Judicial Service – Disciplinary Proceedings – Petition challenging the compulsory retirement of Additional District and Sessions Judge due to heavy unexplained bank transactions – Full Court's recommendation and Governor's order of compulsory retirement upheld – Supreme Court finds Full Court's view justified given the substantial transactions and lack of documentary evidence for land purchases – Petition rejected [Paras 1-15].

Disciplinary Committee – Role and Authority – Argument that findings of the Vigilance/Disciplinary Committee should bind the Full Court dismissed – Supreme Court clarifies that in absence of specific rules, Full Court has jurisdiction to take a different view from the Committee – Reference to Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi case to support the principle [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Petition rejected – Compulsory retirement order upheld – Supreme Court emphasizes the gravity of the misconduct and the standard of ethics required of judicial officers [Paras 13-15].

Service Law – Enhancement of Age of Superannuation – The Supreme Court ruled that Ayurvedic doctors covered under AYUSH are entitled to the same benefit of enhanced superannuation age of 65 years as allopathic doctors. The distinction between AYUSH doctors and allopathic doctors, with the former using indigenous systems of medicine like Ayurveda and the latter using allopathy, does not qualify as an intelligible differentia. Therefore, such classification and discrimination are inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 1-24].

Retrospective Application – The Court held that the order from the AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017, which extended the retirement age to 65 years, should be retrospectively applied from 31.05.2016, aligning with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare's notification. This ensures no disparity in service conditions between the two categories of doctors [Paras 22-23].

Equitable Relief – No Work No Pay Doctrine – The principle of 'No Work No Pay' cannot be applied to the respondent doctors who have continuously served patients. Denying salary for their service under the interim orders would violate their rights under Articles 14, 21, and 23 of the Constitution. The respondents must be paid their lawful remuneration, including arrears [Paras 15-20].

Financial Implications – The Court rejected the appellants' argument that paying arrears would impose a substantial financial burden on the State. The State's financial considerations cannot justify denying salary to doctors who have legally served their patients [Paras 20].

Decision – Appeals Disposed Of – Held – The Supreme Court directed the appellants to disburse full salary arrears to the respondent doctors within eight weeks. Any delayed payment beyond the stipulated period will attract interest at the rate of 6% from the date of this order until the date of payment. The appeals are disposed of with no order on costs [Paras 24].

Penal Code – Sections 425, 427, 447 – Prevention of Damage of Public Property Act, 1984 – Section 3(1) – Criminal Procedure Code – Section 321 – Kerala assembly ruckus case – Withdrawal of Prosecution – Destruction of property not freedom of speech – Committing acts of destruction of public property cannot be equated with either the freedom of speech in the legislature or with forms of protest legitimately available to the members of the opposition – To allow the prosecution to be withdrawn in the face of these allegations in respect of which upon investigation a final report has been submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC and cognizance has been taken would amount to an interference with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons – Such an action is clearly extraneous to the vindication of the law to which all organs of the executive are bound – Hence the mere finding of the High Court that there is no absence of good faith would not result in allowing the application as a necessary consequence by ignoring the cause of public justice and the need to observe probity in public life – Members of the State Legislature have in their character as elected representatives a public trust impressed upon the discharge of their duties – Allowing the prosecution to be withdrawn would only result in a singular result which is that the elected representatives are exempt from the mandate of criminal law. This cannot be countenanced as being in aid of the broad ends of public justice – CJM was justified in declining consent for the withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321 – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1-33].

Constitution of India – Article 194(2) – Acts of vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom of speech and be termed as "proceedings" of the Assembly – Article 194(2) is divided into two limbs: First limb of Article 194(2) which provides the members absolute immunity with respect to anything said or any vote given in the House is a manifestation of the freedom of speech provided under Article 194(1) – Second limb of Article 194(2) gives the members immunity in respect of the publication of 'any report paper votes or proceedings' by or under the authority of the house – Legal immunity to 'anything said or any vote given' in the first limb and the 'publication of a report paper votes or proceedings' in the second limb of Article 194(2) flow from the freedom of speech that is provided under Article 194(1) – Exercise of these manifestations of the freedom of speech – as provided in Article 194(2) – has been provided with express immunity. However the only difference between the two limbs of Article 194(2) is that the first limb protects the exercise of the freedom and the second limb protects the member against the publication of the said exercise of the freedom – Legal proceedings against the exercise of the freedom can only be initiated by those aware of the exercise of freedom which would mean either those who are present in the House or those who become aware of it when the speech vote or the like is published – While the freedoms protected by both the limbs are substantively the same the second limb is clarificatory in the sense that it prevents 'any person' from initiating proceedings against the exercise of freedom of speech inside the House when they obtain knowledge of the exercise of the said freedom through a publication – Immunity provided for the exercise of the manifestations of the freedom of speech in the second limb of under Article 194(2) cannot exceed the freedom of speech provided in the first limb of Article 194(2) – Acts of destruction of public property are not privileged under the first limb of Article 194(2) – Consequently acts of vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom of speech and be termed as “proceedings” of the Assembly – It was not the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to extend the interpretation of ‘freedom of speech’ to include criminal acts by placing them under a veil of protest – Hence the Constitution only grants the members the freedom of speech that is necessary for their active participation in meaningful deliberation without any fear of prosecution – Moreover the word ‘proceedings’ in Article 194(2) follows the words ‘any report paper votes’ – Reports papers and votes are actions that are undertaken by the members of the Assembly in their official capacity for participation and deliberation in the House – These are essential functions that a member has to perform in order to discharge her duty to the public as their elected representative – On application of the interpretative principle of noscitur a sociis the phrase ‘proceedings’ takes colour from the words surrounding it – Since the words associated with the phrase ‘proceedings’ refer to actions that are exercised by the members in their official capacity in furtherance of their official functions the meaning of the word ‘proceedings’ must also be restricted to only include such actions [Paras 34-47].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – Held – Orders of High Court and CJM affirmed – Application for withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 CrPC rejected – Immunities under Article 194(2) do not extend to acts of vandalism or destruction of public property [Paras 48-50].

Arbitration – Arbitral Award – Patent Illegality – Judicial Intervention – Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Scope of interference limited to grounds under Section 34 – Judicial intervention on merits of award not permissible – Award can be set aside if it violates “public policy of India” or principles of natural justice – “Public policy” limited to fundamental policy of Indian law, not expanding into mere erroneous application of law – Findings based on no evidence or ignoring vital evidence can be set aside – High Court's interference with arbitral award set aside – Appeal dismissed [Paras 42-46].

Change in Law – Relief under Contract – License Agreement between PSA SICAL and Port Trust – Change in law adversely affecting rights under contract – Article 14.3 providing relief without compensation – Arbitral Tribunal’s finding on change in law justified – High Court's interference beyond permissible limits [Paras 56-58].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Held – Arbitral Tribunal's award reinstated – High Court’s order set aside – Principles of limited judicial intervention reaffirmed [Paras 60-66].

Civil Procedure Code – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Admission of second appeal with formulation of substantial questions of law – High Court's duty to hear and decide on the substantial questions – Impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside for summary disposal of second appeal without proper consideration of formulated questions – Matter remanded to High Court for reconsideration on formulated questions of law [Paras 1-18].

Substantial Question of Law – Scope of High Court's Powers – Under Section 100 CPC, after admission of second appeal with substantial questions of law, High Court must consider and decide on these questions – High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal summarily – Emphasizes necessity for detailed examination and determination of substantial questions of law [Paras 14-16].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – High Court’s judgment and order set aside – Second appeal restored for reconsideration by High Court on already formulated substantial questions of law – High Court requested to prioritize and expedite the matter [Paras 17-18].

Service Law – Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments – Determination of Seniority – Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (on posts within the purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979, particularly Rules 4 to 7 – Appellant challenged the seniority list re-determined in 2016 which counted services rendered by ad hoc appointees from the date of their initial appointment in 1985 – Supreme Court held that seniority should be counted from the date of regularisation, not initial ad hoc appointment [Paras 1-11].

Ad hoc Appointments – Seniority Determination – Regularisation Rules – Appellants' seniority to be reckoned from the date of their substantive appointment after regularisation, per Rules 1979 – Ad hoc services rendered before regularisation not counted for seniority – Supreme Court quashed the re-determined seniority list of 2016 and restored the final seniority list of 2001, which considered seniority from the date of regularisation in 1989 [Paras 7-11].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – Judgments of High Courts quashed – Seniority list of 2001 restored, counting seniority from the date of regularisation (23.02.1989) – Revised seniority list of 2016 quashed [Para 11].

Criminal Procedure Code – Sections 156(3), 200, and 438 – Indian Penal Code – Sections 418, 419, 420, 405, 467, 468, 471, 474, 120B read with 34 – Fraud and misappropriation of funds – Setting aside of anticipatory bail – High Court granted anticipatory bail on the ground that the magistrate passed an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC directing the complaint to be investigated and that the mandate of Section 200 of the CrPC had not been complied with since the complainant was not examined on oath – Any Judicial Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code – If the magistrate orders an investigation, they are not required to examine the complainant on oath because they have not taken cognizance of any offence therein – For the purpose of enabling the police to start an investigation, it is open to the magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR – There is nothing illegal in doing so – The power under Section 156(3) can be exercised by the magistrate even before taking cognizance provided the complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence – Orders granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 to the accused shall accordingly stand set aside – Appeal allowed [Paras 1-33].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – High Court's order set aside – Anticipatory bail granted to the respondents under Section 438 stands canceled – Orders directing investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC upheld [Paras 24-25].

Insolvency and Bankruptcy – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Initiation by Financial Creditor – Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Meaning of 'Financial Debt' – Definition in Section 5(8) does not exclude interest-free loans – Loan advanced to meet working capital requirements without interest qualifies as financial debt – Reversal of NCLT and NCLAT orders dismissing the petition under Section 7 – Appeal allowed and petition revived for fresh decision in accordance with law [Paras 1-33].

Loan Agreement – Consideration for Time Value of Money – Section 5(8) of IBC – Interpretation – Financial debt includes any amount raised under a transaction having the commercial effect of borrowing – Inclusive definition extends to loans advanced for operational funding without interest – NCLT and NCLAT’s restrictive reading of financial debt reversed – Judgment emphasizes legislative intent and holistic reading of statutory provisions [Paras 7-29].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – Orders of NCLT and NCLAT set aside – Petition under Section 7 of IBC revived for fresh decision by Adjudicating Authority in accordance with law and findings [Paras 32-33].

Sanction for Prosecution – Protection under Section 197 CrPC – Allegation against public servant for criminal acts committed during discharge of official duties – Supreme Court held that sanction under Section 197 is required if the act is reasonably connected with the official duties – Protection intended to prevent unnecessary harassment of public servants while also ensuring it does not shield corrupt officers [Paras 1-11].

Official Duty and Criminal Acts – Scope of Section 197 CrPC – Acts of cheating, fabrication of records, or misappropriation generally not protected under Section 197 unless reasonably connected with discharge of official duties – Test to determine connection involves forming a prima facie view of the reasonable connection between the act and the official duties [Paras 7-9].

Similar Protection for Co-Accused – Consistency in Protection – In similar circumstances, superior officers involved in the same transaction were granted protection under Section 197 CrPC – Supreme Court found no reason to deny the same protection to the appellant, who was a lower division clerk accused of conspiring with his superiors – Sanction from competent authority was necessary, and in its absence, the proceedings were quashed [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court's decision upheld, granting protection under Section 197 CrPC to the appellant – Sanction required for prosecution, proceedings quashed due to lack of sanction [Paras 11-12].