Facts:

The case originated from matrimonial proceedings where certain averments were made in anticipatory bail applications. Allegations of perjury were raised against the appellant for deliberate false statements.

Issues:

Whether the statements in the anticipatory bail application were deliberately and consciously false?

Whether there is sufficient unimpeachable evidence to support perjury charges?

Whether the High Court's grounds were substantial for initiating prosecution under Section 340?

Held:

The High Court felt a prima facie case for perjury existed and ordered prosecution. The statements in anticipatory bail applications were contested, and the Sessions Court held that initiation of proceedings under Section 340 was premature.

The same statements were made in the High Court's anticipatory bail application, leading to the High Court's order. The appellant argued that the investigation report was preliminary and inconclusive. The High Court's order was primarily based on different grounds for granting anticipatory bail.

The law on initiating proceedings under Section 340 was discussed, emphasizing the need for deliberate and conscious false statements. It was noted that evidence had not been led, and the investigation report couldn't be considered unimpeachable. The High Court's grounds were deemed insufficient for prosecution.

Counsel for the respondent cited judgments supporting the initiation of proceedings by the High Court. The Court distinguished these cases as not applicable to the present situation, emphasizing the lack of fabricated documents or a detailed independent inquiry.

The Court rejected the argument that the High Court failed to satisfy itself on the expediency of justice. The appellant's claim of suppression of the Sessions Court order was dismissed.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

Mrs. Sudha Jain, the wife of the appellant, suffered from various diseases.

Admitted to S. Antokba Durlabhji Memorial Hospital and treated by Dr. Anurag Govil for chills and fever.

Discharged from the hospital, but her health deteriorated, leading to subsequent admissions and, ultimately, her demise on 31.10.2011.

Appellant alleged medical negligence, initiating legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the medical treatment administered to Mrs. Sudha Jain amounted to medical negligence.

The appellant's claim of inappropriate and ineffective medication, premature discharge, and oral administration of antibiotics.

Held:

The court cited the Consumer Protection Act, emphasizing that a doctor cannot be negligent if acting in accordance with accepted medical practices.

Reiterated the principle that a doctor need not possess the highest expert skill but should exercise ordinary skill as per the profession's standards.

Acknowledged the possibility of genuine differences of opinion in medical diagnosis and treatment.

Upheld the NCDRC's view that, at most, it was a case of wrong diagnosis and not medical negligence.

Dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that sympathy for the appellant cannot translate into a legal remedy.

FACTS:

Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (Appellants) vs. Adani Power Ltd. (Respondent).

Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) dated 07.08.2008 and 02.02.2007 between the parties.

Change in law due to withdrawal of exemptions by notifications dated 06.04.2015 and 16.02.2016.

Adani Power filed a petition before the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) seeking compensation for change in law.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Article 13 of the PPAs regarding compensation for change in law.

Applicability of restitutionary principles in determining compensation.

Claim for carrying costs under Article 13.

HELD:

Article 13.2 establishes a restitutionary principle, compensating the affected party to restore them economically.Two periods defined for compensation: Construction Period and Operation Period, each governed by specific criteria.( Para 7)

Compensation during the Construction Period is subject to proof of increase/decrease in Capital Cost, resolved through dispute resolution mechanism.( Para 8)

Compensation during the Operation Period is determined by the Appropriate Commission, subject to a threshold limit.Monthly tariff adjustment effective from the date of the change in law under Article 13.4.1(i).( Para 10)

Carrying cost claimed by Adani Power falls within the restitutionary principle of Article 13.2 and is specifically provided in the PPAs.The claim is not based on general principles of equity but is governed by the terms of the PPA.( Para 11)

The judgment dismisses the appeals, affirming the Appellate Tribunal's decision in favor of Adani Power.( Para 16)

REFERRED CASES:

All India Power Engineer Federation and Ors. v. Sasan Power Ltd. and Ors., (2017) 1 SCC 487

Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors., (2017) 14 SCC 80

Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India and Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 161

South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 648

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 migrated to the USA after completing studies in India.

Respondent No. 1 and 2, an Indian couple, returned to India in 2016 after a decade in the USA.

Respondent No. 2 became a US citizen during their stay in the USA.

The couple, unable to conceive, planned to adopt an Indian child upon returning to India.

They submitted an application on 19.07.2016 for in-country adoption as Indian prospective adoptive parents.

While waiting for a referral, Respondent No. 1 was granted US citizenship on 06.12.2016.

A second application was submitted on 05.11.2017 for inter-country adoption after acquiring US citizenship.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition of US citizenship by Respondent No. 1 affects their eligibility for in-country adoption?

Should the offer of the child for adoption to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 be based on their first application or the subsequent application after acquiring US citizenship?

Held:

The High Court upheld the decision to consider the application based on the first registration dated 19.07.2016.

The Court set aside the judgments directing consideration on the basis of the first application and upheld the decision communicated on 15.03.2018.

The competent authority was directed to notify the child for adoption within one week.

If the child is not adopted by Indian prospective adoptive parents within sixty days, adoption to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in inter-country adoption was allowed.

Facts:

The suit property originally belonged to 'PG,' who executed a will in 1971, bequeathing life interest to his sons 'K' and 'B,' and subsequently to the male heirs of his sons. 'B,' on behalf of himself and his minor son 'P,' sold a portion of the property to the defendants-respondents in 1981-82.

Issues:

The plaintiffs filed a suit in 1992, challenging the authority of 'B' to execute sale deeds on behalf of his minor son 'P,' contending that the deeds were void. The defendants raised the defense of limitation, arguing that the suit should have been filed within three years from the death of 'P' in 1986.

Held:

The judgment clarifies that Article 60(b)(ii) of the Limitation Act is applicable in cases where a ward dies before attaining majority, and the limitation to avoid an instrument made by the guardian of the ward is three years from the ward's death.

The period of limitation under Article 65 is relevant when seeking possession of immovable property based on title. However, since the sale deeds were voidable and not void, Article 60 governs the limitation for the suit, and it was rightly held as time-barred.

Sale deeds executed without the court's permission, in violation of Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956, are voidable. The suit, lacking a prayer for setting aside these deeds, was improperly framed and couldn't be decreed.

The release deed executed in 1986 does not repudiate the sale deeds by 'B' on behalf of the minor, and Section 8(3) of the 1956 Act allows the minor or their legal heirs to avoid such alienations.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the court affirmed that the sale deeds executed by 'B' were not repudiated or avoided within the prescribed limitation period, rendering the suit time-barred.

Facts:

Five individuals were tried for the murder of Kaushalya Devi in 1992.

Kanhai Prasad Chourasia was convicted under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, sentenced to life imprisonment.

The other four were acquitted of murder but convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Appeals were filed by Kanhai Prasad Chourasia (Criminal Appeal No. 112/1994) and the other four collectively (Criminal Appeal No. 77/1994).

The High Court, under a misconception, treated all accused as convicted under Section 302/149 IPC, leading to a common judgment convicting all five.

Issues:

Misinterpretation by the High Court regarding the nature of convictions.

Imposition of Section 302/149 IPC without appeal by the State or notice of enhancement.

Failure to consider the acquittal under Section 149 IPC by the trial court.

Absence of sentencing for those convicted under Section 302/149 IPC.

Held:

The Division Bench found fundamental errors in the High Court's judgment.

The misconception of all accused being convicted under Section 302/149 IPC was identified as a primary error.

The High Court failed to consider the acquittal under Section 149 IPC and imposed Section 302/149 IPC without any appeal by the State.

The Bench, invoking Article 136, decided to set aside the entire impugned order against all accused.

Emphasized that an order based on wrong factual premises cannot be perpetuated against non-appealing accused.

Remanded the case to the High Court for re-hearing, directing separate consideration for each accused.

Noted that the appellant, Deep Narayan Chourasia, had already served a significant portion of the sentence and granted bail pending the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The Appellant was convicted under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC for his involvement in a gang rape incident.

The Appellant claimed juvenility at the time of the offense and presented school transfer certificates as evidence.

Issues:

Whether the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case.

Whether an inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court takes precedence over the view of the High Court.

The admissibility and veracity of school transfer certificates in determining the age of the accused.

Held:

The claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case, as per Sections 7A and 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act.

An inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction of the Supreme Court is deemed as an inquiry conducted by the Court itself.

The certificates presented by the Appellant were found admissible and conclusive proof of age under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules.

The High Court's failure to follow the prescribed procedure for age determination under Section 7A was noted.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. The Appellant is released from custody, considering the time served and the juvenile justice provisions.

Facts:

In SLP (Crl.) No.9859/13, an FIR was lodged against the accused under Sections 307, 294, and 34 of the IPC. Simultaneously, in SLP (Crl.) No.9860/13, an FIR was filed for offenses under Sections 394 of the IPC and 25/27 of the Arms Act. The accused sought the quashing of these proceedings based on compromises with the complainants.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in quashing criminal proceedings without considering the non-compoundable nature of the offenses, the seriousness of the charges, and the distinction between personal and social wrongs.

Held:

The High Court failed to consider that the alleged offenses were non-compoundable under Section 320 of the CrPC. It mechanically quashed the FIRs without assessing the gravity of the charges and their social impact, contrary to established legal principles.

The High Court should have recognized that a compromise doesn't necessarily preclude a conviction. In certain cases, the prosecution can still establish guilt with cogent evidence, particularly in disputes not of a commercial or civil nature.

The High Court erred in mechanically quashing the FIR in SLP(Crl.) No.9860/2013, where the accused were absconding. It neglected the antecedents of the accused facing multiple trials for serious offenses, showing a lack of vigilance. The court set aside the impugned judgments, allowing the respective criminal proceedings to continue.

Facts:

The appellant's father's house was fully demolished due to the Ara-Sasaram Railway Project.

The Collector recommended the appellant's case for employment per Railway Board's circular dated 19 April 2006.

The appellant's representation for appointment was rejected, citing a small land acquisition of 0.06 acres in 2006.

Appellant filed a writ petition challenging the rejection.

Issues:

Whether the Railway Board's policy circular dated 19 April 2006 applied to the appellant's case.

Validity of the rejection based on the small land acquisition.

Held:

The circular dated 19 April 2006 applied, allowing consideration for Group 'D' posts when a "large area, house or substantial livelihood has been taken away."

The rejection based on small land acquisition was incorrect, as the circular did not limit benefits only to cases of extensive land acquisition.

Decision: The rejection of the appellant's claim was contrary to the policy circular, and the appeal was allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside. The appellant's claim for appointment to a Group 'D' post was directed to be implemented within two months.