Facts:

The appellant, Dr. Hira Lal, served as a Touring Veterinary Officer (TVO) in Bihar. During his active service, he was accused in a criminal case related to the Fodder Scam, resulting in his suspension in 2002. He superannuated in 2008. The state withheld 10% of his pension and full gratuity based on Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar had the right to withhold 10% pension and full gratuity of the appellant under Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Held:

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions, circulars, and resolutions. Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules permitted withholding or withdrawing pension if the pensioner was found guilty of grave misconduct in departmental or judicial proceedings or caused pecuniary loss to the government. However, the Circulars issued by the state in 1974 and 1980 were deemed to be administrative instructions without the force of law. The court held that the right to receive pension is a property right protected by Article 300A of the Constitution. It emphasized that executive instructions cannot override this constitutional protection.

The court referred to earlier judgments that established pension as a vested right even after the repeal of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. The court ruled that the State of Bihar was unjustified in withholding the pension and gratuity. It directed the state to release 10% of the withheld pension amount from the date of superannuation till a certain point and 90% of the gratuity within a specific period. The remaining 10% of the gratuity was to be released subject to the outcome of the pending criminal proceedings against the appellant.

The judgement referred to "State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 210" and "D.S. Nakara and Ors. vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305" to establish the legal principles related to pension as a vested right and the protection of pension as property under Article 300A of the Constitution.

Facts:

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board introduced bidding parameters, including a criterion for the number of households based on census data. However, this criterion was not formally incorporated into the regulations and was not communicated to the bidders. Bidders with the highest composite scores were initially disqualified for exceeding the 100% limit. Adani Gas Limited challenged the grant of authorization in various geographical areas.

Issues:

The legality of the bidding criteria introduced through the Board Note and the fairness of the disqualification of bidders exceeding the 100% limit based on criteria that were not formally part of the regulations.

Held:

The introduced bidding criteria were not part of the official regulations and were not properly notified to bidders.

The introduced criteria cannot be treated as absolute norms to disqualify bids.

Disqualifying bidders based on a criterion that was not formally incorporated would be arbitrary and unconstitutional (Article 14).

The Board Note was a guideline, and the Board had the right to evaluate the reasonableness of bids exceeding the 100% limit.

Disqualifying bidders solely on exceeding the 100% limit without proper evaluation would be inconsistent with the regulations.

The procedure of calling the highest bidders to justify their bids' reasonableness was justified and fair.

Principles of natural justice were not breached by calling only the highest bidders for justification.

The Board's decision to disqualify or accept bids was based on a proper assessment of reasonableness.

The Chairperson's view regarding the binding nature of the Board Note and the need for hearing other bidders was disagreed with.

The Member Technical's perspective was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the matter of granting Permanent Commissions (PCs) to women SSC officers in the Indian Army. The initial process under the Women Special Entry Scheme (Officers) [WSES] was replaced by Short Service Commission (SSC) with an outer period of fourteen years. A writ petition was filed seeking directions for the grant of PC to women SSC officers. The High Court ruled that SSC women officers who had opted for PC were entitled to it on par with male SSC officers. The Union Government, during the appeal, issued a communication granting PC to SSC women officers in ten arms of Army services.

Issues:

Whether the policy decision of the Union Government dated February 25, 2019, granting PCs to SSC women officers in the Indian Army, enforces the fundamental rights of women officers.

Whether the distinction drawn between women officers with different years of service is valid.

Whether the absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is sustainable.

Whether the application of Article 33 in limiting fundamental rights for Armed Forces is valid.

Held:

Issue 1: The policy decision of the Union Government dated February 25, 2019, is interpreted as enforcing the fundamental right of women officers to seek access to public appointments and equality of opportunity, as per Articles 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution. (Para 50, 52)

Issue 2: The distinction drawn between women officers with different years of service (less than fourteen years, between fourteen and twenty years, and above twenty years) is deemed fallacious. Women SSC officers, regardless of years of service, should be entitled to consideration for grant of PCs. (Para 52, 59, 60)

Issue 3: The absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is not sustainable and goes against the principle of equality under Article 14. Blanket exclusion of women from such appointments lacks justification. (Para 67, 68)

Issue 4: Article 33 empowers Parliament to limit or abrogate fundamental rights for the Armed Forces to ensure proper discharge of duties and discipline. Such restriction must be through a law enacted for the purpose. (Para 44)

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for partition and separate possession of a share in the property. He claimed to be a minor at the time of his father's death, asserting joint possession and enjoyment of the family property. The plaintiff's signatures were allegedly obtained on documents without his awareness of their contents.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff was a minor at the time of executing the release deed.

Whether the release deed executed by the plaintiff is valid and whether he is entitled to a share.

Held:

The trial court found that the plaintiff's age on the release deed was recorded as about 22 years and that he married after executing the deed, indicating he was not a minor. The court did not consider the school leaving certificate as evidence due to lack of authentication. The trial court held that the plaintiff was not a minor at the time of the release deed's execution.

The first appellate court affirmed the trial court's findings. The plaintiff did not challenge the release deed in his plaint based on his minority. The appellate court found that the plaintiff left the joint family, received consideration for the release deed, and upheld the release deed's validity.

The High Court reversed the concurrent findings, considering the school leaving certificate (Ex.P/1) as admissible proof of the plaintiff's minority. However, the Supreme Court held that the certificate lacked proper authentication and did not prove the plaintiff's age. The Court emphasized that findings of fact cannot be interfered with in a second appeal unless they are perverse or against the provisions of law.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a construction company, entered into a contract agreement with the State of Punjab for the construction of the Sutlej Yamuna Link Canal. The appellant claimed that the scope of work increased during execution due to various factors, leading to additional payments. Disputes arose, and the matter was taken to arbitration as per the agreement. The arbitrator passed an award, which was presented before the Senior Sub-Judge for approval. The opposite party objected to the award, alleging misconduct by the arbitrator and lack of reasoning in the award.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator's award was sustainable, particularly the claims related to extra work and the calculation of premium rates.

Whether the absence of reasons in the arbitrator's award rendered it invalid.

Whether certain contractual clauses affected the claims made by the appellant.

Held:

Issue 1 - Claims for Extra Work and Premium Calculation (Para 8-16): The court found that the arbitrator's award lacked proper reasoning, as required by the contract. The contract explicitly demanded that all awards above a certain amount state the reasons for the awarded sum. The court emphasized the importance of reason-giving in quasi-judicial functions and concluded that the award's cryptic conclusion was insufficient. The court then determined that the claimant's argument, which calculated premium rates at 93.12% based solely on the difference between estimated and contract costs, was not justifiable. Clause 39 of the contract provided for the application of the Punjab Common Schedule of Rates, and a communication indicated a premium rate of 35.02%. The court held that the claims under Claim Nos. 2, 3, and 12 should be allowed with premium rates calculated at 35.02%, and the opposite party should make the necessary calculations and payments.

Issue 2 - Claim No. 8 for DALDAL Work (Para 17-18): The court recognized that Clause 39 required monthly statements for extra work claims. However, it held that such a clause should not be a strict bar when claims were substantiated and filed in the arbitration process. The court found that the arbitrator had considered relevant documents, such as soil identification and test results, while awarding an amount. The court ordered that the claim under Claim No. 8 should be calculated with premium at 35.02% and awarded to the claimant.

Issue 3 - Claim No. 16 and Interest (Para 19-20): The court upheld the decisions of the High Court and the First Appellate Court on Claim No. 16 and interest. It agreed with the reduction of interest to 12% per annum, in the absence of a specified interest rate in the contract.

Facts:

The appellants, represented by Monu Kumar and 32 others, filed a joint complaint alleging deficiency of service by the respondent, Metromax Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., with respect to a Buyer's agreement. Seeking permission to file a joint complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), they moved a separate application. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) admitted the case and issued notice to the respondent. The impugned order, however, rejected the application for permission and subsequently dismissed the complaint.

Issues:

Whether the admission of the complaint and issuance of notice inherently imply the grant of permission to file a joint complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

Held:

In the application for permission to file a joint complaint, a specific request was made, and after considering the arguments of both sides, the NCDRC admitted the complaint and issued notice. Although the order did not expressly state the grant of permission, the Court inferred that the permission to file a joint complaint was inherent in the order of admission. As the application seeking permission was moved and an admission order was passed after taking it into account, the rejection of the application by the impugned order was deemed inappropriate. The Court concluded that the grant of permission should be read into the order of admission.

The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the NCDRC with directions to reevaluate the case and adjudicate the complaint on its merits. The civil appeal was allowed with this directive.

Facts:

The appellant, a charitable trust, entered into a lease deed with the respondent for developing its land. Disputes arose, and the respondent invoked an arbitration clause within the lease deed, seeking arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. However, the lease deed was insufficiently stamped and was subject to issues of compliance with stamp duty.

Issues:

Whether an arbitration clause within an insufficiently stamped lease deed can be relied upon for enforcing arbitration proceedings.

Whether the lease deed, given its insufficiency in stamp duty, can be considered valid and admissible for arbitration proceedings.

Held:

The court considered the provisions of Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, and the precedent case of SMS Tea Estates Private Limited vs. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited (2011) 14 SCC 66. The court held that when an arbitration agreement is contained within an unregistered but compulsorily registerable and insufficiently stamped instrument, the court cannot act upon the document or the arbitration clause. The court emphasized that the instrument must be duly stamped before it can be admitted in evidence or acted upon.

The court noted that the lease deed containing the arbitration clause was insufficiently stamped, and despite the Registrar's directive to pay the deficit stamp duty and penalty, the respondents failed to comply. Thus, the court concluded that the High Court's reliance on the insufficiently stamped lease deed for appointing an arbitrator was erroneous.

Additionally, the court observed that the respondent's claims regarding the timing of registering the lease deed contradicted the terms of the deed itself and found that the respondents' actions were inconsistent and unsupported.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and rejected the respondents' application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Laxmibai, was disqualified as a member of the Gram Panchayat due to her failure to submit election expenses within the stipulated time. The appellant explained that her delay was caused by health issues, but this explanation was not accepted, leading to her disqualification for five years.

Issues:

Whether the Election Commission's power to disqualify under Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, should consider the proportionality of the disqualification period.

Whether the provisions of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and the relevant Acts provided an alternative remedy for challenging panchayat election disputes.

Held:

Proportionality of Disqualification Period: The court ruled that while ensuring purity and transparency in the election process, the Election Commission's power to disqualify a candidate must be exercised judiciously. The period of disqualification should be proportionate to the default committed. Disqualifying a candidate for five years requires cogent reasons, as this affects the collective will of the voters.

Constitutional Validity of Article 243-O and Alternative Remedy: The court upheld the constitutional provision of Article 243-O, which prohibits challenging panchayat elections except through an election petition presented to the appropriate authority as per the relevant Acts. The court emphasized that the alternate remedy provided by the statute should be followed, and the High Court should refrain from interfering in election matters after the results are declared.

DECISION: The court held that disqualification under Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, should match the severity of the default. A five-year disqualification must be supported by substantial reasons. The court endorsed the constitutionality of Article 243-O, barring challenges to panchayat elections outside of election petitions. The court set aside the disqualification order, directing the Collector to reassess the period proportionately. Subsequent elections would be contingent on the Collector's final decision.

Facts:

The appellant, APS Forex Services Private Limited, appealed against the acquittal of the respondents, Shakti International Fashion Linkers and others, by the High Court. The respondents had issued cheques for certain amounts, but they were dishonoured due to "STOP PAYMENT." The trial court had acquitted the respondents under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, stating that legal liability was not established. The appellant argued that the respondents had admitted issuance of the cheques and their signatures, thus triggering the presumption under Section 139 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, was applicable.

Whether the accused had successfully rebutted the presumption by leading evidence.

Held:

Issue 1 - Presumption under Section 139: The court observed that Section 139 of the Act creates a presumption in favor of the complainant once the issuance of the cheque and the accused's signature are admitted. The presumption is that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. However, this presumption is rebuttable, and the burden of proof shifts to the accused to disprove it.

Issue 2 - Rebuttal of Presumption and Burden of Proof: The court noted that the accused had admitted issuing the cheques and their signatures, and that these cheques were re-issued after previous ones were dishonoured. The accused had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 139. The court clarified that the accused must demonstrate that the entire debt or liability had been settled to counter the presumption.

Conclusion: The court set aside the acquittals by the trial court and High Court, convicting the respondents under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused were sentenced and directed to pay compensation to the appellant.