FACTS:

The respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction claiming ownership and possession of a property situated in the revenue estate of Village Basai Darapur, Delhi. The appellant contested the jurisdiction of the civil court, arguing that it is a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur, and should be decided under Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954.

ISSUES:

Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to decide boundary disputes between revenue estates.

Whether additional documents can be produced under Order XLI Rule 27 if they are not relevant to the plea raised by the applicant.

HELD:

The boundary disputes between two revenue estates are not covered under Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in certain matters. The suit in question was a simpliciter for an injunction based on possession, and there was no mechanism prescribed under the Land Revenue Act to grant injunctions in possession disputes. Therefore, the civil court has plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes, except where barred explicitly or implicitly by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Para 18, 19, 20)

The application under Order XLI Rule 27 sought to produce additional documents related to Village Basai Darapur. However, the appellants' claim was limited to Khasra No. 79 of Village Shakarpur, and the correctness of Khasra No. 238 of Village Basai Darapur was not directly relevant to their plea. As the parties had already understood the controversy and adduced evidence, the appellants cannot introduce additional evidence in the first appeal. Therefore, the High Court did not commit any illegality in not framing any substantial question of law while dismissing the appeal. (Para 17, 21, 23)

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed.

REFERRED CASES:

Ashok Rangnath Magar vs. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar, (2015) 16 SCC 763

Chandragouda & Anr. vs. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 617

Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. H.S. Mohd. Khan (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 109

Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 438

Madhavan Nair vs. Ramankutty & Anr., (2000) 2 SCC 356

Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs vs. Jagadish Kalita & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 271

N. Venkatareddy & Ors. vs. Gopal & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 309

Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) By LRs vs. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681

Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161

South Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. etc., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1052

Facts:

The drug in question was manufactured by Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Limited, a valid license-holder, and was supplied to the State of Uttar Pradesh through a supplier as per a Tender. The State issued a show cause notice to the manufacturing company, mentioning further action in terms of the Tender for supplying misbranded medicine to the respondent. The State, however, did not explicitly state that action by blacklisting was to be taken or was under contemplation. The appellant company contended that they had not supplied the drug to the respondents, rendering the order of blacklisting invoking Tender clauses as a fundamental flaw. Despite bringing this fact to the attention of the respondents, they disregarded it, leading to the blacklisting order dated 08.09.2009.

Issues:

The order of blacklisting, which was based on Tender clauses, is valid when the manufacturing company did not supply the drug to the respondents.

An order of permanent debarment is justified, and if not, what would be a reasonable duration for blacklisting.

The writ petition challenging the blacklisting order is barred by unexplained delay.

HELD:

The Court held that the order of blacklisting the drug based on Tender clauses was a fundamental flaw as the appellant company did not supply the drug to the respondents. An order of permanent debarment was considered unjustified, and blacklisting beyond 3 years or maximum 5 years was deemed disproportionate, considering the severe consequences on the appellant's business and reputation (Para 9 and Para 13).

The Court clarified that the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction can decline to entertain a writ petition due to delay, but it is not mandatory. The Limitation Act does not strictly apply to writ jurisdiction, and discretion must be judiciously exercised. The respondents' claim of acting in accordance with the Drugs Act was rejected as they did not follow the prescribed procedure under the Act (Para 14 and Para 15).

The writ petition was not barred by unexplained delay as the appellant had been actively pursuing the matter with the authorities. The High Court's dismissal based on delay was deemed erroneous, and the blacklisting order was set aside and the appeal is allowed. (Para 16).

Cases Referred

Basanti Prasad vs. Bihar School Examination Board and others, (2009) 6 SCC 791

Gorkha Security Services vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 105

Joseph Vilangandan vs. The Executive Engineer, (PWD), Ernakulam and others, (1978) 3 SCC 36

Kulja Industries Limited vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and others, (2014) 14 SCC 731

M/s Daffodills Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., 2019 (17) SCALE 758

M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and another, (1975) 1 SCC 70

Maharashtra SRTC vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329

Moon Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Court, AIR 1967 SC 1450

State of M.P. and Others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, (1986) 4 SCC 566

FACTS:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the Act).

The central issue was whether Section 14, which mandates the District Magistrate to deliver possession of a secured asset within 30 days, extendable to an aggregate of 60 days upon reasons recorded in writing, is a mandatory (directory) provision.

ISSUES:

The primary issue before the Court was to determine whether Section 14 of the Act is a mandatory (directory) provision.

The Court also needed to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully examining the scope and purpose of the statute.

HELD:

The Court held that the use of the word "shall" in a statute does not always render it mandatory. Literal construction of the statute without considering the context and scheme of the law may not serve its intended purpose (para 7).

The Act was enacted to empower banks and financial institutions to take possession of secured assets for recovery of public dues. The time limit in Section 14 was fixed to impress upon the authority to take possession but does not render the District Magistrate functus officio. The provision is not to be interpreted literally without considering the object and purpose of the Act (para 20).

DECISION: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that Section 14 of the Act is a directory provision and not mandatory. The District Magistrate's inability to deliver possession within the time limit does not render the remedy under Section 14 redundant.

REFERRED CASES:

Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs. State of Bombay & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181

Dipak Babaria & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 502

Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. vs. Swapan Kumar Jana, (1997) 1 CHN 189

Harshad Govardhan Sondagar vs. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors., (2014) 6 SCC 1

Hindon Forge Private Limited & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through District Magistrate, Ghaziabad & Anr. (2019) 2 SCC 198

Manish Makhija vs. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 553

Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 311

Montreal Street Railway Company vs. Normandin, AIR 1917 PC 142

Nasiruddin & Ors. vs. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577

New India Assurance Company Limited vs. HUH Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, (2020) 5 SCC 757

Nomita Chowdhury vs. State of W.B., (1999) 2 Cal LJ 21

P.T. Rajan vs. T.P.M. Sahir & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 498

Remington Rand of India Ltd. vs. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224

Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 424

Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha vs. District Magistrate of Monghyr, AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436

State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751

State of U.P. vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912

T.V. Usman vs. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality, Tellicherry, (1994) 1 SCC 754

Transcore vs. Union of India and Another, (2008) 1 SCC 125

Union of India & Ors. vs. A.K. Pandey, (2009) 10 SCC 552

United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 110

Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233

Facts:The petitioner filed a writ petition in public interest under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a direction to ban the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, supposedly for protecting them from Covid-19. The petitioner contended that despite the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare issuing an advisory on 18.4.2020 stating that spraying disinfectants on human beings is not recommended, the Union of India did not take any steps to stop the use, advertisement, and sale of chemical-based disinfection tunnels.

Issues:

Whether the respondent no. 1, the Union of India, is required to take necessary measures to prevent or regulate the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, considering the health risks involved and the advisory issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare.

HELD:

The Court observed that respondent No.1 did not take sufficient measures to prevent or regulate the spraying of disinfectants on human beings, despite the advisory against it (Para 29).

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, empowers the National Executive Committee to issue directions in response to disasters. Section 36 enumerates the responsibilities of Ministries and departments of the Government of India (Paras 30 and 31).

The Court held that respondent No.1 was duty-bound to act in the best interest of the people and issue necessary directions regarding the use of disinfectants on human beings (Para 32).

The Court emphasized that more action was required beyond the advisory to protect the health of citizens from potential harm caused by disinfectant use (Para 35).

The Court disposed of the writ petition by directing respondent No.1 to consider and issue necessary directions under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, to ban or regulate the usage of disinfection tunnels involving spraying of chemical/organic disinfectants for human beings or exposure to artificial ultraviolet rays (Para 42).

Facts:

A complaint was filed by the inspector of Food and Health based on a sample taken in 1989 regarding Dalda Vanaspati Khajoor Brand Ghee manufactured by Hindustan Unilever Limited.

The matter was previously remanded by the Supreme Court for an inquiry into the acknowledgment of nomination forms received by the Local (Health) Authority.

The trial Court absolved the directors of the Company, and the prosecution was ordered to continue against the appellant/nominated officer.

In 2015, the trial Court convicted the appellant under various provisions of the 1954 Act, but no conviction was passed against the Company.

Issues:

The proceedings should continue under the 1954 Act or the 2006 Act, considering the repeal and saving clause in the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.

The course adopted by the High Court to remand the matter to the trial court after more than 30 years is justified.

The nominated person can be convicted in the absence of the company, and vice versa, under Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Held:

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, protects the prosecution and punishment under the 1954 Act despite its repeal by the 2006 Act.

The proceedings would continue under the 1954 Act as per Section 97 of the 2006 Act.

The High Court's order to remand the matter to the trial Court after 30 years to cure a defect was not justified, as the failure to convict the Company rendered the appellant's conviction unsustainable.

There is no material distinction between Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882, and Section 17 of the 1954 Act, making both the Company and the nominated person liable for the offenses.

Decision: The order passed by the High Court is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant/nominated person is unsustainable in the absence of a conviction against the Company.

REFERED CASSES :

Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 661

Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 17 SCC 448

R. Banerjee & Ors. vs. H.D. Dubey & Ors., (1992) 2 SCC 552

State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84

T. Barai vs. Henry Ah Hoe & Anr., (1983) 1 SCC 177

Tiwari Kanhaiyalal & Ors. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 101

Facts:

Hitesh Verma appealed against the High Court of Uttarakhand's order dismissing his petition seeking to quash charges under Sections 452, 504, and 506 of the IPC, and Sections 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(e) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Issues:

Whether the offenses under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are established in the present case?

Whether quashing of the charge-sheet in part is permissible under the law?

HELD:

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was enacted to improve the social and economic conditions of vulnerable sections of society subjected to offenses like indignities, humiliations, and harassment due to their caste identity (Para 10). However, for an offense under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, it must be established that there was intentional insult or intimidation with the intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and such insult or intimidation took place within public view (Para 13, 18). In the present case, the Act is not applicable as the insults alleged were against a person claiming title to the property, not on the grounds of the victim's caste membership (Para 18).

The Act does not prohibit quashing the charge-sheet in part (Para 23). In the present case, the Supreme Court quashes the charge-sheet to the extent of charges under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act since they are not made out, but the charges under IPC sections 452, 504, and 506 will be tried by the competent court (Para 25).

Facts:

Late husband of the appellant initially did not opt for the Family Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998, but later opted for it through a notification dated 09.01.2002. He claimed pension payment from Darbhanga, State of Bihar. Subsequently, a writ petition was filed by the husband of the appellant in Patna High Court seeking a refund of Rs.1,33,559/- withheld from him, but it was dismissed on 08.02.2013 for lack of territorial jurisdiction. After the dismissal of this writ petition, the husband filed another writ petition in Jharkhand High Court for the same relief. Following this, letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013 were issued, stating that pension was erroneously settled, and more than Rs.08 lakhs were to be recovered from him. The payment of monthly pension was stopped from November 2013.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent writ petition challenging the letters dated 07.10.2013 and 06.11.2013 was maintainable despite the earlier writ petition's dismissal on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Whether the cause of action for the subsequent writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court.

Held :

The Single Judge of the High Court erred in dismissing the subsequent writ petition based on the earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The causes of action for both writ petitions were entirely different. The earlier writ petition sought a refund of withheld amount, while the subsequent one challenged the stoppage of pension payments. The Court held that the stoppage of pension at the place where the petitioner had been continuously receiving pension for the last 8 years (Darbhanga) gave rise to a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court. Hence, the subsequent writ petition was revived before the Patna High Court. [Para 15, 16, 29]

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the judgment of the Family Court and the High Court, which had awarded interim maintenance to the wife and child.

The proceedings for payment of interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. had been pending for over 7 years.

Issues:

Interim maintenance to the wife and child, the overlapping jurisdictions under different enactments, and the enforcement of maintenance orders.

Held :

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower courts, directing the husband to pay interim maintenance to the wife and child. The court also ordered the husband to pay the entire arrears of maintenance and continue compliance during the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

The court framed guidelines on various aspects of maintenance laws:

The court addressed the issue of overlapping jurisdiction under different enactments, directing the adjustment or set-off of amounts awarded in previous proceedings if successive claims are made under different statutes.

The court emphasized the need for uniformity and consistency in determining maintenance and issued guidelines for filing concise applications for interim maintenance along with an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities by both parties.

The court provided factors for determining the quantum of maintenance, including the status of parties, reasonable needs of the wife and children, and the financial capacity of the husband.

The court ruled that maintenance should be awarded from the date of application to prevent undue delays in disposal of maintenance applications.

The court provided directions for the enforcement of maintenance orders through civil decree provisions under the CPC.

FACTS:

The complainant (PW-4) and his younger son (PW-5) claimed to be eyewitnesses to the murder. They stated that they saw the incident and took the victim to the hospital where he was declared dead. Three accused persons, including the appellants, were apprehended and convicted by the Trial Court for committing the murder. The High Court dismissed their appeals, and two of the accused persons filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

The credibility of PW-4 and PW-5 as eyewitnesses.

The reliability of ballistics evidence connecting the accused to the crime.

The significance of the refusal of the accused to undergo a Test Identification Parade (TIP).

HELD:

The presence of PW-4 and PW-5 at the scene of the occurrence is in doubt. PW-4 mentioned that he, PW-5, and one unknown person lifted the victim to take him to the hospital, while PW-5 did not mention any third person. Moreover, a ruqqa indicated that the deceased was brought to the hospital by someone else (SL) and not PW-4 or PW-5. (Para 17)

There are two FSL reports pertaining to FIR No. 311, and a third FSL report in context of FIR No. 781 (present case). The third FSL report erroneously attributes the weapon W/2 to accused 'R', and it does not mention the pistol W/1 at all. (Para 21)

The authors of the FSL reports were not examined by the prosecution, which is a crucial aspect, as the discrepancies in the reports could have been explained by them. (Para 26)

The failure to examine the ballistics examiner assumes significance in this case, as the eyewitness account of PW-4 and PW-5 is not reliable. (Para 34)

The refusal of the accused to undergo a TIP cannot be the sole basis for their guilt. In this case, the credibility of the eyewitnesses is seriously in doubt, and the ballistics evidence is contradictory and unreliable. (Para 39)