an execution petition to enforce the maintenance order. The Family Court rejected the execution petition, deeming the maintenance order conditional and subject to unfulfilled obligations. The respondent-wife filed an application to recall the order in the maintenance petition. The Family Court revived the maintenance application. The husband challenged this by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court rejected the petition under Section 482.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. persists post passing of the initial order?

Whether the revival of the maintenance application by the Family Court is in violation of Section 362 Cr.P.C.?

Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.?

Held:

The legislative scheme under Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is similar. The prohibition on altering or reviewing judgments by the criminal court is deliberate. The court's jurisdiction is limited to correcting clerical or arithmetic errors. Exceptions to the embargo exist as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure or other applicable laws.

The expression "save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force" in Section 362 relaxes the rigour of the section under specific conditions.

Section 125 Cr.P.C. shows that the Magistrate's jurisdiction remains after passing the initial order. Express provisions in Section 125(1), Section 125(5), and Section 127 Cr.P.C. allow for cancellation or alteration of orders. The term "from time to time" in Section 125(1) indicates the Magistrate's continued jurisdiction. Section 125(5) empowers the Magistrate to cancel orders under certain conditions. Section 127 provides the Magistrate with the authority to alter or cancel orders.

The wife cannot be left without recourse if the husband does not fulfill the terms of settlement. Section 125 Cr.P.C. must be interpreted to advance justice and protect the rights of women.

The appeal is dismissed. The Family Court's revival of the maintenance application is not prohibited by Section 362 Cr.P.C. The High Court appropriately rejected the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are exercised to ensure justice.

Facts:

A Tripartite Joint Development Agreement was executed among a society, MHADA, and a corporate debtor for the development of land. The corporate debtor defaulted on a loan, leading to insolvency proceedings under section 7 of the IBC. The application was admitted, an interim resolution professional was appointed, and a moratorium was declared under section 14. During the moratorium, MHADA issued a termination notice of the Joint Development Agreement to the corporate debtor, requiring possession of the land.

Issues:

The interpretation of section 14(1)(d) of the IBC concerning the recovery of property occupied by the corporate debtor.

The rights and implications of the Joint Development Agreement, especially in relation to the possession of the land during the moratorium.

Held:

Interpretation of Section 14(1)(d): The Court emphasized that section 14(1)(d) of the IBC doesn't pertain to assets, legal rights, or beneficial interests of the corporate debtor. The provision concerns "recovery of any property." The expression "occupied by" refers to actual physical possession or use. The Joint Development Agreement granted a license to the developer (corporate debtor) for various activities, effectively constituting "occupation." [Paragraphs 6-7]

Primacy of the Insolvency Code: The Court underscored that in case of a conflict between the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act and the Insolvency Code, the latter must prevail. The moratorium's purpose is to maintain a status quo during the insolvency resolution process, overcoming any obstacles. The statutory freeze lasts until the Adjudicating Authority approves a resolution plan or orders liquidation. [Paragraph 16]

Facts:

The appellant married her first husband in 1989 and obtained a divorce in 2005. She subsequently filed an appeal against the divorce decree, which was filed after the period of limitation. During the pendency of this appeal, she married the respondent in 2014. The second marriage also ended in discord, leading to a maintenance claim by the appellant against the respondent.

Issues:

Whether a marriage during the pendency of an appeal from a divorce decree is null and void.

The applicability of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in cases of remarriage during the appeal period.

Whether maintenance can be denied on the ground of nullity of marriage.

The consequences of the appellant's second marriage while the appeal from the divorce decree was pending.

Held and Decision:

The Court analyzes Sections 5, 11, and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It establishes that a marriage can be void under certain conditions mentioned in the statute. Contravention of Section 5(i) (having a spouse living at the time of marriage) renders the marriage void, whereas contravention of Section 5(ii) and 5(iii) renders it voidable. Section 15 allows remarriage after divorce if there's no right of appeal against the decree, or the time for appealing has lapsed without an appeal filed. Contravention of Section 15 applies only if an appeal is filed within the limitation period.( Para 25-26)

The Court emphasizes that while contravention of certain conditions in Section 5 renders a marriage void, not all contraventions have this effect. The Court explains that Section 15's prohibition against remarriage applies if an appeal is filed within the prescribed time, not later with delay condoned.( Para 27-28)

The Court clarifies that the legislative intent is not to nullify a divorce and continue the dissolved marriage due to the prohibition against remarriage for a certain period. It agrees with a previous case that stated that such incapacity for remarriage does not imply the subsistence of the dissolved marriage.( Para 36-37)

The Court concludes that the marriage contracted during the pendency of the appeal was valid, considering that the ex-husband had remarried after the period of limitation, and the appeal was infructuous. Thus, the appellant's second marriage was not void.( Para 39)

The order under appeal and the dismissal of the appellant's maintenance application were set aside. The case was remitted to the appropriate court for maintenance determination. Meanwhile, the respondent was directed to pay maintenance as directed by the Family Court.( Para 40)

REFERRED CASES:

Anurag Mittal vs. Shaily Mishra Mittal, (2018) 9 SCC 691

Lila Gupta vs. Laxmi Narain [Lila Gupta vs. Laxmi Narain, (1978) 3 SCC 258

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the calculation of entertainment duty for an amusement park in Maharashtra. The amusement park charged admission fees for entry and various entertainment activities within its premises.

Issues:

Whether the reduced rate of entertainment duty specified in Section 3(2) of the Act applies to the amusement park's admission charges.

How Section 3(5)(a) of the Act, which outlines different rates of entertainment duty for amusement parks, interacts with other provisions.

Held:

The court interpreted the relevant sections of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, and arrived at the following conclusions:

Interpretation of Section 3(2) The court examined Section 3(2) of the Act, which provides for a reduced rate of entertainment duty for specific categories of payments for admission. The court clarified that this provision applies to distinct categories of payments, such as subscriptions to societies, season tickets, or series of entertainments over a period.

Applicability of Section 3(5)(a) The court analyzed Section 3(5)(a) of the Act, which determines different rates of entertainment duty for amusement parks. The court emphasized that this section prevails over Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(2) and dictates the applicable rates of duty for various periods after the amusement park's commencement.

Decision The court concluded that the amusement park did not meet the specific categories mentioned in Section 3(2) for the reduced rate of entertainment duty. Thus, the park was not entitled to a 50% rebate as provided in Section 3(2). The court held that Section 3(5)(a) governs the rates of duty for amusement parks and that only one benefit, either under Section 3(2) or Section 3(5)(a), can be claimed. The court set aside the High Court's interpretation and ruled that the entertainment duty payable followed Section 3(5)(a) of the Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Dr. Hira Lal, served as a Touring Veterinary Officer (TVO) in Bihar. During his active service, he was accused in a criminal case related to the Fodder Scam, resulting in his suspension in 2002. He superannuated in 2008. The state withheld 10% of his pension and full gratuity based on Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar had the right to withhold 10% pension and full gratuity of the appellant under Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Held:

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions, circulars, and resolutions. Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules permitted withholding or withdrawing pension if the pensioner was found guilty of grave misconduct in departmental or judicial proceedings or caused pecuniary loss to the government. However, the Circulars issued by the state in 1974 and 1980 were deemed to be administrative instructions without the force of law. The court held that the right to receive pension is a property right protected by Article 300A of the Constitution. It emphasized that executive instructions cannot override this constitutional protection.

The court referred to earlier judgments that established pension as a vested right even after the repeal of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. The court ruled that the State of Bihar was unjustified in withholding the pension and gratuity. It directed the state to release 10% of the withheld pension amount from the date of superannuation till a certain point and 90% of the gratuity within a specific period. The remaining 10% of the gratuity was to be released subject to the outcome of the pending criminal proceedings against the appellant.

The judgement referred to "State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 210" and "D.S. Nakara and Ors. vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305" to establish the legal principles related to pension as a vested right and the protection of pension as property under Article 300A of the Constitution.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1, Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh, a lecturer and head of department, challenged the promotion process for the post of Principal in Polytechnic colleges. The challenge was based on the requirement of a Ph.D. degree as an essential qualification according to the 'Pay Scales, Service conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions (Diploma) Regulations, 2010' (2010 AICTE Regulations) and the legality of the 'Chhattisgarh Technical Education (Teaching cadre-Polytechnic) (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 2014' (2014 Chhattisgarh Rules) that allowed candidates without a Ph.D. to be appointed as Principals.

Issues:

Whether a Ph.D. degree is mandatory for appointment to the post of 'Principal' under the 2010 AICTE Regulations?

Whether the 2016 AICTE Notification retrospectively 'clarifies' eligibility conditions for the appointment of 'Principal'?

Whether retrospective changes in qualificatory requirements can affect the existing appointments?

Whether the alleged conflict of interest involving one of the appellants influences the decision?

Held:

Issue 1 - The Court interpreted the AICTE criteria and emphasized the use of the term "or," which indicated that 'Ph.D. in Engineering' was optional and discretionary. The eligibility criteria allowed adopting institutions/State Governments to specify either of the two criteria. The Court rejected the interpretation that converted "or" into "and."

Issue 2 - The Court concluded that the 2016 AICTE Notification did not change the existing eligibility conditions but was only a clarification. It reiterated the substance of the 2010 AICTE Regulations and did not alter the position of law.

Issue 3 - The Court emphasized that retrospective changes should not affect the appointments made on the basis of a possible understanding of eligibility conditions. Existing appointments should remain undisturbed, and the principle of non-retroactivity should be upheld.

Issue 4 - The Court found that the alleged conflict of interest involving one of the appellants did not imply undue influence over the rule-making process.

Decision: The appeals were allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh's writ petition challenging the promotion of the appellants was dismissed. The appellants' appointments as Principals were upheld.