Facts:

The Designated Court held that there was no prior sanction under section 20-A(2) of TADA before taking cognizance of the offense.

The sanction order analyzed only the FIR and proposal from DSP, indicating a lack of valid sanction.

The possession of walky-talkies by one of the respondents led to questions about the sufficiency of the sanction and the application of mind by the sanctioning authority.

Issues:

Validity of sanction orders under section 20-A(2) of TADA.

Adequacy of the sanction regarding the possession of walky-talkies.

The power of the Designated Court to convict for offenses under other enactments.

Held:

The sanction order (Exh.84) failed to validly sanction the prosecution but rather permitted the application of TADA provisions. Citing precedent (Gadhvi’s case), the wording of the sanction was considered indicative of its invalidity.( Paragraph 13)

The sanction dated April 1, 2005 (Exh.57) regarding respondent No.3 suffered from non-application of mind, especially in the context of possession of walky-talkies, which do not qualify as classified arms and ammunition.( Paragraph 19)

The Designated Court has the power to try offenses under other enactments connected with TADA, but reliance on confessional statements under TADA was deemed inadmissible for such offenses. The evidence regarding search and seizure was found to have fatal deficiencies, leading to the conclusion that the respondents were not guilty.( Paragraphs 23, 24, 25)

FACTS:

Marriage of deceased Shilpa, daughter of Sudhir Kumar Gupta (PW-1), was solemnized with Dimpal @ Akash Deep.

Shilpa complained about dowry demands by her husband and in-laws.

On 19.08.2012, Shilpa was set ablaze and named several individuals, including the appellants, in her dying declaration.

FIR registered against nine accused, including the appellants, under various sections.

ISSUES:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to summon the appellants for trial under Section 302 IPC.

Whether the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was exercised judiciously.

HELD:

The trial court and the High Court erred in summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The dying declaration mentions only one accused, and the evidence lacks specificity regarding the role of the appellants.

Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. requires stringent tests before summoning additional accused, and the evidence falls short of establishing a prima facie case against the appellants.

The vague allegations in the complaint and evidence do not justify summoning the appellants under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Investigating Officer's decision not to charge the appellants under certain sections supports the lack of a strong case against them.

The trial court and the High Court did not apply well-settled principles in exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The impugned order is set aside, and the appeals are allowed. The Sessions Judge is directed to proceed with the trial.

REFERRED CASES:

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (2014) 3 SCC 92

Sarabjit Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Another (2009) 16 SCC 46

FACTS:

Gorden Wapshare died intestate on 18.01.1991.

Appellant obtained a Succession Certificate in O.P. No. 17 of 2005.

Respondent, claiming to be the daughter of Beatrice, applied to revoke the Succession Certificate under Section 383.

Respondent's lineage questioned; she was not a lineal descendant of Gorden Wapshare.

ISSUES:

Validity of the revocation application under Section 383.

Lineal descent and entitlement to Gorden Wapshare's estate.

HELD:

Succession Certificate can only be revoked under Section 383 for specific grounds (a to e), none of which applied in this case.Respondent was not a lineal descendant; had no familial connection with the Wapshare family.( Para 9)

Respondent's application described her as the daughter of Beatrice, omitting Edward Wapshare, establishing no lineal connection.Gorden Wapshare dying intestate meant his property passes to widow and lineal descendants under Section 33(a).Appellant being the only living lineal descendant, the respondent had no legal standing. ( Para 10)

The High Court erred in not considering all grounds; set aside the judgment and restored the Sub-Judge's decision.( Para 11)

Facts:

The case originated from matrimonial proceedings where certain averments were made in anticipatory bail applications. Allegations of perjury were raised against the appellant for deliberate false statements.

Issues:

Whether the statements in the anticipatory bail application were deliberately and consciously false?

Whether there is sufficient unimpeachable evidence to support perjury charges?

Whether the High Court's grounds were substantial for initiating prosecution under Section 340?

Held:

The High Court felt a prima facie case for perjury existed and ordered prosecution. The statements in anticipatory bail applications were contested, and the Sessions Court held that initiation of proceedings under Section 340 was premature.

The same statements were made in the High Court's anticipatory bail application, leading to the High Court's order. The appellant argued that the investigation report was preliminary and inconclusive. The High Court's order was primarily based on different grounds for granting anticipatory bail.

The law on initiating proceedings under Section 340 was discussed, emphasizing the need for deliberate and conscious false statements. It was noted that evidence had not been led, and the investigation report couldn't be considered unimpeachable. The High Court's grounds were deemed insufficient for prosecution.

Counsel for the respondent cited judgments supporting the initiation of proceedings by the High Court. The Court distinguished these cases as not applicable to the present situation, emphasizing the lack of fabricated documents or a detailed independent inquiry.

The Court rejected the argument that the High Court failed to satisfy itself on the expediency of justice. The appellant's claim of suppression of the Sessions Court order was dismissed.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

The land in question underwent ceiling proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, subsequently being allotted to a hospital on a 30-year lease. Challenges to the notification issued under Section 10(3) of the Act were raised by the respondents. The High Court upheld the notification, but the Supreme Court suggested the availability of alternative remedies.

Issues:

The maintainability of a civil suit seeking a declaration that the proceedings under the Act were null and void, and the respondents be declared owners of the land.

Held:

The judgment establishes that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is a self-contained code, providing a comprehensive framework for dealing with landowners' rights exceeding prescribed ceiling limits. The Act gives finality to appellate orders under Section 33, and bars civil suits under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The jurisdiction of civil courts is held to be excluded implicitly due to the finality provided by Section 33(3), availability of remedies through appeals, and the Act's completeness. The Act expressly excludes civil court jurisdiction under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction to grant reliefs sought in the suit, as it is impliedly barred under the Act.

The respondents had multiple legal remedies available, including filing a civil suit, submitting a statement to the Competent Authority under Section 6, and raising objections under Section 10(1). Failure to pursue these remedies led to the implied bar on filing a civil suit.

Dismissal of a writ petition and SLP affirmed the conformity of proceedings under the Act. The suit property vested in the state, precluding the filing of a civil suit.

Any remedy for the respondents was under the Act, and filing a civil suit was impliedly barred.

The Act's intention to exclude civil court jurisdiction is evident from various sections.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction over land subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act.

Respondents' belated challenge to ceiling proceedings is meritless, and the situation is irreversible after the state's acquisition and lease to hospitals.

The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the appeal, contrary to the trial court's dismissal, which was justified.

Facts:

Respondents were governed by the Employees Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.

Pension Scheme introduced before VRS, but not implemented until 1995.

VRS eligibility required 10 years of service or completion of 40 years of age.

Pension scheme applied retrospectively from 3.8.1981, implemented by the appellant-Corporation in 1995.

Dispute arose regarding the exclusion of the period of unauthorized absence from qualifying service for pension.

Issues:

Whether the period of unauthorized absence without pay should be counted towards qualifying service for pension under the Pension Rules.

Interpretation of Rules 21, 27, and 28 in the context of leave availed of during service.

Held:

The respondents were not governed by the Pension Rules initially but by the Employees Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.

The introduction of the Pension Scheme occurred just before VRS, and its implementation was delayed until 1995.

The period of unauthorized absence without pay should be excluded from qualifying service for pension, as per the clear language of Pension Rules.

Rule 21 explicitly states that only leave periods with payable leave salary should count as qualifying service for pension.

Rules 27 and 28, dealing with interruption in service, are deemed inapplicable as there is no forfeiture of past service.

The Government decision of 28.2.1976 emphasizes the need for prompt entry into service records for extraordinary leave to be considered qualifying for pension.

The respondents failed to qualify for pension benefits under the Pension Rules due to the period of unpaid leave.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, with each party bearing its own costs. However, no refund is claimed for any payments already made to the respondents.

Facts:

The complainants booked apartments in a project titled "DLF Valley, Panchkula." The developer failed to hand over possession within the agreed-upon time, leading to various complaints.

Issues:

Compensation for delayed possession, and the entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee.

Held:

The entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee cannot be determined at this stage and must be left to a competent court. However, 3/4 of the sum is directed to be made over to the widow for herself and on behalf of two children, while the remaining 1/4 shall be made over to the mother.

In all refund cases, interest at the rate of 9% is awarded from the day of deposit till the date of refund. In cases of possession sought, the compensation period is after the expiry of three years from the date of the agreement, with interest at the rate of 9%.

Facts:

Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, issued on 19.05.2008.

Declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 26.05.2008 for 136 acres of land.

Award declared on 21.12.2009, granting compensation @ 25,00,000/- per acre.

Petitioner (M/s. Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited) holding about 15 acres did not prefer any application under Section 18 of the Act for reference.

Reference Court raised compensation to Rs. 41,81,500/- per acre on 16.11.2011.

Petitioner applied for redetermination under Section 28-A(1) of the Act on 01.2.2012.

Application allowed on 06.03.2014, granting the petitioner benefits similar to the Reference Court's order.

High Court enhanced compensation on 24.05.2016 to Rs. 2,80,00,000/- per acre for comparable lands.

Petitioner filed CWP No. 23688 of 2016 on 15.11.2016, challenging the order dated 06.03.2014 and seeking redetermination based on the High Court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the Collector's disposal of the petitioner's application under Section 28A was in line with legal principles.

Whether the petitioner, a limited company, is entitled to relief under Article 226 considering the delay in filing the writ petition.

Held:

The Collector proceeded under the assumption that no further challenge was pending, and the matter had attained finality.

The petitioner did not bring to the Collector's notice the pendency of appeals challenging the compensation.

The petitioner approached the High Court only after the compensation was enhanced by the High Court.

The explanation provided by the petitioner for the delay is not satisfactory.

The profile of the petitioner, a limited company, disentitles it from claiming relief under Article 226.

The High Court was justified in rejecting the petition.

Special Leave Petition dismissed.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra issued a tender for the supply of ready-to-cook food to Anganwadi centers. The petitioner challenged the eligibility conditions, arguing that they favored large corporates over local Mahila Mandals. The contested conditions included mandatory use of extrusion technology, Mahila Mandals having automated production units, a turnover of Rs. 1 crore or more, among others.

Issues:

The reasonableness of the tender conditions, specifically the mandatory use of extrusion technology and the alleged favoring of large corporates over local Mahila Mandals.

Held:

The Court clarified that the imposition of conditions in the tender, such as the mandatory use of extrusion technology, was not in line with the spirit of the National Food Security Act, 2013, and the policies set by the Government of India. The observations in a previous case were based on misrepresentation. The tender notice was struck down, and fresh tenders were directed to be invited within the stipulated period.

The Court acknowledged that it was misled in a previous decision regarding the mandatory specifications in the recipes. After the decision, new policies were framed, and the Act of 2013 was enacted, rendering some earlier observations obsolete.

Various recipes were prescribed, but the Court emphasized that it is for the States/UTs to decide based on local requirements. The Court urged that terms and conditions of tenders should not exclude self-help groups/Mahila Mandals from participating meaningfully.

The Court highlighted the changes in legislation and rules, including the deletion of provisions for energy-dense food fortified with micronutrients. The Government of India launched the POSHAN Abhiyaan to address nutritional challenges comprehensively.

The National Council of India discussed issues related to hot cooked meals and Take Home Ration (THR) for specific age groups. Policies were based on nutritional norms, the Act of 2013, and Supplementary Nutrition Rules, 2015.

The tender conditions imposed by the Government of Maharashtra, especially the 25% turnover condition, were deemed arbitrary and not in line with the spirit of the Act. The tender notice was declared invalid, and fresh tenders were directed to be invited.

Fixing unit areas as districts effectively ousted smaller players. The Court recommended forming groups at smaller levels, like panchayats, to fulfill the real intention of the policy. The existing system of supply was restrained during the interregnum period.