Facts:

The respondent company, M/S Linde India Ltd., was engaged in manufacturing and trading industrial gases, including Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP. The issue was whether these substances should be taxed under Entry 88, Schedule IV of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, or as 'unclassified goods' under Schedule V.

Issues:

• Whether Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP should be classified as taxable goods under Entry 88, Schedule IV, or as 'unclassified goods' under Schedule V of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Held:

The court analyzed Schedule IV, which prescribed a uniform tax rate for listed goods, and found that Entry 88 included drugs and medicines defined in Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Any drug or medicine falling within the ambit of the relevant clauses of Section 3(b) would fall under Schedule IV. It was also noted that the Indian Pharmacopoeia classified Medical Oxygen IP as a drug, lending support to its classification as per Section 3(b)(i) of the 1940 Act. Additionally, the Drug (Prices Control) Order 2013 included Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide as medicines used in anesthesia, supporting their use for treatment under the 1940 Act.

The court held that Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP were medicines used for diagnosis, treatment, mitigation, or prevention of diseases or disorders in humans, as per Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Therefore, they fell within the ambit of Entry 88 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005. The High Court's judgment upholding this classification was affirmed.

FACTS:

The appellant, P. Gopinathan Pillai, was appointed as Project Officer in the Centre for Adult Continuing Education and Extension (CACEE).

He claimed that he should be allowed to continue in his position until the age of 60, contending that he qualified as a "Teacher of the University" under the Kerala University Act, 1974.

The appellant's argument was based on the fact that he was employed as the Assistant Director in CACEE and therefore considered a "Teacher."

ISSUES:

• Whether the appellant's position as Assistant Director in CACEE meets the criteria for being classified as a "Teacher" within the Kerala University Act, 1974, and if he is entitled to continue in service until the age of 60.

HELD:

The court considered the appellant's arguments and cited a previous judgment where a Director of a center was considered a "Teacher" under specific circumstances. However, the court found that the present case was distinguishable because the appellant's initial appointment was on an administrative post and not a teaching role in a university department or affiliated college.

The court emphasized that CACEE was not a statutory university department and was not affiliated with the University of Kerala.

The court stated that the appellant had not been appointed as a Teacher within the University and did not meet the statutory criteria for being classified as a "Teacher of the University."

The court dismissed the appellant's claim, noting that he did not fall within the definitions of "Teacher" or "Teacher of the University" as per the relevant provisions of the Kerala University Act.

The court also addressed certificates indicating teaching roles but held that they did not alter the appellant's status under the applicable laws.

The court upheld the decision of the Kerala High Court, which had dismissed the appellant's writ petition, and concluded that the appellant was not entitled to continue in service until the age of 60 as a "Teacher" or "Teacher of the University."

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the selection process for the post of Physical Training Instructor (PTI) conducted by the Haryana Staff Selection Commission. The selection process included multiple criteria and stages, which were altered arbitrarily by the Chairman of the Commission. Candidates participated in the selection process without knowledge of changing criteria.

Issues:

• The applicability of the principle of estoppel in challenging selection criteria.
• The authority of the Commission to devise the mode of selection and fix criteria.
• The legitimacy of arbitrary changes to the selection process.
• The role of the Chairman in making decisions on the selection process.
• The distinction between "malice in fact" and "malice in law."
• The direction of the High Court for a fresh selection process.

Held:

The court ruled that candidates who participated in the selection process without knowing the changing criteria have the right to challenge the process. (Para 37-39)

The Commission was empowered to devise the mode of selection and fix criteria. Changes in criteria cannot be made arbitrarily, especially if they downgrade the selection standards. (Para 44-48)

The Commission, being a multi-member body, should collectively make decisions regarding selection criteria. Arbitrary changes made by the Chairman alone were not valid decisions of the Commission. (Para 51-54)

The court differentiated between "malice in fact" and "malice in law." In this case, allegations of malice-in-law were more relevant. (Para 61-62)

The High Court's direction for a fresh selection process was modified. The selection should continue based on the original criteria from the stage when the Chairman arbitrarily changed the criteria. All candidates who applied, including those selected, should participate. (Para 72-73)

Mangat Ram had four sons, and his family tree branched into different lineages. The appellant, Bhagwat Sharan, claimed to be the grandson of Umrao Lal, one of the sons. The case revolved around the joint family's property, including houses and agricultural land. The appellant argued that the properties were part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), while the respondents contested this claim.

Issues:

• Whether the properties mentioned were joint family properties or self-acquired properties.
• Whether the plaintiff's acceptance of a will in a previous suit estops him from challenging the validity of the will.
• Whether the agricultural lands were part of the HUF property.

Held:
The burden lies on the person alleging the existence of an HUF to prove the same. The mere fact that separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly for business does not imply joint family status. Proof of joint property does not lead to the presumption that the property is joint family property; the burden of proof lies with the claimant.

Admission is not conclusive evidence and can be challenged if not acted upon to one's detriment. The plaintiff's acceptance of benefits under a will precludes him from challenging the validity of the same will later.

As for agricultural land, the plaintiff failed to prove that they were receiving proceeds from its income, and various transfers of the land were not challenged in time.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The assessment proceedings for NDTV involved allegations of creating a network of shell companies to transfer untaxed income abroad and then back to India, thus avoiding taxation. The revenue relied on complaints made by minority shareholders suggesting such misconduct.

Issues:

• Whether there were sufficient reasons to believe that NDTV's undisclosed income escaped assessment.
• Whether NDTV made a full and true disclosure of relevant material facts.
• Whether the second proviso to Section 147 was applicable in this case.

Held:

Issue 1 - Invocation of Powers under Section 147: The Court held that information discovered during proceedings for subsequent assessment years could form tangible material to invoke powers under Section 147. At the notice issuance stage, the assessing officer only requires a prima facie view. The material disclosed for subsequent years sufficed to establish such a view. Thus, there were grounds to believe that income escaped assessment (Paragraph 23).

Issue 2 - Disclosure of Material Facts: The Court determined that NDTV fully and truly disclosed all necessary material facts for assessment. The assessing officer had knowledge of all entities, transactions, and relevant details. Therefore, NDTV did not withhold material information from the revenue (Paragraphs 26, 28, 29).

Issue 3 - Applicability of Second Proviso to Section 147: The Court found the notice silent about the second proviso to Section 147, which relates to the extended 16-year period. Mention of the second proviso was introduced only when rejecting objections. The Court ruled that the revenue couldn't surprise NDTV by invoking the second proviso at a later stage, thereby disallowing its benefit (Paragraphs 38, 43,).

Accordingly the appeal allowed.

Facts:

The respondent, an employee of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), served in the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) during a certain period. He claimed deputation allowance and special allowance for his service in the NDRF. The question was whether personnel from various Central Para Military Forces, including the respondent, were on deputation during their service in the NDRF.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent and similarly situated personnel were on deputation during their service with the NDRF.
• Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting relief with nationwide implications.

Held:

The Court analyzed the concept of deputation, emphasizing that it involves the temporary assignment of an employee from one department to another in the public interest. Until September 11, 2009, the respondent remained under the administrative control of the CISF and received pay from them, indicating he was not on deputation. However, from September 11, 2009, when control shifted to the NDRF and pay started coming from it, the personnel were deemed to be on deputation.

The Court criticized the High Court for overstepping its jurisdiction in granting nationwide relief. High Courts have jurisdiction only over their respective states, unlike the Supreme Court which has pan-India jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed payment of deputation allowance to the respondent from September 11, 2009, to October 7, 2011.The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a situation where the Governor was intimated about the resignations of certain Members belonging to a political party. The Chief Minister advised the Governor for the removal of some ministers, and notices of disqualification were issued. Subsequently, the Speaker accepted resignations of some ministers. The Chief Minister requested a floor test to resolve the situation. However, no floor test was conducted, and the Legislative Assembly was adjourned.

Issues:

• Whether the Governor's exercise of power to convene a floor test was constitutionally proper
• Whether the convening of a trust vote can be deferred until the Speaker decides on issues of resignation and disqualification.

Held:

The Governor's role is to ensure the stability and accountability of the government to the legislative assembly. The Governor's discretionary powers should maintain a balance of power between the executive and the legislature. [Para 32, 37]

The concept of legislative assembly's control over the government is crucial in a parliamentary democracy. The Governor's power to call a trust vote is not meant to displace elected governments but to intervene cautiously when circumstances suggest a loss of majority. Judicial review is applicable to the Governor's decision. [Para 39, 43, 44]

The Governor's power to call for a floor test should be exercised to ensure that the legislative assembly's authority to determine confidence in the government is upheld. No reason exists for the Governor to delay the ordinary legislative process of a no-confidence motion. The Governor is expected to act impartially. [Para 45, 46]

The Governor's exercise of authority to convene a floor test, given the context of the case, was constitutionally proper. The trust vote is essential to ascertain the government's confidence and legitimacy. The Speaker's authority to decide on resignations and disqualifications remains intact. [Para 47, 48, 49]

The Court cannot mandate a trust vote only in the presence of all Members or postpone it until by-elections occur. The decision to attend the proceedings is up to the individual Members. The Court aims to prevent restraint on their rights and liberties. [Para 50, 51, 54, 55, 56]

Facts:

The 1994 EIA notification mandated prior Environmental Clearance (EC) for the setup and expansion of industrial units in specified categories. The circular of 2002 extended the deadline and allowed for ex post facto ECs. The circular was challenged and quashed by the National Green Tribunal (NGT). The industries in question did not seek ECs as required by the EIA notification and operated without complying with the notification.

Issues:

• Does the 2002 circular allowing for ex post facto ECs align with environmental jurisprudence and the principles of the 1994 EIA notification?
• Does the NGT have jurisdiction to strike down the circular?
• Are the industries in question entitled to the exemption provided in Clause 8 of the explanatory note to the EIA notification?

Held:

The concept of ex post facto ECs contradicts environmental jurisprudence and the 1994 EIA notification. Such clearances would be detrimental to the environment, as they would allow industrial activities to proceed without proper assessment of their impact.(Paragraphs 23, 25)

The NGT has the jurisdiction to enquire into the legitimacy of the circular dated 14 May 2002. The circular's purpose contradicts the objectives of the EIA notification, and it is not protected by Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.(Paragraphs 20, 21)

The three industries in question did not seek proper clearances before the commencement or expansion of their operations, as required by the EIA notification. None of these industries are entitled to the exemption under Clause 8 of the explanatory note.(Paragraphs 28-32)

The industries must deposit compensation of 10 crores each for operating without proper ECs. The NGT's directions for revocation of ECs and closure of the units are set aside due to the principle of proportionality.(Paragraphs 36, 38, 39)

Facts:

The case revolved around an organization formed to achieve separate statehood for Tamil Nadu. The appellant and other accused allegedly conspired to bomb the State Government building. The bomb was defused before detonation. The prosecution's case relied on confessions, both from the appellant and co-accused, as well as evidence related to the conspiracy and bomb-making materials.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's confession was obtained voluntarily and adhered to the guidelines set by the court.
• Whether the confession of co-accused is admissible in the absence of a joint trial.

Held:

The court examined the appellant's confession (Ex. P-57) and observed that the requirements for recording confessions under Section 15 of the TADA Act were not followed. The appellant alleged torture and claimed that his statement was not voluntary. The court found discrepancies in the warning given, and the appellant's petitions (Ex. D-1 and D-2) raised doubts. The court held that the confession was not proven to be voluntary and rejected it.

The court considered the admissibility of co-accused confessions (Ex. P-26 and P-27). Since the appellant was absconding and a separate trial was conducted against him, the joint trial requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence Act was not met. The court upheld that for a co-accused confession to be admissible, a joint trial is necessary. Therefore, the co-accused confessions were not admissible against the appellant.

Conclusion : As the appellant's confession was rejected and co-accused confessions were not admissible, the Designated Court's conviction was unsustainable. The appellant was acquitted and his bail bond was canceled.