Facts:

The Appellants, traders in cotton fabrics and made-ups, supplied raw materials to over 70 job workers. The total clearances amounted to more than Rs. 1.45 crore. Only one job worker exceeded the limit of Rs. 25 lakhs, while the individual clearances of the rest were below this threshold.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants' liability extended to the entire aggregate value of clearances or only to the clearance value of the job worker exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs.

Held:

The Court held that Rule 12B treated the person as an assessee if conditions were met, and the Exemption Notification focused on the aggregate value of clearances. The Circular clarified that once any job worker crossed the exemption limit, duty applied to the aggregate value. The second illustration in the Circular emphasized that the entire clearance value became dutiable when it exceeded the limit. The Court affirmed that it was not the individual clearance of one job worker alone but the aggregate of all clearances by the Appellant that was liable to duty. The appeals were dismissed.

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute governed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, wherein the Adjudicating Officer is tasked with determining the quantum of penalty. The provisions in question are found in s.15-J, Cl. (a), (b), and (c), alongside other related sections (ss.15-A to 15-HA).

ISSUES:

Whether conditions stipulated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are exhaustive or illustrative.

Whether the conditions in Clauses (a) to (c) of s.15-J are mandatory for imposing penalties under ss.15-A to 15-HA.

HELD:

The court holds that the provisions of Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are illustrative and must be considered whenever relevant. However, the Adjudicating Officer is not precluded from considering other circumstances beyond those enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) while determining the penalty.

The court clarifies that the conditions in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are not exhaustive. There may be circumstances beyond these clauses that the Adjudicating Officer can consider while deciding the quantum of penalty, especially in cases not covered by certain provisions like s.15-A, 15-B, or 15-C.

The court further explains that Clause (c) of s.15-J, which mentions the "repetitive nature of default," refers specifically to a recurring or successive default. However, this does not exclude the consideration of a continuing default as a relevant factor, as Clauses (a) to (c) are illustrative and not exhaustive.

The court addresses the argument that the power and discretion vested by s.15-J are eclipsed by penalty provisions in ss.15-A to 15-HA. It emphasizes that these sections must be read harmoniously to avoid inconsistency. The Explanation to s.15-J, added by Amendment Act No.7 of 2017, reinforces the Adjudicating Officer's discretion in determining penalties.

The court delves into the applicability of s.15-J in the context of s.15A(a) between 29th October 2002 and 7th September 2014. It highlights that the legislative intent, clarified by the Explanation to s.15-J, was not to curtail the Adjudicating Officer's discretion during that period.

REFERRED CASES:

Securities and Exchange Board of India through its Chairman vs. Roofit Industries Limited, (2016) 12 SCC 125

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd, (2018) 13 SCC 753

Siddharth Chaturvedi vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2016) 12 SCC 119.

State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 890

Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648

Facts:

The appellants, lecturers/professors in engineering disciplines, challenged the order treating their appointments as temporary. The University contended that its statutes did not apply to teachers in Self Financing Institutions. The Single Judge allowed the petition, but the Division Bench held in favor of the University, asserting that appellants were not University teachers.

Issues:

Whether the appointments were temporary or against substantive posts.

The applicability of University statutes to teachers in Self Financing Institutions.

Entitlement of lecturers to pay revision benefits.

Held:

The appointment orders did not indicate temporary or part-time positions, governed by University statutes, indicating permanency through regular selection.

The benefits extension discrepancy was based on the erroneous claim of temporary appointments. The facts established the substantive nature of appellants' posts, justifying benefit extension.

AICTE's Progress Profile affirmed appellants as permanent faculty, disputing the University's claim of temporary status.

Despite initial rulings against appellants, subsequent contradictory decisions highlighted the inconsistency in the University's stance.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and Special Leave Petitions were segregated based on the clarity in the appointment order.

Facts:

The appellant, Shri Ram Mandir, claimed to be a private temple, managed by successive Gurus in a Guru-shishya tradition. The appellant contested the government's interference in the temple's administration and possession of agricultural lands.

Issues:

Whether Shri Ram Mandir is a private or public temple.

The validity of the government's appointment of a District Collector as the Manager.

The hereditary or Guru-shishya nature of the succession.

The appellant's right to challenge government control after leasing temple lands.

Held:

Recognition of Shri Ram Mandir as a Public Temple The onus of proving private temple status lies with the appellant. Lack of pleadings on the temple's construction and public participation in worship led to the conclusion that Shri Ram Mandir is a public temple.( Para 12)

Importance of Public Participation Public participation is a crucial factor in determining a temple's character. The entry of Shri Ram Mandir in the list of public temples supports its public nature.( Para 14)

Succession by Guru-shishya Relationship The absence of blood relation between successive pujaris indicates a departure from hereditary succession, supporting the finding that Shri Ram Mandir is a public temple.( Para 16)

Government Appointment of Pujari and Estoppel The appellant's acceptance of temple lands on lease from the government estops them from denying government control. Appointment of pujaris by the government further strengthens this position.( Para 18)

Inam Rights and Ownership of Temple Lands Documents demonstrate Inam rights granted to Shri Ram Mandir, refuting the appellant's claim of individual ownership. The appellant's lease of temple lands from the government reinforces government control.( Para 20)

Dismissal of Appeal Concluding that Shri Ram Mandir is a public temple, the appeal is dismissed.( Para 26)

Facts:

The appeal arises from income tax proceedings initiated after a search operation.

The Tribunal favored the respondent, leading to the Revenue's appeal to the High Court.

Issues:

High Court's failure to frame substantial questions of law.

Lack of discussion on why the ITAT's order is not illegal.

Held:

After hearing both parties, the court allows the appeal, remanding the case to the High Court for a fresh decision.( Para 7)

High Court failed to discuss and assign reasons for dismissing the appeal.( Para 8)

High Court erred in not framing substantial questions of law despite hearing both parties.( Para 11)

Emphasizes the need for the High Court to frame questions and provide reasons under Section 260A(4) and (5) of the Act.( Para 16)

The court sets aside the impugned order and remands the case to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing that the court hasn't expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.( Para 20)

Facts:

The dispute arising from the interpretation of Section 24(1)(b) and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, relating to compensation and lapsing of land acquisition, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the proviso in Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2).

Held:

The court establishes that Section 24(1) deals with compensation, while Section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of land acquisition. The proviso, accordingly, pertains to Section 24(1)(b) and not Section 24(2) [Para 9].

The court highlights the scheme of Section 24(1), emphasizing enhanced compensation even in cases under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso acts as an exception to Section 24(1)(b) in cases where compensation for a majority of land holdings has not been deposited, allowing the application of more favorable provisions of the 2013 Act [Para 10].

Reading the proviso as applicable to Section 24(2) would lead to anomalies, arbitrary results, and potential violation of Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 11, 12, 13].

The language of the proviso makes it clear that it does not refer to the award under Section 24(2). Reading it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) ensures compatibility with awards made under Section 11, irrespective of the timeline [Para 14].

Emphasizing the beneficial nature of the 2013 Act, the court advocates a construction that furthers its purpose. The preferred view is the one aligned with the legislation's objectives [Para 15].

Due to the referral of the Indore Development Authority case to a Bench of five Judges, the present judgment is also referred to the same Bench for further consideration [Para 17].

Facts:

The case involved a prosecution under sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act concerning the export of antiquities. The appellant, Sharad Gandhi, challenged the prosecution, invoking the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.

Issues:

The compatibility of the Customs Act with the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, especially regarding the prohibition on the export of antiquities. The interpretation of Section 30 of the Antiquities Act and the applicability of the Customs Act were central to the case.

Held:

The principles of ejusdem generis were applied to interpret the relationship between the Customs Act and the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act. The court emphasized the need to consider legislative intent and purposive interpretation to understand the coexistence of both laws (Para 17).

Section 30 of the Antiquities Act was analyzed, and the court concluded that the words "any other law for the time being in force" should be construed ejusdem generis with the specific laws mentioned in the section (Paras 27, 28).

Legislative intent behind Section 30 was to allow the application of other laws dealing with antiquities to continue after the passing of the Antiquities Act, but the Customs Act was not included in the scope (Para 38).

Section 4 of the Antiquities Act already provided for the applicability of the Customs Act with certain qualifications, ensuring its application except where inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Para 40).

The court examined whether prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act was permitted under Section 4 of the Antiquities Act. It clarified that such prosecution was permissible as long as the ingredients of the offenses were satisfied (Para 42).

The court addressed the distinction between the offenses under Section 25 of the Antiquities Act and Section 132 of the Customs Act. It emphasized that the ingredients of these offenses were distinct and different (Para 42).

The court rejected the argument that prosecution under Section 132 would violate Section 25 or Section 26 of the Antiquities Act, highlighting the different elements of the offenses (Para 67).

The prosecution's case involved the interception of a wooden box declared as 'Stone Figure Handicrafts,' later identified as an antiquity. The charges under Section 135(1)(a) were based on fraudulent evasion of export prohibition (Paras 69, 71).

Section 135(1)(a) was analyzed in the context of the Antiquities Act and the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act 1992. The court clarified the distinct elements of this offense compared to Section 25 of the Antiquities Act (Para 76).

The court considered the mandate of Section 4 of the Antiquities Act and its impact on the prosecution under Section 135(1)(a). It concluded that such prosecution was consistent with Section 25 read with Section 26 of the Antiquities Act (Para 77).

Section 24 of the Antiquities Act, dealing with the power to decide the status of an article as an antiquity, was highlighted. The court emphasized the role of the Director General of Archaeological Survey of India in making such determinations (Para 78).

The concept of 'inconsistency' as found in Article 254 of the Constitution was briefly discussed, though acknowledging its limited applicability to the case (Para 80).

The court recognized the Antiquities Act as a comprehensive law but highlighted its non-exhaustive nature. It emphasized the legislative intention allowing multiple offenses arising from the same set of facts (Para 83).

The court concluded that full play was given to the Customs Act, ensuring its application where not inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Paras 84, 85).

Facts:

Civil Suit No. RBT 1251/95/92 filed by the first respondent-plaintiff for a declaration as a joint owner of a specific share in the suit scheduled land.

Allegation that a fictitious gift deed was executed by the appellant, playing fraud on Smt. Vidya Devi, the original owner.

Contention by the appellant that the gift deed was valid, executed with free will and consent, and not in violation of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the evidence did not support the fraud allegation and the gift deed was valid.

First Appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court's findings.

High Court reversed the judgments, primarily based on the consideration mentioned in the gift deed.

Issues:

Validity of a registered gift deed.

Interpretation of the consideration mentioned in the gift deed.

Whether the High Court exceeded its authority in re-evaluating evidence.

Held:

The appellant argued that the Rs. 5,000 mentioned in the gift deed was for valuation purposes and not consideration for the gift, a point accepted by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

High Court misconstrued the document, wrongly holding that the gift was evidenced by a consideration of Rs. 5,000.

The judgment of the High Court set aside, emphasizing that the mentioning of Rs. 5,000 was for valuation, not consideration for the gift.

Lack of evidence to substantiate the claim that the gift deed was not executed with free will and consent.

High Court erred in re-evaluating evidence, and findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court upheld.

FACTS:

The dispute revolves around a Purchase Order dated 01.10.2008, where Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) was to provide last mile connectivity within two months. The Appellant failed to provide the required connectivity by the stipulated time, leading to the termination of the contract by the Respondent.

ISSUES:

Did the Appellant have justified reasons for not providing last-mile connectivity?

What compensation is the Respondent entitled to for the breach of contract?

HELD:

The petitioner (Appellant) failed to provide last-mile connectivity within the stipulated time. The defense of lack of access and permission was deemed weak. The Tribunal found the petitioner's case unacceptable and ruled in favor of the Respondent.( Para 25)

Considering the delay and failure on the part of the petitioner, the Tribunal explored the possibility of reducing the claimed amount based on the actual cost of providing last-mile connectivity. However, lacking reliable materials for cost assessment, the Tribunal invoked clause 16.2(b) of the Agreement, limiting liquidated damages to a maximum of 12%.( Para 26)

The Tribunal allowed the claim in part. The principal amount to be refunded or paid back to the petitioner was determined as Rs. 84,74,087/-. Interest at the rate of 9% from the due date until the judgment date was also directed.( Para 28)

REFERRED CASES:

Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 793

Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA, (2015) 4 SCC 136

Kanhayalal Bisandayal Bhiwapurkar (Dr.) v. Indarchandji Hamirmalji Sisodia, AIR 1947 Nag 84

Moselle Solomon v. Martin & Co., ILR (1935) 62 Cal 612

Mulamchand v. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 214

Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. v. Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd., (2017) 5 SCC 86