Facts:

The case emerged due to a conflict between two Constitution Bench judgments, namely Ch. Tika Ramji & Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (1956) SCR 393 and U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others (2004) 5 SCC 430. The issue centered around whether the State of Uttar Pradesh could fix the SAP over and above the minimum price set by the Central Government for sugarcane.

Issues:

• Determining the legality and authority of the State of Uttar Pradesh to fix the SAP for sugarcane.
• Resolving the conflict between the two mentioned Constitution Bench judgments regarding the relationship between the State's SAP and the Central Government's minimum price.

Held:

The court analyzed the legislative history, relevant provisions, and the scope of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, as well as the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the Sugarcane (Control) Orders of 1954 and 1966. The court concluded that the decisions in Ch. Tika Ramji and U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations dealt with different factual matrices and legal provisions. The court determined that the concept of fixing the minimum price by the Central Government versus the SAP by the State Government was not considered in Ch. Tika Ramji. The court endorsed the view taken in U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations that there was no inconsistency or repugnancy in fixing a higher advised price by the State Government alongside the minimum price set by the Central Government. The court held that as long as the State's advised price was higher than the Central Government's minimum price, there was no conflict, and both orders could operate simultaneously.

The court ruled that under Entries 33 and 34 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, both the Central and State Governments had the power to fix sugarcane prices. However, once the Central Government fixed the minimum price, the State Government could not fix a lower minimum price. The court clarified that while the Central Government could fix the minimum price, the State Government was empowered to fix the advised price, which must always be higher than the minimum price.

In determining repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, the court reiterated that it only arises when there is an actual irreconcilable conflict between laws. The court upheld the power of the State Government to fix the SAP under Section 16 of the Act, noting that it was not arbitrary or illegal. It clarified that the State Advised Price was a legitimate regulatory measure to protect the interests of sugarcane growers.

Facts:

The case pertains to the dispute over the use of certain plots of land in the JVPD Scheme, Juhu, Mumbai. The appellant, Anjuman E Shiate Ali, sought to construct on plots initially reserved as open spaces and garden areas. These plots, bearing Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 6, were part of a sub-division of land for construction purposes.

Issues:

• Whether the plots initially designated as open spaces and gardens in the approved layout of 1967 could be used for construction. The contention revolved around the subsequent development plan showing these plots as residential areas.

Held:

The Division Bench analyzed the conflicting arguments. It affirmed that plots reserved as open spaces and gardens in an approved layout cannot be repurposed for construction. The subsequent development plan's residential zoning did not negate the earlier designation. The court emphasized that open spaces designated in the approved layout must be maintained as such, irrespective of later development plans. The Bench dismissed the appellant's claims and upheld the High Court's decision.

Facts:

Various schemes were framed by the Himachal Pradesh government in the years 2001 and 2003 to address vacant posts of teachers in different categories. Appointments were made under these schemes, including The Himachal Pradesh Prathmik Sahayak Adhyapak/Primary Assistant Teacher (PAT) Scheme, The Himachal Pradesh Para Teachers (Lecturer School Cadre), Para Teachers (TGT's), and Para Teachers (C&V) Policy, 2003, and the Himachal Pradesh Gram Vidya Upasak Yojna, 2001.

Issues:

• Whether the appointments made under the various schemes were contrary to the rules and regulations?
• Whether the delay in approaching the court by the appellants affected their claims?
• Whether the appointed teachers who had completed 15 years of service were entitled to regularization under the schemes?

Held:

The court analyzed the various schemes, appointments, and the circumstances surrounding them. The court noted that the appointments were made to fill vacancies in remote and difficult areas where qualified teachers were not readily available. The court observed that the appointments were not challenged at the time of their implementation but were questioned after a significant delay of more than a decade.

The court emphasized that the appointed teachers had acquired professional qualifications during their service and had served for over 15 years. It held that the delay in filing the petitions and the lack of evidence to counter the state's justifications led to the dismissal of the appeals. The court ruled that the appointments were not illegal, and the appointed teachers could not be denied regularization after their substantial service.

Facts:

The Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), Imphal, advertised the vacant post of Director. Various writ petitions were filed challenging the advertisement and raising concerns about eligibility criteria, age limits, and compliance with relevant regulations. The High Court quashed the advertisement on these grounds.

Issues:

• Validity of the amendments to the recruitment rules.
• Compliance with Medical Council of India regulations for eligibility.
• Providing relaxation in upper age limit.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court found that the High Court erred in considering the validity of the recruitment rules, as there was no challenge to these rules in the writ petitions. The Court emphasized that not notifying the amended rules to the public did not invalidate the notification. It clarified that eligibility criteria were within the domain of the employer and that relaxation could not be claimed as a matter of right. The Court also noted that the experience criteria in the advertisement aligned with the Medical Council of India regulations for affiliated teaching hospitals. Consequently, the advertisement was upheld, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

 The appellants challenged a High Court judgment that quashed a Government Resolution and a Gradation List, arguing that the Resolution failed to adequately assess SC/ST representation for granting seniority in promotions.

Issues:

• Whether the Government Resolution dated 20.03.2002 was in line with Article 16(4A) of the Constitution of India and whether SC/ST representation was appropriately evaluated for seniority in promotional posts.

Held:

The Court observed that the State of Orissa had not enacted any legislation or issued an executive order to provide the benefit of promotion with consequential seniority to SC/ST candidates as per Article 16(4A). The Government Resolution dated 20.03.2002, issued without assessing representation, did not meet the requirements. The Court emphasized the need for the State to examine quantifiable data on backwardness and representation before extending seniority benefits.

The Court held that the Orissa Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (For Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975, did not provide for seniority benefits in promotions for SC/ST candidates. Therefore, the Resolution couldn't rely on this Act.

The Court noted that the Gradation List prepared on 16.05.2001, based on the "Catch Up Rule," was correctly done following established principles.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, as the Resolution failed to meet the criteria set out in Article 16(4A), and there was no legislation or executive order extending seniority benefits to SC/ST candidates.

Facts:

The appellant was a permanent Mirashi tenant who had mortgaged the property to the respondent.

After the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 came into effect, the mortgagee obtained a re-grant of the property.

The appellant sought redemption of the mortgaged property, claiming that their right to redeem had not been extinguished by the re-grant.

Issues:

• Whether the right of redemption of the mortgagor was extinguished when the mortgagee obtained a re-grant of the property under the Abolition Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court referred to Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, which imposes an obligation on a mortgagee who gains an advantage through their position to hold such advantage for the benefit of the mortgagor. The Court emphasized the principle "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage," stating that the right of redemption can only be extinguished through contractual agreement, merger, or statutory provision. The Court held that the failure of the mortgagor to obtain re-grant did not extinguish their rights as a tenant, and the mortgagor's right of redemption was protected by the provisions of the Abolition Act and the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.

The Court determined that the re-grant obtained by the mortgagee was traceable to their possession as a possessory mortgagee and that the benefit should accrue to the mortgagor. The Court upheld the High Court's decision and held that the mortgagor's right of redemption was not extinguished by the re-grant obtained by the mortgagee.

Facts:

A surgeon employed by a hospital was traveling in a bus owned by the hospital, which met with a fatal accident due to the negligent driving of the bus driver. The surgeon sustained serious injuries and eventually passed away. The surgeon's wife claimed compensation under the Comprehensive Private Car 'B' Policy from the insurance company. The insurance company denied liability, citing a clause in the policy excluding coverage for accidents arising out of employment by the insured.

Issues:

• Whether the deceased surgeon could be deemed an employee of the hospital at the time of the accident, thus determining the insurance company's liability under the policy.

Held:

The Court began by emphasizing that the intention of the parties should be discerned from the terms of the contract. Analyzing the contract between the surgeon and the hospital, the Court pointed out that the terms indicated the nature of the relationship as a contract for service. Specifically, the contract specified that the surgeon would transition from a regular employee to an independent professional from the contract's commencement date. This distinction highlighted the shift in the nature of services provided.

Furthermore, the Court noted that the contract referred to the surgeon's remuneration as an honorarium, reflecting his status as an independent professional. The Court also highlighted that the contract had a fixed term of three years, extendable by mutual consent, indicating a balanced arrangement.

The Court also considered other factors such as termination clauses, which were different from those applicable to regular employees. The contract explicitly subjected the surgeon to certain rules but not others, reinforcing the independent nature of the relationship. Dispute resolution being directed to the Managing Committee of the Institute further underlined the professional nature of the engagement.

Given these factors, the Court concluded that the contract was between the hospital and an independent professional, rather than a master-servant relationship. Applying the economic reality test, the Court held that the contract was one for service.

Regarding insurance coverage, the Court upheld the High Court's finding that the deceased surgeon, falling outside the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act, was covered under an endorsement (IMT-5) of the policy. This endorsement provided compensation for unnamed passengers, which included the surgeon in this case.

In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's decision and reinstating the tribunal's order. The insurance company was thus held liable to pay compensation based on the interpretation of the contract and insurance policy.

Facts:

The respondent company, M/S Linde India Ltd., was engaged in manufacturing and trading industrial gases, including Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP. The issue was whether these substances should be taxed under Entry 88, Schedule IV of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, or as 'unclassified goods' under Schedule V.

Issues:

• Whether Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP should be classified as taxable goods under Entry 88, Schedule IV, or as 'unclassified goods' under Schedule V of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Held:

The court analyzed Schedule IV, which prescribed a uniform tax rate for listed goods, and found that Entry 88 included drugs and medicines defined in Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Any drug or medicine falling within the ambit of the relevant clauses of Section 3(b) would fall under Schedule IV. It was also noted that the Indian Pharmacopoeia classified Medical Oxygen IP as a drug, lending support to its classification as per Section 3(b)(i) of the 1940 Act. Additionally, the Drug (Prices Control) Order 2013 included Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide as medicines used in anesthesia, supporting their use for treatment under the 1940 Act.

The court held that Medical Oxygen IP and Nitrous Oxide IP were medicines used for diagnosis, treatment, mitigation, or prevention of diseases or disorders in humans, as per Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Therefore, they fell within the ambit of Entry 88 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005. The High Court's judgment upholding this classification was affirmed.

FACTS:

The appellant, P. Gopinathan Pillai, was appointed as Project Officer in the Centre for Adult Continuing Education and Extension (CACEE).

He claimed that he should be allowed to continue in his position until the age of 60, contending that he qualified as a "Teacher of the University" under the Kerala University Act, 1974.

The appellant's argument was based on the fact that he was employed as the Assistant Director in CACEE and therefore considered a "Teacher."

ISSUES:

• Whether the appellant's position as Assistant Director in CACEE meets the criteria for being classified as a "Teacher" within the Kerala University Act, 1974, and if he is entitled to continue in service until the age of 60.

HELD:

The court considered the appellant's arguments and cited a previous judgment where a Director of a center was considered a "Teacher" under specific circumstances. However, the court found that the present case was distinguishable because the appellant's initial appointment was on an administrative post and not a teaching role in a university department or affiliated college.

The court emphasized that CACEE was not a statutory university department and was not affiliated with the University of Kerala.

The court stated that the appellant had not been appointed as a Teacher within the University and did not meet the statutory criteria for being classified as a "Teacher of the University."

The court dismissed the appellant's claim, noting that he did not fall within the definitions of "Teacher" or "Teacher of the University" as per the relevant provisions of the Kerala University Act.

The court also addressed certificates indicating teaching roles but held that they did not alter the appellant's status under the applicable laws.

The court upheld the decision of the Kerala High Court, which had dismissed the appellant's writ petition, and concluded that the appellant was not entitled to continue in service until the age of 60 as a "Teacher" or "Teacher of the University."