Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the applicability of the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, when the contract for supply was entered into before the enforcement of the Act on September 23, 1992. The central issue revolves around the retrospective operation of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the Act is applicable when the contract for supply was entered into before the enforcement of the Act.

Whether the Act can be deemed to have retrospective operation.

Whether the suit filed by the appellants for the recovery of only interest, with the principal amount already paid, is maintainable.

Whether the High Court, even after expressing that the Act is not applicable, could have allowed 9% interest to the plaintiff.

Held:

The liability of the buyer under the Act arises upon the supply of goods or rendering of services, irrespective of whether the agreement was entered before or after the enforcement of the Act. The interpretation that the liability arises only if the agreement is made subsequent to the Act is not in line with the statutory scheme.

The Act is prospective in operation and not retroactive. The liability of the buyer and the day from which payment and interest become payable do not relate to events that occurred before the enactment of the Act.

The suit filed by the appellants for the recovery of interest is maintainable, even when the entire principal amount was paid before filing the suit. Section 6 of the Act supports the recovery of interest along with the amount due from the buyer.

The Limitation Act, 1963, is fully applicable, and the limitation for the suit for the recovery of interest under the 1993 Act falls under Part X Article 113 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and the Court affirms the findings on the issues mentioned above.

Facts:

On February 27, 2004, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh communicated a policy for regularizing part-time class-IV employees with certain conditions.

Some part-time employees moved the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal seeking regularization.

The Tribunal and High Court directed the State Government to provide daily wage employment to eligible part-time employees.

The State Government issued instructions in 2011 and 2012 regarding the conferment of daily wage status without financial benefits for past periods.

Issues:

The payment of consequential monetary benefits to part-time Revenue Chowkidars from January 1, 2007.

Held:

The original policy of February 27, 2004, applied to part-time class-IV employees, and subsequent policies in 2011 and 2012 specified the conditions for part-time Revenue Chowkidars.

The High Court's direction for the payment of monetary benefits from January 1, 2007, was inconsistent with previous judgments and policies.

The State Government should follow the stipulations in the communication dated September 22, 2011, which granted seniority without past financial benefits.

The seniority of part-time Chowkidars granted daily wage status would be counted from the completion of ten years as part-time, without financial benefits for the past.

The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involved writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the 2009 Bye-Laws of the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC). The impugned Bye-Laws introduced the Unit Area Method (UAM) for determining the rateable value, deviating from the previous method based on annual rent.

Issues:

The constitutionality of the UAM in fixing the annual value, with the respondents contending it was inconsistent with Section 63 of the 1994 Act.

Held:

The court clarified that "rateable value" means the value of any land or building fixed under the provisions of the 1994 Act and Bye-Laws for property tax assessment.

Section 63(1) of the 1994 Act specifies that the rateable value shall be the annual rent at which the property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year.

The court held that the UAM in the impugned Bye-Laws was foreign to the scheme of Section 63(1) of the 1994 Act and, therefore, ultra vires the provisions of the Act.

Despite declaring the Bye-Laws ultra vires, the court, in the exercise of powers under Article 142, directed that assessments made under the Bye-Laws for those satisfied with the assessments would not be reopened. This exception did not apply to the writ petitioners.

Decision:

The Impugned Bye-Laws were deemed ultra vires the provisions of the NDMC Act.

The court acknowledged the potential benefits of UAM but emphasized the need for legislative amendments to incorporate such changes.

Facts:

The Abhyankar Road Widening and Buty Mahal Street Scheme, framed under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act in 1960, included a provision for a 15-meter internal road. Subsequently, the Development Plans under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act (MRTP Act) did not incorporate this 15-meter road. The Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT) decided to implement the scheme, leading to legal challenges when notices for shop demolitions were issued.

Issues:

Conflict between the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act and Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act regarding the 15-meter internal road.

Validity of the modification of the scheme, specifically the deletion of the 15-meter wide road, in line with the Development Plan sanctioned under the MRTP Act.

Held:

The Final Development Plan of 1976 did not include the 15-meter internal road. Section 59 of the MRTP Act emphasizes the importance of the Development Plan, stating that it shall prevail. Development contrary to the MRTP Act is not permitted, even if the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act allows it.

Changed circumstances and widened existing roads in subsequent Development Plans override the 15-meter road provision in the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. The impugned judgment by the High Court, favoring the original scheme, cannot be sustained.

Layout plans and building permits are in accordance with the MRTP Act. The High Court's view that the NIT's actions were legally problematic is flawed. Equitable considerations also favor the landowners/developers, who have faced prolonged litigation.

Section 39 of the MRTP Act empowers the Planning Authority to modify schemes in line with the Development Plan. The modification deleting the 15-meter road, in conformity with the DP, is not illegal.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over inheritance rights arising from the marriage of a Muslim man (Mohammed Ilias) with a Hindu woman (Valliamma/Souda Beebi). The plaintiff, Shamsudeen, claims legitimacy and inheritance rights, while the defendants argue that the marriage was irregular and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any share.

Issues:

The validity of the marriage between Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma, the legitimacy of the plaintiff, and the subsequent inheritance rights over the properties owned by Mohammed Ilias.

Held:

The court establishes the timeline of events and concludes that the plaintiff was born two months before the death of Mohammed Ilias, supporting the legitimacy of the marriage.( Para 7)

The court analyzes Muslim law, distinguishing between valid, void, and irregular marriages. It emphasizes that a fasid (irregular) marriage, though not void, does not create mutual rights of inheritance between the parties.( Para 8)

The court reaffirms that a batil (void) marriage and a fasid (irregular) marriage are distinct, clarifying that the former is void ab initio and results in illegitimate offspring, while the latter, though irregular, produces legitimate children.( Para 9)

Referring to legal texts and previous judgments, the court underscores that a marriage between a Hindu woman and Muslim man is irregular (fasid) but does not render the offspring illegitimate.( Para 10)

The court concludes that the marriage of a Muslim man with a Hindu woman is irregular (fasid), and any child born out of such wedlock is entitled to claim a share in the father's property.( Para 13)

The court upholds the decisions of the trial court and the high court, confirming the legitimacy of the plaintiff and awarding the appropriate share in the property.( Para 14)

Facts:

A winding-up petition (No. 42 of 2014) was filed by the appellant before the High Court of Delhi in 2014.

Notice under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, had been served.

Another operational creditor filed an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code).

Respondent No. 1, a financial creditor, moved the NCLT under Section 7 of the Code in 2017.

The appellant appealed the NCLT's order, arguing the independence of winding-up proceedings.

Issues:

Whether winding up proceedings should continue in parallel with insolvency petitions under the Code.

The interpretation of Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.

Applicability of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013, and its amendments.

Held:

Rules 26 and 27 pertain to a pre-admission scenario, indicating that notice under Rule 26 is served before the hearing.The expression "was admitted" in Form No. 6 only means that notice has been issued, and the petition is fixed for a hearing. (Para 17)

The statutory scheme evolved with amendments to Section 434, allowing the transfer of winding-up petitions to NCLT even if notice has been served.The objective is to avoid parallel proceedings and resuscitate corporate debtors under the Code.( Para 18)

Citing Jaipur Metals & Electricals Employees Organization case, the Court emphasizes the independent nature of proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the Code.Section 238 of the Code prevails in case of any inconsistency.( Para 19)

Referring to PSL Limited v. Jotun India Private Limited, the Court upholds the applicability of the Code to post-notice winding-up proceedings.( Para 20)

Section 11 of the Code is of limited application and does not bar the filing of an Insolvency Petition until a liquidation order is made against the corporate debtor.( Para 21)

While not interfering with the Appellate Tribunal's order, the appellant is granted liberty to apply under the proviso to Section 434 to transfer the winding-up proceedings to the NCLT.( Para 23)

Facts:

The Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPC) received a requisition for 162 posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The State Government, by order dated 08.08.2014, decided on a disability percentage of 40%-50% for partially blind and partially deaf candidates after consultation with the High Court. The appellant, Mr. V. Surendra Mohan, with a disability of 70%, participated in the selection process. However, his name was not included in the list of successful candidates.

Issues:

Whether the appellant with a disability of 70% was eligible for the selection process, considering the specified disability percentage in the notification.

The validity of the condition of 40%-50% disability for partially blind and partially deaf candidates for the post of Civil Judge.

Held:

The Government order dated 08.08.2014, after consultation with the High Court, clearly specified the disability percentage as 40%-50% for the post of Civil Judge. The appellant, with a disability of 70%, was ineligible as per the advertised notification (Para 13-14).

The State, in consultation with the High Court, has the authority to determine eligibility criteria for the post of Civil Judge. The condition of 40%-50% disability was well-founded and did not violate any statutory provisions or the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 (Para 35-39).

Section 33 of the Act, 1995, mandates the reservation of posts for persons with disabilities. The requirement of 40%-50% disability for eligibility aligns with this provision, and the State's decision was within its authority (Para 36-39).

The reasons provided by the respondents justified the requirement of a 50% disability, deemed reasonable and fair. The High Court did not err in dismissing the appellant's writ petition (Para 41).

Facts:

The respondent filed a petition under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, claiming ownership and possession of land exempted from vesting under Section 3(2). The appellant-State disputed the claim, asserting that the land vested in the government.

Issues:

Whether the respondent's claim of ownership and possession is valid under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971?

Whether the certificate of purchase issued under the Kerala Land Reforms Act is conclusive proof of the respondent's title and possession over the land?

Held:

The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, provides for the vesting of private forests in the government. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 exempt certain lands from vesting. The respondent claimed exemption under sub-section (2) based on personal cultivation, which the appellant contested.( Para 8)

The crucial term "held by the owner under his personal cultivation" from sub-section (2) of Section 3 was interpreted. Ownership entails legal title, and the certificate of purchase under the Land Reforms Act is considered conclusive proof of assignment.( Para 9)

The certificate of purchase, issued after Land Tribunal inquiry, is conclusive proof of the assignment of the landlord's right, title, and interest to the respondent. The land is exempted from vesting under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Kerala Private Forests Act.( Para 20)

Citing Kunjanam Antony (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2003) 3 SCC 221, the judgment emphasizes the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase and the statutory conclusiveness of title under Section 72K of the Land Reforms Act.( Para 22)

Facts:

The appellant was aggrieved by the rejection of his claim for financial upgradation by CSIR and non-promotion to the higher post.

The appellant contended that the failure to communicate the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), in which he had failed to meet the benchmark, violated the O.Ms issued by the Department of Personnel and Training.

The appellant moved the Central Administrative Tribunal, and subsequently, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challenging the decisions of CSIR.

Issues:

Whether the non-communication of ACRs to the appellant violated principles of natural justice?

Whether the appellant was entitled to financial upgradation under the MACP scheme?

Whether the appellant's representation for financial upgradation and promotion was considered appropriately?

Held:

The Tribunal and the High Court were in error in concluding that CSIR, being an autonomous entity, was exempt from the obligation to communicate ACRs as per the principles established in Dev Dutt v. Union of India & Ors.

The failure to communicate the ACRs deprived the appellant of the opportunity to submit a representation for financial upgradation. The appellant should be granted an opportunity to submit his representation, and CSIR must consider it within a specified time frame.

If the ACRs for the relevant period are upgraded, the appellant's case for financial upgradation and promotion shall be considered afresh by the Screening Committee and the Departmental Promotion Committee, respectively.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellant is granted an opportunity to submit representations for ACRs, and decisions on financial upgradation and promotion shall be made within specified time frames.