Facts:

Pursuant to a public notice, the auction for shops/showrooms was conducted by the appellant on 18.10.2016.

Disputes arose regarding the readiness of the auctioned premises, completion of construction, and availability of civic amenities.

The matters reached the High Court through various Writ Petitions, leading to referral to a sole arbitrator.

The arbitrator passed an award on 14.10.2010, directing the Municipal Council to complete the work and awarding damages and interest to the petitioners.

Issues:

Validity of the arbitrator's award and the subsequent dismissal of objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Interpretation of the interest rate mentioned in the award.

Held:

The appellants' objections under Section 34 were dismissed at different levels, including the High Court and this Court, rendering the directions in the award final (Para 4).

As for the interest rate, the Executing Court and the High Court erred in awarding compound interest when the award specified a simple interest rate of 7% per annum. The Court directed that the interest mentioned in the award should be construed as simple interest at 7% per annum (Para 9-11).

Conclusion: The appeals were partly allowed with modifications in the interest calculation, and no costs were awarded (Para 12).

Facts:

The writ petition, filed under Article 32, sought a mandamus to direct the Union of India to appoint a regular Director of CBI following the procedure in section 4A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The petition also aimed to quash the appointment of Mr. Nageshwar Rao as the interim Director, alleging arbitrary and illegal appointment.

Issues:

Legality of the appointment of Mr. Nageshwar Rao as the interim Director.

Adherence to the procedure laid down in section 4A of the DSPE Act in the appointment process.

Held:

The Court examined the resolution passed by the Committee on 9/10th January 2019 and determined that the appointment of the interim Director was authorized by the Committee under section 4A. The submission that the Selection Committee had not authorized the appointment was deemed fallacious. The Court concluded that the appointment was not unauthorized or illegal and dismissed the petition.

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed, and the Court found no grounds to interfere in the matter. It emphasized that, if necessary, challenges to the appointment should be made in accordance with the law, without routine haste.

:

Facts:

The prosecution alleges that the accused, numbered 1 to 4, intercepted the victims on a motorcycle. Accused 2 and 3 restrained the victim while accused 1 fired at close range, causing immediate death. The incident was witnessed by PW-2, PW-3, and PW-13.

Issues:

The appellants, accused 1 to 3, contested the conviction, claiming material contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of eyewitnesses PW-2, PW-3, and PW-13.

Held:

The court found PW-2, PW-3, and PW-13's accounts consistent and credible, attributing specific acts to each accused. The trial court's assessment of their evidence as credible and trustworthy was upheld. (Para 13)

The appellants argued a blind murder, citing alleged contradictions in the testimonies. However, the court deemed these contradictions trivial and not affecting the core of the prosecution case. The power of observation differences among eyewitnesses does not undermine credibility. (Para 14)

Contradictions in the evidence of PW-2, PW-3, and PW-13 were considered normal discrepancies due to errors of observation, not affecting the trustworthiness of the witnesses. (Para 16)

Despite variations in injuries sustained by the victim, the court emphasized that the consistent oral evidence of eyewitnesses prevails over opinionative medical evidence. (Paras 25, 26)

The alleged inconsistencies between eyewitnesses and medical evidence were deemed minor contradictions that did not shake the prosecution case. Eyewitnesses' accounts were accorded primacy over medical evidence. (Para 27)

Regarding Section 34 of the IPC, the court clarified the necessity to establish common intention through a pre-arranged plan and simultaneous conscious action. Accused 2 and 3 were acquitted as evidence did not prove their shared common intention in committing the murder. (Para 33)

The court affirmed the conviction of accused No. 1 under Sections 302 IPC, 341 IPC, and Section 25(1A) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, along with a sentence of life imprisonment. However, accused Nos. 2 and 3 were acquitted under Section 302 r/w s.34 IPC. (Paras 37 and 38)

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai initiated action under Section 314 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, for the removal of unauthorized stalls/structures. The respondents, who were running various food stalls, challenged this action through writ petitions, claiming the removal was arbitrary and illegal.

Issues:

The legality of the removal under Section 314, the validity of health licenses, and the issuance of mandamus under Article 226.

Held:

The action under Section 314 was justified as the stalls were erected on public sewer lines, causing hindrance and traffic congestion.

Grant of health license does not exempt from removal under Section 314; the section requires compliance with the conditions specified.

The High Court's mandamus to provide alternate land was unjustified as there was no legal duty or right in favor of the respondents.

A writ of mandamus is issued when there is a right and corresponding legal duty, which was lacking in this case.

FACTS:

The agreement dated 14.12.1993 appointed MMTC Ltd. as a consignment agent for Vedanta Ltd., involving services such as storage, handling, and marketing of copper rods.

Dispute arose regarding supplies of copper rods to Hindustan Transmission Products Ltd. (HTPL) after April 1995, where payments were not made by HTPL to the Appellant, leading to the invocation of the arbitration clause.

ISSUES:

Whether the dispute falls within the terms of the arbitration clause of the agreement dated 14.12.1993.

Whether the agreement between Vedanta Ltd. and HTPL is independent of the agreement between MMTC Ltd. and Vedanta Ltd.

HELD:

Discusses the scope of interference with an arbitral award under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.Emphasizes the limited grounds for interference, including violation of public policy and patent illegality in the arbitral award.( Paragraph 11)

Highlights that the question of whether the arbitral award deals with a dispute falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration is a matter of construction of the contract between the parties.( Paragraph 13)

Stresses that the conduct of parties and correspondences exchanged are relevant factors in interpreting the terms of a contract, within the arbitrator's jurisdiction.( Paragraph 14)

Evaluates the correspondences, agreements, and oral evidence to determine whether the supplies to HTPL were governed by the agreement dated 14.12.1993.Concludes that the dispute falls within the agreement, and the view taken by the arbitral tribunal and the High Court is reasonable and justifiable.Rejects the argument that the agreement with HTPL is independent of the agreement between MMTC Ltd. and Vedanta Ltd.( Paragraphs 15-24)

Dismisses the appeal and affirms the order of the High Court, stating there is no reason to disturb the Majority Award on the ground that the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable.( Paragraph 25)

REFERRED CASES:

Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49)

D.D. Sharma v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 325

Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445

McDermott International v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181

ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705

Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC, (2003) 8 SCC 593

Facts:

The respondent operated a copper smelter plant, and TNPCB directed its closure under the Air Act and Water Act. Composite appeals were filed before the NGT challenging six orders. The State and TNPCB argued against leapfrog appeals directly to the NGT.

Issues:

The maintainability of leapfrog appeals before the NGT, the jurisdiction of the NGT, and the interpretation of relevant sections of the Water Act, Air Act, and NGT Act.

Held:

The Court held that an appeal is a creature of statute, and the NGT's jurisdiction is circumscribed by specific sections of the Water Act, Air Act, and NGT Act.

An appeal lies to the NGT only from orders or decisions of the appellate authority under the Water Act (Section 33B(a) read with Section 16(a)) and the Air Act (Section 31B read with Section 16(f)). Direct appeals to the NGT against original orders are incompetent.

The NGT's order, set aside under the statutory powers conferred by the Water Act, the Air Act, and the NGT Act, was deemed an order passed without jurisdiction.

The doctrine of necessity was discussed, highlighting that the NGT has jurisdiction only from an order passed in the exercise of the first appeal. Without such an order, the NGT lacks jurisdiction.

Powers of judicial review under the NGT Act were clarified. The Tribunal, in its appellate jurisdiction, cannot strike down rules or regulations under this Act. It does not possess powers of judicial review similar to a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court emphasized that the NGT is not a Tribunal set up under Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution but is a statutory Tribunal under the NGT Act. It does not have the general power of judicial review akin to High Courts.

The Court set aside orders passed by TNPCB under Sections 33A and 31A of the Water Act and Air Act. It clarified the appealability of directions under Section 31A of the Air Act to the NGT, stating that such directions are not appealable.

Regarding the order dated 28.05.2018 under Section 18 of the Water Act, the Court stated that it is not appealable to the NGT. If challenged, it can only be set aside through a suit or under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Facts:

Criminal appeal against the conviction under various sections of IPC.

Appellant claimed to be a juvenile on the date of the offense.

School certificate submitted by the appellant stated his date of birth as 17.08.1982.

Discrepancy in the date of birth mentioned in the appellant's school certificate and the birth certificate issued by the Municipal Authority.

District and Sessions Judge conducted an inquiry and held that the appellant was not a juvenile on the date of the offense.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the offense and framing of charges.

Applicability of Juvenile Justice Rules 2007.

Held:

The school certificate should have been accepted as per Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007.

However, Rule 2007 was not in force during the date of the offense, and the relevant rules were Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001.

Rule 22(5) of 2001 Rules specifies the procedure for age determination, giving preference to birth certificates, school certificates, or matriculation certificates.

The High Court's order dismissing the applications related to additional evidence on juvenility is set aside.

The High Court is directed to reconsider the question of juvenility based on relevant materials, including documents sought to be submitted by the appellant.

Decision: The order dated 30.01.2015 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is set aside, and the question of juvenility is remitted to the High Court for reconsideration. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 issued the 2007 Scheme for coal distribution through e-Auction.

Appellant participated in e-Auction from 2012 to 2015 under the 2007 Scheme.

Disputes arose when Appellant couldn't lift booked coal, leading to forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD).

Appellant invoked the arbitration Clause 11.12 of the 2007 Scheme after failed attempts at resolution.

The High Court rejected the application for appointment of an independent arbitrator, stating sale orders didn't incorporate the arbitration clause.

ISSUES:

Whether the arbitration clause in the 2007 Scheme is incorporated into individual sale orders, and if so, can an arbitrator be appointed to resolve the disputes between the parties?

HELD:

The court acknowledged the principle of incorporation by reference in arbitration jurisprudence. Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause to constitute a valid arbitration agreement, provided specific conditions are met.( Paragraph 4)

The court held that the sale orders specifically state they would be governed by the guidelines, circulars, office orders, etc., issued by Coal India Limited or Bharat Coking Coal Limited, thereby incorporating the arbitration clause from the 2007 Scheme into the sale orders.( Paragraph 5)

Emphasizing that Clause 7 in the sale orders falls under the 'single contract case,' where the arbitration clause is in a standard form document (2007 Scheme) referenced in individual sale orders, the court clarified that general words of incorporation are sufficient for a 'single contract case.'(Paragraph 5.1)

The court discussed the expansive interpretation of terms like "in relation thereto" in the arbitration clause, indicating its application to all transactions under the 2007 Scheme, including the sale transactions in question.( Paragraph 5.2)

The parties agreed to appoint Mr. Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay as the Sole Arbitrator, subject to disclosure and declaration as per the Sixth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The proceedings were to be conducted in Kolkata.( Paragraph 6)

REFERRED CASES:

Alimenta SA v. National Agriculture Co-op Marketing Federation of India Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 615 : AIR 1987 SC 643 : 84 (2000) DLT 494

Clements v. Devon Country Insurance Committee, [1918] 1 KB 94

Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., 1988 (36) ELT 201 (SC)

Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v. Sometal SAL, [2010] EWHC 29 (Comm).

Inox Wind Ltd. v. Thermocables Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 519

M.R. Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd., (2009) 7 SCC 696 : 2009 (3) Arb LR 1 (SC) : 2009 (9) SCALE 298

Macleod Ross and Co. Ltd. v. Compagnie d' Assurances Generales L'Helvetia of St Gall, [1952] 1 All ER 331 : [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 12 (CA).)

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company and Anr, [1985] 1 SCR 432

SEA 2011 Inc. v. ICT Ltd., [2018] EWHC 520 (Comm)

Sea Trade Maritime Corporation v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Limited, The Athena, [2006] EWHC 2530 (Comm)

Facts:

The appellant, now represented by legal representatives, filed a suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell, claiming that the respondent had agreed to sell a property, but the Trial Court's decree was reversed by the First Appellate Court and subsequently by the High Court. The primary ground for dismissal was the appellant's failure to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Issues:

The plaintiff's continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract, a prerequisite for specific performance under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Held:

The court agrees with the High Court that the specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of the plaintiff due to the lack of proof of continuous readiness and willingness to perform essential contract terms.( Para 13)

Emphasis on the nature of the relief of specific performance as an exercise in equity and the requirements under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.( Para 14)

Despite the 2018 amendment substituting "who fails to aver and prove" with "who fails to prove," the court reiterates the necessity for the plaintiff to prove continuous readiness and willingness.( Para 15)

Referring to precedent, the court underscores that the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence must establish their preparedness and willingness to perform their part of the contract.( Para 16)

Finding no fault in the High Court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to aver and prove continuous readiness and willingness.( Para 17)

Rejecting the proposition for amendment, the court asserts that the late attempt to improve pleadings at the appellate stage was futile, given the plaintiff's failure to establish readiness and willingness.( Para 18)

The court upholds the High Court's adherence to the provisions of Section 100 CPC and the proviso to sub-section (5), emphasizing that a second appeal should be heard on the question formulated unless strong reasons exist.( Para 19)