Facts:

The appellant convicted for murdering Smt. Ruby by acid attack.

Additional convictions under IPC sections for injuring other family members.

Appeal against the death sentence confirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the death sentence in light of the circumstances.

Consideration of special reasons for the imposition of the death penalty.

Connection between the present crime and a prior murder conviction.

Held:

The appellant rightly convicted for causing the death of Smt. Ruby. Dying declaration of the victim and consistent witness accounts establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.( Para 5)

The evidence of the appellant fleeing the crime scene, fingerprints matching on the acid container, and the Dying Declaration hold strong probative value. The conviction is well-founded.( Para 6)

Consideration of the imposition of the death sentence. Special reasons required. Appellant committed the crime while on bail for a prior murder conviction. However, the earlier case is unrelated to the present incident.( Para 8)

Appellant's disappointment in his relationship with the deceased led to the attack. The choice of acid suggests an intention to injure or disfigure rather than premeditated murder.( Para 9)

No special reasons found to warrant a death sentence. Reference to Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 for sentencing guidelines.( Para 10)

The death sentence imposed by the High Court is set aside. Appellant to undergo imprisonment for life.( Para 12)

Facts:

The case involves the death of an employee in the Horticulture Department in 2005. The respondent, the deceased employee's dependant, applied for compassionate appointment in 2007. The State policy, formulated on 18.01.1990, is central to the case, emphasizing immediate assistance to families left in indigent circumstances due to the untimely death of a government servant. The policy considers family pension and other terminal benefits in assessing financial need.

Issues:

Whether the State can consider family pension and other terminal benefits in determining compassionate appointments.

Validity and interpretation of the income slab prescribed by the Finance Department.

The impact of delay in seeking compassionate appointment.

Held:

Compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of appointment based on constitutional principles. Dependents of a deceased state employee are eligible by virtue of the compassionate appointment policy. There is no inherent right to compassionate appointment; eligibility is subject to fulfillment of terms in the policy.( Para 20)

The policy, formulated on 18 January 1990, aims to provide employment assistance to dependents left in indigent circumstances. Family pension and death gratuity are considered in assessing financial need. The receipt of family pension is a relevant factor but not a preclusion for consideration. The policy emphasizes the immediacy of financial need.( Para 21)

The fixation of an income slab reduces arbitrariness, bringing objectivity and uniformity to decision-making. Circulars by the Finance Department are clarificatory, not amendments. The State is directed to periodically revise income limits, considering inflation and cost of living.( Para 39)

The respondent's delay of over seven years in seeking compassionate appointment diminishes the sense of immediacy, as highlighted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal case. The respondent is barred from seeking compassionate appointment due to the delay and the lapse of time.( Para 40 and 42)

Facts:

The case involved three accused facing charges under relevant sections of the Penal Code, Madhya Pradesh Dakaiti and Vyapharan Prabhavit Kshetra Adhiniyam, Arms Act, and others. The prosecution's case relied on circumstantial evidence, last seen witnesses, and the recovery of incriminating articles based on confessional statements.

Issues:

The central issues included the reliability of last seen witnesses, the voluntary nature of confessions, the legality of fingerprint samples, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case.

Held:

In a case where the High Court acquitted the accused, a double presumption in favor of the accused arises. The Supreme Court should only interfere if there are compelling reasons, substantial errors, or a palpable miscarriage of justice. (Para 17)

Last seen witnesses (PW12 and PW20) lacked credibility due to discrepancies and a delay in recording statements. Their evidence was deemed an afterthought. (Para 18)

The delay in the arrest of accused persons, despite clear knowledge of their whereabouts, cast doubt on the prosecution's case. (Para 20)

Confessions leading to recovery were found to be involuntary, violating Article 20(3) of the Constitution, undermining the evidentiary value. (Para 22)

Issues with the identification procedure, non-examination of important witnesses, and doubts regarding recovery of stolen items raised suspicion over the prosecution's case. (Para 23-26)

The absence of a magisterial order for fingerprint samples raised doubts on their credibility, indicating a possibility of tampering. (Para 27)

The inference drawn by a high-ranking police officer impeded the investigation, creating prejudice against the accused. (Para 28)

The High Court's acquittal was well-reasoned, and the appellants failed to prove any error. The Court confirmed the acquittal based on the reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. (Para 29)

Facts:

The respondents, appointed between 1982 and 1989 as Rifleman in Assam Rifles, were working as Havildars.

Changes in the structure of Assam Rifles in 2011 introduced an intermediate rank of Warrant Officer.

Recruitment Rules of 2012 specified promotion from Havildar to Warrant Officer, contrary to the earlier avenue to Naib Subedar.

Writ proceedings were initiated, challenging the promotion to the lower rank of Warrant Officer.

Issues:

Whether the changes in the structure and Recruitment Rules affected the rights accrued to Havildars for promotion to Naib Subedar.

The constitutional validity of promoting Havildars to the rank of Warrant Officer.

Held:

The High Court erred in stating that vacancies occurring before the amendment must be governed by the old Rules. No universal rule dictates filling vacancies based on the law at the time of their occurrence.

There is no vested right to promotion; the right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with the existing Rules during the promotion process.

Creation of an intermediate post (Warrant Officer) does not infringe on vested rights, as clarified in previous judgments.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. No costs are imposed.

FACTS:

The shares in question, acquired by the appellants, have always been in the custody of Appellant No.1.

The acquisition of shares was from the funds of Appellant No.1, and the complainant failed to provide material supporting his claim.

Appellants asserted that shares could be sold in the market, and the proceeds divided between Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2.

Appellant No.1 disowned Respondent No.2 and initiated civil proceedings against them.

ISSUES:

Whether the shares were acquired from the funds of Appellant No.1 or the complainant.

Whether the criminal complaint is a genuine case or an attempt to seek vengeance against the appellants.

Whether the application under Section 245(2) CrPC justifies the quashing of the criminal complaint.

HELD:

The material on record establishes that the acquisition of shares was from the funds of Appellant No.1.

The criminal complaint appears to be an abuse of the process of the court, motivated by personal vendetta.

The Court invoked its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, preventing abuse of the court's process.

DECISION: The appeal is allowed, the orders of the Courts below are set aside, and the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC is allowed. Respondent No.2 is directed to pay costs of Rs.25,000/- to each appellant for initiating frivolous litigation within two months.

REFERRED CASES:

Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330

FACTS:

In 2002, 1500 acres of land were acquired from different villages for the public purpose of developing an Industrial Township in Manesar, Gurgaon.

Compensation was awarded to landowners based on different types of lands.

Two sets of villages were given differential treatment.

The Reference Court initially relied on the decision in Pran Sukh's case to enhance compensation.

The High Court, in subsequent applications, further increased compensation based on a cumulative enhancement at rates of 12% and 15% over the base rate.

ISSUES:

The differential treatment of two sets of villages in compensation calculation and the validity of the enhancement of compensation rates.

HELD:

The sale deeds (P1, P2, P3) for lands in Bas Kusla and Dhana postdated the acquisition initiation in Pran Sukh's case. The High Court rightly ruled out one transaction (PY) due to construction and CLU. (Para 21, 22)

For lands in Naharpur Kasan and Kasan, three methods were applied. The appropriate value in 2002 was determined to be Rs. 39,54,666/- per acre, and all statutory benefits were deemed payable. (Para 23, 25, 26, 30)

Lands in Bas Kusla, Bas Haria, and Dhana showed no substantial increase. Using a rough method, their market value in 2002 was assessed at Rs. 29,77,333/- per acre, with statutory benefits payable. (Para 27, 30)

Lands in Manesar, abutting National Highway No.8, justified a 50% rise over the market value of Naharpur Kasan and Kasan. Market value in 2002 was fixed at Rs. 59,31,999/- per acre, with statutory benefits. (Para 28, 30)

No severance charges were awarded to M/s. K Private Limited as the High Court was not justified in granting additional compensation on this account. (Para 29)

REFERRED CASES:

General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and Another, (2008) 14 SCC 745

Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation v. Pran Sukh & Ors, (2010) 11 SCC 175

Lal Chand vs. Union of India and another, (2009) 15 SCC 769

Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer v. Ramanjulu (2005) 9 SCC 594

Ranjit Singh (1992) 4 SCC 659 related to acquisition for development of Sector 41 of Chandigarh. Ramanjulu (2005) 9 SCC 594

Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1992) 4 SCC 659

Satish Kumar Gupta and others v. State of Haryana and others, (2017) 4 SCC 760

Surender Singh v. State of Haryana and others, (2018) 3 SCC 278

Facts:

The appellant, Hansraj, and his brother Bansraj were Bhumidhars of Plot No.677.

Consolidation proceedings were initiated, and the Assistant Consolidation Officer proposed chaks to both the appellant and respondents on Plot No.677.

Dispute arose over the allocation on the pitch road, leading to objections from respondents.

The Consolidation Officer allowed objections, allocating chaks on the northern side to respondents and placing the appellant on the southern side away from the pitch road.

Issues:

The equitable distribution of land during consolidation, especially concerning the appellant's claim for a portion on the pitch road.

The respondents argued for chaks according to their possession, leading to objections to the initial proposal.

Held:

The appellant, being the original tenure holder, had a right to claim allocation on a part of the plot on the pitch road.

The Assistant Consolidation Officer initially proposed chaks on the pitch road for all parties.

The Consolidation Officer's decision to allocate chaks in favor of the respondents was reversed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation.

Lack of partition under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 indicated that all co-sharers had rights to the plot.

The High Court erred in setting aside the orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation, as their decisions were based on spot inspection and resulted in an equitable distribution on the pitch road.

The High Court's justification, citing the location of the house of one petitioner and the appellant's pumping set, was disregarded as the Settlement Officer had already addressed this by allocating chaks accordingly.

The orders of the High Court were unsustainable, and the appeals were allowed. The writ petition filed by the respondents was dismissed.

Facts:

The case pertains to alterations made to a vehicle and the subsequent legal implications. The appellants, Regional Transport Officer and others, challenged the High Court's judgment, asserting that the court unduly emphasized rules over Section 52(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 52(1) post-amendment in 2000. The appellants contended that the High Court failed to acknowledge the prohibition of alterations beyond the manufacturer's original specifications.

Held:

The amendment to Section 52(1) explicitly prohibits alterations beyond the manufacturer's specifications, including changes to tires of higher capacity.

The provisos to Section 52(1) allow for modifications to the engine under certain conditions, and the Central Government possesses the authority to prescribe specifications for such alterations.

Section 52(2) grants State Governments the power to permit alterations under specific circumstances.

Alterations made without the approval of the Registering Authority, as permissible under Section 52(3), require reporting within 14 days.

Rule 92(1) of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules must be subservient to Section 52 of the Act, ensuring no alterations contrary to the original specifications.

Rule 126 focuses on vehicle fitness tests, emphasizing compliance with AIS: 017-2000.

Rules in Chapter V act as additional safeguards, prohibiting alterations as per Section 52(1).

The High Court erred by prioritizing rules over Section 52(1), and Circular No. 7/2006 should be interpreted in alignment with this perspective.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, with the Court holding that the High Court's decision did not correctly interpret the law. The Rules should be subservient to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Section 52(1).

Facts:

On 07.01.2019, the Court delivered a judgment in favor of the appellant, setting aside the High Court's order. However, a crucial point was overlooked during the initial hearing – the amendment to the definition of "employee" under Section 2(E) of the Payment of Gratuity Act by Amending Act No.47 of 2009.

Issues:

The Court realized that the judgment's reliance on Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association vs. Administrative Officer (2004) 1 SCC 755 was based on a definition that had been retrospectively amended in 2009, with effect from 03.04.1997.

The oversight raises concerns about the correctness of the initial judgment.

Held:

The Court, sua sponte, took up the matter for reconsideration due to the overlooked amendment.

The amendment in the definition of Section 2(E) was not brought to the Bench's attention during the original appeal, leading to a prima facie finding of error in the judgment.

Pending a rehearing, the Court stayed the operation of its judgment dated 07.01.2019.

The Registry was directed to list the matter for rehearing before the appropriate Bench, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra.

Decision: The judgment dated 07.01.2019 shall not be given effect to until the matter is reheard finally by the appropriate Bench.