Facts:

The appellant's father's house was fully demolished due to the Ara-Sasaram Railway Project.

The Collector recommended the appellant's case for employment per Railway Board's circular dated 19 April 2006.

The appellant's representation for appointment was rejected, citing a small land acquisition of 0.06 acres in 2006.

Appellant filed a writ petition challenging the rejection.

Issues:

Whether the Railway Board's policy circular dated 19 April 2006 applied to the appellant's case.

Validity of the rejection based on the small land acquisition.

Held:

The circular dated 19 April 2006 applied, allowing consideration for Group 'D' posts when a "large area, house or substantial livelihood has been taken away."

The rejection based on small land acquisition was incorrect, as the circular did not limit benefits only to cases of extensive land acquisition.

Decision: The rejection of the appellant's claim was contrary to the policy circular, and the appeal was allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside. The appellant's claim for appointment to a Group 'D' post was directed to be implemented within two months.

Facts:

The appellant, a driver with the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, collided with a railway crossing gate, resulting in damage.

Charged under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act, 1989.

Conviction and sentencing by three successive courts: Magistrate, Appellate Court, and High Court.

Issues:

Legitimacy of the appellant's conviction under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act.

Appropriateness of the six-month jail sentence considering the nature of the offense.

Held:

The three courts below concluded that the appellant committed the offense, and their concurrent finding is binding under Article 136.

No identified perversity or illegality in the concurrent finding, justifying interference.

The appellant's argument against the conviction is deemed unsubstantiated.

The six-month sentence is considered excessive given the absence of harm or injury to individuals and the age of the offense (13 years old).

The sentence is reduced to the period already served by the appellant.

Facts:

A piece of land, allotted to M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd., was in unauthorized occupation. The Port Trust initiated eviction proceedings and recovered possession. The question arose regarding the right to seize and dispose of goods and materials found on the premises, including those not belonging to the erstwhile tenant/licensee.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 6 of the Public Premises Act and its applicability to goods belonging to third parties found on public premises after an eviction order.

Held:

Section 6 of the PP Act applies to any person in unauthorized occupation, including goods not belonging to the erstwhile tenant/licensee.

The Estate Officer is entitled to sell goods, even of a stranger, found on premises under unauthorized occupation.

Section 6 of the PP Act must be read independently of Sections 59 and 61 of the Major Port Trusts Act.

The provision aims to enable authorities to take consequential steps after receiving possession of public premises and for the recovery of dues.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeals, affirming the right of the Port Trust to seize and dispose of goods on public premises, even if not belonging to the unauthorized occupant. The Full Bench's judgment was upheld.

Facts:

The accused, Dattatraya @ Datta Ambo Rokade, was convicted by the trial court for the rape and murder of a minor child. The high court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence imposed by the trial court. The Supreme Court heard the appeal challenging the conviction and sentence.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction for offenses under various sections, including rape and murder.

Appropriateness of the death sentence imposed by the trial court.

Held:

The forensic reports, coupled with the extrajudicial confession made by the accused, substantiate the guilt. The DNA analysis establishes the accused's involvement in the rape of the victim, confirming the convictions under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), 377 of the IPC, and Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the POCSO Act (Paras 85, 86, and 96).

While the accused's actions were heinous and cruel, there is no evidence of premeditated murder or diabolic planning. The absence of intent to kill the minor child led the court to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment (Paras 122, 125, 126, 127, and 128).

The court highlighted the inadequate defense representation and the denial of an effective hearing on the question of sentence under Section 235(2) of the CrPC. The accused was not given the opportunity to present mitigating circumstances, leading to the commutation of the death sentence (Paras 136, 137, 138, and 139).

The court emphasized that Section 235(2) of the CrPC is not a mere formality and must be obeyed in letter and spirit. The trial judge's failure to elicit relevant facts and provide an opportunity to present mitigating factors led to the commutation of the death sentence (Paras 103, 105, 139, 140, and 141).

The court exercised its authority to prescribe the length of incarceration, directing that the accused should undergo imprisonment for life till his natural death, with no remission of sentence due to the heinous nature of the crime (Paras 143 and 144).

Facts:

The appellant, Jagdish, was convicted for the murder of his wife and five children. The trial court, High Court, and Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence. The mercy petition, filed on 13.10.2009, was rejected by the President of India on 16.07.2014. The appellant challenged the rejection on the grounds of a nearly 5-year delay in deciding the mercy petition.

Issues:

Whether the delay in deciding the mercy petition justifies the commutation of the death sentence?

Is this case one of the "rarest of rare" instances for awarding a death sentence?

Held:

The Review Petition is not entertained on the merits of the case, as three courts had a concurrent finding of the appellant's guilt.

The issue of the delay in deciding the mercy petition is considered separately. The Court refers to V. Sriharan's case, emphasizing that an exorbitant delay renders the execution arbitrary and inexecutable. The delay in this case is deemed unreasonable.

The State of Madhya Pradesh's unexplained delay of more than 4 years in forwarding the mercy petition is criticized. The Court cannot condone such unexplained delays, especially in death penalty cases.

The Court takes into consideration the appellant's 14-year incarceration and the nature of the crime. Despite the brutal nature of the crime, the Court commutes the death sentence to life, specifying that life imprisonment means the entire remaining life, with no possibility of release until death.

The Review Petition and Writ Petition are partly allowed in the aforementioned terms.

Facts:

The case involves an incident on March 13, 1994, where the appellants, among others, were accused of attacking and ultimately causing the death of the father-in-law of the complainant. The charges were framed under various sections of the Penal Code, including s.141, s.149, s.302, and s.326.

Issues:

The appellants' alleged participation in the unlawful assembly, the common object of the assembly, and their roles in the attack on the deceased.

Held:

The statement of PW1, recorded soon after the incident, supported by PW2 and PW3, detailed the accused's presence and actions. Both trial and high courts found no reason to doubt this account. Discrepancies were attributed to the lapse of time since the occurrence.

The FIR, lodged promptly after the incident by residents (PW2 and PW3), validated PW1's account, and minor discrepancies in recalling accused details did not undermine the prosecution's case.

The "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" maxim was deemed inapplicable in India. The court emphasized that rejecting part of a witness's statement doesn't discredit the entire testimony, especially when the witness is found reliable overall.

Confessional statements (Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.8) were used to recover weapons, and while DW4 suggested a different timeline for injuries, it didn't dispute the core events. The active roles of A-1 and A-2 were proven, with the presence of other accused established by multiple witnesses.

The argument that appellants other than A-1 and A-2 lacked a common object was dismissed. The court held that the evidence showed a collective attack on the deceased due to his role in Panchayat affairs against caste Hindus.

Judicial orders, it was emphasized, are case-specific. The cumulative effect of facts led both courts to conclude that all appellants, as part of an unlawful assembly, shared the common object leading to the deceased's murder.

Facts:

The appellant won an open auction in 1996 for a booth but defaulted on payment terms.

Despite several notices, the appellant failed to make payments as per the allotment conditions.

The booth was resumed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority in 2001.

An appeal in 2011 set aside the resumption order subject to the appellant clearing dues and paying a penalty.

The appellant made a payment of Rs. 7,00,000 but the resumption order was later restored.

The High Court, in 2014, dismissed the writ petition, citing the appellant's non-compliance over 20 years.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, who defaulted on payment terms for the booth allotted in 1996, is entitled to relief?

Held:

The appellant defaulted on payment terms after an initial payment of 25%.

Despite multiple notices, the appellant continued to default on payments over the years.

The appeal filed against the resumption order was dismissed, and subsequent restoration attempts were also unsuccessful.

The executed General Power of Attorney (GPA) was considered an assignment of litigation.

The current estimated value of the booth is stated to be around Rs. 2.14 crores.

The court rejected the appellant's plea for relief under Article 142, as it cannot protect an unscrupulous buyer.

The order of resumption was confirmed, and the appellant was given an opportunity to withdraw the deposited amount with interest, minus unauthorized occupation charges.

The appeal was disposed of, confirming the resumption order. The appellant's deposited amount could be withdrawn by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, with accrued interest towards unauthorized occupation charges. Any surplus would be returned to the appellant with interest. No order as to costs was issued.

Facts:

Appellants booked a residential plot with the respondent for a villa in "Cloud-9 Hill Town."

Total consideration for the villa: Rs. 15,65,000/-. Completion time: 30 months.

Consumer complaint filed by appellants against respondent.

District Forum ruled in favor of appellants, directing respondent to deliver the completed villa.

Issues:

Delay of 721 days in filing an appeal by the respondent.

Explanation for the delay: Non-informing advocate and pending complaint against the advocate.

Held:

The High Court erred in condoning the delay without a satisfactory explanation.

Gross negligence on the part of the respondent.

The delay should not have been condoned.

Order condoning delay set aside, and the First Appeal dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioner, a student of Medicine, sought compensation for the loss of an academic year due to the cancellation of MBBS admissions by the first respondent, Kannur Medical College.

Legal proceedings ensued, involving regulatory committees and court interventions.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the loss of a valuable year in pursuing studies.

Validity of the withdrawal of complaints made by the petitioner's father.

Held:

The petitioner, having lost a valuable academic year due to the first respondent's actions, is entitled to compensation.

Withdrawal of complaints by the petitioner's father was not voluntary but a result of the urgent need for a refund for the petitioner's admission to another institute.

The Committee's finding that withdrawal was not voluntary supports the petitioner's claim.

The petitioner can pursue her claim before the Committee as per court orders, and the Committee should decide expeditiously within three months.

Decision: The writ petition is disposed of, leaving it open for the petitioner to pursue her claim before the Committee. The Committee is requested to decide within three months.