FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 issued the 2007 Scheme for coal distribution through e-Auction.

Appellant participated in e-Auction from 2012 to 2015 under the 2007 Scheme.

Disputes arose when Appellant couldn't lift booked coal, leading to forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD).

Appellant invoked the arbitration Clause 11.12 of the 2007 Scheme after failed attempts at resolution.

The High Court rejected the application for appointment of an independent arbitrator, stating sale orders didn't incorporate the arbitration clause.

ISSUES:

Whether the arbitration clause in the 2007 Scheme is incorporated into individual sale orders, and if so, can an arbitrator be appointed to resolve the disputes between the parties?

HELD:

The court acknowledged the principle of incorporation by reference in arbitration jurisprudence. Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause to constitute a valid arbitration agreement, provided specific conditions are met.( Paragraph 4)

The court held that the sale orders specifically state they would be governed by the guidelines, circulars, office orders, etc., issued by Coal India Limited or Bharat Coking Coal Limited, thereby incorporating the arbitration clause from the 2007 Scheme into the sale orders.( Paragraph 5)

Emphasizing that Clause 7 in the sale orders falls under the 'single contract case,' where the arbitration clause is in a standard form document (2007 Scheme) referenced in individual sale orders, the court clarified that general words of incorporation are sufficient for a 'single contract case.'(Paragraph 5.1)

The court discussed the expansive interpretation of terms like "in relation thereto" in the arbitration clause, indicating its application to all transactions under the 2007 Scheme, including the sale transactions in question.( Paragraph 5.2)

The parties agreed to appoint Mr. Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay as the Sole Arbitrator, subject to disclosure and declaration as per the Sixth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The proceedings were to be conducted in Kolkata.( Paragraph 6)

REFERRED CASES:

Alimenta SA v. National Agriculture Co-op Marketing Federation of India Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 615 : AIR 1987 SC 643 : 84 (2000) DLT 494

Clements v. Devon Country Insurance Committee, [1918] 1 KB 94

Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., 1988 (36) ELT 201 (SC)

Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v. Sometal SAL, [2010] EWHC 29 (Comm).

Inox Wind Ltd. v. Thermocables Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 519

M.R. Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd., (2009) 7 SCC 696 : 2009 (3) Arb LR 1 (SC) : 2009 (9) SCALE 298

Macleod Ross and Co. Ltd. v. Compagnie d' Assurances Generales L'Helvetia of St Gall, [1952] 1 All ER 331 : [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 12 (CA).)

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company and Anr, [1985] 1 SCR 432

SEA 2011 Inc. v. ICT Ltd., [2018] EWHC 520 (Comm)

Sea Trade Maritime Corporation v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Limited, The Athena, [2006] EWHC 2530 (Comm)

Facts:

The appellant, now represented by legal representatives, filed a suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell, claiming that the respondent had agreed to sell a property, but the Trial Court's decree was reversed by the First Appellate Court and subsequently by the High Court. The primary ground for dismissal was the appellant's failure to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Issues:

The plaintiff's continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract, a prerequisite for specific performance under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Held:

The court agrees with the High Court that the specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of the plaintiff due to the lack of proof of continuous readiness and willingness to perform essential contract terms.( Para 13)

Emphasis on the nature of the relief of specific performance as an exercise in equity and the requirements under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.( Para 14)

Despite the 2018 amendment substituting "who fails to aver and prove" with "who fails to prove," the court reiterates the necessity for the plaintiff to prove continuous readiness and willingness.( Para 15)

Referring to precedent, the court underscores that the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence must establish their preparedness and willingness to perform their part of the contract.( Para 16)

Finding no fault in the High Court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to aver and prove continuous readiness and willingness.( Para 17)

Rejecting the proposition for amendment, the court asserts that the late attempt to improve pleadings at the appellate stage was futile, given the plaintiff's failure to establish readiness and willingness.( Para 18)

The court upholds the High Court's adherence to the provisions of Section 100 CPC and the proviso to sub-section (5), emphasizing that a second appeal should be heard on the question formulated unless strong reasons exist.( Para 19)

Facts:

The case involves a custody and guardianship dispute, with emphasis on the confidentiality of the mediation process. Reports of the mediator and counsellor regarding the child's behavior and attitude were in question, particularly their admissibility in court proceedings after the failure of the mediation.

Issues:

The applicability of confidentiality in mediation to court proceedings.

The role of the court in custody and guardianship disputes concerning the best interest of the child.

The validity of the High Court's decision to treat reports of the mediator and counsellor as confidential.

Held:

The court highlighted the distinction between regular adjudicatory processes and mediation, emphasizing the importance of confidentiality in mediation. However, it acknowledged that complete adherence to confidentiality may not be conducive when the court is acting in its role as parens patriae in child welfare matters.

Statements made by parents during mediation were not to be relied upon due to confidentiality, but natural responses from the child to the counsellor were deemed valuable for the court to determine the best interest of the child.

Rule 8(viii) of the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1992, was considered an exception to the norms of confidentiality, allowing reports of the counsellor on the home environment, personalities, and relationships of the parties to assist the court in custody or guardianship issues.

The court concluded that the High Court's exercise of review jurisdiction was not correct, as it acted as if sitting in appeal. The judgment under appeal was restored, setting aside the subsequent judgment.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that to justify the exercise of review jurisdiction, the error must be self-evident. The High Court erred in entertaining the review petition and setting aside the earlier view. The confidentiality aspect in custody and guardianship issues was clarified, upholding the importance of reports by the counsellor in such matters.

Facts:

Rajiv Vijayasarathy Ratnam (son of the appellants) and Savitha Seetharam (daughter of the first respondent) married in 2002.

Money dispute arose due to a car accident involving Savitha in 2010.

Allegations of Rs 20 lakhs being transferred to the first respondent's account due to fear of property attachment.

Various legal proceedings ensued, including a civil suit by Rajiv for money recovery.

The first respondent filed a private complaint in 2016, alleging criminal breach of trust and cheating.

Issues:

Whether the allegations in the complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for the offenses under the Penal Code.

Whether the criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.

Held:

The primary question is whether the High Court erred in rejecting the plea to quash the criminal proceedings.

The court must examine whether the averments in the complaint constitute the necessary ingredients for the alleged offenses under the Penal Code.

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the High Court to quash proceedings to secure the ends of justice.

A complaint can be quashed if, even when taken at face value, it does not prima facie constitute any offense or make out the case against the accused.

Quashing should not be used to stifle legitimate prosecution, and the power must be used sparingly and with caution.

The complaint must contain the basic facts necessary for making out an offense under the Penal Code.

Examining the ingredients of criminal breach of trust (Section 405), cheating (Section 415), and cheating inducing delivery of property (Section 420).

Entrustment is essential for Section 405; the complaint does not show entrustment of property to the appellants.

Dishonest inducement is essential for Section 415; the complaint does not show dishonest inducement by the appellants.

Cheating is an essential ingredient for Section 420; the necessary ingredients are not made out from the face of the complaint.

Referring to precedent (Binod Kumar v State of Bihar), the court emphasizes that the basic essential ingredients of dishonest misappropriation and cheating are missing in the present case.

The suit for recovery of money was filed before the criminal complaint, and the latter was filed after a significant delay.

The court concludes that the complaint constitutes an abuse of the process of the court, attempting to cloak a civil dispute with a criminal nature.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the criminal proceedings are quashed.

Clarification that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the pending civil suit for the recovery of money.

Facts:

Lt. Colonel Dharamvir Singh, an officer in the Indian Army, was posted to various locations.

Allegations of breaches of discipline, violations of the Arms Act 1959, and security lapses were made against him.

The respondent filed a Writ Petition challenging the attachment order issued by the Additional Directorate General, Discipline and Vigilance, Adjutant General's Branch, Integrated HQ of the Ministry of Defence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition.

Whether the High Court's intervention preempted the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Army.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising jurisdiction in a matter concerning the disciplinary actions of the Army. The respondent was subject to the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, and the High Court's interference was deemed inappropriate and detrimental to maintaining discipline in the Armed Forces. The Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and dismissed the Writ Petition.( Paragraphs 11-15)

Facts:

The case revolves around the exclusion of 'Services' under Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule from the legislative and executive domain of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD). The challenge pertains to a notification dated May 21, 2015, which addresses the Union Territory cadre, including Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service Personnel. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) is also contested, specifically its limitation to investigate offenses committed by employees of the GNCTD.

Issues:

Validity of the exclusion of 'Services' from the legislative and executive domain of the NCTD.

Legality of restricting ACB's jurisdiction to investigate offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held:

Per A.K. Sikri, J.:

The Court acknowledges the doubtfulness in categorizing All India Services and DANICS Services as State Public Services under Entry 41 of List II. A mechanism is proposed to avoid conflicts, suggesting that transfers and postings of higher officials be handled by the LG, while a Civil Services Board decides on lower-level officers. Similar Boards are recommended for DANICS officers.( Para 1-1.4)

The exclusion of ACB's jurisdiction to investigate offenses of Central Government employees is upheld, emphasizing the broad interpretation of legislative entries. The Court concludes that the impugned notifications restricting ACB's jurisdiction are valid and prevent jurisdictional conflicts. (Para 2)

The Court underscores that Entries 1, 2, and 18 of List II are excluded from the jurisdiction of GNCTD, and control over 'public order' rests with the Central Government. This exclusion is justified to avoid confusion or overlap in controlling and coordinating crucial aspects related to the nation's capital.( Para 3)

The Court asserts that the Notifications dated November 08, 1993, and subsequent modifications are valid, restricting ACB's jurisdiction to investigate Central Government employees and preventing dual investigation.( Para 4)

Per Ashok Bhushan, J. (Partly Dissenting):

The judgment asserts that Entry 41 of List II is not available to the Legislative Assembly of GNCTD, leading to the conclusion that the GNCTD cannot exercise executive power over 'Services.' The decision emphasizes the need for executive powers to be exercised under laws framed by Parliament or delegated powers.( Para 1-5)

The Court affirms the LG's role in issues related to 'Services' under Art.239AA(4) and stresses that the GNCTD can exercise executive powers delegated to it. It argues that the LG, as per Art.239AA(4), shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.( Para 6)

The Court discusses the power to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor under s.24, Cr.P.C., and concludes that in respect of Entries 1 and 2 of List III, the GNCTD has legislative competence under Art.239AA.( Para 7)

Facts:

The appellant was declared a foreigner by a Foreigners' Tribunal, citing discrepancies in the name of his grandfather and the father residing in different villages. The High Court upheld this decision, emphasizing the petitioner's failure to adequately disclose material facts related to his citizenship in the written statement.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's declaration as a foreigner was erroneous. The contention focused on the adequacy of the information provided in the written statement and the reliability of the documents presented.

Held:

Upon thorough examination of documents, the Court noted discrepancies in the spelling of the grandfather's name but emphasized the consistency in the father's name. The Court found it untenable to dispute the identity of Kematullah despite variations in spelling. The appellant successfully established familial identities through various documents.( Para 3)

The Court rejected doubts arising from the father's change of residence to another village, deeming it insufficient to question the established identities. The judgment of the High Court and the Foreigners' Tribunal were set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 4)

Consequently, the appellant was ordered to be released immediately.( Para 5)

FACTS:

The appellant was convicted for offenses under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Judicial Magistrate awarded specific sentences, but the appellant challenged the order, primarily contesting the lack of specification on whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.

ISSUES:

The absence of clarity in the Magistrate's order regarding the concurrent or consecutive nature of the sentences imposed under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC.

HELD:

The appellant argued that the Judicial Magistrate erred in not specifying whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively, citing Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Court acknowledged the mandatory requirement under Section 31 and found that the Magistrate indeed erred in not ensuring compliance.

The Court held that in a case where an accused is convicted for multiple offenses in a trial, it is necessary for the Magistrate to specify, under Section 31, whether the sentences for each offense would run concurrently or consecutively.

Recognizing the oversight, the Court modified the order of the Magistrate and directed that the sentences awarded for both Section 279 and Section 304-A IPC would run concurrently.

The Court affirmed the finding of conviction and sentence under both sections, emphasizing that three Courts had previously found the prosecution's case against the appellant valid.

Facts:

Respondent No.1, a limited company, closed its cement factory in Gujarat, leading to a dispute with the appellant Union over unpaid wages.

The Labour Court in Gujarat ruled in favor of the Union, issuing a recovery order.

Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in Calcutta, where Respondent No.1's registered office is located, ordered the sale of properties for an unpaid loan by Respondent No.1.

Issues:

Whether the Gujarat High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Special Civil Application (SCA) filed by the appellant.

Held:

The Single Judge held that Gujarat High Court has territorial jurisdiction.

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, stating that no part of the cause of action arose in Gujarat.

The Supreme Court held that Article 226(2) empowers a High Court to entertain a petition if the cause of action arises wholly or in part within its territorial jurisdiction.

The cause of action partially arose in Gujarat, considering the location of the cement factory, the Labour Court's involvement, and the claim regarding outstanding wages.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Division Bench's order, and restoring the Single Judge's decision that the SCA is maintainable in the Gujarat High Court. The case is remanded to the Single Judge for further proceedings.