FACTS:

The Bank advertised vacancies for the post of Peon, specifying eligibility criteria that the candidate should have passed 12th class and should not be a graduate as of 01.01.2016.

The Respondent-candidate declared his qualification as 12th pass and was subsequently appointed as a Peon.

During scrutiny, it was discovered that the Respondent was, in fact, a graduate, rendering him ineligible as per the prescribed educational qualifications.

The original writ petitioner did not challenge the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement and participated in the recruitment process based on the advertisement.

ISSUES:

Whether the candidate's participation in the recruitment process without challenging the eligibility criteria bars him from contending that higher qualifications cannot be a disqualification.

Whether the Bank's decision to provide eligibility criteria excluding graduates from the post of Peon was justified and reasonable.

HELD:

The appointments to the post of Peon were to be strictly made as per the eligibility criteria mentioned in Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 and Circular letter No. 6 of 2016 dated 04.3.2016. (Para 5.1)

The Respondent-candidate never challenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement and participated in the recruitment process based on it. Therefore, he cannot later contend that higher qualifications cannot be a disqualification. (Para 6)

The employer has the authority to determine the relevancy and suitability of qualifications for any post, and Courts are not suitable forums to assess such matters. In this case, the Bank's decision to exclude graduates from the post of Peon was justified and in force since 2008. (Para 7.3)

The Respondent-original writ petitioner suppressed the material fact of being a graduate and provided false information in the application/bio-data. Such conduct rendered him ineligible for the job, and the Bank rightfully canceled his candidature and denied him resumption of duty. (Para 8)

The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court are unsustainable and are quashed and set aside. (Para 10)

REFERRED CASES:

J. Rangaswamy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 288

Jyoti K.K. vs. Kerala Public Service Commission (2010) 15 SCC 596

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Ram Ratan Yadav (2003) 3 SCC 437

State of Orissa vs. Bibhisan Kanhar (2017) 8 SCC 608

State of Punjab vs. Anita (2015) 2 SCC 170

Yogesh Kumar vs. Government of NCT of Delhi (2003) 3 SCC 548

Zahoor Ahmad Rather vs. Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019) 2 SCC 404

Zahoor Ahmad Rather vs. State of J&K, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936

FACTS:

The complainant (PW-4) and his younger son (PW-5) claimed to be eyewitnesses to the murder. They stated that they saw the incident and took the victim to the hospital where he was declared dead. Three accused persons, including the appellants, were apprehended and convicted by the Trial Court for committing the murder. The High Court dismissed their appeals, and two of the accused persons filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

The credibility of PW-4 and PW-5 as eyewitnesses.

The reliability of ballistics evidence connecting the accused to the crime.

The significance of the refusal of the accused to undergo a Test Identification Parade (TIP).

HELD:

The presence of PW-4 and PW-5 at the scene of the occurrence is in doubt. PW-4 mentioned that he, PW-5, and one unknown person lifted the victim to take him to the hospital, while PW-5 did not mention any third person. Moreover, a ruqqa indicated that the deceased was brought to the hospital by someone else (SL) and not PW-4 or PW-5. (Para 17)

There are two FSL reports pertaining to FIR No. 311, and a third FSL report in context of FIR No. 781 (present case). The third FSL report erroneously attributes the weapon W/2 to accused 'R', and it does not mention the pistol W/1 at all. (Para 21)

The authors of the FSL reports were not examined by the prosecution, which is a crucial aspect, as the discrepancies in the reports could have been explained by them. (Para 26)

The failure to examine the ballistics examiner assumes significance in this case, as the eyewitness account of PW-4 and PW-5 is not reliable. (Para 34)

The refusal of the accused to undergo a TIP cannot be the sole basis for their guilt. In this case, the credibility of the eyewitnesses is seriously in doubt, and the ballistics evidence is contradictory and unreliable. (Para 39)

Facts:

The predecessor of the appellants filed a civil suit against the respondents (original defendants) seeking a declaration of a registered sale deed executed by one of the defendants as null and void.

The suit also sought a permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from transferring the disputed property to any other person.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appealed against the dismissal.

During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant no.1 filed an application for the dismissal of the appeal and for the appellant to vacate the property.

The appellant sought an amendment in the relief, requesting a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from forcibly dispossessing them from the disputed house.

The High Court dismissed the application for delay and laches but allowed the appellants to file a separate suit.

Subsequently, the High Court dismissed the suit, but while doing so, it made observations regarding the possession of the plaintiffs of the disputed house.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to review its own judgment under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC?

Whether there were sufficient grounds to warrant a review of the observations made by the High Court regarding possession?

Held:

The scope of review under Section 114 CPC is a substantive provision. There are no specific conditions precedent for exercising the power of review, but the review can only be conducted on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

The High Court clearly overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC in reviewing its own judgment. The observations on possession were made after appreciating the evidence on record and did not constitute an error apparent on the face of the proceedings.

The High Court had already taken note of the evidence and found that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed house. Deleting para 20, which contained the observations on possession, was not justified.

Non-framing of the issue with respect to possession did not impact the proceedings, as the necessary pleadings on possession were present in the plaint and written statement. The parties also led evidence on the matter.

The High Court's review lacked sufficient and just reasons, and the powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power or an appellate power.

Facts:

M/S. IMPERIA STRUCTURES LTD. launched a housing scheme in 2011, and the respondents (complainants) booked apartments. Builder Buyer Agreements were executed between the appellant and each respondent on November 30, 2013. The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 came into force on May 01, 2016. Despite substantial payments made by the respondents, there were no signs of the project getting completed even after four years. In 2017, the respondents filed consumer cases before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, alleging deficiency in service by the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the respondents were 'consumers' within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act.

Whether, after the RERA Act came into force, all questions concerning the project, including construction and completion issues, would be under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the authorities under the RERA Act.

Held:

The Commission's conclusions were upheld, confirming that all complainants were 'consumers' under the Consumer Protection Act, and the appellant was indeed responsible for the construction delay. The Consumer Protection Act's remedies are supplementary and do not preclude complaints under other statutes, including the RERA Act. [Para 21]

Section 79 of the RERA Act restricts Civil Courts from entertaining suits within RERA's jurisdiction but doesn't prevent Consumer Commissions from handling complaints. The RERA Act's provisions supplement other laws, and Section 18 provides a remedy 'without prejudice to any other remedy available.' [Para 25]

Allottees can choose to pursue actions under either the Consumer Protection Act or the RERA Act. [Para 28]

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by M/S. IMPERIA STRUCTURES LTD. and upheld the decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in favor of the respondents. [Para 33]

Facts:

The prosecution's case was based on the testimony of eyewitnesses and forensic evidence. The recovered weapons of assault were not conclusively linked to the crime, and the chemical analyst report supporting the presence of blood on the exhibits was not produced by the prosecution.

Issues:

Whether the recovered weapons of assault were adequately linked to the crime.

Whether the prosecution failed to produce the chemical analyst report supporting the presence of blood on the exhibits.

Whether vital forensic evidence (seized shirt of the co-accused) was withheld by the prosecution.

Whether the Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted with proper procedures.

Whether inconsistencies in the statement of PW-3 regarding the lungi found at the crime scene impacted the reliability of evidence.

Whether PW-4 could be considered a reliable eyewitness considering his poor eyesight and hearing capacity.

Whether the unnatural conduct of PW-4 affected the credibility of his testimony.

Held:

The alleged weapons of assault were not adequately linked to the crime as the chemical analyst report supporting the presence of blood on the exhibits was not available in the case records. This lack of evidence weakened the prosecution's case. The prosecution's withholding of vital forensic evidence, i.e., the seized shirt of the co-accused, led to an adverse inference against the prosecution. (Para8.1, 8.2)

The Test Identification Parade (TIP) was flawed due to the presence of police during the exercise, making the identifications unreliable and inadmissible under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 10)

Inconsistencies in the conduct of the TIP, where only one lungi was shown to the related witness despite the pahchan patra mentioning three lungis, rendered the TIP unworthy of acceptance. Inconsistencies in the statement of PW-3 regarding the location of the lungi found at the crime scene and the similarity of lungis worn by many farmers in the village made it unsafe to link the appellant to the exhibit. (Para11, 12)

PW-4's reliability as an eyewitness was doubtful due to his poor eyesight and hearing capacity, and his testimony was further undermined by the fact that another witness, PW-2, who was closer to the crime scene, did not hear anything. (Para 13)

The unnatural conduct of PW-4, who knew the victim and his family but remained quiet about the incident, led to the dismissal of his testimony. (Para 14)

Facts:

The petitioner filed an execution application before the NGT based on its earlier order. However, the District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram, had already passed an order in compliance with the NGT's order. As a result, the execution application filed before the NGT became infructuous.

Issues:

Whether the execution application filed before the NGT is maintainable, given the Collector's order?

Can the petitioner challenge the Collector's order dated 30.04.2019?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the execution application before the NGT has become infructuous since the District Collector has already passed an order in response to the NGT's order dated 19.12.2018. However, the petitioner is not barred from challenging the Collector's order dated 30.04.2019 in accordance with the law. The court allows the petitioner to file such a challenge within a period of 8 weeks from the date of this judgment, and the challenge will not be dismissed solely on the ground of delay.

Referred Case:

M.K. Balakrishnan vs. Union of India (2017) 7 SCC 810

Facts:

The respondent (Heem Singh) was appointed as a constable in the State police service. He was alleged to have overstayed his sanctioned leave by three days and was subsequently arrested for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. The prosecution claimed that there was a dispute over land between the respondent and the victim-deceased. Additionally, the respondent's father had died after being treated by the victim using witchcraft, which led the respondent to bear a grudge towards the victim. The victim's death resulted from an accident with an unknown vehicle. During the trial, several prosecution witnesses turned hostile, and the respondent was acquitted of the murder charge.

Issues:

Whether the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings differs from that of a criminal trial.

Whether the connection of the respondent to the incident would affect the reputation of the police force and justify his dismissal from service.

The scope of judicial review over disciplinary matters and when interference is permissible.

Held:

The standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is a preponderance of probabilities, while in a criminal case, it is proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The State had sufficient material to conclude that the respondent's connection to the incident would affect the reputation of its police force, justifying his dismissal.

In exercising judicial review over disciplinary matters, two ends of the spectrum are observed. The court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or suffer from perversity. The court must maintain a balance between deference to the disciplinary authority's findings and the authority to interfere when the findings or penalty are disproportionate to the weight of evidence or misconduct.

Decision: The direction of the Division Bench of the High Court for reinstating the respondent in service is set aside. The respondent's dismissal from service is upheld, as there was sufficient material to conclude that his connection to the incident would affect the reputation of the police force.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the extension of a mining lease for the obstructed period due to judicial interdicts. The appellants sought an extension of the lease term, but the respondents argued that the obstructed period did not entitle the lease-holders to such an extension.

Issues:

Whether an obstructed period caused by judicial interdicts allows for the extension of a mining lease?

Whether Rule 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 permits the extension of a lease in such cases?

Whether the New Mining Policy of the State includes provisions for the grant of extension during the obstructed period?

What are the consequences of the disruption of mining operations in a lease area under Rule 40(h)?

Held:

The right to extension of a mining lease flows either from a statutory provision or the terms of the lease agreement. An obstructed period due to judicial interdicts alone does not grant a window for lease extension when the lease agreement does not provide for such consequences. (Para 36)

Rule 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 is a relaxation rule in special cases and must be read in conjunction with the Rules governing mineral exploitation. The legislative intent behind Rule 68 is to provide a restricted window for lease extension, and this intent should not be defeated by alternative interpretations. (Para 35)

The New Mining Policy of the State, issued on 12.6.2017, does not include provisions for lease extension during obstructed periods. Any extension granted would violate the policy and cannot relate back to the date of the lease. (Para 39)

Rule 40(h) of the Mining Rules provides for the consequences of disruption of mining operations due to special circumstances. The statute requires the DM, with the prior approval of the State Government, to adjust the amount equivalent to the installments payable during the disrupted period against forthcoming installments. The State is liable to refund any security deposit or advance royalties paid during the obstructed period. (Para 40)

Decision: The appropriate course of action is not to extend the lease for the obstructed period but to refund the security deposit and advance royalties paid by the lease-holders, along with simple interest at 9% per annum. The interest will be calculated from the date of the obstruction until the date of payment. (Para 42-44)

Facts:

Mrs. Ritika Sharan and Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, a married couple, have been living apart since 2016, with divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court, Bengaluru. Their minor child has been residing with Mrs. Ritika Sharan in Bengaluru under the care of maternal grandparents. The Family Court restrained Mrs. Ritika Sharan from taking the child out of Bengaluru and granted visitation rights to Mr. Sujoy Ghosh.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the child should remain with the maternal grandparents or be transferred to the mother, Mrs. Ritika Sharan, who is working in Singapore?

Whether the child's expressed desire to reside with the mother should be considered while determining custody?

Whether the court can use its jurisdiction under Art.142 of the Constitution to modify arrangements in the best interests of the child?

Held:

Ever since the couple started living apart in 2016, the child has been in the care and custody of the mother, Mrs. Ritika Sharan. The fact that the maternal grandparents have moved to Bengaluru to help Mrs. Ritika Sharan does not transfer the child's custody to them.

The paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Mr. Sujoy Ghosh's insistence on the continued presence of the child under the care of the maternal grandparents, who have moved to Bengaluru, is not fair. There is insufficient material to indicate that Mr. Sujoy Ghosh can look after the child on his own.

During a video conferencing interaction, the child expressed his desire to reside with his mother in Singapore. The child is attached to the father, but his preference is clear.

In matters concerning the welfare of the child, Article 142 of the Constitution is a facilitative constitutional instrument to advance substantive justice. The court has the power to modify arrangements in the child's best interests.

Technicalities regarding the challenge to the Family Court's order cannot overshadow the core issue – the welfare of the child. Delaying the decision could lead to the child staying in Bengaluru with the grandparents while the mother is in Singapore, causing the child to lose a year of education.

The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Mrs. Ritika Sharan is permitted to take the child with her to Singapore, where she is employed and resides. Directions are issued to facilitate visitation rights for Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, which will supersede all previous orders.