FACTS:

The appellant was accused of strangulating his wife in their matrimonial house. The chargesheet included the appellant's father-in-law and mother-in-law. The Trial Court relied on the evidence of PW-1 and medical evidence to convict all the accused. During the appeal in the High Court, the prosecution against the father-in-law abated due to his death, and the mother-in-law was acquitted, while the appellant (husband) was convicted.

ISSUES:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to convict the appellant.

Whether the appellant's failure to provide a plausible explanation for the cause of death raised a strong suspicion of his involvement in the crime.

HELD :

The Court acknowledged the common occurrence of witnesses turning hostile during lengthy trials. However, it emphasized the need to examine the available evidence to determine its sufficiency for conviction. [Para 20]

The court correctly appreciated the rationale behind some witnesses turning hostile to preserve close family ties. In the Indian context, relationships between two families continue after marriage, which may affect witness testimony. [Para 21]

The prosecution's case was primarily built on the testimony of PW-1 and medical evidence. While there were some inconsistencies in PW-1's statement, the court found it to be consistent and cogent, making it a credible piece of evidence. [Para 22]

The doctor opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. The location of the crime and the absence of outsiders supported the prosecution's case. [Para 23-24]

As the husband, the appellant was under an obligation to provide a plausible explanation for the cause of death during his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. His failure to do so raised strong suspicion of his involvement in the crime. [Para 25]

DECISION: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant (husband) for the murder of his wife. However, it directed the State to consider his release on completion of 14 years of actual sentence. [Para 27]

REFERRED CASES :

Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 15 SCC 455

Gulam Sarbar vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), (2014) 3 SCC 401

Namdeo vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150

Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 433

Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681

Yanob Sheikh Alias Gagu vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 6 SCC 428

Facts:

The second respondent filed a winding-up petition against the first respondent, M/S Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd., on the ground of its inability to pay debts. A winding-up order was passed based on the petition. Subsequently, the first respondent sought to recall the winding-up order and paid the entire amount due to the second respondent (petitioning creditor). The second respondent had no objection to recalling the order, but the Official Liquidator opposed it, stating that the first respondent owed money to various other creditors totaling Rs. 27 Crores. The Company Court kept the winding-up in abeyance but directed the Official Liquidator to continue custody of the company's assets.

Meanwhile, the appellant (M/S Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd.), claiming to be a creditor of the first respondent, moved an application before the NCLT under Section 7 of the IBC, 2016, seeking payment of Rs. 32 lakhs. The appellant also sought the transfer of the winding-up petition to the NCLT, but the Company Court refused, stating that the requirements of the relevant rules had been complied with, and a winding-up order was already passed.

Issues:

Under what circumstances can a winding-up proceeding pending before a High Court be transferred to the NCLT?

At whose instance can such a transfer be ordered?

Held:

The Court held that if the winding-up petition has already been served on the respondent (company) as per Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, then the proceedings are not liable to be transferred. However, if the service of the winding-up petition on the respondent has not been completed, such proceedings, whether under Clause (c) of Section 433 or under Clauses (a) and (f) of Section 433, must be transferred to the NCLT. [Para 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32]

The Court held that the proceedings for winding-up of a company are proceedings in rem, where the entire body of creditors is a party. Although the proceeding may be initiated by one or more creditors, the petition is treated as a joint petition, and the official liquidator acts on behalf of all creditors. Therefore, any creditor of the company in liquidation comes within the definition of "party" in the fifth proviso to Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013. As a result, the appellant (creditor) is entitled to seek the transfer of the pending winding-up proceedings to the NCLT. [Para 41, 42, 43, 44]

The Court emphasized that parallel proceedings in different forums would defeat the purpose of the IBC. Therefore, the transfer of proceedings to the NCLT is necessary. [Para 45, 46]

Referred Case:

Forech India Ltd. vs. Edelweiss Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCALE 142

Facts:

The case involved the recruitment process for the post of Assistant Teacher of Junior Basic Schools in U.P. In a previous case, "Anand Kumar Yadav," Shiksha Mitras were given the opportunity to be considered for the next two recruitment cycles for the post. Subsequently, the U.P. government amended the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981, to make Shiksha Mitras eligible for the Assistant Teacher position. The amendments required candidates to pass the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) and Assistant Teacher Recruitment Examination (ATRE) to be eligible.

ISSUES:

The primary issue was the validity of fixing the minimum qualifying marks at 65% for General category and 60% for reserved categories in ATRE-2019 after the examination was conducted.

The question was whether such fixation was exclusionary and illegal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the fixation of minimum qualifying marks at 65% for General category and 60% for reserved categories in the ATRE-2019 examination was valid (Para 65). The Court affirmed the authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to lay down norms for teacher appointments for classes I to V, which were binding on the State of U.P. (Para 41).

The Court also clarified that Shiksha Mitras could not be equated with candidates of ATRE-2018, as they were part of different selection processes (Para 51). The Government had the power to fix minimum marks after the examination, provided it was not actuated by malice or ill-will and aimed at securing the best talent (Para 63).

Consequently, the appeals of Shiksha Mitras, ex-servicemen, persons with disabilities, and B.Ed./B.T.C. candidates were dismissed (Para 68). The Court upheld the State's right to fix the minimum qualifying marks and fill the vacancies in accordance with the law. The State can proceed with recruitment based on the results declared on May 12, 2020 (Para 69).

Cases Referred

Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa, (2014) 4 SCC 583 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 54

Anand Kumar Yadav vs. Union of India, 2015 SCC Online All 3997 : ILR 2015 All 1108

Basic Education Board, U.P. vs. Upendra Rai and others, (2008) 3 SCC 432

C. Channabasavaih vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 1293

Dr. Preeti Srivastava and another etc. vs. State of M.P. and others etc., (1999) 7 SCC 120

Durgacharan Misra vs. State of Orissa, (1987) 4 SCC 646

Hemani Malhotra etc. vs. High Court of Delhi, (2008) 7 SCC 11

Jharkhand Public Service Commission vs. Manoj Kumar Gupta, (2020) 1 SCALE 504

K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (2008)3 SCC 512

Madan Mohan Sharma and another vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 3 SCC 724

Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and others vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve and others, (2001) 10 SCC 51

Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Surender Singh and others, (2019) 8 SCC 67

P. Mahendran and others etc. vs. State of Karnataka and others, (1990) 1 SCC 411

P.K. Ramachandra Iyer vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141

Salam Samarjeet Singh vs. High Court of Manipur at Imphal and another, (2016) 10 SCC 484

Sandhya Singh vs. State of U.P., (2013) 7 ADJ 1

Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. State of U.P., 2013 SCC Online All 4097 : (2013) 6 ALJ 366 : 6 ADJ 310

Sivanandam C.T. and others vs. High Court of Kerala and others, (2018) 1 SCC 239

State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and others, (1974) 3 SCC 220

State of Karnataka vs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 826

State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753

State of M.P. and others vs. Gopal D. Tirthani and others, (2003) 7 SCC 83

State of Maharashtra vs. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others, (2006) 9 SCC 1

State of U.P. and another vs. Anand Kumar Yadav and others, (2018) 13 SCC 560

State of U.P. etc. vs. Rafiquddin and others etc., 1987 (Supp) SCC 401

Tej Prakash Pathak and others vs. Rajasthan High Court and others, (2013) 4 SCC 540

Umesh Chandra Shukla vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 721

Yogesh Yadav vs. Union of India and others, (2013) 14 SCC 623

Facts:The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) conducted an investigation into the respondent's alleged insider trading activities related to the sale of 51,000 company shares based on confidential financial information. The investigation was initiated in 2017, and the respondent was requested for information on November 28, 2019. The Whole Time Member passed an ex-parte order on June 15, 2020.

Issues:whether the SEBI's ex-parte interim order, passed by the Whole Time Member without considering the balance of convenience or irreparable injury, was justified under the given circumstances.

Held:The Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that there was no extreme urgency to pass an ex-parte interim order in this case, considering the investigation had been pending since 2017 and the required information was supplied on November 28, 2019. While the power of SEBI to pass such orders in urgent matters was affirmed, it should be exercised "only in extreme urgent matters." However, the interpretation of SEBI's powers by the Tribunal in this specific case should not be cited as a precedent in other cases.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of in accordance with the above observations.

Facts:

An FIR was registered by the CBI against the Director of a coal-purchasing company and unknown public servants, alleging offenses under Section 120B and 420 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Later, during the investigation, two public servants of the State Government were found to be involved in the conspiracy. The charge-sheet was filed against the Director and the public servants after obtaining sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act. Subsequently, the accused individuals filed petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to quash the criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether prior consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act was necessary for registering an FIR against private individuals?

Whether post-facto consent after completion of investigation was valid under Section 6 of the DSPE Act for public servants?

Whether any prejudice or miscarriage of justice was caused to the public servants due to the absence of prior consent under Section 6?

Held:

The Court held that for private individuals, no specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act is required, and there is no embargo in registering an FIR against them under the relevant provisions.

Regarding public servants, the Court found that the post-facto consent given by the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act for their investigation was valid. The public servants failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused to them or any miscarriage of justice due to the absence of prior consent under Section 6.

The Court remitted the matter to the High Court to decide other issues raised before it, as the Single Judge did not consider question Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the case after the matter was returned by the Division Bench.

FACTS:

The respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction claiming ownership and possession of a property situated in the revenue estate of Village Basai Darapur, Delhi. The appellant contested the jurisdiction of the civil court, arguing that it is a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur, and should be decided under Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954.

ISSUES:

Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to decide boundary disputes between revenue estates.

Whether additional documents can be produced under Order XLI Rule 27 if they are not relevant to the plea raised by the applicant.

HELD:

The boundary disputes between two revenue estates are not covered under Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in certain matters. The suit in question was a simpliciter for an injunction based on possession, and there was no mechanism prescribed under the Land Revenue Act to grant injunctions in possession disputes. Therefore, the civil court has plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes, except where barred explicitly or implicitly by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Para 18, 19, 20)

The application under Order XLI Rule 27 sought to produce additional documents related to Village Basai Darapur. However, the appellants' claim was limited to Khasra No. 79 of Village Shakarpur, and the correctness of Khasra No. 238 of Village Basai Darapur was not directly relevant to their plea. As the parties had already understood the controversy and adduced evidence, the appellants cannot introduce additional evidence in the first appeal. Therefore, the High Court did not commit any illegality in not framing any substantial question of law while dismissing the appeal. (Para 17, 21, 23)

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed.

REFERRED CASES:

Ashok Rangnath Magar vs. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar, (2015) 16 SCC 763

Chandragouda & Anr. vs. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 617

Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. H.S. Mohd. Khan (dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 109

Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 438

Madhavan Nair vs. Ramankutty & Anr., (2000) 2 SCC 356

Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs vs. Jagadish Kalita & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 271

N. Venkatareddy & Ors. vs. Gopal & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 309

Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) By LRs vs. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681

Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161

South Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. etc., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1052

Facts:

The case involved NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) as the appellant and Rajiv Chakraborty as the respondent. The dispute pertained to the preparation of the Information Memorandum by the Resolution Professional.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's name was appropriately classified in the Information Memorandum?

What is the role and authority of the Resolution Professional in accepting or disallowing claims during the CIRP?

Held:

The court held that the appellant's claim was listed as "other creditors claim" in the memorandum because it was still pending adjudication before an Arbitrator. The purpose of the Information Memorandum was to provide relevant financial information about the company and did not decide the validity of claims. The Resolution Professional lacked the authority to accept or disallow claims. The court emphasized that the appellant's claim would not be extinguished unless adjudicated upon by a competent forum or by operation of law.

Decision: The court disposed of the matter, affirming that the appellant's claim could be appropriately addressed if it is aggrieved with the final resolution plan by taking recourse to an appropriate remedy.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs filed suits to declare sale-deeds executed by the Power of Attorney-holder and by the plaintiff herself as illegal and void, alleging fraud in the execution of the GPA and sale deeds. The trial court dismissed both suits, and the first appellate court partly allowed one appeal and dismissed the other. However, the High Court reversed the findings of the lower courts.

ISSUES:

Whether the disputed documents were genuine since they were registered.

Whether the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the subject documents were forged or a product of fraud.

Whether the plaintiff could prove the misuse of trust by the defendants.

Whether the sale deed required the signature of the vendee to be valid.

Whether the standard of proof in civil disputes is preponderance of probabilities.

Whether the expert evidence produced by the plaintiff regarding disputed signatures was conclusive.

Whether the suits were barred by limitation due to the existence of fraud.

Whether subsequent purchasers' titles were valid.

HELD :

The Supreme Court held that the disputed documents were registered and, therefore, presumed to be genuine. (Para 32)

The Court concluded that the initial burden of proving that the subject documents were forged or a product of fraud rested on the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to prove the misuse of trust by the defendants. (Para 40 and 41)

The plaintiff could not establish the existence of fraud, and the Court found no credible and tangible evidence to support the plea of impersonation by the defendants. (Para 46)

The Court clarified that the signature of the vendee was not mandatory for the validity of a sale deed. (Para 48)

The standard of proof in civil disputes was determined to be preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized the need for tangible evidence to support claims of fraud. (Para 80)

The expert evidence produced by the plaintiff regarding disputed signatures was not conclusive, and the Court deemed it unreliable since it lacked corroborating evidence. (Para 65)

The suits were held to be barred by limitation as the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of fraud, thus negating any grounds for invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (Para 78)

The titles of subsequent purchasers were found to be valid since the 1990 GPA had been proved. The trial court and first appellate court's findings on this matter were upheld. (Para 82 and 83)

REFERRED CASES:

Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi and Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 582

Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558

Damodar vs. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 12 SCC 336

Jagdish Chand Sharma vs. Narain Singh Saini (dead) through legal representatives & Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 615

Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353

Satya Gupta (Smt.) alias Madhu Gupta vs. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423

Facts:

The Corporation issued a Bid Document inviting bids for a recruitment agency to conduct the recruitment process for hiring watchmen.

UMC Technologies Private Limited (appellant) was awarded the contract and conducted the written exam for the watchmen post.

On the same day of the exam, the police arrested 50 individuals found in possession of handwritten documents related to the exam.

The Corporation issued a show cause notice to the appellant, alleging breaches of the Bid Document.

Eventually, the Corporation terminated its contract with the appellant and blacklisted them from participating in future tenders for a period of 5 years.

Issues:

whether the show cause notice given to the appellant prior to blacklisting was valid and provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Held:

The Court emphasized that a valid, clear, and unambiguous show cause notice is essential in cases of blacklisting due to the severe consequences and reputational damage it entails for the affected entity (para 14).

The Court cited previous decisions stating that a prior show cause notice granting a reasonable opportunity to be heard is vital in blacklisting cases (para 19).

The Court highlighted the importance of the show cause notice containing a clear mention or inference of the intention to blacklist the noticee, ensuring a meaningful opportunity to defend against blacklisting (para 21).

The Court observed that the show cause notice issued by the Corporation lacked clarity on the intention to blacklist the appellant, rendering it invalid for the purpose of blacklisting (para 24).

As a result, the Court quashed the Corporation's blacklisting order, as it exceeded the scope of the inadequate show cause notice (para 25).