Facts:

The suit was filed by the Plaintiff, Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad, seeking a permanent injunction against State authorities to restrain them from commencing a solid waste disposal project. The Plaintiff challenged the Project at its nascent stage.

Issues:

Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit concerning environmental issues, given the establishment of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

Whether an injunction could be granted under Sections 41(f) and 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, considering the circumstances of the case.

Whether the Plaintiffs had fulfilled the burden of proof required to establish actionable nuisance.

Held:

The suit was filed prior to the establishment of the NGT and even after the establishment of the NGT, the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit involving environmental issues. The suit should have been transferred to the NGT for adjudication under Section 29 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 and the precedent set by the Bhopal Gas Case. (Para 13)

The Plaintiffs' suit suffered from a fundamental deficiency as it did not challenge the decisions of the competent authority regarding the Project. Relief of permanent injunction simpliciter was not sufficient. The suit should have been dismissed at the threshold. (Paras 14 and 15)

The possibility of harm due to the proposed Project was insufficient to grant an injunction. The Plaintiffs failed to meet their initial burden of proof to establish actionable nuisance. Equally efficacious relief could be obtained through other modes of proceedings as provided under Sections 41(f) and 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (Paras 17 and 18)

The trial court had rightly found that the Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their case of actionable nuisance. The appellate court's findings were based on assumptions and conjectures, shifting the burden of proof improperly. (Para 16)

The civil suit should have been dismissed, allowing affected parties to make representations to appropriate authorities and seek remedies as permissible by law. (Para 19)

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of the applicability of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to co-operative banks. The central question revolves around whether co-operative banks, registered under state legislation and multi-state co-operative societies, fall under the purview of the Act and the constitutional provisions related to banking.

Issues:

Whether co-operative banks registered under state legislation and multi-state co-operative societies are governed by legislation related to Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

Whether co-operative banks involved in banking activities can be considered within the definition of a "Banking Company" under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Whether the recovery procedure prescribed under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is applicable to co-operative banks.

Whether the Constitutional provisions inserted by the Constitution (Ninety Seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, support the interpretation that co-operative banks fall under Entry 45 of List I.

Held:

The Court held that co-operative banks registered under state legislation and multi-state co-operative societies with respect to banking activities are governed by legislation related to Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. Co-operative banks engaged in aspects of incorporation, regulation, and winding up that fall outside Entry 45 are governed by the legislation related to Entry 32 of List II.

Co-operative banks engaged in banking activities fall within the definition of a "Banking Company" under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. They are covered under Entry 45 of List I and must comply with the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and other applicable legislation.

The Court ruled that recovery is an essential part of banking, and therefore, the recovery procedure under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, a legislation related to Entry 45 of List I, is applicable to co-operative banks.

The Constitutional provisions introduced by the Constitution (Ninety Seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, make a clear distinction between co-operative banks and other co-operative societies. Co-operative banks are governed by Entry 45 of List I, and the BR Act, 1949, and RBI Act under Entry 38 of List I are applicable to them.

Facts:

The case revolved around the classification of car mats by M/S. Uni Products India Ltd. The question was whether these car mats should be classified as parts and accessories (Chapter 87) or as textile floor coverings (Chapter 57) under the Central Excise Tariff Act.

Issues:

The appropriate classification of car mats: Chapter 57 (textile floor coverings) or Chapter 87 (parts and accessories). The dispute arose from the difference in excise duty rates between the two classifications.

Held :

The Commissioner argued that car mats should be classified under Chapter 87 due to their use as parts and accessories for cars. However, the Tribunal and the Court upheld the respondent's contention that car mats should be classified under Chapter 57. The Court referred to the HSN Explanatory Notes, recognizing their strong persuasive value, to analyze the proper classification.

The Court emphasized that the common parlance test and other similar tools for interpretation are applicable when an item could be classified under more than one heading. In this case, the Explanatory Notes provided guidance for classification. The Court noted Chapter Note 1 of Chapter 57, which stipulated that textile materials serving as the exposed surface of the article when in use should be considered as carpets and floor coverings.

The Court further highlighted the exclusion of "textile carpets" from parts and accessories under Section XVII of the Explanatory Notes, confirming that car mats should be classified under Chapter 57. The argument that car mats were designed exclusively for cars was not sufficient to transplant them to the residual entry under Chapter 87.

Therefore, the Court sustained the Tribunal's decision, classifying car mats under Chapter 57 (textile floor coverings) rather than Chapter 87 (parts and accessories) of the Central Excise Tariff Act.

Facts:

Pradeep Mehra, the respondent, resigned from his position as Chief Operating Officer after 12 years of service.

He claimed gratuity of Rs.1.83 crores based on his last drawn monthly wage.

The appellant-employer argued that the respondent was entitled to a maximum of Rs.10 lacs as gratuity, in line with Section 4(3) of the Act.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent is entitled to receive gratuity of Rs.1.83 crores based on his last drawn wage, or if the ceiling under Section 4(3) of the Act applies.

Held:

The court analyzed Section 4(3) and Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Section 4(3) places a cap on the amount of gratuity payable to an employee, while Section 4(5) preserves an employee's right to receive better terms of gratuity under any award, agreement, or contract.

For Section 4(5) to be invoked, better terms of gratuity must be available under an arrangement with the employer compared to what the Act provides.

The Trust Deed and Scheme of the appellant-Company clearly stipulate that gratuity calculations for employees covered by the Act should be in accordance with the Act itself. No alternative is offered under the Scheme for such employees.

Rule 6(b) of the Scheme explicitly states that if an employee is covered by the Act, the gratuity amount must be calculated as per the Act's provisions.

The court emphasized that the intent of the Scheme was to provide a similar benefit to employees not covered by the Act and not to offer a better package to employees covered by the Act.

The court concluded that Section 4(5) does not apply in this case, and the appellant-employer was correct in applying the provisions of the Act and the prescribed ceiling under Section 4(3).

Any errors in making extra payments to some other employees would not create a right in favor of the respondent in light of the stipulations in the Trust Deed and the Scheme.

We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order and dismiss the Claim Petition preferred by the respondent.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the notifications issued by the Medical Council of India (MCI) and Dental Council of India (DCI) introducing NEET for admissions to MBBS, BDS, and other medical courses. The initial quashing of the notifications was later recalled. During the pendency of the case, Section 10D of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, providing for a uniform entrance examination, was introduced.

Issues:

• Whether the notifications and amendments violate the rights of unaided/aided minority institutions under Articles 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1), and 30. The case also examines whether the introduction of NEET for admissions in medical and dental courses is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The notifications, amendments to Section 10D, and the regulations introduced by MCI and DCI do not violate the rights of unaided/aided minority institutions. The court emphasizes the need for regulatory mechanisms at the national level, even in prestigious institutions like All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). The decision aligns with T.M.A. Pai Foundation, allowing regulatory mechanisms and maintaining academic standards.

The notifications and amendments do not infringe upon minority institutions' rights. Regulatory measures apply uniformly to all institutions, and conditions of recognition must be followed. The court emphasizes that regulations do not impede minority institutions' rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25, and 30.

The court justifies the introduction of NEET in the larger public interest and the improvement of medical education. NEET is a reasonable condition of recognition/affiliation and aims to prevent malpractices and commercialization of education. The court cites constitutional articles, including Article 47, Article 51A(j), and Article 30, to support the constitutionality of NEET.

NEET is seen as a means to standardize qualifications and combat malpractices in admissions. The court emphasizes that minority institutions must comply with reasonable regulatory measures for the overall welfare of students and the nation's interest.

The court concludes that NEET and regulatory measures do not violate Articles 19(1)(g) and 30, as they are intended to maintain educational standards, prevent malpractices, and ensure transparency. The court underscores the importance of balancing rights in the interest of the nation.

Accordingly, the transferred cases, appeal, and writ petitions are disposed of.

Facts:
The case involves Judicial Officers who were promoted on an ad-hoc basis to serve as Additional District and Sessions Judges in Fast Track Courts. The question arose regarding their seniority in relation to officers promoted on a substantive basis to the Cadre of District Judge and those selected through Direct Recruitment and Limited Competitive Examination (LCE).

Issues:

• Whether officers promoted on ad-hoc basis as Additional District and Sessions Judges for Fast Track Courts are entitled to seniority from the date of their initial ad-hoc promotion.
• Whether the selection process initiated under a certain notification can be considered a continuation of an earlier process.
• Whether the promotion of 47 Judicial Officers to the Cadre of District Judge can be treated as part of the same selection process as the candidates selected through LCE.
• How the inter se seniority of candidates selected through LCE should be determined.
• Whether the Report dated 15.03.2019 requires any modification or correction.

Held:

Judicial officers promoted on ad-hoc basis to Fast Track Courts are entitled to seniority from the date of their substantive appointment, not from the date of initial ad-hoc appointment.

The selection process initiated under a specific notification is not in continuation of an earlier selection process.

The promotion of 47 Judicial Officers to the Cadre of District Judge is not part of the same selection process as candidates selected through LCE. Cyclic Order rules do not apply, and the 47 Officers were rightly placed senior to the candidates from the later selection process.

The inter se placement of candidates selected through LCE should be based on merit, not their seniority in the erstwhile cadre.

The Report dated 15.03.2019 does not require significant modification, except regarding the placement of LCE candidates based on merit.

The seniority list issued in line with the Report stands modified only to the extent mentioned above.

This case primarily deals with issues related to the seniority and promotion of Judicial Officers in the Cadre of District Judges in Rajasthan and provides clarifications on various aspects of the selection process and the application of relevant rules and regulations.

Facts:

PILCOM, a committee formed by Cricket Control Boards/Associations of Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka for conducting the World Cup tournament in 1996, made payments to ICC and various Cricket Control Boards/Associations of member countries from its London Bank Accounts. The Income Tax Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 194E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, questioning whether income accrued to Non-Resident Sports Associations in India and whether PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source.

Issues:

• Whether income accrued to Non-Resident Sports Associations in India?
• Whether PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source under Section 194E?

Held:

The payments made by PILCOM were intricately connected with the World Cup event, where cricket teams of Non-Resident Sports Associations played matches in India. The source of income was the playing of matches in India. Therefore, income accrued to the Non-Resident Sports Associations in India.

Section 115BBA(1)(b) mandates that if the total income of a Non-Resident Sports Association includes guaranteed payments for games played in India, income tax becomes payable. The connection between the game played in India and the Guarantee Money establishes liability. Thus, PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source under Section 194E.

Conclusion: The appeal and special leave petitions were dismissed, confirming PILCOM's liability to deduct Tax at Source for payments made to Non-Resident Sports Associations participating in the World Cup event held in India.

Facts:                                                   

The appellant and respondent companies entered into various agreements for renting construction equipment for infrastructure development projects. The agreements contained arbitration clauses referring to the Construction Industry Arbitration Association (CIAA) Rules and Regulations. The agreements also specified different venues for arbitration, including New Delhi and Kolkata.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent's objections regarding the venue of arbitration were waived due to its non-participation in the arbitration proceedings.
• Whether the venue specified in the agreements was crucial to the validity of the arbitration awards.

Held:

The respondent's failure to participate in the arbitration proceedings and its failure to raise objections regarding the venue amounted to a waiver of its right to object to the venue.

The Court held that the specification of the place of arbitration did not have a critical bearing on the validity of the arbitration awards in the present case. The respondent's objections on this ground were rejected.

Decision: The Court upheld the dismissal of the respondent's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the arbitration awards. The Court held that the venue of arbitration did not invalidate the awards, and the respondent's objections were waived due to its non-participation in the arbitration proceedings.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of Sections 143(1) and 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant, Vodafone Idea Ltd., filed a return of income for Assessment Year (AY) 2017-18. Subsequently, a notice was issued under Section 143(2) of the Act, initiating proceedings for scrutiny assessment.

Issues:

• The distinction between the exercise of power under Section 143(1) and Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
• Whether an intimation is required to be given to the assessee regarding the deferral of processing the return under Section 143(1) once proceedings are initiated under Section 143(2).
• Applicability of Section 241-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in withholding refunds.

Held:

The power under Section 143(1) is summary in nature and is designed to make adjustments that are apparent from the return. On the other hand, the power under Section 143(2) involves deeper scrutiny to ensure no understatement of income, overstatement of loss, or underpayment of tax. The processing under Section 143(1) should await the outcome of scrutiny assessment under Section 143(2).

For AYs ending on or before March 31, 2017, if a notice is issued under Section 143(2), it is not necessary to process the return under Section 143(1). The requirement to process the return stands overridden in such cases.

In AYs commencing on or after April 1, 2017, Section 241-A requires a separate recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer to withhold refunds when a notice is issued under Section 143(2) and it is likely to adversely affect revenue.

The intimation under Section 143(1) does not require a separate notice of deferral due to initiation of proceedings under Section 143(2). The issuance of notice under Section 143(2) is sufficient indication, and no separate intimation is contemplated by the statute.

This judgment clarifies the distinction between Sections 143(1) and 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and establishes that processing under Section 143(1) must be deferred if proceedings under Section 143(2) are initiated. It also addresses the requirement for intimation and the withholding of refunds under Section 241-A for AYs commencing on or after April 1, 2017.

The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court's decision.